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Abstract 
 
This study is concerned with the spiritual impetus and the lived dimension of 
the philosophy of the French Thomist Jacques Maritain in light of John 
Caputo’s Heideggerian critique of Thomist metaphysics. In Heidegger and 
Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, Caputo argues that the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas, probably the most important and most 
representative figure of orthodox Catholic thinking, is a paradigmatic case of 
what Martin Heidegger calls ‘ontotheology’. This is the dominating tendency of 
Western philosophy and theology to view Being not as a mystery, but 
metaphysically as a mere collection of things which are simply present—
external to the human being and the value of which is use. For Aquinas, 
according to Caputo, God is the highest ‘being’ that creates other ‘beings’, and 
it is in virtue of this relationship that human beings, allegedly made in God’s 
image, view the world simply as a collection of things to be manipulated. The 
first question constituting this study’s point of departure, then, is: if Aquinas is 
indeed an exemplar of ontotheological thinking, is the same true of Jacques 
Maritain, perhaps the twentieth century’s most influential follower and 
interpreter of Thomas Aquinas? 
 Yet in the same work Caputo also proclaims that what has been said is 
not the whole truth about Aquinas, and the argument that his thought is an 
instance of ontotheology is in fact what Caputo sets out to respond to—for the 
sake of recovering an Aquinas who was not a ‘cold rationalist’, but a spiritually 
gifted contemplative, a Catholic saint. Caputo makes the case that we can, by 
employing a method of ‘retrieval’ or ‘deconstruction’—inspired by Heidegger 
and Jacques Derrida—find that which is hidden or left ‘unthought’ in Aquinas 
but which nevertheless determines his entire philosophical and religious life. 
This, Caputo argues, is a pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency directed 
towards the mystery of being, which overcomes metaphysics and escapes 
ontotheology. Here I apply this Heideggerian critique and retrieval to Maritain, 
and I argue that while there is in Maritain the same ‘ontotheological’ tendency 
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to view reality as a collection of things and God as paradigmatic maker of 
things—the prima causa so richly expressed in Thomistic doctrines of the 
‘transcendentals’ and participative being—there is in him a deep pre-
metaphysical, mystical tendency which is, in fact, far more explicit than in 
Aquinas. 
 In the first part of the study, I compare the philosophical doctrines and 
projects of Maritain and his first teacher and guide, Henri Bergson, and then of 
Heidegger in relation to Maritain. I also give a sketch of Maritain’s religious and 
intellectual development, identifying the key religious and artistic figures 
involved: the novelist Léon Bloy and the painter Georges Rouault. In light of 
the philosophical analyses and what can be gleaned from Maritain’s 
biographical notes, his correspondence, and the biographical insights provided 
by those close to him, I argue that we can see in Maritain the same concern 
for the question of the meaning of being in relation to human life that we find 
in Heidegger, and that, like Heidegger, this concern underlies his philosophical 
thought and serves as the impetus for something beyond philosophy. I show 
that from his Bergsonian beginnings to his later days as a Little Brother of 
Jesus, Maritain has a profound sense of the pre-conceptual and intuitive kinds 
of knowledge that we find in existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, and also 
artists and mystics. I posit that while Maritain claims what he calls the ‘intuition 
of being’ is the most primordial experience human beings can have of ultimate 
reality, there is, in fact, an experience, or aspiration to have such an 
experience, which is even more basic, with greater implications for overcoming 
metaphysics and ontotheology: mystical communion with ultimate reality. The 
aspiration for such communion is, I claim, the ‘unthought’ in Maritain that must 
be sought out for the purpose of retrieving a Maritain who goes beyond 
metaphysics. 
 Mapping out the main branches of Maritain’s thinking about being in 
terms of the classical doctrine of the ‘transcendentals’ and corresponding 
instances of connatural knowledge, the second part of the study is devoted to 
finding where, in Maritain’s thought, a retrieval might be possible. Examining 
Maritain’s conceptions of the connatural experience-knowledge of the moral 
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good and mystical experience, I conclude that we cannot discover any 
overcoming of metaphysics and ontotheology in either when they are taken on 
their own terms. For underlying both conceptions, I claim, is Maritain’s ‘master 
concept’ of the ‘act of existence’, or esse, the metaphysical principle which 
makes it possible for the human being to take hold of their own existence and 
participate in the moral and divine life. The distinction between esse and the 
essence of beings (essentia) and a stress on the former, as Caputo argues 
with regard to Aquinas, in fact only supports Heidegger’s thesis on the 
ontotheological character of Thomist thought. For a stress on esse, the 
principle by which God creates and sustains things in existence is only the 
outcome of a preoccupation with conceiving God primarily as the ‘maker’ of 
things. And what of esse when it comes to mystical experience? Mystical 
experience, Maritain says, is that of which metaphysical wisdom ‘awakens a 
desire’ even while it is unable to attain it, such that the testimony of it, such as 
that provided by St. John of the Cross, ‘no philosophical commentary will ever 
efface’. Yet here, too, esse only serves to make an unbridgeable ontological 
and cognitive divide between God as viewed in terms of His causal 
transcendence and as an intentional object of consciousness, as presence—
something or someone external to oneself. This is so even as one is, in virtue 
of the connatural experience-knowledge of love, united with Him in ‘one spirit’, 
as Maritain says, following St. John of the Cross. 
 Given this, I seek a retrieval of Maritain elsewhere, in the richest and 
most original areas of his thought: the connatural experience-knowledge of the 
artist and the relationship between the artist and the mystic. For Maritain, true 
artists and mystics are not concerned with reducing reality to manageable 
chunks but with expressing the mystery of reality, and, as I demonstrate in the 
final two chapters, it is when the vocations of the Catholic artist and the 
Catholic mystic converge in Maritain’s reflections—in the cases of Léon Bloy, 
St. John of the Cross, and Maritain’s wife Raïssa—that we are able to retrieve 
a Maritain that, while very much remaining a Catholic philosopher, is also a 
mystic. I claim that it is when his thought is situated in its wider existential and 
religious context that Maritain as both thinker and contemplative escapes the 
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charge of ontotheology because there exists in him a primordial and utterly 
determining mystical aspiration to experience a communion in love with 
ultimate reality, best expressed in terms of poetic and mystical language, 
rather than the metaphysical language of Thomist philosophy. Essential in 
demonstrating this are events in Maritain’s life as well as people—artists and 
mystics—who reveal the mystery of Being to him. Toward the end of the study, 
I claim that this immanent mysticism in Maritain—which, unlike that of Caputo’s 
retrieved Aquinas—balances apophatic and cataphatic elements and, as such, 
is complex and profound enough to render the categories of contemporary 


















  ix  
Lay Summary 
 
The boundary between philosophy and mysticism blurs as soon as we speak 
of the meaning and mystery of reality, and how we ought to live when such 
mystery pervading all things begins to occupy an important role in human 
thought. Where exactly a thinker lies on this most opaque of boundaries 
defines what the thinker values the most in his or her life and the trajectory of 
their intellectual project as reflective of such philosophical and spiritual 
convictions. This study is concerned with the question of the relationship 
between the philosophical and the mystical in the life and writings of Jacques 
Maritain, a French Catholic philosopher and perhaps the twentieth century’s 
most influential follower of the most representative thinker of Catholic thinking, 
its ‘Common Doctor’, St. Thomas Aquinas. I take as my point of departure John 
Caputo’s argument in his book Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on 
Overcoming Metaphysics that Aquinas’ thinking is an instance of what 
Heidegger calls ‘ontotheology’: thinking characterized not by a contemplative 
or mystical appreciation of the mystery of reality, but rather by the dominating 
conception of reality as a collection of things to be manipulated. Such an 
attitude has prevailed in the West for centuries, argues Caputo, partly because 
Aquinas (and his followers) view God as the archetypal ‘maker’ of the world, 
whom we emulate in our technological mastery over nature. 
 Might the same be said for Maritain? In the same work, Caputo sets out 
to ‘retrieve’ an Aquinas quite different from the Aquinas just described. The 
Aquinas which Caputo feels is truer to the historical person is not a calculative 
rationalist, with no sense of the mystery of the universe or of God, but is rather 
a deeply humble and contemplative soul, befitting the title of ‘saint’. To retrieve 
or rediscover this more genuine Aquinas, Caputo seeks to situate Aquinas in 
his wider context and vocation as a medieval Dominican friar of deep religious 
piety before a philosopher-theologian. A key event in Aquinas’ life that Caputo 
draws on is Aquinas’ alleged mystical experience in which he had a vision of 
God, and after which he said all of his writings were only worth ‘straw’. In this 
  x  
study, I apply Caputo’s method to the case of Maritain and argue that while 
there is the same ‘ontotheological’ tendency to view reality as a collection of 
things and God as paradigmatic maker of things, there is in Maritain a deep 
pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency which is in fact far more explicit than in 
Aquinas. By exploring Maritain’s philosophical relationship with Heidegger and 
the philosophical, religious and artistic influences in his life, such as Henri 
Bergson, the novelist Léon Bloy, Georges Rouault, and the Counter-
Reformation mystic St. John of the Cross, I make the case that Maritain has a 
profound sense of the pre-conceptual and intuitive kinds of knowledge that we 
find in artists and mystics, who are not concerned with reducing reality but with 
expressing the mystery of reality. It is when the vocations of the Catholic artist 
and the Catholic mystic converge in Maritain’s reflections that we are able to 
retrieve a Maritain that, while very much remaining a Catholic philosopher, is 
also a mystic who escapes the charge of ontotheology. This, as I say in the 
final two chapters, is because Maritain expresses his most profound 
statements about mystical experience of God not in the metaphysical language 
of philosophers, but in language that is at once poetic and mystical—largely 
shaped by the most influential figures in his life and thought, who reveal the 
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Introduction: The Meaning of Being  




1. Developmental Background  
of the Study 
Jacques Maritain, was a major representative of the ‘Existential’ school of the 
twentieth century’s Thomist revival that followed Pope Leo XIII’s call for the 
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas to be taken up and revitalized in Catholic 
centers of learning. Existential Thomists like Maritain, and also Étienne Gilson, 
were distinguished from earlier ‘Aristotelian’ Thomists by their insistence that 
the dynamic principle or ‘act’ of existence of any given being is more 
ontologically basic than the principles of form and prime matter that make up 
its substance.1 Maritain’s philosophical project was also in sharp contrast to 
‘Transcendental’ Thomists of the revival such as Joseph Maréchal, Bernard 
Lonergan, and Karl Rahner, who sought to employ the insights of Kantian or 
modern transcendental philosophy and situate the source of knowledge in the 
knower. Maritain was deeply distrustful of and rejected much of modern 
philosophy, conceived in the wake of the ‘epistemological’ and ‘subjective’ and 
turns, beginning in earnest, for him, with Descartes.2 
 One exception to Maritain’s opposition, however, was the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson. Bergson’s thought was neither of Cartesian origin 
nor (at least explicitly) Christian, and when I first began delineating the topic 
and identifying the themes of my doctoral research, the crucial role of intuition 
in many modes of knowing was, I learned, both Bergson’s major philosophical 
contribution and a point on which many twentieth-century philosophers 
                                                 
1 John. F. X. Knasas, Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York, NY: Fordham 
University Press, 2003), pp. 14–17. 
2 Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p. 
vii, 24. 
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working within the Cartesian tradition—namely, phenomenologists—agreed 
upon. Consequently, I had in mind a comparison between the Maritain and 
major phenomenologists of the twentieth century on the subject of the 
epistemological relevance and modalities of intuition.  
 In my reading of Maritain, I found that the most significant concept 
pertaining to intuition in his work was that of ‘connaturality’—a concept, as we 
shall see, that Maritain appropriated from Thomas Aquinas but whose content 
and application was also inspired by Bergson’s philosophy of intuition. A most 
basic characterization of connaturality as presented by Maritain is pre-
conceptual, intuitive and, most important of all, experiential knowledge. It is for 
that reason both affective and cognitive, and involves description of the 
phenomena known just as much as explanation about how they are known. 
This latter point I saw as the main point of contact between Maritain and 
phenomenologists. Given that in almost all of his discussions of the nature and 
possible instances of connaturality Maritain deals with moral knowledge, 
artistic knowledge, and mystical knowledge, I thought it appropriate to model 
the major chapters of my thesis according to these three modes of intuitive, or 
connatural, knowledge. These are featured in the second part of the thesis. 
 I soon realized that because the subjects of morality, art and mystical 
knowledge are first of existential or lived significance, the most appropriate 
phenomenologists for my comparison were existential phenomenologists 
rather than early Husserlian phenomenologists whose principal concerns were 
almost entirely epistemological and abstract in nature—examples of the latter 
being Husserl himself, and, to a lesser extent, Edith Stein. In virtue of the fact 
that a study on a thinker should be concerned with the biographical as 
inextricably related to their ideas, there was also a methodological requirement 
that the existentialists about whom I chose to study were those whose work 
Maritain had explicitly addressed and critiqued in his own writings, rather than 
arbitrarily chosen among the long list of twentieth century existentialist 
thinkers. Among these, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre were the two 
obvious choices given that they both feature in some of Maritain’s major works. 
It was also in virtue of this biographical aspect of the study that Maritain’s own 
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philosophical development had to be mapped out. To this end Part I of the 
study includes an exposition of the problematics and themes in the work of 
Bergson, as Maritain’s first philosophical guide, serving to convey the first 
inspirations and later trajectory of Maritain’s thought.  
 As I moved to investigate Heidegger’s existentialism, I found that a 
central theme that constantly recurs throughout the work of both Heidegger—
and, retrospectively, Maritain—is the relatedness that all human ways of acting 
and knowing, such as morality, art and mysticism have with ultimate questions 
posed for human existence—the question of the meaning of life and that in 
which it is contained, namely the question of the meaning of reality or being as 
such. Such questions, while obviously being the biggest of all, are not just for 
specialists in epistemology, and they are, above all, of existential, lived 
significance to us all. As I began draw the connections between Maritain’s 
doctrines of the intuition of being, of the good, of art and the beautiful and of 
mystical knowledge with this question of the meaning of being—all the while 
drawing parallels with Heidegger—I chanced upon the book Heidegger and 
Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics, by the renowned Heidegger 
scholar John Caputo. Caputo’s central argument in that book would come to 
determine my doctoral research. 
 Caputo argues that despite the best efforts of ‘existential’ Thomists such 
as Étienne Gilson, the Heideggerian critique of Thomas Aquinas as being a 
paradigmatic case of viewing being as merely something to be objectivized, as 
well as failing to differentiate between being as such and beings in the world, 
still stands. 3  While Gilson argues that Aquinas’ distinction between the 
principle of esse (the ‘act’ or ‘thatness’ of existence) and the principle of 
essentia (the essence or ‘whatness’ of that which exists) satisfies just these 
necessities, Caputo argues that because Aquinas’ metaphysical doctrines are 
based upon creation—that which creates and that which is to be created, esse 
in fact serves to objectivize being precisely as an object to be worked, and 
God, whose essentia is pure act, pure esse, comes, in fact, to be seen as an 
                                                 
3 HA, pp. 2–3. 
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object Himself—a builder, or maker, most fundamentally.4 Heidegger argues 
that Western philosophy has long since forgotten the question of the meaning 
of being because of an ‘ontotheological’ understanding of being, that is, as an 
object to be totally comprehended and controlled. According to Caputo, both 
the medieval Aquinas and the Aquinas of the existential Thomists is 
inescapably bound to this mechanistic, objectivizing metaphysical structure 
which leaves nothing left of the mystery of being—nothing of that which allows 
for the opening up of the difference between being and beings and the 
‘unconcealment’ of things into our world.5 
 But another reading of Aquinas is possible, Caputo proclaims. If we take 
Heidegger’s critique of Aquinas on the former’s own terms, we can 
acknowledge the objectivizing and mechanical nature of the latter’s 
philosophical system which dominated Western and Catholic thought for so 
long. At the same time, we can, by employing a method of ‘retrieval’ or 
‘deconstruction’, find that which is hidden or left ‘unthought’ in Aquinas but 
which nevertheless determines his entire philosophical and religious life. 6 
Retrieving or revealing what is unthought, Heidegger says, is ‘the greatest gift 
that thinking can bestow.’7 
 The notion of deconstruction as Caputo uses the term refers to ‘taking 
a text apart in order to find its most essential and enlivening insights and then 
reconstructing the whole around them.’ 8  In the case of the Thomistic 
metaphysics of Aquinas, Caputo believes that ‘the uninterruptedly 
metaphysical mode of St. Thomas’ discourse effectively covers over the truest 
tendencies of his thought’, and as such, Caputo sets out to ‘break open its 
metaphysical encasement and to expose the contents of its essentially 
mystical significance.’9 In anticipatory response to the claim that the result of 
such a deconstruction is a ‘purely hypothetical and capriciously contrived 
                                                 
4 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 
5 Ibid., p. 5. 
6 Ibid., pp. 148–149, 157, 249–254. 
7 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York, NY: Harper & 
Row, 1972), p. 76. 
8 HA, p. 247. 
9 Ibid. 
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Aquinas’, Caputo answers that the metaphysical representation of Aquinas is 
only one way, and not the most genuine way, of presenting his thought.10 I 
think we can understand this claim more easily if we consider the fact that a 
historical figure can be studied in a number of different ways or with different 
emphases, and the perspective from which one looks at a figure will determine 
the genre of the study one produces. Naturally, what is presented will only 
constitute one aspect of a multifaceted life. In the case of Aquinas, if we choose 
to study him only from the perspective of his metaphysical treatises, we will 
undoubtedly be left with a ‘metaphysical’ Aquinas, to the exclusion of other 
elements in his life and thought. 
 I mention religious life because Caputo reminds us that Aquinas was 
not merely an academic philosopher-theologian, but first and principally a 
Dominican friar and, most basically, a medieval Catholic, whose life was 
defined by religious practice and piety.11 This is evident in paintings of the 
saint such as that by Justus of Ghent which is exhibited in the Louvre, as well 
as in biographies of the saint. Of supreme significance is a reported experience 
had by Aquinas during the celebration of mass, after which, according to 
Aquinas’ personal secretary Reginald of Piperno, he fell silent on philosophical 
matters, comparing his masterful writing to ‘straw’.12 This silence in the face 
of the ineffable mystery of Being, claims Caputo, is the key to the retrieval of a 
more contemplative, mystical Aquinas—the possibilities of which can be made 
explicit by means of referring to Aquinas’ admirer and successor as chair of 
theology at the University of Paris, Meister Eckhart. Eckhart’s mysticism is 
precisely one of silence before the mystery of God, of a Gelassenheit, or 
‘letting-be’ of God as distinct from any and all concepts or thoughts we may 
have about Him. In an earlier work, The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s 
Thought (1978), Caputo argues that it is this Eckhartian mysticism which is at 
work in Heidegger’s own project and his own ‘element’ of mysticism, a position 
which he maintains in Heidegger and Aquinas.13 Eckhartian mysticism, then, 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p. 248. 
11 Ibid., pp. 7, 252–256. 
12 Ibid., pp. 252–253. 
13 Ibid., p. 247. 
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can be used as a connecting bridge between Aquinas and Heidegger, and 
establish among them something of a mystical rapport, even if the mystical 
elements are quite dissimilar and Heidegger cannot, in Caputo’s estimation, 
be called a mystic (for reasons I will elucidate over the course of this study).14 
This ‘deconstruction’ of Aquinas’ allows for a retrospective re-interpretation of 
the principles at work in his thinking, and Caputo, following Pierre Rousselot’s 
classical study, The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas, and turning to Meister 
Eckhart, Aquinas’ successor as the Dominican chair of theology at Paris, finds 
a luminous thread running throughout. What we find at its end, Caputo argues, 
is the overcoming of metaphysics and a species of mysticism.15  
 With this basic exposition of Caputo’s thesis, it should be noted that the 
notion of deconstruction which he employs seems to be a combination of 
Heidegger’s ‘Destruktion’ and Jacques Derrida’s ‘déconstruction’. Caputo 
acknowledges the negative connotations of Heidegger’s original term and says 
that for this reason he prefers the term of ‘deconstruction’ used by Derrida16 
Responding to questions about the method, Derrida says that ‘deconstruction’ 
is ‘an analysis which tries to find out how their [philosophers’] thinking works 
or does not work, to find the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity 
within their own corpus. . . . [and in finding these tensions, etc.] it is interested 
in what is considered the great canon—the study of great Western works—
and open at the same time to new works, new objects, new fields, new 
cultures, new languages’.17 With this, no explicit goal or end point is implied, 
which is in contrast to Heidegger who writes that the end of Destruktion is to 
‘arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of 
determining the nature of Being—the ways which have guided us ever since.’18 
Caputo repeatedly affirms that in deconstructing Aquinas’ metaphysics he 
intends to break open the ‘possibilities which can be brought forth’.19 At the 
                                                 
14 Ibid., pp. 274–275; MEHT, p. 239. 
15 Ibid., pp. 265–271. 
16 Ibid., p. 247. 
17 Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, (New 
York, NY: Fordham University Press), 1997), pp. 9–11. 
18 BT, 6/44. 
19 HA, p. 274. 
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same time, he nails his colors to the mast in his commitment to Heidegger’s 
basic claim that Western metaphysics ought to be characterized as 
ontotheology and that the primordial experience of Being as taken 
ontotheologically ought to be discerned in Aquinas and overcome.  
2. The Case of Maritain 
Caputo’s amazingly bold (and difficult to understand) claims about Aquinas 
made me consider Maritain’s life and work, as one of the twentieth-century’s 
most influential Catholic and Thomist thinkers, in a new light, and made me 
ask whether what Caputo said of Aquinas could also be said of Maritain. My 
research on Maritain led me to believe the answer to this question was ‘yes’. 
Being equally fascinated with Maritain’s philosophy and his personal story, I 
was convinced that the determining factor in Maritain’s colossal philosophical 
project, illustrated especially in his relatively early masterwork The Degrees of 
Knowledge, was his search for the meaning of being and the infinite mystery 
of being that ever eludes us. This amounts to a relationship between the 
person for searching meaning and ultimate reality that is at first expressed in 
metaphysical terms but only realizable in a mystical experience which 
underlies and lies at the summit of such a search. Caputo writes of Aquinas 
that ‘beneath the scaffolding of his Scholastic metaphysics there lies an 
animating mystical experience.’20 I believed that the same could be said for 
Maritain when he writes the following: 
[A] mystical aspiration traverses every metaphysics; it seems . . . 
the desire—an inefficacious one—of knowing the first cause in its 
essence is like a secret fire in the heart of the metaphysician. He 
does not know what he thus desires, for the philosopher as such 
has no conception of the Beatific Vision and of what God has 
prepared for those who love Him. His desire is a natural mystical 
desire.21 
Mystical wisdom and theological wisdom vivify metaphysical 
wisdom, just as the latter vivifies philosophical activities of a lower 
grade—and this happens in a region in which no human word is 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 9. 
21 DK, pp. 284–285. 
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spoken, and no violence can be exerted, in the immaterial heart 
of the soul’s energies.22 
And perhaps more significantly: 
To beat our heads against the wall when the why? escapes us is 
nothing extraordinary. The longing for death always comes when 
the work of pouring truths into the mould of our truest words 
seems to be treason to truth. Happy are they whose anguish has 
been transfigured by the purity of tears. The biographers of St. 
Thomas tell us that he wept much: the masterpiece of serenest 
objectivity was born in the tears of a saint. . . . He wept as he 
gazed at the mystery of being; he wept because he saw enough 
to faint under the flood of that which he did not see.23 
And again, more significantly, in the introduction to his The Degrees of 
Knowledge, entitled ‘The Majesty and Poverty of Metaphysics’—from 
which I take the main title of the present study, hence the quotation 
marks: 
[This] is the poverty of metaphysics (and yet its majesty too). It 
awakens a desire for supreme union, for spiritual possession 
completed in the order of reality itself and not only in the 
concept. It cannot satisfy that desire.24  
A few questions related to this hypothesis presented themselves. Were there 
events in Maritain’s life that were of similar effect to those experienced by 
Aquinas? Could it be that Maritain’s modulations of intuition or connatural 
knowledge as seen in his treatments of metaphysics, ethics and art pointed to 
some common, higher, intuitional experience that we could call mystical? 
Perhaps Maritain’s intuition of being was itself mystical in nature? Most 
importantly, however, what precisely is meant by the ‘mystical’, ‘mysticism’, 
‘mystical knowledge’, ‘mystical experience’ was merely assumed by Caputo, 
and assumed by myself in applying Caputo’s thesis to Maritain. These issues 
presented themselves to me as urgent and requiring the utmost diligence, and 
the latter, I came to see, required addressing first. The question of what the 
                                                 
22 Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, trans. Bernard Wall (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940), 
p. 86. 
23 EE, pp. 145–146. 
24 DK, p. 7. 
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mystical means will be addressed later in this introduction. 
 The question of whether the mystical was the source and summit of 
Maritain’s religious and philosophical life demanded that I take the thesis in a 
new direction. In my view this change of direction did not represent a break in 
terms of subject-matter but rather a progression and indeed a radical pushing 
through to the highest (or deepest) planes of philosophical and theological 
discourse, taking Maritain’s terms of the intuition of being and connaturality to 
their final, and logical conclusions.  
 In this connection I should mention that I found that Maritain and Jean-
Paul Sartre shared only two insights—only one of which turned out to be 
relevant as the nature of the thesis changed. The first is a wordless and earth-
shattering intuition of existence or being, which for Sartre is the first taste of 
the meaningless and nauseating reality of the world we find ourselves in. For 
Maritain, as we shall see over the course of this study, the intuition of being is 
much richer in possibilities as the gateway to an overarching theistic 
metaphysics and encompasses both positive and negative experiences. I shall 
argue that while not being an instance of connaturality, the intuition of being in 
fact the beating heart of all of Maritain’s philosophy and the best way to 
approach his underlying mystical tendency.  
 The second shared insight between Maritain and Sartre is the 
necessary role of intuition in moral decision-making in virtue of the 
indeterminacy of the circumstances and conditions in which one makes a 
moral decision. For Sartre this necessity implies absolute moral relativism, 
whereas for Maritain it amounts to nothing less than evidence for freedom of 
the will over and against a deterministic human nature that is nevertheless 
bestowed on us by God. This second point of contact was, therefore, without 
significant implications for the study, for I am concerned not with the question 
of moral relativism and its wider implications for the field of ethics but with the 
values and obligations (and their content) which are at play when moral 
decisions are made and how they relate to mystical experience in Maritain. I 
therefore only address the first point of contact which, in itself, does not warrant 
an extensive, dedicated comparative analysis between Maritain and Sartre 
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given that Sartre’s existentialism is in fact derivative of Heidegger’s. As such, 
I discuss the relevant details of Sartre’s intuition of being in the context of the 
wider comparative analysis of Maritain and Heidegger. And as preparation for 
this extensive comparative analysis, I provide an exposition of the philosophy 
of Heidegger in relation to Maritain’s preoccupations as a Catholic and a 
Thomist philosopher in Part I, following the outline of Bergson’s philosophy of 
intuition and its influence on Maritain. 
 The change in direction, to the mystical experience of reality as the most 
profound dimension of human existence and the hidden source of 
metaphysical inquiry, was not, therefore, horizontal but vertical—as one scales 
a mountain or an aircraft gains altitude, or indeed, as an archeologist digs 
deeper and a diver pierces the ocean’s depths. In the thesis I speak of ‘levels 
of relation to Being’, a notion inspired by Maritain’s ‘degrees of knowledge’, 
and which illustrates both immanence and progression rather than clear-cut 
breaks, implying that if the thesis presented here is broad in its topic (namely, 
‘Being’), it is also narrow insofar as it considers it in terms of the movement as 
we find it in Maritain’s life and work. That Maritain, in dealing with connaturality 
is in some ways similar to and performs the same act as the phenomenologist 
in virtue of his concern with the experiential, and with description rather than 
explanation, remains relevant. While it is a theme that stands in the 
background, it grounds the initial comparison with Heidegger and the 
investigation into the mystical. In this connection, it is helpful for us to 
remember these words of Maritain: 
Whereas speculative language, because it considers the pure 
object of the intellect, is an essentially ontological language, 
practical and mystical language . . . must, of necessity, be 
predominantly psychological and affective, because it considers 
things in relation to, and even as inviscerated in, the acting 
subject.25 
Following Aquinas and St. John of the Cross, Maritain writes that 
‘contemplation is an experiential knowledge of love and union.’26 And on this 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 357. 
26 Ibid., p. 359. 
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point Maritain further quotes St. John of the Cross, who, in his Spiritual 
Canticle, warns: ‘it would be ignorance to think that sayings of love understood 
mystically, such as those of the present stanzas, can be fairly explained by 
words of any kind.’27 Maritain always insists on the radical difference between 
metaphysical and mystical propositions. 
 The question of the immanence of the mystical in Maritain required a 
fresh look at both the philosopher and the man behind the words. 
Corresponding to the biographical and philosophical elements of the study, it 
required asking what influences on him—events, people, philosophical 
preoccupations and doctrines—would confirm my hypothesis. Chapter 3 of 
Part I of the study sets out just this methodology in greater detail, as applying 
Caputo’s deconstructive approach not just to the events in Maritain’s life but 
also influential people. It identifies and discusses two inspirational figures in 
Maritain’s life for study. The first is Léon Bloy, a Catholic novelist and prophet 
figure who was to become the primary inspiration for Maritain’s conversion to 
Catholicism and become Maritain’s godfather. The second, Georges Rouault, 
a Catholic painter and friend of Bloy’s, for whose religious artworks Maritain 
was to give the highest praise in his writings on the philosophy of art. Both Bloy 
and Rouault were, to put it mildly, social outcasts and misfits, whose lives were 
defined by a radical, individual piety and, I argue, a spiritual bent akin to 
mysticism that was especially influential for Jacques Maritain and supremely 
relevant for his philosophical development. 
 After establishing a theoretical framework in the first chapter, Part II of 
the study includes three extensive treatments of Maritain’s approaches to 
moral, artistic and mystical knowledge directed to the question of whether the 
source and summit of Maritain’s philosophical enterprise is the mystical. In the 
first two chapters I argue that for Maritain, connatural moral and artistic 
knowledge amount to analogies of mystical knowledge. They are not 
synonymous with the mystical because, in Thomistic language, the habitus—
the virtue or capacity—of the latter is distinct from the other two in virtue of its 
‘formal object’: God, who is ultimate reality and experienced as such, rather 
                                                 
27 St. John of the Cross, The Spiritual Canticle, ‘Prologue’, quoted in DK, p. 357. 
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than a glimmer or mere aspect of it. It is the direct experience of ultimate reality 
afforded by mystical knowledge and the mystical life that is the ‘element or 
quality in them’, as William James writes, ‘which we can meet nowhere else.’28 
Moral and artistic experiences can, like metaphysics, serve to inspire and 
cultivate mystical experiences and mystical life as a vocation in virtue of their 
intuitive, connatural modes of knowing and their affective qualities: namely, as 
we will see, the supremacy of love and a giving of the personality and being of 
the subject in the face of the good and the beautiful. As analogies, they often 
reflect and imitate mystical aspiration. Here, Bloy and Rouault and the 
determining events in Maritain’s life become crucial. The event in Maritain’s life 
that has most significance is Maritain’s suicide pact with his wife Raïssa in 
1902, when they were both students at the Sorbonne. This, as I suggest in the 
fourth and final chapter of Part II, marks the beginning of the mystical journey 
in Maritain that is echoed throughout his life and philosophical work.  
3. Defining the Mystical: The  
‘Core/Contextualist’ Debate 
A critical issue which presents itself throughout all these considerations is the 
question of what, precisely, is meant by ‘mysticism’, ‘mystical knowledge’, 
‘mystical experience’, ‘mystical theology’, the words which Maritain uses often 
with regard to experiences of God, ‘mystical contemplation’ and ‘infused 
contemplation’, as well as the quality which all of these share, which is the 
‘mystical’. The attendant methodological questions of how exactly one is to go 
about defining mysticism and what methodological assumptions one must take 
in doing so came to the surface at once. Was I to take Caputo’s own definition 
of the mystical in virtue of the fact that my study was, for all intents and 
purposes, an extension of his? Or was I to take Maritain’s own definition and 
from there, on his own terms, judge whether there is an overcoming of 
metaphysics in mysticism in his thought? Or perhaps I ought to research the 
literature on defining mysticism, provide a literature review, formulate a 
                                                 
28 VRE, p. 62. 
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working definition for my purposes and then proceed to making my argument? 
 To understand the parameters and philosophical implications of both 
Caputo’s and Maritain’s conception of the mystical however, would in fact 
require a wider context, including the recent literature, in which to compare 
them to others. In attempting to provide that wider context and compose a 
literature review, I found that mysticism is, like so many other concepts, very 
much a contested one. If I did not arbitrarily decide on a definition of mysticism 
on the basis of a comparison and synthesis of current theories, I should, I 
reasoned, at least, first identify the contours and limitations of Caputo’s 
definition, and secondly, do the same for Maritain, in order to see whether the 
latter’s mysticism is the kind that the former claims for Aquinas (and if it wasn’t, 
whether my thesis would still hold). 
 The publication of William James’ Gifford Lectures as The Varieties of 
Religious Experience in 1902 attracted academic interest in mystical 
experience as a psychological phenomenon that could be empirically 
investigated. James’ investigation, and many of those following him, primarily 
took the form of examining case studies of those claiming to have had mystical 
experiences, and particularly what are now known as ‘peak’ experiences—in 
James’ words, ‘cases where the religious spirit is unmistakable and extreme.’29 
James was concerned with the subjective experiences reported by individuals 
or their biographers, taking religion for the purposes of his lectures to be ‘the 
feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as 
they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider 
the divine.’30 Distinguishing between ‘personal’ and ‘institutional’ religion, the 
latter being all other aspects of religion, such as scripture, ritual, clergy, and in 
fact all tradition, James writes that he chooses ‘to ignore the institutional 
branch entirely’. 31  As William Harmless points out, James’ focus on the 
biographical and subjective appears to be a sharp break from traditional 
treatments of mystical experience as one important, though not the most 
important, part of religious life—the theological context and content of which 
                                                 
29 Ibid. p. 57. 
30 Ibid., p. 50 (original emphasis). 
31 Ibid., p. 49. 
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was called ‘mystical theology’32 by those such as St. John of the Cross, and 
later, also by Maritain.  
 In setting out his methodological and conceptual assumptions at the 
beginning of The Varieties, James continues that ‘Since the relation [between 
people and what they take to be the divine] may be either moral, physical, or 
ritual, it is evident that out of religion in the sense in which we take it, 
theologies, philosophies, and ecclesiastical organizations may secondarily 
grow.’33 James therefore considers all extrinsic manifestations of religion as 
outgrowths of a primordial experience of which all mystics share—this 
primordial experience being a function of the ‘personal religion’ he speaks of. 
The mystical experience is identical for all mystics but is subsequently given 
(often incommensurable) interpretation(s) on the basis of their respective 
religious presuppositions and evangelical commitments. To support such a 
thesis, James offers four ‘marks’ of the mystical, four criteria by which an 
experience can justifiably be called a mystical experience. These are 
‘Ineffability, a ‘Noetic quality’, ‘Transiency’, and ‘Passivity’.34 In proposing such 
a thesis, James became a representative of those arguing that all mystical 
experiences—and all religions—despite outward differences of creed—have a 
common core, of origin and how exactly they are experienced. Well-known 
thinkers who have advanced a ‘core’ or ‘essentialist’ thesis of some kind 
include Aldous Huxley, Alan Watts, Walter T. Stace and John Hick, among 
others.35  
 As Heather Erb suggests, core theorists, in claiming to have identified 
a common and universally experienceable heart of all religions, aim to 
establish three elements of mysticism as invulnerable to attempts at reduction 
and skeptical attack: ‘a comprehensive phenomenology of mysticism, a 
                                                 
32 M, pp. 5–9, 36. 
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34 Ibid., pp. 367–368.    
35 See Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1945); 
Alan Watts, This is It: And Other Essays on Zen and Spiritual Experience (New York, NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1960) and Cloud-Hidden, Whereabouts Unknown: A Mountain Journal (New 
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nonsectarian spirituality, and a robust ecumenism.’36 That all religions—and 
by extension, religious denominations—have a common, experienceable core 
is undoubtedly one of the central arguments used by those whose efforts are 
directed to not only interfaith and ecumenical dialogue—which is laudable—
but also establishing a non-religious, personally-directed mystical ‘spirituality’ 
as distinct from religion and which is regarded as superior to it. I will show that 
what we find in Maritain’s discussions of mystical experience, particularly in his 
late works The Peasant of the Garonne and On the Church of Christ, echoes 
at least some of these interfaith and even Christian ecumenical concerns, 
while remaining committed to the truth claims of orthodox Catholicism.  
 Opposed to the core thesis is the view that mystical experiences are 
determined in both origin and content or manner of experience by the prior 
religious beliefs and available religious language of the mystic. This view, 
which has been most famously articulated by Steven Katz, is known as 
‘contextualism’ or ‘constructivism’.37 Katz argues that the beliefs of mystics in 
varying times and places are so different that it is false to the phenomena to 
attempt to find a common core among them, and that it is unlikely that the 
evident differences in the accounts of mystical experience are due to 
subsequent interpretation or, as Stace also suggests, an inability to distinguish 
between what are commonly called ‘pure states’ of consciousness and say, 
theistic interpretations.38  
 Katz writes that it is ‘necessary in order to understand mysticism to 
ground the mystic in his polyform context so that one comes to realize what 
may well be the necessary connection between the mystic’s way and his goal, 
the mystic’s problematic and the mystic’s solution to this problematic; the 
mystic’s intentions and the mystic’s actual experiences’. 39  For Katz, the 
                                                 
36 Heather McAdam Erb, ‘Natural Mysticism Gateway or Detour? Aquinas, Maritain, and the 
Core/Contextualist Debate’, in John J. Conley (ed.), Redeeming Philosophy: From 
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37 Ibid, pp. 30–31. 
38 Walter T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London: Macmillan & Co, Ltd., 1961), pp. 102–
104. 
39 Steven T. Katz, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Steven T. Katz (ed.) Mysticism and Religious 
Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1983), p. ix.  
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beliefs and expectations that the mystic brings to his or her wider religious life 
determines what mystical experiences can be had, making them particular to 
each religious tradition. In virtue of this epistemological divergence, Katz is 
able to persuasively argue, concerning the experiences of the Buddhist in 
contrast with those of the Jew or Christian:   
 
There is no intelligible way that anyone can legitimately argue 
that a ‘no self’ experience of ‘empty’ calm is the same 
experience of intense, loving, intimate relationship between two 
substantial selves, one of whom is conceived of as the personal 
God of western religion and all that this entails. The losing of 
self is not equivalent to the finding of another, especially when 
this other is conceived of as the God of Jewish tradition.40 
  
The wider religious context in which the mystic undergoes their experience 
encompasses religious cosmologies and narratives about the history and 
nature of human beings in relation to the divine, as well as distinctions between 
orthodox and heterodox conceptions of the nature of the divine itself and 
genuine experiences one might have of it. For Katz, the mystic brings all of this 
to the experience, such that is there no pre-given mystical phenomena that 
may be universally shared: 
 
[I]n order to understand mysticism it is not just a question of 
studying the reports of the mystic after the experiential event but 
of acknowledging that the experience itself as well as the form 
in which it is reported is shaped by concepts which the mystic 
brings to, and which shape, his experience . . . [What] is being 
argued is that, for example, the Hindu mystic does not have an 
experience of X which he then describes in the, to him, familiar 
language and symbols of Hinduism, but rather he has a Hindu 
experience, i.e., his experience is not an unmediated 
experience of X but is itself the, at least partially, pre-formed 
anticipated Hindu experience of Brahman. Again, the Christian 
mystic does not experience some unidentified reality, which he 
then conveniently labels God, but rather has the at least partially 
prefigured Christian experiences of God, or Jesus, or the like.41 
  
                                                 
40 Steven T. Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology and Mysticism’, in Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism 
and Philosophical Analysis (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 39–40. 
41 Ibid., pp. 26–27. 
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As Harmless explains, contextualism is the dominant position among most 
contemporary scholars of comparative mysticism and has the advantage of 
utilising an empirical approach to the study of mysticism. Harmless nicely sums 
up the contextualist critique of the core approach by saying that ‘mystical 
experiences do not come out of the blue. They are the culmination of broader 
experiential pathways.’ 42  Elsewhere Katz expresses this fact that in their 
seeking experiences of the divine, mystics ‘seek different goals because their 
initial, generative, problems are different. The Sufi and the Christian mystic 
begin with the “problem” of finitude, sin, and distance from God, while the 
Buddhist begins with the problem of suffering and anitya or impermanence’.43 
Certainly, from this perspective, it seems like arrogance and the worst kind of 
intellectual or even spiritual elitism to suggest that the differences between 
what mystics report are merely verbal and not, in fact, experiential.  
 Other flaws of the core thesis can also be pointed out, for example that 
the studies used to support it are often confined to case studies mystics of only 
one or two religious traditions (usually Christian, as in Henri Bergson’s The 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion), and that there is often a methodological 
bias in favor of mystics whose emphasis is apophatic—to the neglect of those 
whose mysticism also features cataphatic and/or liturgical aspects (for 
example D. T. Suzuki’s Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist, which takes 
Eckhart ‘as representative of Christian Mysticism’).44 This is to say nothing of 
the post-Heideggerian and post-Derridean hermeneutic propensity toward 
textual analysis in contemporary theology and philosophy of religion, in virtue 
of which the attempt to derive a primordial, pre-conceptual nugget of mystical 
experience from the reports of mystics seems to many naïve at best.  
 Nevertheless, the contextualist view, while appearing to be more 
epistemologically sophisticated than the core view, has nevertheless also 
come under scathing attack. Philip Almond, for instance, argues that Katz has 
failed to show why there is a ‘necessary’ connection a between mystic’s 
                                                 
42 M, p. 256. 
43 Katz, ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, p. 62. 
44 Daisetsu Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist (London: Routledge Classes, 2002), p. 
vii. 
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religious beliefs and their mystical experiences, rather than a ‘strong 
contingent correlation’.45 Almond agrees with the basic idea mystics emerging 
from within a tradition will most likely have experiences that correlate or can 
correlate to the beliefs and previously reported experiences by mystics of that 
tradition. Yet, ‘experiential novelty is ruled out a priori’ by Katz and this is a 
mistake because, Almond explains, just as our gastronomic experiences often 
reflect our culture, this does not prevent one trying dishes of a foreign culture 
and thereby having—as far as oneself is concerned—novel experiences. In 
addition, powerful mystical experiences are often interpreted by means of 
analogy and allegory in order to fit into theological moulds, yet in so doing, they 
can also ‘lead to the creative transformation of religious traditions’, which 
suggests that the experience that the mystic has is not necessarily or entirely 
determined by their religious beliefs.46 Almond also points out that mystical 
traditions are often influenced by philosophical schools or even other mystical 
traditions, an instance being the influence of Neo-Platonism in the Christian 
mystical tradition.47 For Almond, this shows that Katz’s contextualism, as an 
empirical claim, demonstrates unfalsifiability, rendering it merely trivially true. 
But, as he says: ‘While it is trivially true that the experience of a Christian mystic 
is formed by his cultural context, it is clearly not true that the experience of a 
Christian mystic is formed solely by a Christian context.’48 
 This remark is particularly salient when it comes to the case of Maritain, 
for, as I will show, Maritain’s mysticism is immanent throughout his life and 
work, and that while it corresponds to Christian belief and comes to be 
expressed and developed in explicitly Christian terms, it is not necessarily 
determined or contained by Christian beliefs. I argue that this element of 
Maritain’s mysticism is easy enough to identify before his conversion to 
Catholicism. Such a case constitutes an anomaly for Katz’s contextualism.  
 One more problem with Katz’s view is that it risks religious and mystical 
                                                 
45 Philip C. Almond, ‘Mysticism and its Contexts’, in Robert K. C. Forman (ed.), The Problem 
of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
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46 Ibid., pp. 213–214. 
47 Ibid., p. 215. 
48 Ibid. 
  19  
relativism. In something of a Kantian manner, as Martin Adam demonstrates,49 
Katz claims that ‘all experience is processed through, organized by and makes 
itself available to us in extremely complex ways,’50 and furthermore, that ‘the 
forms of consciousness which the mystic brings to an experience set 
structured and limiting parameters on what the experience will be, i.e., on what 
will be experienced’.51 If this is the case, it rules out any objective or extra-
mental source of mystical experiences, which would be an unwarranted 
presupposition on Katz’ part. It would also mean that mystical experiences are 
entirely derived from the mystic’s prior belief and language structures and 
would share nothing in common. But we have seen that the former notion is 
false, and as we also have seen, ‘different mystical discourses are not totally 
incommensurable anymore than are different languages’,52 in virtue of their 
historical relationships, mutual influence, and in many cases, translatability of 
one into the other, and vice versa. 
 What has been the purpose of these considerations of the 
core/contextualist debate? It has made it possible to identify and situate 
Caputo’s conception of mysticism in a wider context, which then allows us to 
compare it to Maritain’s and ask whether the two are the same. In this, I do not 
intend to attempt to discern which of the two sides of the debate may be correct 
or more correct than the other. That said, I do believe it necessary to consider 
a mystic’s biography and broader religious or spiritual background contributes 
to their views about mysticism and mystical experience, and Katz’s example 
of the Buddhist and Jewish or Christian experience is sufficient to prove the 
validity of the argument.  
 With this, we ought to acknowledge with Almond, however, that if we 
reject the implication of Katz’s position that the content and context of mystical 
experiences are necessarily connected, what we are left with is description of 
the facts which is merely trivially true.53 As such, we should not expect that 
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the case of the mystic, in their religious experiences, subsequent 
interpretations and composition of their interpretative records of their 
experiences, should be any different in that there will at least very likely be a 
correlation between content and context, even while the mystic can also have 
novel experiences because theological structures and religious practices can 
be combined, ignored, transcended, or even, as Almond points out, 
reinvigorated precisely in virtue of the insights gained through mystical 
experiences.54 
 I therefore share with William Harmless the conviction expressed in his 
wonderfully articulate and logically rigorous Mystics that in approaching 
mysticism one must ‘situate individual mystics in their wider world, both 
historically and intellectually’, 55  while also, for reasons just provided, 
preventing ourselves from entirely and deterministically reducing their 
experiences to the physical, religious and literary environment in which they 
occur and, as a result, falling into mere a psychological relativism of mystical 
experience. In the words of Harmless himself: ‘I am concerned that too often 
mysticism gets presented as a network of psychological or theological 
abstractions, divorced from the life stories of those who have shaped it—as 
though it somehow takes place outside the bounds of time and space. 
Mysticism needs to stay embedded in the thicket of the history that created 
it.’56  
 Again, this is not to claim that a mystic’s experiences are necessarily 
determined by or confined within the conceptual framework of the particular 
religion they practice, but it is to claim that the mystic’s mysticism will be largely 
shaped by their biography—their religious quest, their intellectual and spiritual 
propensities, and their influences, whether it be those of acquaintances or 
community—and, because of this, expressed in one ‘mystical language’ 
among many. 57  This must be taken as a methodological necessity in 
examining the mysticism of Maritain. 
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 With this comes an acknowledgement of the difference between 
mystical ‘experience’ and mystical ‘knowledge’. Harmless argues that the 
former, following James, is the focus of modern writers on mysticism, whereas 
mystical writings themselves concern themselves less with experiences of the 
God or the divine and more with illuminating ways for spiritual perfection, which 
include mystical experiences and using scriptural images to outline the 
contours of such experiences. All of this takes it for granted that mystical 
experiences are themselves not isolated events, but one element in the 
spiritual life and granting certain kinds of knowledge. For Christian writers, they 
lend themselves to knowledge about who God is and who we are as human 
persons in relation to God.58 This, as I said, is what the mystical ‘theology’ of 
St. John of the Cross and Maritain consists in.  
 It also, as Harmless points out, means that whatever mystical 
knowledge may be, it is not just conveyed by mystics in autobiographical texts, 
but in a wide variety of genres, such as letters, journals, sermons, treatises, 
scriptural commentaries, poetry, proverbs, and hagiography. I am concerned 
to illustrate how Maritain’s mystical theology is immanent in all his work, which 
crosses some of those genres but, as I explained in outlining my argument, I 
am persuaded that what makes this immanent mysticism in Maritain are 
mystical experiences and the influence of people exuding something akin to 
mysticism. I therefore hope to place equal emphasis on the approaches of both 
the ‘core’ and ‘contextualist’ schools in drawing out the mystical in Maritain. 
 
4. Caputo and the Limitations  
of Apophaticism 
So now we have an overview of the current debate on the nature and role of 
the mystical, where does Caputo stand? What is his operative definition in 
Aquinas and Heidegger? Caputo employs increasingly elaborate scholastic 
vocabulary and distinctions in spelling out what the mystical he identifies in 
Aquinas refers to. In distinguishing between Aquinas the scholastic doctor and 
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Aquinas the mystic, Caputo makes use of disputatio and ratio to characterize 
the former and pietas, intellectus, pati divina, raptus, and assimilatio, and unio 
to characterize the latter. Caputo’s central argument is that on the basis of a 
Heideggerian deconstruction of Aquinas’ life, and in particular, how Aquinas 
appears in the painting by Justus of Ghent—deep in thought and yet serene, 
with his black Dominican habit draping over his arms—we can take a fresh 
look at key Thomistic doctrines and find in them an in-built tendency to reach 
beyond metaphysics and impel us to an apophatic mystical experience, of a 
letting-be of God (or to use Heidegger’s term, Gelassenheit), which is 
evidenced by Aquinas’ almost complete silence following his alleged mystical 
experience or revelation from God: 
The painting discloses a world not of disputatious Scholastic 
argumentation but of composure, not of disputatio but of pietas, 
not of calculativeness but of meditation and Gelassenheit. When 
one hears the words of St. Thomas in the Summa, one may miss 
the silence. But the painting discloses the silence of St. Thomas, 
which gives the words their meaning.59  
Caputo says that a deconstruction of Aquinas ‘must be carried out on 
two fronts: that of the interpretation of esse and that of the interpretation 
of intellectus’ and that there is a unity of the two that mirrors the unity of 
‘thought’ and ‘Being’ in Aquinas.60 That said, intellectus is the most 
important, and because esse is the cornerstone of Maritain’s philosophy 
and as such requires much elucidation, let us look at the second for now. 
Here the discussion actually concerns both the concepts of ratio 
(reason, or reasoning) and intellectus (intellect). Closely reading 
Aquinas’ epistemological teaching, Caputo argues that ratio for Aquinas 
characterizes human science as a way of knowing that proceeds step 
by step, from gathering the many and grouping them into a unity, 
whereas the function of intellectus consists in immediate and holistic 
insight, intellectus being that ‘unitative’ faculty which is directed to the 
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unification between mind and things, and between God the soul.61 In 
contrast to human beings, whose mode of knowledge is primarily that of 
ratio, angels, whose cognition is entirely in the mode of intellectus, 
apprehend and comprehend all the aspects of metaphysical principles 
such as esse. 62  Intellectus operates from the perspective of one 
overarching truth and on that basis understands the multiple. ‘Thus, as 
reason moves backward, by way of “resolution,” from the many to the 
one, intellect moves forward, by way of “composition,” from the one to 
the many.’63 How does this relate to mysticism? Caputo continues: 
But it is the task of metaphysics to treat of that highest unity 
toward which all the sciences tend, and into which they are 
resolved, for metaphysics treats of the highest principles 
and supreme causes of all things. Though metaphysics, 
like every science, must make use of reason, and through 
it is permeated by rational and demonstrative 
argumentation, what is most distinctive about 
metaphysical knowledge is its character as the beginning 
(principium) and end (terminus) of reason . . . 
[M]etaphysics signifies . . . a simple insight into the highest 
principles and ultimate causes under which all other things 
are comprehended.  
 St. Thomas appears to say that although 
metaphysics is embedded in reason and must carry out its 
life within the framework of discursive argumentation, it 
nonetheless strives to extricate itself from ratio and 
transform itself into intellectus. . . .  
 Metaphysics [therefore] tends by its own nature to 
pass from the calculative to the meditative mode. But this 
remains forever impossible for metaphysics so long as 
metaphysics is a Scientia practiced by men whose 
characteristic mode of thinking is “rational.” What is 
needed to carry out this inner tendency of metaphysics, of 
which metaphysics remains incapable, is for man to take 
up an altogether new way of thinking, that of intellectus 
itself. This is possible for Thomas in a thoroughgoing and 
complete way only after death. But it is possible in the 
present life, as a foretaste and foreshadowing, in mystical 
experience. Metaphysics thus points toward mysticism. 
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Mysticism is the terrestrial fulfillment of metaphysics, even 
as union with God is its celestial fulfilment.64  
Having here the essentials of one of Caputo’s arguments, it is clear to 
me that Caputo, despite his situating Aquinas in his historical and 
religious context in which scripture, liturgy and prayer employed much 
cataphatic language about God, means by the ‘mystical’ (i) ineffable 
experiences and (ii) apophaticism in mystical theology. Apophatic 
theology involves a negation of positive attributions to or predication of 
God, describing God, not directly, but indirectly, by saying what God is 
not in light of an experience or revelation of His inner nature. In the Latin 
of Aquinas, this is theology via negativa, ‘by way of negation’.  
 As previously mentioned, earlier studies on mysticism tend to be 
flawed because of an arbitrary emphasis on apophasis in mystical 
experiences and reports of experiences in the writings of mystics. 
Apophaticism has often been used by ‘core’ theorists of mysticism in 
arguing precisely for an ineffable, common core of profound mystical 
experiences in all times and places that is utterly other than the religions 
and theologies that grow up on the basis of them. Caputo’s argument is 
that it is the same Eckhartian—that is, apophatic—mystical ‘element’ 
that we see in Heidegger that can be identified in Aquinas, and therefore 
his focus is on apophaticism: 
[O]nce the depth dimension, the mystical element in St. Thomas; 
metaphysics, is wrested loose from this metaphysical 
encasement one finds a Thomas who eludes Heidegger’s critique 
of metaphysics, for whom metaphysics is something to be 
overcome, a more essential thinker in whom Heidegger would 
have been compelled to concede that here too—and not just in 
Eckhart—there is a profound unity of mysticism and thought. The 
key to St. Thomas lies in the non possum. In the non possum 
there lies the most profound possibility of St. Thomas’ thought.65 
I agree with Caputo and apply his argument to the case of Maritain in this study 
with much confidence in the latter’s aforementioned statements, such as that 
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‘a mystical aspiration traverses every metaphysics’ and metaphysics ‘awakens 
a desire for supreme union, for spiritual possession completed in the order of 
reality itself and not only in the concept.’ But I also do more than merely agree 
and recite Caputo’s thesis, for Caputo, in his strong emphasis on the apophatic 
in Aquinas, neglects the cataphatic—the cataphatic which was necessary for 
most of Aquinas’ religious life and writings. Harmless rightly argues that 
mysticism, insofar as it emerges from and utilizes a religious language, is also 
present in other forms precisely because it is another way of doing theology, 
including liturgy, spiritual and ascetic practices (such as the Exercises of St. 
Ignatius) and biblical commentaries. In all of these practices, it is not as if a 
religion and its theology is a mere appendage to mysticism. In fact, mysticism 
often includes these in its very exercise, and in a communal manner, often 
taking place in religious communities whose purpose is to promote spiritual 
perfection.66 Maritain himself writes that when a record of mystical experience 
is handed down and shared among Christians, it ‘awakens in hearts the desire 
for this recollection in God, and for the seeking of spiritual perfection’.67 It 
should be said, moreover, that religious communities and the individuals 
composing them regard scripture as indispensable in their pursuits. Again, to 
quote Harmless:  
Sometimes mystics appeal to scriptural verses, scriptural 
terminology, or scriptural images as a way to articulate, even 
map, the contours of their own (or others’) most profound interior 
experiences. Other times mystics appeal to scripture as a public 
standard to judge their own (or others’) experiences—to judge 
whether they be true or false, orthodox or heterodox, divinely 
inspired or demonic. The modern accent on experience distorts 
the usual mystical balance: scriptures measure experience, not 
vice versa.68 
In modifying and applying Caputo’s thesis that what underlies Aquinas’ thought 
is a movement toward unio to Maritain I am arguing two other things. The first 
is that both the apophatic and the cataphatic have roles to play in realizing 
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such a unitive, ineffable mystical experience as Aquinas had—after all, the 
experience was had when Aquinas had finished celebrating mass. The second 
is that such unitive, ineffable mystical experiences need not, just because they 
are ineffable, imply only a secondary value to a mystic’s philosophy, theology, 
and general cataphatic means of contact with God or the divine, be it prayer, 
worship, liturgy or scriptural exegesis. While Caputo points out that Aquinas’ 
experience and consequent silence was never used against him but rather as 
a validation of his saintly life,69 it seems to me that because Caputo is so 
concerned to meet the Heideggerian critique of Thomism that he relegates the 
cataphatic to second place in virtue of an apparent ontotheological 
interpretation, and places undue emphasis on the apophatic as found in 
Eckhart (and, as he claims, Heidegger and Aquinas himself). While it is not 
wrong, Caputo’s thesis suffers the limitation of the one-sidedness of earlier 
studies of mysticism. Caputo seems to argue for the core view that the mystical 
in Aquinas is an experience of the divine that is completely unrelated and 
uninfluenced by the mystic’s wider religious life, and that the proper mystical 
way to approach the divine is solely by apophatic means.  
 In this study, I argue that in the case of Maritain, we can meet the 
Heideggerian critique without necessarily relegating the cataphatic to the 
realm ontotheology and second-rate religious life, and that, in the case of 
Maritain, both the apophatic and cataphatic have roles to play in determining 
just what mystical experiences Maritain had and how these fit in his wider 
thinking. I offer a composite of core and contextualist arguments, as it pertains 
to the mysticism of Jacques Maritain. I argue that we can identify animating 
mystical experiences which are (to use James’ ‘marks’) ineffable, possessing 
a noetic quality, transient, and only possible in virtue of passivity on the part of 
the mystic, which underly Maritain’s deepest philosophical principles and 
insights. Yet, I also argue that the mystical experiences Maritain had and 
interpreted precisely for the purposes of a mystical ‘theology’ were in part 
determined by a specific kind of religious sentiment and religious practices that 
required a rich spiritual life. Maritain’s Catholic life, as we shall see, 
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encompassed quite literal beliefs in supernatural realities and miracles, 
Catholic prayers and devotions, liturgy (namely, the Catholic mass), an 
intensely active part in the Catholic Church itself, an oblate and taking vows in 
smaller religious communities and orders, spiritual apprenticeships, and 
spiritual exegesis. With regard to the latter, Harmless argues that for many 
whom we regard as mystics, ‘the very act of exegesis is itself mystical 
experience’,70 and I argue that this is indeed the case for Maritain as we find 
in his first and last example of biblical exegesis, which is also one of his most 
important texts: a translation and commentary of the Song of Songs named Le 
Cantique des Cantiques. As Harmless argues: ‘Theology lies at the very heart 
of the mystical enterprise. Mystics often set forth their (or others’) experiences 
as the experience of doctrine. This sets mystical theologies apart from other 
ways of doing theology.’71 
 We begin to see that at the heart of apophatic mysticism is a lived 
paradox: that of simultaneous Christian belief—that is, belief in the Christian 
conception of God—and the assertion that that God is unnamable, that all 
concepts and predications fall by the wayside when it comes to talking about 
God as He really and truly is (how one experiences Him). This paradox makes 
itself known whenever Catholics refer to the ‘Mysteries’ of the Christian faith—
so-called ‘revealed truths’ from God that transcend human understanding such 
as the nature of Holy Trinity, the Virgin Birth of Christ, and the Passion, death, 
and Resurrection of Christ (the Paschal Mystery). The term ‘Mystery’ is also 
used in the Catholic Church to refer to events in the life and death of Christ 
that are contemplated in praying the Rosary. The apophatic paradox or 
element of mystery is evident in the mysticism of Maritain as he takes his 
inspiration from Aquinas and St. John of the Cross—the latter being infamous 
for his apophaticism—and, as I will show, goes all the way back to and mirrors 
the conflict that Maritain saw between the necessary propositions of faith that 
he held God uses to communicate truth to human beings and the Bergsonian 
claim of the obvious inability of concepts to grasp reality as it is experienced. 
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 All of this, I will argue, was the life-blood of Maritain’s philosophy and 
mystical theology. As I will illustrate, Maritain’s mysticism—or what he also 
often called ‘contemplation’—is multi-faceted, many-layered, resistant to 
essentialization. It is both poetic in spirit and scripturally anchored. It is as 
much about self-effacingly entering the mystery of Being as it is communing 
with Christ. Like the mysticisms of Aquinas and St. John of the Cross, it has its 
origin and terminus in caritas—the bottomless and supremely mysterious 
divine love of God and God’s love for us—and it is present throughout 
Maritain’s life and work as he grapples with the meaning of Being and the hard 
road of spiritual perfection. It is present in Maritain’s frequent personal and 
theological reflections on the experience and contemplative significance of 
suffering in the light—or shadow—of the Cross of Christ. In this regard, 
Maritain quotes St. Paul in expressing his ‘supreme desire: “cupio dissolvi et 
esse cum Christo” [meaning] I desire to be dissolved and be with Christ.”’72  
 Consequently, in the seventh and final chapter of this study I show that 
Maritain’s mysticism calls for a balancing of core and contextualist occupations 
and methodologies, of apophatic mystery and Catholic affirmations of faith and 
prayer. At the highest point of mystical contemplation, I suggest, is an 
indissoluble paradox that reflects the aforementioned mysteries of Catholic 
faith, that, as Maritain says, God ‘is actually known—while remaining unknown 
and inscrutable.’73 One novel suggestion I offer in the final chapter is that this 
calls for entertaining the possibility that, considered in its both biographical and 
theological aspects, it is complex enough to transcend the terms of the 
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1. The Sorbonne 
At the time Henri Bergson was appointed Chair in Greek and Latin philosophy 
at the Collège de France in 1900, the French philosophical scene was 
dominated by the three broad philosophical traditions of positivism, founded 
by Comte and carried forward without Comte’s political emphases by 
Durkheim at the Sorbonne, idealism, led by Brunschvicg also at the Sorbonne, 
and third, spiritualism, which had its origins in Maine de Biran, and to which 
Bergson brought his own doctrines and style.  
 As students of French philosophy know, the channels by which one 
becomes a professional philosopher in France were and still are highly 
centralized. Analogous to the historical rivalry of the Café de Flore and the 
Deux Magots, there was, at the time, between the Sorbonne and the Collège 
de France—the two seats of institutional philosophical power in France—a 
‘mountain of distrust of prejudice . . . particularly so on the part of the Sorbonne 
philosophers with respect to Bergson’s teaching.’1 As Raïssa Maritain relates, 
when she and her fiancé Jacques, who were students at the Sorbonne, 
decided to attend Bergson’s famous lectures in 1902, ‘These feelings were so 
strong that it was almost as difficult for the young students to think of going 
from the Sorbonne to the Collège de France as from the Sorbonne to the 
Church of Saint Genevieve, its near neighbour.’2  
 Responding to the positivist rejection of metaphysics and the idealists’ 
hyper-intellectualism and discounting of the epistemological significance of the 
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body and the emotions, Bergson offered a unique challenge to the historically 
dominant metaphysical position that privileges being over becoming. For 
Bergson, ultimate reality is constituted of neither discrete, atomistic simples 
nor a static One; rather, ultimate reality is conceived as mobility or ‘pure 
duration’, known through pre-linguistic and therefore pre-conceptual intuition. 
With regard to animate life forms, this mobility is manifested for Bergson in the 
élan vital—a ‘vital impulse’ which spontaneously pushes for novel and 
increasingly complex forms, and which was thought by Bergson to explain the 
emergence of consciousness better than other evolutionary theories.  
 While of the highest quality with respect to the sciences (with the 
teaching and friendships of eminent scientists such as Felix Le Dantec),3 the 
intellectual environment of the Sorbonne at which Jacques and Raïssa 
Maritain studied at the turn of the twentieth century was for them, as it was for 
Bergson, sterile, fundamentally atheist and epistemologically skeptical. Raïssa 
recalled:   
At the Sorbonne, as we knew it, the scientists, insofar as they 
philosophised at all, were generally partisans of such 
philosophical theories as mechanism, epiphenomenalism, 
absolute determinism, evolutionary monism—doctrines which 
deny the reality of the spirit and the objectivity of all knowledge 
which goes beyond the cognition of sensible phenomena. All 
these theories constituted a more or less acknowledged system 
which Jacques, several years later, in one of his first books was 
to designate by the name of Scientism.4 
In what is one of the great stories of Western intellectual and spiritual 
biography, the Maritains’ paradoxical resigned acceptance of and 
disillusionment with the scientistic and skeptical teaching of the Parisian 
intellectual elite reached a crisis point, culminating in their suicide pact in 1902. 
Raïssa relates that at the time they determined: 
If we must also give up the hope of finding any meaning 
whatever for the word truth, for the distinction of good from evil, 
of just from unjust, it is no longer possible to live humanly . . . I 
would have accepted a sad life, but not one that was absurd. . 
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. . Either the world could be justified, and this could not be if real 
knowledge did not exist; or else life was not worth the trouble of 
a moment’s further notice.5 
Jacques and Raïssa determined that if they could not somehow find or realize 
the ability of the intellect to reach truth and discover immutable values on which 
to base their thought and lives within a year, they would commit suicide. This 
moment in the Maritains’ lives is of great philosophical and theological 
consequence, and as I will show, directly relevant in examining the relationship 
between Maritain and phenomenology. It was, however, only by attending 
Bergson’s famous lectures at the Collège de France at Péguy’s suggestion 
that the Maritains did not end up acting upon their pledge.  
 For Jacques and Raïssa, Bergson’s philosophy offered the possibility 
of reaching ultimate reality, of discovering truth, to everybody: 
Bergson freed the mind in calling it back to the inward activity 
wherein is its real life, back to the entirely qualitative depths of 
consciousness. He forcefully and successfully combatted the 
tendency of the philosophers of his time to reduce everything—
even the qualitative, the unique and the incomparable—to 
number and space, to quantities which may be measured, 
superposed and reversed after the fashion of the externality 
and homogeneity of physico-mathematical relations . . .6 
 
While renouncing socialism after his conversion to Catholicism, Maritain 
remained a Bergsonian for some time. By 1908, however, he keenly felt what 
he believed was Bergson’s misconstrual of conceptual knowledge and an 
incompatibility between Bergsonism and Catholic doctrine concerning the 
viability of concepts in attaining and expressing knowledge of ultimate truths. 
At the suggestion of Raïssa, Maritain became acquainted with the writings of 
St. Thomas Aquinas and spent several years in study before his article ‘Les 
Deux Bergsonismes’ was published in Revue Thomiste in 1912 and his first 
book, La Philosophie bergsonienne: études critiques (Bergsonian Philosophy 
and Thomism), was published in 1914.  
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 This book was, as Maritain regretfully recalled, a thorough but 
unnecessarily harsh critique of his former master. Maritain was to claim that 
Bergson was an anti-intellectualist, that he defined the intellect too narrowly as 
that which merely creates concepts based on utility and that he consequently 
pits the intellect against the faculty of intuition, only the latter of which was able 
to access reality.7 Maritain would, nevertheless, be forever in debt to Bergson 
for his notion of intuition to the extent, Peter Redpath argues, that ‘What we 
find in Maritain is an “inverted” Bergsonianism translating into the language of 
later scholastic Thomism and speculative metaphysics the major principles of 
Bergsonian thought.’8 
2. Bergson’s Intuition 
Bergson is significant in this enquiry into the immanent mysticism of Maritain 
not just because of his influence on Maritain but also because his example 
helps us to discern the basic philosophical motivations at play in Maritain’s 
mystically-directed project by serving as a foil revealing the philosophical 
motivations in direct opposition to the mystical.  
 Historically, Bergsonism was replaced by phenomenology as the 
dominant stream of philosophy in France from the 1930s onwards, following 
the publication of Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, whose 
tone was considered too religious for upcoming philosophers influenced by 
Husserl, namely Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Gary Gutting relates that twentieth 
century French philosophy often had anti-religious overtones and that Bergson 
was the last major philosopher in France in that century sympathetic to 
religious belief. His defense of religion in the Two Sources was one of the 
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reasons why he was quickly eclipsed in French intellectual life. 9  In this 
connection, Gutting remarks:  
Bergson, for all his flair and brilliance, was too much of a pre-
war figure, a philosopher . . . of ‘final serenity’ through 
communion with nature. The terrors of two world wars made 
such optimism unpalatable if not ludicrous, and philosophers of 
the second half of the twentieth century turned to thinkers like 
Heidegger with a sensibility for the tragedy and absurdity of 
existence.10 
 
Bergsonism received something of a revival through the work of Giles Deleuze 
in the 1960s, but that was in part because Deleuze argued that Bergsonism 
was a credible alternative to phenomenology, particularly regarding 
intentionality, writing that for Husserl, the founder of the most distinct and 
significant school of phenomenology, consciousness is intentional (that is, 
always about or of an object), whereas for Bergson consciousness is its own 
object.11 More importantly, Maritain remarks that Bergson,  
 
really was a philosopher and holds no place in the line of 
descent. . . . After Bergson, everybody readily re-entered the 
Cartesian lineage, at the thin end of it: with Husserl first . . . and 
for whom, whatever the catastrophe he caused, I have a great 
intellectual respect. I also have intellectual respect for some of 
those who take after him, Heidegger in particular, [whereas] I 
have none for Jean-Paul Sartre, who seems to me too artful. . . 
. But he has offered a testimony we would be quite wrong to 
neglect.12 
 
From this we learn not only that Maritain himself thought that Bergson broke 
with the Cartesian tradition so dominant in French philosophy but also that he 
thinks that Husserl and the phenomenologists after him actually regress in their 
returning to Cartesianism. In fact, for reasons that will be made clear, Maritain 
considers the advent of Cartesian philosophy as singularly disastrous for 
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Western thought and religion, refusing to grant Descartes and those following 
in his footsteps, such as Husserl, the status of true philosophers. 13  This 
suggests a fundamental divergence between what I claim is Maritain’s 
mystically-orientated philosophy and Cartesian philosophy. From the above 
quote we also get a taste of what Maritain thinks of Heidegger and Sartre. More 
on all of this shortly. 
 As Descartes was the principle enemy of Maritain, so Kant, in the same 
vein as a rationalist, was Bergson’s. Bergson concedes to Kant the limits of 
knowledge by rational cognition, but does not rest there, arguing instead for 
another mode of cognition able to access reality, or things ‘in themselves’. This 
mode or faculty of cognition is intuition, a concept which Bergson rescues from 
everyday parlance and brings to supreme metaphysical and epistemological 
value, and as William Fossati writes, like ‘the trunk of a tree’, intuition 
‘supported any number of subordinate principles as though they were 
branches. His positions on duration, perception, biological evolution, and faith 
all bore on his treatment of intuition.’14 Bergson’s metaphysic is one of motion 
and change, and his underlying method and principle is intuition.  
 Bergson’s aim, then, was nothing less than to re-establish metaphysics 
after Kant had placed on it seemingly impenetrable epistemological 
constraints, 15  Reclaiming metaphysics—and thereby recovering the 
metaphysical defense of deity and a cosmic universe as opposed to a universe 
contained within the limits of human thought—was, for Maritain, not only 
philosophical salvation, but in the end, also literal salvation.16 It is reasonable 
to believe that Bergson, in proving to Maritain that the mind was able to access 
real being, as opposed to mere phantasms of thought, also provided the 
philosophical foundation of Maritain’s Catholic faith, that is, the metaphysical 
and epistemological realism just alluded to, allowing for the objective reality of 
                                                 
13 Ibid., p. 102.  
14 William Fossati, ‘Out Of The Shadow: Henri Bergson and Three French Philosophers’, in 
Douglas Ollivant (ed.), Jacques Maritain and the Many Ways of Knowing (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 2002), p. 277. 
15 IM, pp. 56–60. 
16 Jacques Maritain, De Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin: essais de métaphysique et de morale 
(Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1947), p. 57, 127; WHBF, pp. 79–82.  
  37  
which the saintliness of Léon Bloy was a sign and which Maritain claimed that 
Bergson grasped—albeit perhaps reservedly—such that it spoke to him on its 
own terms: 
[W]hen Jesus teaches the disciples and says to them, for 
example, ‘I and the Father are one’, or ‘when the Paraclete 
comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, he will bear 
a witness to me,’ do the terms of these propositions come from 
a priori synthetic judgements subsuming the data of experience 
(no, that won’t do), or do they express an Idea of Reason in 
which a postulate of practical Reason obliges us to believe? 
(That won’t do either.) In what drawer of the Critique, then, must 
we put the terms of the assertions uttered by the Lord?. . . . 
 The Judeo-Christian revelation is the strongest, the most 
insolently self-assured testimony rendered to the reality in itself 
of being—the being of things, and Being subsisting by itself—I 
say being dwelling in the glory of existence in total 
independence of the mind that knows it. Christianity professes 
with a tranquil impudence what in the philosophical vocabulary 
is known as realism.17 
Bergson argues that the intellect is a tool in the service of evolution, and given 
that the value of such a tool is the guaranteeing of survival by detection and 
manipulation of entities animate and inanimate, the intellect perceives the 
world as a conglomeration of things in space.18 As such, our thinking about 
things is primarily quantitative rather than qualitative, and our language deals 
in spatial metaphors, discrete units such as miles, pounds and most tellingly, 
minutes of time—which, like rhythm in musical notation, can only be conceived 
of, Bergson says (in agreement with Kant), by drawing or imagining a 
geometrical line. Common sense and everyday language and practical life, 
Bergson says, ‘proceeds, on the one hand, by solid perceptions, and, on the 
other, by stable conceptions.’19 Motion or movement, like time, is therefore 
analyzed as ‘points’ or ‘instants’, as when we say: ‘At this (or that) point in 
time’. What we fail to see, in virtue of our practical preoccupations, is that what 
we call time and motion are both pure ‘mobility’, or change,20 the experience 
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of which Bergson calls ‘duration’. Peter Redpath writes that for Bergson, 
concepts are ‘wholly practical instruments ([that is,] they are wholly utilitarian 
signs)’ and ‘for him the human intellect is not made for truth—it is made to 
fabricate.’21 
 Bergson famously describes two ways of knowing a thing, that of 
analysis and that of intuition. Analysis always proceeds from outside the given 
object, from a certain perspective in relation to it. We are then forced to 
represent the object using an image, sign, or symbol and then reconstruct the 
object on the basis of the representations which possess only a resemblance 
to one another but which can never give us the whole or what we might call 
the being of the object.22  Examples Bergson gives are a translation of a 
passage in Homer, the identification of psychological states of a person by the 
psychologist, and an artist’s sketch of the towers of Notre Dame in Paris.23 All 
these, Bergson says, are symbols and parts isolated from the whole and 
incapable of re-constituting the whole.24 
 The second way of knowing a thing—intuition—consists of entering into 
the thing by means of an ‘intellectual sympathy.’25 Other than becoming one 
with motion, as opposed to translating into points and instants, Bergson offers 
the example of identifying ourselves with a character in a novel, rather than 
merely attempting to construct an image of the character on the basis of the 
very limited knowledge that we get of them for the purposes of story.26 Another 
example Bergson gives is that of the many meanings of a poem, often folded 
within one another and which, in their singular significance for the reader, defy 
intersubjective expression and rational explanation.27 Only coincidence with 
the person or the meaning that presents itself in literature, can give us the 
‘absolute’, Bergson says, going on to argue that ‘It is in this sense, and this 
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sense only, that absolute is synonymous with perfection.’ 28  Furthermore, 
because with intuition we know the original and not its representation, ‘[i]t is 
doubtless for this reason that the absolute has often been identified with the 
infinite.’29 Entering into the object as opposed to analysing it from outside, we 
are able to comprehend that ‘[t]hat which lends itself at the same time both to 
an indivisible apprehension and to an inexhaustible enumeration is, by the very 
definition of the word, infinite.’30 
 For Bergson it is direct, non-mediated intuition which allows us to grasp 
the pure, qualitative nature of duration. What Bergson calls ‘duration’ is 
perception of the self, of the constant, irreducible and self-subsistent mobility 
and of qualitative ‘multiplicity of expanding states’, including of the self’s 
conscious states, continuously permeating one another.31 As such, he was 
opposed to philosophical ‘systems’ and the concepts upon which they are built, 
as they are necessarily static signs and symbols arbitrarily isolating and 
reifying a piece of a thing, offering only relative and incomplete knowledge of 
it.32 Bergson says that the ‘inner life’ is ‘all this at once: variety of qualities, 
continuity of progress, and unity of direction.’33 Bergson argues forcefully: 
In this way, as many different systems will spring up as there 
are external points of view from which the reality can be 
examined. . . . Simple concepts have, then, not only the 
inconvenience of dividing the concrete unity of the object into 
so many symbolical expressions; they also divide philosophy 
into distinct schools, each of which takes its seat, chooses its 
counters, and carries on with the others a game that will never 
end. Either metaphysics is only this play of ideas, or else, if it is 
a serious occupation of the mind, if it is a science and not simply 
an exercise, it must transcend concepts in order to reach 
intuition.34 
 
All this, however, did not mean that Bergson quit philosophy or ceased writing. 
While Bergson did believe that it was only by means of intuition that we can 
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come into touch with the Real, he was by no means an anti-intellectualist—a 
charge which Maritain later regretted. As Thomas Gwozdz argues, Maritain did 
not intend to claim that Bergson sought to destroy the intellect, but rather, that 
by critiquing the pre-eminence of the intellect and of analysis, ‘destroy the 
notion that scientific knowledge is the only paradigm of knowledge.’ 35  As 
related earlier, Bergson sought to end the dominance of positivism, which not 
only introduced Maritain to the possibility of a realist philosophy—his own 
brand of which Maritain was later to call ‘critical realism’—but which also led 
Maritain on a similar life-long struggle against positivism. For Bergson, intuition 
and philosophical analysis function together. This is first because the intuition 
must inevitably be interpreted and articulated in some manner, second 
because Bergson insisted that new concepts can be fashioned to express such 
a metaphysical intuition, and third because Bergson himself insisted on the 
complementarity of intuition and analysis for philosophical knowledge—
intuition being expressed in analysis and analysis serving to deepen and clarify 
what is given in intuition, with the philosopher always referring back to the 
intuition to prevent or minimize misinterpretations.36 Bergson writes: 
 
On no point, whatever, then, do we diminish the intelligence; we 
do not drive it away from any of the territory it has occupied up 
to the present. . . . Only beside it, we note the existence of 
another faculty capable of another kind of knowledge. Thus we 
have on one hand science and mechanical art, which have to 
do with pure intellect; on the other hand, metaphysics, which 
calls upon intuition. . . . But intuitive, or intellectual, knowledge 
will be stamped with the seal of precision.37 
 
Bergson argued that philosophy could no longer rely on familiar concepts built 
on the basis of practical utility, inevitably static in nature, but had to employ 
metaphor and craft new, image-laden concepts and in order to indirectly 
express intuition and duration: 
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[Metaphysics] must transcend concepts in order to reach 
intuition. Certainly, concepts are necessary to it, for all the other 
sciences work as a rule with concepts, and metaphysics cannot 
dispense with the other sciences. But it is only truly itself when 
it goes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from 
rigid and ready-made concepts in order to create a kind very 
different from those which we habitually use; I mean supple, 
mobile and almost fluid representations, always ready to mold 
themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition.38 
 
Bergson famously chose the examples of winding thread into a ball and an 
indefinite stretching of a piece of elastic to express mobility and duration and 
of moving one’s hand to express direct, non-discursive knowledge, or intuition. 
The new concepts for the expression of the metaphysics were ‘duration, 
qualitative or heterogenous multiplicity, unconsciousness—even 
differentiation, if one considers the notion such as it was to begin with.’39 
Bergson also clearly favors qualitative nouns over quantitative nouns, such as 
‘elements’, ‘aspects’, ‘notes’ and ‘expressions’ over the notion of ‘part’. 40 
Bergson does not, therefore, do away with concepts, but with what he 
considers as merely static representations or signs of reality. For this reason, 
Bergson writes that ‘Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to 
dispense with symbols.’41 
 As Redpath relates, for Maritain, the underlying problem with Bergson’s 
philosophy was that it approached the immediate character of intuitive 
knowledge in the wrong manner.42 Maritain claims that 
 
it supposed that all knowledge truly attaining the real be a lived 
coincidence, without subjective intermediary, of the subject and 
object, thus known, it is thought, in all the plenitude of its reality, 
thus exhausted to the very root; Bergsonism then opposes its 
intuition to the idea, to the concept, to abstract knowledge—and 
to reason, to discursive knowledge.43 
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As we have seen, Bergson claimed that true knowledge of the absolute must 
be intuitive, which as direct, non-discursive sympathy, cannot have the 
intermediary of a concept inevitably produced by external analysis. Before 
going into detail about Maritain’s solutions to Bergson’s opposition between 
intuition and the concept, it is worth noting with Redpath that Maritain’s overall 
approach is 
 
to consider knowledge of the real to be a lived coincidence, not 
without subjective intermediary but with it. Knowledge of the 
real does not occur without ideas; it occurs with them. Thus 
intuition is not opposed to conceptualization, abstraction, 
reasoning, or discursive knowledge; it is naturally joined to 
them.44  
 
Maritain sought to incorporate Bergsonian intuition in what he will call the 
‘intuition of being’—a notion which will provide one of the main focusses of this 
study. As Gwozdz writes, Maritain spent his whole life clarifying and deepening 
his understanding of intuition, and, particularly, of the intuition of being and its 
implications for metaphysics, the inception of which he owes to Bergson.45 
Maritain wrote early on in Bergsonian Philosophy and Thomism: 
 
The intellect . . . produces, as long as truth requires it, new 
concepts, in the measure and likeness of things, which well up 
from the depths of its activity and which contain exhaustible 
riches; for it is true as Bergson has expressed it, perhaps 
exaggerating a little, that each of the great philosophers has 
spent his whole life in developing, in every possible direction, a 
single intuition, in reality the intuition in question has been an 
intellectual intuition, a living intellectual perception expressible 
in ideas or concepts.46 
 
Maritain also aims to incorporate the Bergsonian notion of intuition as 
sympathy in productive knowledge (poieton). The intuition of duration in the 
latter terminates, Maritain writes,  
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in a fusion of the mind in the thing, it transports us into the object 
and identifies us by an intense and even painful effort of 
sympathy with what is unique, inexpressible, incommunicable 
in the thing . . . with matter itself—which united to form, makes 
the singularity of the thing.47 
 
The particular way in which Maritain reconstituted Bergsonian intuition as 
sympathy was to determine his fundamental notion of connaturality as applied 
in art, morality and mystical experience. In Bergsonian Philosophy and 
Thomism, a very early work, Maritain writes of the ‘creative invention’ of the 
artist48—which was to become ‘poetic ‘intuition’ and ‘creative intuition’ in later 
works. Maritain writes that the effort of intuition ‘remains intellectual but, 
because it is a question of penetrating the contingent singular, the intelligence 
in it is “pushed out of doors,” into the domain peculiar to sense.’49 This relates 
to Maritain’s other solution to Bergson’s opposition between intuition and the 
concept, the notion of intentionality, of the mind becoming its object even 
through the concept.50  Intentionality, with Maritain’s intuition of being, will 
receive some attention later in this study and I will argue that it is also one 
source of Maritain’s affinities with Heidegger. 
 However, for now, let us observe with Gwozdz that Bergsonian intuition 
was a principal inspiration for Maritain’s own philosophy. It provided Maritain 
with the following insights: 
 
[F]irst, that metaphysics [is at all] possible; second the basic 
insight that metaphysics must have its foundation in an intuition; 
third, that conceptual knowledge and intuition are two different 
kinds of knowledge; fourth that knowledge of the absolute and 
truth is possible; fifth, that there is an intuition that is in the mode 
of sympathy (Maritain’s connatural knowledge); sixth, that to be 
a metaphysician entails a certain contemplative stance in life; 
seventh, that methodologically, intuition and philosophical 
analysis work hand in hand.51 
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The application of intuition in the practical order, specifically concerning moral 
experience and artistic knowledge and inspiration in the creation of art works, 
will be subjects of considerable importance for mapping out the contours of 
what I argue is the immanent mysticism in Maritain’s life and philosophy, given 
his indebtedness to Bergson and his development of Bergsonian insights. I will 
argue, however, that this is most apparent concerning the ‘intuition of being’, 
as the foundation of Maritain’s philosophy and Catholic faith. This, writes 
Raïssa Maritain, who Jacques always quotes concerning the intuition of being, 
she felt as a ‘powerful intuition’, the ‘violence’ of which, she says, ‘sometimes 
frightened me, and first gave me the knowledge of a metaphysical absolute’.52 
The intuition of being, it will be argued, provides for Maritain a metaphysics 
that is permeated with mystical aspirations. Bergson wrote to Maritain in 1932, 
after reading Maritain’s newly published Distinguish to Unite: ‘It seems to me 
that about certain questions, notably, about mysticism, the distance which 
separates us is less great than one first believed.’ 53  Toward the end of 
Bergson's life, Maritain and Bergson had, in Bergson’s own words, ‘moved 
toward each other, and we have met in the middle of the way.’54 Maritain saw 
in Bergson’s last book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion Bergson’s 
veiled conversion to Catholicism,55 with Bergson’s treatment of the Christian 
mystics as the source and key of his coming to faith.56 
 
3. Bergson and Maritain Versus  
Cartesianism and Kantianism 
 
I said at the beginning of this chapter that Bergson’s philosophy is significant 
in this enquiry into Maritain’s mysticism not just because of his influence on 
Maritain but also because he helps us to discern the philosophical motivations 
at play in Maritain’s mystically-directed project by serving as an antithesis to 
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the philosophical motivations in direct opposition to the mystical. These, I 
suggested, were Cartesianism, and, in virtue of its denial of metaphysical 
knowledge, Kantianism, to which Bergson was opposed. I want now to go into 
further detail of Maritain’s critique of these two philosophical traditions in order 
to bring into sharper focus his underlying preoccupation with the human ability 
to come into contact with Being and, moreover, to know Being intuitively. 
 According to Maritain, Descartes is ‘the father of modern idealism’,57 
and as such, any phenomenologist that is Cartesian in point of departure or 
principles remains in fundamental opposition to Maritain in terms of the 
purpose or end of philosophy. In the case of Husserl, who, in his later work—
especially the Cartesian Meditations—sets out a method explicitly based on 
Descartes’ radical doubt, he becomes, according to Maritain, ‘more Cartesian 
than Descartes’.58  
 From the time of his early work Logical Investigations, in which he 
follows Franz Brentano in describing phenomenology as a ‘descriptive 
psychology’,59  to what we may regard his ‘intermediate’ and transitionary 
phase marked by The Idea of Phenomenology,60 Husserl’s phenomenological 
project was characterized by the realist struggle, as with Bergson, against 
scientism and skepticism. Husserl characterized the view to which he was 
opposed as that ‘[w]hatever is belongs to psychophysical nature, which is to 
say that it is univocally determined by rigid laws’, and which brings with it ‘the 
sort of absurdity that characterises every theory of skepticism’. 61  This is 
because we are then faced with the epistemological problem of how the mind 
can know objective truth and the ground of those very scientific laws positivists 
take for granted.  
 We are forced to turn to epistemology, says Husserl, as a science of 
consciousness and a first philosophy providing the foundations for the 
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sciences. 62  Husserl argues that the objects of mental acts are mind-
independent and that we have an intuitive awareness of particulars, universals, 
causal connections and the states of affairs which they constitute.63 Husserl 
aims to isolate and describe the essential features of conscious experience—
the ‘meaning’ or ‘essence’ of or what it is to perform mental acts such as 
perceiving, judging, remembering, desiring and willing, and the essence of the 
objects of mental acts, which include the particulars, universals and causal 
structures that they are and are built up from.64 Maurice Natanson explains 
that ‘meaning’ here ‘is not designative or referential; it is precisely that which 
is presented as the correlate of intentional [or directed mental] activity.’65 This 
intentional activity—what is called by Husserl, after the philosopher and 
psychologist Franz Brentano—the ‘intentionality’ of the mind, is particularly 
important for our purposes. Brentano characterizes intentionality in the 
following manner. 
 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) 
inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not 
wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards 
an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a 
thing), or immanent objectivity. In presentation something is 
presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in 
love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.66 
 
In other words, every mental act has an object; consciousness is ‘intentional’ 
in that acts of consciousness are always concerning or about something—
such as an idea, a physical object, or feeling or emotion. It is important to note 
that by ‘intentionally inexistent’, Brentano does not mean that the object of a 
mental act does not literally exist, but rather that the object, in being the object, 
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need not be either physical or existentially mind-dependent. In differentiating 
between the object of a mental act and the content that is to be found in the 
mental act by which we can refer to the object, the notion of intentionality, 
seems then, to be allied to a realist position. Phenomenological analysis 
consists in a retrospective, intuitive ‘seeing’ of the modalities of the intentional 
activity of the mind,67 and in this validation of knowledge through an intuitive 
‘seeing’, Husserl aims to refute the epistemological constraints of scientism 
and skepticism. He thus famously writes that in its description of modalities of 
intentional activity, phenomenology allows us to ‘go back to the “things 
themselves”.’68  
 In this connection, Maritain argues in the Degrees of Knowledge that 
the medieval notion of intentionality is indeed strongly allied to a realist 
position. He also argues, however, that in his later Cartesian Meditations, 
Husserl misconstrues intentionality as a property or constituent of objects 
cognized by the mind and, as such, more or less ‘spatial’ in the Cartesian 
setting up of mind confronting object.69 Maritain argues that intentionality is 
not just a property of consciousness, but more fundamentally, ‘a property of 
thought, a prerogative of its immateriality’.70 Intentionality, I will show, is an 
indispensable principle in Maritain’s epistemology as it pertains to moral 
experience, love, and mystical experience. 
 In proclaiming at the start of the Cartesian Meditations that it is in the 
spirit of Descartes’ turning inward and of Cartesian doubt that ‘we make a new 
beginning, each for himself and in himself’,71 Husserl sets out, like Descartes, 
to discover a first philosophy, an absolute ground for knowledge and for the 
constitution of objects as they appear to consciousness. The first and most 
essential step of Husserl’s later phenomenological method is the epoché, or 
‘phenomenological reduction’, which is the suspension of judgements about 
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the existence of everything external (or ‘transcendent’) to the subject which 
may be doubted, such that one begins with the cognizing ego, whose existence 
is ‘apodictic’—that is, evidence of ‘absolute indubitability’ and ‘which discloses 
itself, to a critical reflection, as an absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) 
of the seen object’s non-being’ 72 —and whose mental processes are 
‘immanent’.73  
 In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl argues that the continuous stream 
of or synthesis of all possible experience that is visible upon performing a 
phenomenological reduction implies the existence of a ‘transcendental Ego’, 
and characterizes phenomenology as ‘transcendental idealism’74—a tradition 
most associated with Kant. The ground of phenomenology itself as first 
philosophy, therefore, is the Ego as unifying source of ‘the constituting 
intentionality itself’.75 As such, the operation of the epoché is now called the 
‘transcendental-phenomenological epoché.76 
 
The epoché can also be said to be the radical and universal 
method by which I apprehend myself purely: as Ego, and with 
my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective 
world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me. Anything 
belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for 
me—that is to say, is accepted by me—in that I experience it, 
perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge about it, 
value it, despite, or the like.77 
In his critique of Husserl’s transcendental ‘turn’, Roman Ingarden—one of 
Husserl’s students—writes: 
Just as Kant had insufficient grounds for accepting ‘things in 
themselves’ and had to limit himself to the recognition of 
‘phenomena’ then here we have to reject—Husserl would say—
the allegedly autonomously existing objects and content 
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ourselves with the recognition of intentional correlates of sets 
of cognitive acts.78 
In the fourth meditation of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl states that the 
phenomenological enterprise both culminates in and is sufficient proof for his 
idealism, of a necessarily existent, grounding and constituting Ego, writing: 
[W]e have here a transcendental idealism that is nothing more 
than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of 
a systematic egological science, an explication of my ego as 
subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect to 
every sense of what exists, wherewith the latter might be able 
to have a sense for me, the ego.79  
The precise nature or version of Husserl’s ‘transcendental idealism’ is a matter 
of philosophical dispute. However, in The Degrees of Knowledge and The 
Peasant of the Garonne some thirty years later, Maritain argues that Husserl, 
having been of a realistic philosophical orientation partly thanks to Brentano’s 
reintroduction of the notion of intentionality, falls into a metaphysical idealism 
beyond those of Descartes and Kant. ‘[I]n spite of all the philosopher’s 
[Husserl’s] efforts’, writes Maritain, ‘in spite of the realistic tendency which gave 
birth to phenomenology, it remains radically incapable of furnishing anything 
but an illusory idealistic substitute for the real.’80 Maritain is exceptionally clear 
in his writings about phenomenology that Husserl is an idealist and a ‘victim of 
Descartes and Kant’,81 and as such, is in fundamental opposition to Thomism 
and Christian realism.  
Nothing is more instructive than the way phenomenology, after 
being finally vanquished by the false ‘radicalism’ of Cartesian 
principles, ends up today by returning in a most decided 
fashion, proud of its rediscovered bonds, to the Kantian tradition 
and by declaring itself to be a new transcendental idealism 
different, it is true, from Kantian idealism, but chiefly in that it 
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refuses to ‘leave open the possibility of a world of things-in-
themselves, be they nothing more than concept-limits.’82 
Husserl writes of the constituting character of the transcendental Ego: 
That the being of the world ‘transcends’ consciousness in this 
fashion (even with respect to the evidence in which the world 
presents itself), and that it necessarily remains transcendent, in 
no wise alters the fact that it is conscious life alone, wherein 
everything transcendent becomes constituted, as something 
inseparable from consciousness . . .83 
Intentional analyses, as revealing the operations of consciousness, are 
supervenient upon the objects which are themselves now ontologically 
dependent on particular types of operations performed by consciousness as 
constitutive and synthesizing.84 Husserl appears to give the transcendental 
ontological rather than merely epistemic priority, positing a relationship of 
existential dependence of the world on the transcendental Ego: 
By phenomenological epoché I reduce my natural human Ego 
and my psychic life—the realm of my psychological self-
experience—to my transcendental-phenomenological Ego, the 
realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience. 
The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always 
has and always will exist for me, the only world that ever can 
exist for me—this world, with its Objects, I said, derives its 
whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from 
me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who 
comes to the fore only with transcendental-phenomenological 
epoché.85  
For Maritain, Husserlian phenomenology is bereft of being as ‘the first thing 
given to the mind’,86 and makes the mistake of ‘thinking of being while refusing 
to think of it as being’.87 It was after reading The Peasant of the Garonne that 
Thomas Merton remarked to Maritain ‘It had not occurred to me—yet it is so 
                                                 
82 DK, p. 111; Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 72 
83 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 62. 
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85 Cartesian Meditations, p. 26 (original emphasis). 
86 DK, p. 106. 
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obvious—that the phenomenologists by and large have no sense of being.’88 
In his brief treatment of phenomenology in that book, Maritain writes that 
Husserlian phenomenology, in replacing extra-mental being with (the) idea(s) 
of being, is thereby a 
lineage of idealist origin, which from mutation to mutation more 
and more radically impugns extra-mental reality and the 
absolutely primary foundation of philosophic knowledge, could 
not possibly be called a philosophic lineage. Whoever is careful 
to be precise in his language should consider it an ideosophic 
lineage.89 
With Heidegger, however, the picture is quite different. While emerging from 
Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger strives just as much as Maritain to end 
the dominance of Cartesianism in Western philosophy and society at large. 
Maritain sees in Heidegger a philosopher ‘obsessed with anxiety for being’, but 
argues that, for the reasons just elucidated, phenomenology prevents him from 
realizing in a genuine intuition of extra-mental being. 90  That said, I 
nevertheless claim that Heidegger, especially as he moves from 
phenomenology to the rejection of philosophy and the affirmation of what he 
calls ‘thinking’ (Denken), has deep affinities with Maritain in the search for and 
contemplation of Being. For this reason, Caputo claims that in his later works, 
which focus on the meditative ‘letting-be’ (Gelassenheit) of Being, ‘Heidegger 
moves into the proximity of the German mystics’ and he regards Heidegger’s 
Denken as at least analogous to Eckhartian, apophatic mysticism.91  
 In fact, the underlying connection between Maritain, Bergson and 
Heidegger, is their common preoccupation with demonstrating that contact 
between the human being and Being as such—that is, the extra-mental reality 
of all things—is actually possible, in contradistinction to scientism and both 
absolute idealism and Kantian idealism, which for Maritain have their origin in 
Descartes. Maritain says in a little-known lecture that the existentialism of 
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Heidegger and Sartre, is in fact ‘a sign of a certain deep want to find again the 
sense of Being.’92 This sense of Being, for Maritain, is absent in Husserl and 
Cartesianism. For Husserl, the transcendental Ego is that upon which all else 
supervenes, being the absolute, non-contingent, ontological ground of all 
else.93 To this Maritain responds that though I can be certain of my existence, 
I can also be certain that I, as self, am contingent. Recognizing myself as 
actual but not necessary, I must ground myself upon that which is ‘pure Act’, 
or necessary.94 As such, science cannot begin with my own existence as the 
prime datum of the speculative intellect, but rather with the principle of 
identity,95 which, also difficult to express, may be defined as the law that a 
thing or being is, and is itself.96 The principle of identity, I interpret Maritain to 
mean, because I intuitively recognize I am or another thing in relation to me is 
existent, as moving, doing, living, being absent—as opposed to a mere 
blankness or absence of any intentional content. This intuition, which is the 
intuition of being, is fundamental to Maritain’s entire philosophy, demonstrating 
not only that Maritain is absolutely opposed to Cartesian and Kantian or 
transcendental philosophy, but also that for Maritain all human cognition 
involves intuition and first of all concerns a dynamic relating to extra-mental 
Being on the part of the human being. As Maritain writes in A Preface to 
Metaphysics, the mind ‘sees intuitively the first principle of all which it will 
formulate thus: each being is what it is.’97 And, more importantly: 
To exist is to maintain oneself and to be maintained outside 
nothingness; esse is an act, a perfection, indeed the final 
perfection, a splendid flower in which objects affirm themselves. 
Moreover, the formula [of the principle of identity] also means 
‘being is not non-being’. . . .  
 What an excellent thing it is that we are compelled to 
stammer, debate, and dispute, that we meet with technical 
difficulties in formulating the first self-evident intellectual 
principle. It is indeed proof that is not a matter of formulas but a 
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96 Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being, trans. unknown 
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1945), pp. 91–93. 
97 Ibid., p. 92 (original emphasis). 
  53  
living intuition whose purely spiritual light incomparably 
transcends all the words in the dictionary.  
 The principle of identity is concerned with being outside 
the mind, with the implications of being at least possible, and is 
thus not a law of thought but the first law of objects outside the 
mind apprehended in the intuition of being.98 
In speaking of a ‘living intuition whose purely spiritual light incomparably 
transcends all the words in the dictionary’, Maritain is speaking of an immediate 
and non-discursive relation between the human mind and Being in which 
reality both ‘is’ and ‘is not’, an alternation between existence and non-
existence.  
 While Maritain’s language is dominated by a Thomistic occupation with 
esse, the act of existence, and with causality when he speaks of oneself being 
‘maintained outside of nothingness’, we gain four crucial insights. The first is 
that the apprehension of Being is, first of all, not conceptual but intuitive. The 
second is that this intuition does not preclude laws pertaining to the nature of 
reality, given that Maritain is a metaphysical and epistemological realist (such 
that Being takes on positive attributes). The third insight is that what Maritain 
calls the ‘intuition of being’, with all its immanent and implied metaphysical 
principles, is in fact the retrospective articulation of an even more primordial 
experience, which is the meeting, or confrontation, between the human being 
and reality to express which one must ‘stammer, debate, and dispute’—and 
this, I claim, is the foundation of his mysticism. We therefore see—and this is 
the fourth insight—that Maritain’s metaphysical articulations of pre-conceptual 
experiences of reality reveal both ‘core’ and ‘contextualist’ elements, and that 
these are, in fact, not opposed, because the primordial experience of Being, 
while it resists articulation, does not thereby totally preclude it. When Being is 
given the name of God, this amounts to the same paradox immanent in 
Christian mystical experience that I alluded to in the introduction, that, as 
Maritain says, God ‘is actually known—while remaining unknown and 
inscrutable.’99         
 Even so, if one wishes to avoid the relativistic implications of Katz’s 
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Kantian-motivated contextualism of mystical experience while conceding the 
epistemological relevance of the mystic’s wider context, one must affirm some 
form of metaphysical realism so that mystical experiences can, at least in 
principle, have as their object some extra-mental, divine reality, rather than an 
object which is constructed by, and in Husserl’s terminology, immanent to, 
consciousness. In this philosophical realism, I claim that Maritain, Bergson and 
Heidegger are allies, even if Heidegger would reject the term as objectivizing 
reality, as an instance of ontotheology. As we shall see later, it was this 
immanent dynamism between metaphysical realism and mysticism that the 
young Heidegger saw in the medieval scholastics before he argued that the 
philosophy Aquinas was paradigmatic of ontotheology. It is this dynamism 
which I find in Maritain and it has its philosophical roots in both Aquinas and 
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1. Heidegger’s Existential Phenomenology 
Martin Heidegger is perhaps the most influential phenomenologist of the 
twentieth century. Heidegger’s spiritual biography is that of a journey from 
Catholicism (first enrolling in theology and intending to enter the Jesuits) to 
Protestantism, followed by atheism. His intellectual biography is that of a 
journey from scholasticism to a ‘hermeneutic’ phenomenology, followed by 
what is referred to as a ‘turn’ (Kehre) defining his later career, such that some 
scholars differentiate between an early and later Heidegger, or Heidegger ‘I’ 
and ‘II’.1 George Pattison proposes that the ‘themes, methods, topics and 
even stylistics’ in Heidegger’s works considered to be of the later phase ‘taken 
together, define a distinctive body of writing that can be read and studied in 
relative independence from the Heidegger of Being and Time’.2 Madga King 
argues that in Heidegger’s later work, ‘Being is no longer approached through 
man’s understanding, but rather it is man’s understanding which is approached 
through the manifestations of being.’3 I will not attempt to determine whether 
what is reported to be such a clear divide in Heidegger’s career is in fact 
justified, but it is necessary to be aware of what is at least a change in 
Heidegger’s preoccupations as a thinker. And what needs to be noted for the 
purposes of this study is that Maritain himself recognizes a shift in Heidegger’s 
thought amounting to Heidegger giving pride of place to poetry over 
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philosophy. Maritain suggests that this is a culmination of Heidegger’s project, 
rather than a radical break.4 
 Becoming Husserl’s assistant in 1920 and working with him for three 
years, Heidegger was greatly influenced by Husserl and dedicated his first and 
most famous book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) to Husserl in 1927. Even 
so, Heidegger deviated from Husserl’s conception of the phenomenological 
enterprise from very early on. In contrast to Husserl’s Cartesian point of 
departure for philosophy—the reflective subject juxtaposed to the objects of its 
constituting cognitions—Heidegger’s point of departure is an ‘ontological 
difference—the differentiation being and beings’ and ‘surmounting beings in 
order to reach being.’5 Heidegger is obsessed with what he calls ‘the question 
of the meaning of being’ (Sein),6 beginning Being and Time with a quote from 
Plato’s Sophist: ‘For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean 
when you use the expression “being”. We, however, who used to think we 
understood it, have now become perplexed.”’7 But this is not metaphysics as 
traditionally understood. While the central problem for Husserl is the problem 
of constitution, that being how the world as phenomenon is constituted in and 
by our consciousness, instead of asking how something must be given in 
consciousness in order to be constituted, Heidegger goes further than this and 
questions the mode of being of that being in which the world is constituted. As 
John Sallis relates, the historical origins of Heidegger’s thought are Husserlian 
phenomenology as method and Greek ontology as issue.8 Phenomenology, 
thoroughly radicalized by Heidegger, is 
 
our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it 
is our way of giving it demonstrative precision. Only as 
phenomenology, is ontology possible. In the phenomenological 
conception of ‘phenomenon’ what one has in mind as that which 
shows itself is the Being of entities, its meaning, modifications 
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and derivatives.9   
    
Heidegger writes that ‘“phenomenology” is the name for the method of 
scientific philosophy in general.’10 His first ‘law’ of phenomenology is ‘the law 
of proximity’,11 which dictates that what is obvious is precisely that which is 
likely to escape our notice. The paradigmatic case of this our understanding of 
actuality, expressed in the copulative verb ‘is’: ‘Whenever it is said of beings, 
the tiny word “is” names the being of beings’.12 
 This being the case, however, being is understood or revealed to that 
agent which is able to recognize and question it, which Heidegger calls 
‘Dasein’—best translated as ‘being-there’. Dasein is the unique being which is 
able to question being, and more specifically, the meaning of being for itself 
and of itself. Being is uniquely ‘disclosed’ to Dasein and Dasein is able to 
question the meaning of its own being as it presents itself to itself. Given that 
Dasein is ‘already-in-the world’ as the pre-condition for its questioning, 
however, Dasein, must always interpret being according to Dasein’s own 
modalities: 
 
Something like being reveals itself to us in the understanding of 
being, an understanding that lies at the root of all comportment 
toward beings. Comportments toward beings belong, on their 
part, to a definite being, the being which we ourselves are, the 
human Dasein. It is to the human Dasein that there belongs the 
understanding of being which first of all makes possible every 
comportment towards beings. The understanding of being has 
itself the mode of being of human Dasein. . . .  
 The analysis of the understanding of being . . . 
presupposes an analytic of Dasein ordered to that end. This 
analytic has the task of exhibiting the basic constitution of the 
human Dasein and of characterizing the meaning of the 
Dasein’s being.13 
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Heidegger’s claim, prior to the Kehre spoken of earlier, is that to understand 
being it is necessary to understand the being of that being (Dasein) to whom 
being discloses itself. This being of Dasein as a being and which discloses 
itself to Dasein is hereafter capitalized for clarification. Heidegger’s ‘existential 
analytic’ of Dasein will consist in the analysis of Dasein’s modes of being as 
they present themselves in actual experience or ‘everydayness’ as constitutive 
of ‘being-in-the-world’ 14 —what Heidegger calls ‘modes of encounter’ and 
which include ‘readiness-to-hand’, ‘presence-at-hand’, ‘un-readiness-to-hand’, 
‘spatiality’, ‘being-with’, ‘Care’, ‘being-towards-death and many more 
phenomena, which will be discussed in Part II of this study. The important point 
for now, is that given that Dasein is always already involved in the world, 
phenomenology for Heidegger must therefore be hermeneutic, or 
interpretive.15 Like Maritain, Heidegger early on identifies Descartes and Kant 
as his principal targets of philosophical critique, 16  and one important 
consequence of this methodological approach, according to Calvin Schrag, is 
that  
 
Heidegger’s accentuation of the ‘pre-conceptual understanding 
of Being’ constitutes an explicit rejection of the isolation of the 
epistemological subject or the res cogitans as formulated in the 
Cartesian tradition. There is never an isolated ‘I’ given without 
a world, which is then confronted with the task of formulating a 
theory of knowledge for its own existence as well as the 
existence of an ‘external’ world. Prior to the rise of the 
epistemological question there is already a pre-conceptual 
disclosure of man’s relation to his world.17 
 
Again, in my estimation, this relatedness between the human being and the 
world—in contrast to the opposition between or mutual exclusion of the 
Cartesian cogito and the extramental world—is necessary for an immanent 
mysticism or mystical element to be present. It is the most basic kind of 
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common ground between Maritain and Heidegger that allows for a species of 
mysticism in the former and at least a mystical ‘element’ in the latter. 
 Heidegger rejected the label of ‘existentialist’ (for reasons which will be 
detailed later), but it is, nevertheless, usually claimed that he provided the 
impetus of the twentieth century’s existentialist movement that gained 
popularity in post-war France and the United States. For the purposes of this 
study, I follow the common labelling of Heidegger as an existentialist, while 
acknowledging that his later thought does not fall into this category.  
 In fact, the name that most often springs to mind when existentialism is 
mentioned, other than Nietzsche, is not Heidegger, but rather Jean-Paul 
Sartre. In post-war France, Sartre received something of a cult following, and 
the values and preoccupations of French existentialism were absorbed by 
wider society, in time becoming integral to popular culture. Of existentialism 
and existentialists, Sartre famously said that ‘What they [existentialists] have 
in common is simply their belief that existence precedes essence; or . . . that 
subjectivity must be our point of departure.’18  
 Sartre is the culmination of what can be taken as an existentialist 
trajectory or ‘movement’, a movement towards which Maritain reacted strongly 
from the late 1940s onwards. Sartre drew extensively from Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, dedicating his own Being and Nothingness (1943) to Heidegger. It 
was in the light of the popularity of Sartre’s seductive philosophy that Maritain 
wrote Existence and the Existent (1948), aiming in that work to help recapture 
the idea of ‘existentialism’ from atheistic existentialists such as Sartre, whom 
he took to be corrupting the notions of existence and essence. Maritain 
believed Aquinas to be the original and true existentialist and argued both that 
authentic Thomism must be existentialist, and that atheistic existentialisms, 
such as those of Sartre, were incoherent in their denial of essence—with Sartre 
placing freedom as the source and end of all human action and other human 
values in particular.19 Maritain saw no contradiction in God’s existing, his 
giving us a nature or essence, and human beings living free and unique 
                                                 
18 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trans. C. Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2007), p. 20.  
19 EE, pp. 3, 125–143. 
  60  
existences. True Thomism, for Maritain, enabled authentic existence.  
 Whether Maritain’s distinctive brand of Thomism can accurately be 
called ‘existentialism’ is a question that will be touched upon later. However, 
defining existentialism is, despite Sartre’s remarks, a difficult task. As a start I 
shall follow Robert Solomon when he writes that existentialists ‘shift the 
emphasis away from Husserl’s question, “What is knowledge?” to the very 
different question, “What is it to be a person?”’20  
 Existentialism, or existential phenomenology, seeks to describe what it 
is to be a human being, as an individual and as a member of the species. One 
might hark back to Kierkegaard in his insistence on the irreducible value of 
individuality and of embracing one’s existence as an individual, as opposed to 
following custom or common practice uncritically. In his Existentialist 
Philosophies (1947), Emmanuel Mounier, a friend and one-time colleague of 
Maritain’s, does indeed place Kierkegaard and his reaction against 
Hegelianism at the center or ‘trunk’ of the ‘existentialist tree’, writing that 
existentialism generally is  
 
a reaction of the philosophy of man against the excesses of the 
philosophy of ideas and the philosophy of things. For it, the 
fundamental problem of philosophy is not so much existence in 
its widest sense as the existence of man. It accuses orthodox 
philosophy of having far too often ignored him in favour of 
philosophy about the world or about products of the mind.21  
 
Whereas Husserlian phenomenology seeks epistemological foundations, 
existential phenomenology seeks existential foundations, that is, of meaning 
or significance of the life that is lived by the individual—what Gabriel Marcel 
calls ‘ontological weight’. 22  Providing existential foundations involves 
addressing questions of self-identity and self-determination—how to 
characterize the human in its most primordial dimensions of experience in the 
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world and the meaning of one’s own life, as opposed to totalizing systems 
which are seen to undermine or even vitiate human freedom and uniqueness, 
thereby also trivializing the quest for meaning that is significant to the singular 
individual.  
 Existentialists are generally not in the business of providing deductive 
arguments and often merely assert their views on the basis of experience. 
They may make use of implication and suggestion. One of the reasons why 
existentialism is so different from conventional Western philosophy and why 
some are inclined to deny that is in fact philosophy is, as Zaretsky says, that 
‘They may be trying to do something else: to make us think, to give us a vision, 
to inspire us to change our lives by way of many different devices, only one of 
which is argument.’23 
 Like Bergson, and, as we shall see in Part II with the case of mystics, 
existentialists often use a variety of images or impressions, as well as 
narratives and mythical figures to convey their messages. Intimately related to 
the methodology of existentialists is the medium in which they work and 
express their thought. While existentialism is evidently a way of doing 
philosophy and perhaps also a set of doctrines, it is by no means confined to 
academic philosophy, or even to what one might call philosophy at all. The 
mediums through which existentialists express their ideas are as diverse as 
philosophical treatises, news editorials, novels, imaginary dialogues and plays, 
such as Sartre’s novel Nausea and the play No Exit and Heidegger’s dialogue 
‘Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking’ and philosophical poems in 
the short work ‘The Thinker as Poet’.  
 The subject matter, problematics and the methodology of the tradition 
of existentialism broadly construed therefore constitute a break with most 
philosophy ancient and modern and encompass both cognitive and affective 
aspects of human discourse. These are problems for thought, says Swenson 
in his introduction to Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, that have been 
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generally neglected by philosophers, or at most half-heartedly 
pursued. They have had much more to say about the environing 
conditions of life and about the abstract problems of being and 
knowledge, than about life in its inner core, and they have 
expended a finer workmanship upon objectivities than they 
have condescended to bestow upon subjectivities.24 
 
As Caputo relates, it is precisely because Heidegger came to see the priority 
of existential problems over logical problems that he moved away from 
dialogue with Catholicism and became much more interested in Protestant 
thinkers at the heart of modernity—that is, the rise of the subject as the source 
and end of worthwhile contemplation.25 Caputo writes: 
 
The detached objectivism of Scholasticism was rejected in 
favor of concrete existential-phenomenological investigations. 
This is to say that the problem of being for Heidegger was no 
longer the problem of the Being of meaning . . . but the problem 
of the meaning of Being. [Heidegger comes to argue that] . . . 
the meaning of Being can be investigated only by means of an 
existential analytic which will work up the implicit understanding 
of Being embedded in the entirety of Dasein’s concrete life.26 
 
At first glance, the approach of modern existentialism to philosophy as a 
discipline and to human being so delineated seems to be in sharp contrast with 
that of Aristotle and therefrom, Aquinas and scholasticism, who doubtlessly 
take a definite cosmological or ‘objective’ perspective and perhaps even 
disinterested approach, reflected in the style of their texts. In his later writings, 
Heidegger will repudiate the Western philosophical tradition as it unfolds after 
the pre-Socratics, marking Western philosophy as ‘ontotheological’—with the 
moderns employing a largely unacknowledged metaphysics of subjectivity and 
domination that typifies the technological age, and conceptual moral systems 
which are a degradation of a more ‘original ethics’ or ethos found in the ancient 
Greek world.27  
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 With Maritain seeing his own work as both continuing and renewing 
Thomism and claiming that Thomism is a genuine existentialism as distinct 
from a phenomenological existentialism, I am concerned to find out whether 
Maritainian Thomism accommodates the life of the individual, with the 
problems that existentialism addresses of meaning or purpose, solitude, 
authenticity and death. A preoccupation with such existential problems, in my 
estimation, unites Maritain and Heidegger. And such problems are surely what 
give rise to religions and mystical life in the first place. 
 
2. Thomism as a Philosophy of Sein 
 
At the beginning of his study of Heidegger and Aquinas, Caputo states that the 
two are ‘philosophers of being par excellence,’ 28  arguing that Gilson’s 
concern—Gilson, with Maritain, representing the ‘existential’ school of modern 
Thomism as opposed to the ‘transcendental’ school represented by Maréchal 
and Lonergan aiming to reconcile Thomistic metaphysics and Kantian 
epistemology—was at bottom the same as Heidegger’s, i.e. to counteract the 
tendency of metaphysics to ‘make Being something conceivable and 
definable. . . . something entitative’.29 
 The relationship between Maritain and Heidegger is fascinating not only 
because of the general connections already identified, but also because of the 
conspicuous lack of engagement with Heidegger on the part of Maritain, given 
just how much of a leading figure Heidegger was in twentieth century thought, 
perhaps being that century’s most important phenomenologist and 
existentialist thinker. As John Deely observed, in contrast with transcendental’ 
Thomism, in the existential Thomism of Maritain and Gilson, ‘Heideggerean 
thought of Being has found little resonance or deep sympathy.’30  
 That said, while Maritain’s writings on Heidegger are extremely brief, 
what we find is an apparent recognition of Heidegger’s importance over time. 
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This is reflected in an increase in things that Maritain has to say about 
Heidegger, as well as a change of tone in his remarks. In contrast to Maritain’s 
views on Husserl, which did not change, there is evidently some change that 
occurs between what amounts to little more than acknowledgement of 
Heidegger’s existence in The Degrees of Knowledge to a thorough analysis of 
the concept of Dasein in Untrammeled Approaches forty-one years later. In 
The Peasant of the Garonne, Maritain quotes Gilson at length regarding 
Heidegger: 
 
Thomism . . . is a philosophy of Sein insofar as it is a philosophy 
of esse. When young people invite us to make the discovery of 
Martin Heidegger, they invite us, without knowing, to make 
them rediscover the trans-ontic metaphysics of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. . . . they are urging us to follow those we have left 
behind.31 
 
This argument from Gilson is significant because Gilson, a philosopher close 
to Maritain and also like Maritain, an 'existential Thomist’, is claiming that 
contrary to Heidegger’s critique of scholasticism—which is that it operates on 
too shallow a level, of the merely ontic—the scholastic metaphysics of Aquinas 
(and therefrom Maritain and himself) uniquely touched upon something deeper 
which Heidegger either missed or barely recognized. Maritain himself agrees 
and writes: ‘St. Thomas did not stop short at ens—the “be-ing” (“das Seiende”, 
“l’étant”)—but straight to esse (“Sein”, “l’être”), to the act of existing. (A pity . . 
. that Heidegger couldn’t see that.)’32 On this most fundamental question, 
contemporary commentators are very divided, with some, such as John 
Caputo, arguing that Thomistic metaphysics, taken in itself as a system of 
doctrines, does indeed operate on the merely ontic level, and others, such as 
John Knasas, as we shall see later, arguing that the distinction between esse 
and ens suffices to meet the demand of acknowledging the difference between 
Being and beings. My argument in this study follows that of Caputo, and as 
Caputo seeks a pre-metaphysical, mystical tendency which is immanent in 
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Aquinas, so I see the same, if not more pronounced immanent mystical 
tendency in Maritain. 
 
3. Intentionality, Intuition and Time 
 
Given that for Heidegger Dasein is always already related to the world, he does 
not accept Husserl’s conception of intentionality as constitutive of the 
phenomena of consciousness and is also therefore fundamentally opposed to 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction given that it consists for Husserl in 
freeing subjectivity from ontic constraints (that is, being caught up in the midst 
of the realities and passively accepted beliefs of normal, everyday life) and 
thereby for Heidegger brackets the very condition in which Dasein finds itself 
relates to every other being, namely Being.33 It follows that Heidegger is, 
moreover, opposed to Husserl’s notion of the transcendental Ego, given that 
Dasein is always already involved with the world, always finds itself in a 
condition of ‘finitude’, necessarily interpreting beings of the world based on 
available language(s), concepts and knowledge(s).34  
 For Heidegger, intentionality is not conceived as a property of 
consciousness but a relating to that which is, intrinsic to the nature of Dasein 
and present not just as an operation of knowing and thing-as-known of ‘pure 
consciousness’, but present in all of Dasein’s ‘pre-cognitive awareness’.35 As 
Joseph Kockelmans remarks, ‘With this in mind we can easily understand that 
Heidegger’s intentional analysis can never take the form of a constitutive 
analysis as we find in Husserl.’ 36  Husserl’s transcendental Ego is, for 
Heidegger, a pure abstraction from Dasein’s concrete existence. Heidegger 
rejects the Cartesian presumption of the possibility of a disinterested observer, 
capable of a universal or global reflection beyond the limitations of language 
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and culture.37 The notion of ‘spatiality’ in Being and Time denotes Dasein’s 
relatedness to the world, not as an object in Cartesian space—what Heidegger 
refers to as the characteristic of objects merely ‘present-at-hand’—but as that 
which is capable of ‘de-severence’ and ‘directionality’; 38  in other words, 
making objects available to it regardless of physical distance (severing any 
distance between it and objects). 39  Again, Heidegger argues that 
‘fundamental ontology, from which all other ontologies can take their rise, must 
be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein.’40 As we have already seen, 
this existential analytic consists in the phenomenological analysis of the modes 
of being of Dasein. 
 These considerations of intentionality and Dasein’s relatedness to the 
world allows us to go deeper and reach Heidegger's theory of intuition. Unlike 
Bergson, Heidegger does not consider intuition and intellect as two distinct 
faculties of mind or two distinct operations in intellection. Whereas for Bergson 
non-conceptual and non-discursive intuition or ‘intellectual sympathy’ is the 
genuine source of metaphysical knowledge and is prior to subsequent 
conceptualization of experience, for Heidegger there can be no perception 
without interpretation. Heidegger writes that ‘We see not so much primarily and 
originally the objects and things, but rather we first speak about them; more 
precisely, we do not say what we see but rather, vice versa, we see what one 
says about the matter’.41  And again: ‘The concrete intuition that explicitly 
yields an object is never an isolated sensory perception with a single layer, but 
rather is always a layered, that is to say, categorically determinate intuition’.42 
 Heidegger, unlike Bergson, is not skeptical about the ability of language 
to denote or express the real. Description is not alien to what is given in 
experience, and experience is not, therefore, inexpressible. Dan Zahavi 
interprets Heidegger’s position thus: ‘experiential life is imbued with meaning, 
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is intentionally structured, has an inner articulation and rationality and is 
comprehensible because it always spontaneously expresses itself.’43  In a 
passage that seems remarkably similar to Maritain’s own thinking on the 
matter, Heidegger writes: 
 
The categories are nothing invented, no ‘framework’ or 
independent society of logical schemata; they are rather in an 
originary fashion in life itself of life; of life, in order to ‘cultivate’ 
it. They have their own mode of access which, however, is not 
such as would be foreign to life itself, imposed upon it arbitrarily 
from without, rather it is just the eminent way in which life comes 
to itself.44 
 
In his later writings, Heidegger also famously says that ‘Language is the house 
of [B]eing.’45 While in phenomenology the notion of ‘meaning’ is not usually to 
be taken semantically, as when we ask the meaning of a word and proceed to 
look it up in the dictionary, for Heidegger language is, in fact, an intrinsic 
preoccupation in the question of the meaning of being. It seems, then, that for 
Heidegger it is as much a matter of etymology concealing being as it is a matter 
of a more primordial rupture in our relationship with being: 
 
[W]e must above all take an absolutely serious view of the fact 
that gives the question [of being] its immediate necessity, the 
fact that for us being has become little more than a mere word 
and its meaning an evanescent vapor. . . .  
 But the emptiness of the word ‘being’, the total 
disappearance of its appellative force, is not merely a particular 
instance of the general exhaustion of language; rather, the 
destroyed relation to [B]eing as such is the actual reason for the 
general misrelation to language. . . .  
 Because the destiny of language is grounded in a 
nation's relation to [B]eing, the question of [B]eing will involve 
us deeply in the question of language.46 
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While Maritain nowhere makes such a strong claim—amounting to the mutual 
dependence of language and being47—he does always stress the importance 
of correct linguistic distinctions. Throughout Maritain's writings we see a stress 
on the etymology of English and French concepts, usually with their origins in 
the Latin terms used by Aquinas. Much of the time Maritain aims to expound 
these terms and correct modern misunderstandings. We see precisely this in 
Existence and the Existent, in which Maritain attempts to reclaim the language 
of existence and essence (or lack thereof) that he believes Heidegger and 
Sartre have appropriated and deformed. 48  Here I shall quote Maritain at 
length, not only to demonstrate the importance of language to the philosopher 
but also to highlight again Maritain’s own position on existential 
phenomenology: 
 
I am quite aware that the notion of essence, like every other 
notion contained in the lexicon of metaphysics, has been re-
cast in an entirely phenomenological perspective. Precisely 
because of this, if we are to call things by their right names, we 
are obliged to say that in phenomenological existentialism that 
originates in Heidegger there is a radical bad faith which 
consists in appropriating to itself all the notions that we owe to 
the great metaphysicians of being . . . Those notions were 
appropriated for the purpose of exploiting them in the universe 
of phenomenological thought, the universe of the ‘appearance 
which is essence’ (L’Etre et le Néant, p. 12), where, in reality, 
they cease to possess meaning, but where, since the aim is to 
remain a metaphysician, they will continue to be corrupted in 
such a way that they may endlessly yield anti-natural 
meanings.49 
 
Maritain argues that in what is an irony of history, the metaphysical language 
of scholasticism (in other words, Aquinas and Thomism, for Maritain) is in part 
retained in philosophical discourse because of this appropriation and 
corruption: 
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[P]henomenology, under its existentialist aspect, is no more 
than a scholasticism corrupted at its root. Incidentally, this is 
what constitutes its undeniable historical interest. The 
metaphysics of being and scholasticism, though it be only in this 
corrupt form, is back in the main stream of modern philosophy, 
or rather, it makes plain to modern philosophy that a certain 
cycle has been completed. . . . this corrupt scholasticism may 
perhaps be manuring the soil for a new germination of authentic 
metaphysics, at least wherever the earth shall have been 
vigorously enough ploughed.50 
 
It is in virtue of the distant kinship between scholastic metaphysics and 
existentialism which Maritain perceives that he expresses respect for 
Heidegger and regret that he appears to have missed an opportunity to find in 
Aquinas the thinker in whom he can find his model. The key, for Maritain, is 
the commitment to some form of metaphysical realism, which he later calls the 
‘philosophic’ or ‘metaphysical’ eros’. He writes that, judging from his later 
writings, there is in Heidegger ‘an ardent metaphysical eros, but enchained 
too, [which] relentlessly torments, and who, obsessed with anxiety for being, 
carries on a tragic struggle against the emptiness of thought implied by 
phenomenology, only to go and seek help now, it seems, from the poets and 
the theogonic powers of their language’.51 
 In identifying phenomenology as the method of fundamental ontology, 
Heidegger—that is, the Heidegger of Being and Time—is in agreement with 
Husserl that phenomenology allows the philosopher to return ‘to the things 
themselves’, that is, realities which are given in, or present themselves as 
basic facts of experience. However, when it comes to the precise nature of 
those realities, Husserl and Heidegger part ways. For Husserl, the ‘things 
themselves’ are only conceivable in virtue of the prior constituting synthesis of 
consciousness (i.e. as phenomena). Heidegger, by contrast, asks what 
remains unthought in the very appeal to return ‘to the things themselves’. That 
which has remained unthought is nothing less than Being. If phenomenology 
is concerned with things as they show themselves, as Sallis, writes, ‘What 
remains unthought is the ground of the possibility of such showings as those 
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to which phenomenology demands we attend.’52 
 Here we come to the crucial Heideggerian notion of ‘disclosure’ or 
‘disclosedness’—which in his later writings will rather be referred to as ‘original 
truth’ or the Greek aletheia (ἀλήθεια)—as well as notions of the ‘oblivion of 
[B]eing’ and ‘ontotheology’. Admittedly, the number of concepts and notions 
which Heidegger articulates with his own idiosyncratic meanings, as well as 
the organic relationships between them, can initially be overwhelming. The 
complexity and number of Heidegger’s terms, then, demand that one 
approaches them steadily and with caution, being willing to follow Heidegger 
in ‘thinking’ that spirals, rather than proceeds by steps.  
 Heidegger claims that the meaning of being—or Being—has been 
forgotten. He therefore writes that that ‘“Disclosure of [B]eing” means the 
unlocking of what forgetfulness of being closes and hides. And it is through 
this questioning that a light first falls on the essence of metaphysics that had 
hitherto also been hidden.’53 Enquiring about the meaning of Being for Dasein 
is enquiring about that mode of comprehension which allows Dasein to 
apprehend beings in the first place. It is, as Sallis says, that ‘understanding 
which constitutes the ground of the possibility of things showing themselves. It 
is to ask about the opening up of the open space for such showing, about the 
disclosure of world, about disclosedness.’54 Calvin Schrag seems to suggest 
that the posing of question of the meaning of Being for Heidegger is 
synonymous with Dasein's own disclosedness to itself, at least in the first half 
of Heidegger's career—before the Kehre—and ontology as issue and 
phenomenology as method both converge on the problem of Dasein’s 
disclosedness.55 
 If we recall the story of Maritain’s youth, from the very beginnings of his 
intellectual life he too sought to escape the confines that Kant had placed on 
the intellect such that it was incapable to access extra-mental reality. To 
reiterate a fundamental point of Heideggerian methodology adopted in the 
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introduction of this study, we must refer to what remains ‘unthought’ in 
Maritain’s philosophy as ‘the greatest gift that thinking can bestow.’ I claim that 
for Jacques and Raïssa Maritain it was nothing less than an existential 
necessity for them both to experience for themselves and commune with, as 
Heidegger would put it, the Being of beings, and to constantly return to the 
question of what Being is and what it means, in relation to human life as 
disclosed to us. This is why for the Maritains, Bergson’s thought, which 
promised that both things in themselves and Being itself can be accessed by 
the mind was so attractive (at least initially). The existential necessity of 
experiencing Being and pursuing the meaning of Being is the ‘unthought’ in 
both Maritain and Heidegger, which determines their respective philosophical 
projects. And in Maritain’s case at least, it is the source and end of an 
immanent mysticism.  
 To return specifically to intuition, for Maritain, too, as we have seen, 
there is no conflict or temporal ordering between the intuition of sense 
perception and abstraction or conceptualization—there is instead a logical 
ordering. Maritain provides a detailed account of his philosophy of perception 
in Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, in which he offers the teleological claim 
that the more ‘perfect’ powers of the soul of intellect and imagination, while 
being temporally subsequent to the develop of the nutritive powers of the soul, 
are the ontological principle and reason for being of the lower powers of the 
external senses, such that the senses ‘proceed from the essence of the soul 
through the intellect.’56  Every capacity of the human soul is infused with 
intellect.57  
 Maritain and Heidegger therefore seem to have a common 
understanding of the role of the senses and of intuition in the formation of 
metaphysical knowledge as distinct from artistic or moral knowledge. In 
metaphysics, intuition and abstraction are both present, whereas artistic and 
moral experience for Maritain, are first and foremost pre-conceptual, instances 
of connatural knowledge. Of moral knowledge by connaturality, Maritain writes 
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that it ‘is through connaturality that moral consciousness attains a kind of 
knowing—inexpressible in words and notions—of the deepest dispositions—
longings, fears, hopes or despairs, primeval loves and options—involved in the 
night of the subjectivity.’ 58  And the artist, he says, has an ‘experience-
knowledge’ through the senses in intuiting or divining the ‘secret meaning’ of 
things, in virtue of emotion.59  
 With this distinction between metaphysical knowledge and other forms 
of knowledge (artistic and moral), we can agree with but also qualify Redpath’s 
argument that, in appropriating Bergsonian intuition, ‘Maritain's own meaning 
of intuition is a direct knowledge of a thing which does not result from 
reasoning.’60 This is because Maritain also distinguishes between intellect and 
reasoning, such that to intuit correct moral behavior in a given circumstance is 
employing the intellect but not in form of conceptualization and abstraction, as 
if we were to consult Kant’s categorical imperative before making any decision. 
This, for Maritain, is a distinction that rationalists like Descartes and Kant 
especially, could never recognize.61 
 Other than Heidegger’s views on art and ethics, what remains to be 
investigated, however, is the very condition for any experience whatsoever, or 
the ‘horizon’ or ‘field of presence’ of both Dasein itself and objects experienced 
in the world.62 We find here that for Heidegger time is this very horizon of 
experience and of the being of Dasein itself. For Heidegger, time is the 
condition of the being of the subject, as Elliot says, ‘with respect to which the 
relation of concrete human existence to the things of its world is at all 
possible.’ 63  Time is the ‘field of existential possibilities’ 64  that undergirds 
Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein in the second part of Being and 
Time. Heidegger, modifying Kant’s notion of pure intuition and differentiating 
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between the non-sensible ‘pure intuition’ of time as phenomenological horizon 
and ontic or empirical intuition of the senses writes: 
 
Dasein as finite is referred to a subsistent being it encounters . 
. . This ontic [i.e. empirical] intuition is only possible on the basis 
of pure intuition. Space and time as the pure forms of intuition 
are conditions of the finitude of intuition and thereby the most 
acute indices of the finitude of Dasein, precisely insofar as they 
must be realized in advance . . .65  
 
For Heidegger, time or temporality is the horizon or a priori or transcendent 
condition of Dasein’s being, and Dasein’s own modalities must be interpreted 
in terms of time: ‘In this ontological analytic of Dasein, the original constitution 
of the Dasein’s being is revealed to be temporality.’66 It is the temporality or 
finitude of Dasein that engenders ‘anxiety’ in the face of the possibility of one’s 
(my) death (that possibility which prevents the actualization of all other 
possibilities), which is in turn the condition for Dasein’s ‘authenticity’—that is, 
a taking hold of one's own being, a conscious ‘being-towards-death’.67 Time 
is both the condition for all understanding of being and the essential 
constitution of the meaning of Dasein's being: 
 
If temporality constitutes the meaning of the being of the human 
Dasein and if the understanding of being belongs to the 
constitution of the Dasein’s being, then this understanding, too, 
must be possible only on the basis of temporality. Hence there 
arises the prospect of a possible confirmation of the thesis that 
time is the horizon from which something like being becomes at 
all intelligible. We interpret being by way of time (tempus).68 
 
For Maritain, whereas Bergson substitutes Being for time, Heidegger places 
Being on time,69 which he opposes, probably in virtue of Aquinas’ notion of the 
esse subsistens as immutable. This is significant for an analysis of Heidegger’s 
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later claim that the metaphysics of Aquinas contributes to the ‘oblivion’ of Being 
as an instance of ‘ontotheology’, for it will be shown that in the highest mystical 
experience for Maritain, that of the beatific vision, God is experienced beyond 
time, as eternal.  
 To return to a prior theme for now, however, phenomenology, for 
Heidegger, must be hermeneutical, or interpretive, as opposed to being merely 
descriptive. We have seen that this is precisely because of Dasein’s situation 
as finite and always already in the world, incapable of impersonal and universal 
knowledge. The way Dasein conceives the world is considerably determined 
by a linguistic, cultural and religious context, and when conflicts between 
societal norms and personal preferences arise, Dasein is likely to fall back on 
the norms as a source of stability.70 This hermeneutical attitude, characteristic 
of most phenomenology after the Second World War—influenced more by 
Heidegger than Husserl—says Kockelmans, 
 
can be described as that attitude in which the philosopher no 
longer maintains the pretense of being an a-cosmic, a-
historical, and a-social consciousness. The attitude can be 
positively defined as one in which the philosopher must 
consider his own ek-sistence and all its essential characteristics 
as previously given. He then must try to clarify the essential 
structures of his ek-sistence and to understand their ontological 
meaning. The hermeneutic postulate arose when the 
phenomenology of the post-war period rejected the Cartesian 
ideal of ab absolute beginning, which Husserl always 
maintained.71 
 
In conceiving Dasein, Heidegger aims to undermine the dualisms that have 
plagued philosophy—such as that between subject and object, knower and 
known, mind and body, consciousness and experience—and have created 
intractable skeptical dilemmas. For Heidegger, the existence of the ‘external 
world’ is not a genuine philosophical problem: 
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All access to such entities is founded ontologically upon the 
basic state of Dasein, Being-in-the-world; and this in turn has 
care as its even more primordial state of Being (ahead of itself—
Being already in a world—as Being alongside entities within-
the-world). 
 The question of whether there is a world at all and 
whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised 
by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?72 
 
For Maritain and Thomism generally, while metaphysics as first philosophy is 
not necessarily where we begin in thinking as such, all thought, especially 
philosophical, presupposes a foundational metaphysical realism and the 
operation of the mind on immanent and self-evident first principles (such as 
the law of identity) which allow us to cognize reality as something intelligible. 
This we saw at the end of the previous chapter. As such, the question of the 
existence of the external world is also meaningless for Maritain. Furthermore, 
for the above reasons, what we now call ‘epistemology’ or the theory of 
knowledge, is considered by Maritain as dependent upon and a sub-discipline 
of metaphysics, denoting the correct methods of attaining accurate 
correspondences between thought and extra-mental reality, and is therefore 
otherwise known as ‘criticism’.73 For Maritain, contra Descartes and Husserl, 
epistemology can be neither first philosophy nor a discipline separate from 
metaphysics. 
 For Heidegger, then, the transcendental epoché cannot be done 
because the relationship between Dasein and other beings belongs to the 
nature of Dasein itself. In Heidegger’s terminology, Dasein is necessarily both 
ontically and ontologically involved with the world. One might say, that Dasein 
is an aperture through which Being is addressed, demanding and providing 
the possibility of an ontological grounding of all science through an analysis of 
Dasein’s own being and the being of its areas of knowledge. As being-in-the-
world, there is also an ontic imperative to explore the meaning of Dasein’s own 
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being.74  
 For Maritain, too, the transcendental epoché cannot be done because 
it consists for him in bracketing that extra-mental reality which makes any 
knowledge possible. The notion of intentionality is important for Maritain in this 
regard, for the knower, he argues, ‘becomes the known’ in an activity which is 
necessarily spiritual.75 How it does this—what Maritain calls esse intentionale 
and esse spirituale—will be very significant in the analyses of connatural 
knowledge in Part II. Suffice it to say here that for Maritain, as for Heidegger, 
the mind is also an aperture through which being is addressed, and this is in 
fundamental opposition to Cartesianism and any idealism for him.76 
 
4. The Destruktion of Metaphysics 
 
On the basis of a shared quest for Being, a shared repudiation of the Cartesian 
and Kantian projects—and consequently Husserl’s epoché—of a shared 
notion of intentionality which extends far beyond conscious cognition to the 
pre-conscious relation between human beings and the world, it seems that we 
already have much to go on in comparing Maritain and Heidegger, even 
perhaps at this point being tempted to claim they share a common 
philosophical project overall. 
 It is, however, too early to make such a claim, and as we have seen, 
there are arguments in the literature on Heidegger and Thomism to the effect 
that Heidegger’s project bears little resemblance to either Aquinas or Maritain, 
at least explicitly. This is especially true when it comes to Heidegger’s 
‘destruction’ (destruktion) of metaphysics and the claim that Western 
metaphysics is ontotheological. This is precisely the point on which Caputo 
argues that Aquinas’ metaphysics is in fact an instance of ontotheology and 
we must seek beyond or beneath it to retrieve a mystical tendency. 
 Heidegger’s later career is characterized by a move away from an 
                                                 
74 BT, 3–5/28–36.  
75 DK, p. 393. 
76 Gutting, Thinking the Impossible, p. 56. 
  77  
analytic of being to a stepping back to allow Being to reveal itself. As such, 
Heidegger describes his work no longer as ‘philosophy’ but as ‘thinking’ 
(Denken), 77  and specifically thinking what is left un-thought in Western 
philosophy (metaphysics in particular). Heidegger claims that Western 
philosophy since Socrates has brought about an ‘oblivion of [B]eing’78—a 
forgetting of the meaning of being as Heidegger said earlier in Being and 
Time—and this for the principal reason that ever since the pre-Socratics, 
Western metaphysics has uncritically taken as its point of departure a 
distinction within being when it first manifested itself at the beginning of 
Western history. ‘Thinking’ is opposed to ‘calculation’ in Heidegger’s writings. 
I will go into detail about just what Heidegger means by the idea in Part II.  
 This distinction is between the being of beings (entities) in their 
whatness and Being as highest cause of all beings (thatness). Being has, since 
the beginning of Western metaphysics, been posited as ‘ground’ or 
‘foundation’ of everything else—has been a foundationalist’ project—and has 
been so dualistically. Philosophers have posited an ontological ground, or that 
which all beings must share to be (what Iain Thomson calls a ‘bottom-up’ 
grounding) and a theological ground or justification of their being (that they are, 
and ‘from where’?)79 in terms of a highest kind of being or entity (a ‘top-down’ 
grounding). According to Thomson, this difference (Differenz) has its roots in 
the pre-Socratics Thales and Anaximander, given that Thales posits water as 
that being which all beings share and Anaximander posits a highest being 
(apeiron) as the origin of beings.80 Heidegger characterizes metaphysics as 
ontotheology succinctly: 
 
[I]f we recall once again the history of Occidental-European 
thought, then we see that the question about being, taken as a 
question about the being of the existent, is double in form. It 
asks on the one hand: What is the existent, in general, as 
existent? Considerations within the province of this question 
come, in the course of the history of philosophy, under the 
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heading of ontology. The question ‘What is the existent?’ [or 
‘What is that which is?’] includes also the question, ‘Which 
existent is the highest and how does it exist?’ The question is 
about the divine and God. The province of this question is called 
theology. The duality of the question about the being of the 
existent can be brought together in the title ‘onto-theo-logy.’81  
 
Heidegger argues that it is with Aristotle’s Metaphysics that metaphysics as 
ontotheology is formally inaugurated, but he also argues that between the pre-
Socratics and Aristotle is the determining influence of Plato, in whom the 
ontotheological difference was implicit. According to Heidegger, Plato’s Forms 
or Ideas are both the paradigms which beings only imperfectly copy and 
instantiate (making the Forms the ‘highest’ kind of beings and the theological 
ground of beings) and also the universals which are common to beings 
(making the Forms the ontological ground of beings). With Plato we see an 
implicit distinction between ‘whatness’ (the essence, or ontological grounding 
of beings, when we ask ‘what’ a thing is) and ‘thatness’ (the existential 
grounding, or condition of existence, of a thing).82 Aristotle was to make this 
distinction explicit, and in so doing, set the ontotheological framework for 
Aquinas’ distinction between the act of existence (esse) and essence 
(essentia).  
It is . . . easy to establish historically the connection of the 
distinction between essentia and existentia with the thinking of 
Aristotle, who first brought the distinction to a concept, that is, 
at the same time to its essential ground. This occurred after 
Plato’s thinking had responded to the claim of Being in a way 
that prepared that distinction by bringing its establishment out 
into the open.83 
As we saw in the introduction, the distinction between esse and essentia was 
fundamental for Aquinas. For Aquinas, though, the former has ontological 
precedence over the latter. If we ask how a thing or ‘substance’ actually exists 
in the world, says Aquinas, it is clear that we cannot refer to the substance 
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itself in answering the question because nothing in the substance itself can 
explain its own (actual) existence. In other words, there is nothing in any 
material substance’s essence, which is the ‘that which it is’ that explains or 
gives reason for its actual existence, the ‘that by which it is’.84  As such, 
essences stands in ‘potency’ or potentiality to esse to be actuated and actual—
hence Aquinas calls esse the ‘act of existence’. 85  Maritain repeats this 
doctrine in his works on metaphysics.  
 In some of his remarks of Aquinas, Heidegger seems to argue that in 
his doctrine of the transcendentals of the ‘one’, the ‘good’, the ‘true’, and the 
‘beautiful’—which Maritain calls ‘properties of [B]eing’86 and with which we 
shall be very much concerned with in Part II in the analysis of connatural 
knowledge—Aquinas also makes explicit the previously implicit bottom-up and 
top-down groundings that Plato’s Forms provided. This is because, as 
Heidegger says in Being and Time, the transcendentals posited by Aquinas 
are  
those characters of Being which lie beyond every possible way 
in which an entity may be classified as coming under some 
generic kind of subject-matter (every modus specialis entis), 
and which belong necessarily to anything, whatever it may be. 
Thomas has to demonstrate that the verum is such a 
transcendens. He does this by invoking an entity which, in 
accordance with its very manner of Being, is properly suited to 
‘come together with’ entities of any sort whatever.87  
While Heidegger goes on to say that for Aquinas (following Aristotle), this entity 
is the soul as the ground of all experience, we can very easily see that this line 
of thought regarding Aquinas’ transcendental ground of beings taken in Being 
and Time is soon to be followed by the insight that the soul itself requires a 
ground. And that ground, making explicit the implicit ontotheological tendency 
in such causal thinking, is God. This seems to be correct if we consider the 
fact that On Being and Essence, Aquinas argues that a substance’s act of 
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existing itself has a cause—an efficient cause and ‘the original source of 
change or rest [of a thing]’, 88  as Aristotle says—to give a contingency 
argument from efficient causation for God’s existence. God, for Aquinas is a 
being ‘existing in virtue of itself [and being] the cause of the existing of all things 
because it itself is the act of existing alone [ipsum esse subsistens]’,89 and, as 
Maritain says, because God is ipsum esse subsistens, he is the source of all 
the properties of Being even while transcending them.90 We can, then, be 
quite sure that Heidegger regards Aquinas (and would regard Maritain) as 
standing within the metaphysics of ontotheology. Pattison sums things up 
nicely when he says: 
In his [Heidegger’s] view the Christian tradition, through 
Augustine’s Christian Platonism and Thomas Aquinas’ 
adaptation of a Latinised Aristotle for Christian purposes, had 
allowed its God to be absorbed into the Supreme Being of 
metaphysics. In Heidegger’s own terms, the Christian Creator 
God had become identified with onto-theology. The result of this 
was that theology had become incapable of speaking of God’s 
radical otherness, since, by construing God metaphysically, it 
had placed him on a continuum with beings and trapped him 
within the reifying system of enframing.91 
The notion of ‘enframing’ mentioned by Pattison brings us to another, deeper 
aspect of Heidegger’s thought. In his Destruktion, Heidegger further 
characterizes the ontheological difference in Western metaphysics 
phenomenologically as ‘presencing’ and ‘presence’, between that process 
whereby beings come into existence or are shown, remain, and pass away 
(thatness, existentia), and that aspect which remains (whatness, essentia). Yet 
it is with Aristotle, Heidegger says, that thatness, existence, or presence has 
taken precedence in Western metaphysics in the understanding of being, such 
that to be is to be present—before we know what a thing is, we know that it is, 
and is here or there.92 This the heart of the ontotheological conception of 
Being as ontic—as a reduction and commodification to beings which can be 
                                                 
88 Aristotle, Physics, trans. R. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 39. 
89 Aquinas, On Being and Essence, p. 47. 
90 MAG, p. 30. 
91 TLH, p. 198. 
92 Thomson, ‘Ontotheology?’, p. 314. 
  81  
totally known and totally mastered, with no sense of mystery as they emerge 
from Being.  
 Heidegger goes on to propose an alternative to ontotheology, of a pre-
metaphysical comprehension—as he puts it, phenomenologically—of the first 
‘opening’ (sometimes also translated as the ‘clearing’) of Being, provided by 
two other pre-Socratics: Heraclitus and Parmenides. Heidegger argues:  
In the beginning of its history, Being opens or clears—Lichtung] 
itself out as emerging (physis) and unconcealment (aletheia). 
From there it reaches the formulation of presence 
[Anwesenheit] and permanence [Beständigkeit] in the sense of 
enduring (ousia). Metaphysics proper begins with this.93  
 
Being, rather than being understood as mere presence, can be understood in 
non-foundational, non-grounding terms as dynamic, ‘self-opening’, ‘self-
blossoming emergence’ from Heraclitus and as ‘unconcealement’ and 
‘disclosure’ from Parmenides. 94  The emergence of Being, as a temporal 
emergence (Being, as we saw in Heidegger’s earlier work, is only experienced 
with time as its horizon), Heidegger calls Ereignis (‘the event of appropriation’ 
or, one might say, the event of the happening of Being), but the opening which 
allows for this very event, of happening, is aletheia.95 What is unconcealed 
and discloses, also conceals and closes off from sight, and aletheia, as the 
‘truth’ of the unconcealedness of beings, Heidegger writes, ‘is never itself but, 
viewed dialectically, is always also its opposite.’96 This means that beings, as 
much they emerge into presence, also withdraw from our understanding. 
 Now why is this significant? It is because Heidegger’s claim, which is 
nothing less than monumental, is that ever since being has been taken as 
presence—what Heidegger calls ‘present-at-hand’ in Being and Time97—it has 
taken on the characteristic precisely of object, which, for human beings, has 
been exemplified in the modern period especially, in the tool or, more broadly, 
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what Heidegger calls ‘equipment’:98 something made and used by subjects. 
What Heidegger calls ‘enframing’, is ‘the way of revealing that holds sway in 
the essence of modern technology and that is itself nothing technological’, a 
‘producing and presenting’ which is the way beings come to be present, or 
unconcealed, for us.99 The problem, as Heidegger sees it, however, is that 
with the mastery and commodification of nature that modern technology 
brings, everything in the world, including the human being, has become an 
object for exploitation and consumption, such that now ‘In enframing, the 
unconcealment propriates in conformity with which the work of modern 
technology reveals the actual as standing-reserve.’100 What Heidegger calls 
‘standing-reserve’ means standing as available for calculation, manipulation, 
or as Pattison says, ‘technological management’.101 Connecting the previous 
remarks concerning Christianity and ontotheology, Heidegger therefore writes 
in the essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’: 
 
The realm of beings thus opened up was then transformed into 
a being in the sense of God’s creation. This happened in the 
Middle Ages. This kind of being was again transformed at the 
beginning and in the course of the modern age. Beings became 
objects that could be controlled and seen through by 
calculation.102  
 
Heidegger fears that all too often this is so even for art—about which he does 
not aim to provide an aesthetics or theory of aesthesis (of sensuous 
experience of the beautiful), but rather an understanding of art as a matter of 
truth insofar as it can express and tell of the concealment and ‘unconcealment’ 
of Being as related throughout history. Art in this sense reveals ‘ontological 
historicity’—that, for Heidegger, as Thomson says, ‘ontology is a temporally 
dynamic construct’. This will be a subject of discussion in Part II concerning art 
and mystical experience, but it is worth noting that this ontological historicity 
is, as Thomson relates, a ‘central doctrine of the later Heidegger’, and in 
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Heidegger’s later writings ‘now forms a taken-for-granted point of philosophical 
departure for virtually every major practitioner of post-structuralism, post-
modernism, and deconstruction.’103  
 Yet for art to be a matter of truth requires what Heidegger calls 
‘comportment’—an openness, a standing back, or certain respect for the 
dignity of the work. This standing back characterizes Heidegger’s later work, 
going beyond philosophy and utilizing the poetry of Rilke and Hölderlin. It is 
what Heidegger calls ‘meditative’ thinking, in contradistinction to ‘calculative’ 
thinking.104 Heidegger goes so far as to say that ‘Poetry is nothing other than 
the elemental way in which existence as Being-in-the-world is discovered.’105 
This meditative standing back that art demands will be a crucial point of contact 
between Maritain and Heidegger and I will in fact argue that for Maritain, artistic 
creation, undertaken in such a manner and with the Christian conception of 
the divine as its subject-matter, amounts to a species of mysticism.   
 In relating all of this to Maritain we should recall that Aristotle says in 
the Posterior Analytics that ‘our capacity for discovering what a thing is 
depends upon our awareness that it is’.106 Maritain echoes this and builds his 
whole philosophy—not just his metaphysics—on this primacy of existence, or 
esse over essentia, and it is why he regarded himself as an existentialist.107 
The awareness of esse is the core of Maritain’s notion of an ‘intuition of being’ 
for he writes that ‘What counts is to have seen that existence is not a simple 
empirical fact [i.e. that something exists] but a primitive datum for the mind 
itself, opening to the mind an infinite supra-observable field—in a word, the 
primary and super-intelligible source of intelligibility’. 108  Again, God for 
Maritain, as for Aquinas, is ipsum esse subsistens, and for their own 
existences, creatures participate in God’s own existence. Heidegger identifies 
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the Christian doctrine of God as creator and Aquinas’ ‘real distinction’ between 
essence and existence as determining factors in the history of the movement 
of subjectivization of Being in the image of the human being and human 
equipment, for as Matthew Pugh writes, according to the history of Being 
provided by Heidegger, ‘Thomas understands esse as act, actualitas, or 
cause, as that which makes a thing actual, or real in the sense of hardened 
presence.’109  
 Again, God is understood as highest being and cause, but more 
importantly, and historically speaking, we are given the paradigm of the 
craftsman, who, in Aristotelian terms, gives form to, or informs, inert matter 
according to the images in his or her mind.110 We, who have ‘killed God’, as 
Nietzsche said, have taken on this role of self-subsistent subjects, calculatingly 
converting the earth into raw materials for production, which is why Heidegger 
identifies the driving question of Nietzsche’s thought as the following: ‘Is the 
man of today in his metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion over 
the earth as a whole?’ 111  If Maritain’s project is capable of transcending 
ontotheology and cease to be regarded as contributing to the oblivion of being 
spoken of earlier, at the heart of Maritain’s philosophy must be a pre-
metaphysical meeting with being, and there has to be sustained in a similar 
‘meditative’ mode of thinking that which is not defining and controlling but 
appreciative. Moreover, this must be what Caputo calls an ‘alethiological’ 
experience of Being, in which Being is not mere presence, but also concealing 
and concealment; there must, in Caputo’s own words, be a ‘religious 
alethiology’.112  
 At the end of his life, Aquinas had a mystical experience of such power 
and profundity that he afterwards claimed all that he had written was only straw 
compared to what he had felt and seen—thereafter writing almost nothing until 
his death. Maritain’s final book, Untrammeled Approaches, published in 1973 
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shortly after his death, features essays and lectures in which Maritain similarly 
admits defeat on the part of the philosopher in approaching God—whether it 
be concerning conceptualizing God’s necessary capacity to suffer in love with 
his creatures as does a Father, or indeed any positive analogical 
categorization whatsoever. In the essay ‘No Knowledge Without Intuitivity’, 
Maritain writes of a ‘veil on unknowing’. 113  I believe that in Maritain’s 
metaphysics, in what will be shown to be a person-focused ethics, and in his 
philosophy of art, what we find is precisely an openness to the disclosure of 
being which quietly tells of an immanent mysticism—not a ‘mystical element’ 
as in Heidegger but a fully-fledged mysticism which has its source in a religious 
yearning for meaning and its end in a religious yearning for union with God in 
love.  
 But in Heidegger and Aquinas, Caputo makes this argument: 
 
[A]ll attempts to carry out a confrontation of Heidegger and St. 
Thomas have failed because they remain lodged on the level of 
St. Thomas’ metaphysics. And I am arguing further that once 
the depth dimension, the mystical element in St. Thomas’ 
metaphysics, is wrested loose from this metaphysical 
encasement one finds a Thomas who eludes Heidegger’s 
critique of metaphysics, for whom metaphysics is something to 
be overcome, a more essential thinker in whom Heidegger 
would have been compelled to concede that here too—and not 
just in Eckhart—there is a profound unity of mysticism and 
thought.114 
 
I believe the same argument can be made for Maritain—and in fact the 
argument is much easier given Maritain’s very explicit concerns with intuitive 
and mystical knowledge, to the extent, as we saw in the introduction, that he 
claims metaphysical knowledge is imbued with mystical aspirations.115 It is 
precisely, in ‘the light of the alethiological’, Caputo argues, that for Aquinas his 
philosophical tomes ‘appear as straw; that is to say, the texts need to be 
deconstructed in the light of the experience of Being . . . to which they give 
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way.116 I will argue that this is not only the case for Maritain’s metaphysics, 
but also the case for his philosophy of art. For while the experience of the artist 
in creating works of art and the experience of the intended audience are indeed 
subjects of analysis in works such as Art and Scholasticism and Creative 
Intuition in Art and Poetry, Maritain’s focus is undoubtedly what art—both what 
he calls the ‘virtue’ of art and the artefact or performance itself—can reveal 
about Being. As we shall see, Maritain’s writings on art are perhaps his richest 
in terms of depth and originality, and there is present in Maritain’s thought a 
dialectic between the intuition and emotions of the subject and beauty as a 
‘transcendental’ of Being as such—a dialectic in which Being can be both 
revealed and concealed. As such, for Maritain, art, both in terms of activity and 
artefact or production, is more a matter of revealing truth than a matter of 
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1. Resources for a Deconstruction 
 
While he acknowledges the ontotheological character of Aquinas’ systematic 
thought, Caputo aims to demonstrate that ontotheology is not all that there is 
to Aquinas. He aims to refute the commonplace view of Aquinas as only a cold 
rationalist, whose Aristotelian philosophical machinery leaves no room for the 
wonder or experience of being as inexhaustible mystery. In this pursuit, Caputo 
draws attention to the fact that while Aquinas came to see the Summa 
Theologiæ as ‘straw’ following his revelation from God, this was never 
something held against him, but was rather something that was held to be 
evidence of a fully religious life which merited saintliness.1 It was not as if 
Aquinas’ inability to write further refuted what he had written prior to the vision. 
Rather, Caputo argues, it was taken to edify Aquinas’ life, such that he ‘was 
held by his contemporaries to be a man endowed with contemplative gifts, with 
religious and mystical grace, and not merely with theological intelligence.’2 
Describing Aquinas’ religious context and decisive mystical experiences 
prepares the ground for and illuminates the pre-metaphysical significance of 
esse and intellectus.  
 In this chapter, I follow Caputo’s method in highlighting the major 
religious events and influences in Maritain’s life before going on to the key 
terms in Maritain to be considered, bringing out the deeper meaning and (as 
Caputo says regarding Aquinas) ‘possibilities’ latent in Maritain’s metaphysics. 
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Unlike Caputo, however, I will stress the importance of both the people and 
events of Maritain’s earlier years (pre-conversion and post-conversion) in 
addition to his later years in demonstrating what I believe is the unthought in 
Maritain’s colossal philosophical enterprise—the mystery of the meaning of 
Being and the existential and religious need to commune with Being as 
mystery. I want to show that other than being a philosopher employing and 
renewing the philosophical tools of Thomism, Maritain is a contemplative. I 
also want to show that the unthought in his philosophy and wider life is the 
foundation for his immanent mystical tendency. It is true that in much of 
Maritain’s writing there is ‘calculative thinking’, but there is also clear evidence 
in both his writings and his life not just of what Heidegger calls ‘meditative 
thinking’, but also of a kind of Christian mysticism that is capable of 
appreciating mystery beyond the conceptual instruments employed even by 
the existential Thomism of which Maritain is perhaps the lead representative. 
 In this endeavor, Maritain’s tortuous existential struggles in his 
university days are of utmost concern because they reveal his most 
fundamental motivations and aspirations as a human being and as a 
philosopher who would come to fly the Thomist flag later on. It is before the 
Maritains’ conversion, at around the time of Jacques and Raïssa’s suicide 
pact, that we get a sense of what it is that Maritain most desired in his very 
being, as it were—in other words, what he lived for, and literally so, before the 
red-hot philosophical gold, extracted from extraneous matter, cooled and 
settled into discreet philosophical categories. The people who were most 
influential in his life at this time, other than the faculty at the Sorbonne, were 
Henri Bergson and Léon Bloy and they should therefore be given priority. I 
hasten to add that in addition to Bergson and Bloy, there is Raïssa, to whom 
he will acknowledge much debt. Determining the precise philosophical content 
of Maritain’s thought for which she is partly responsible, however, is a task that 
requires and deserves a full-length study itself, with reference to the 
posthumously published Journal de Raïssa (1963) as well as any 
correspondence and unpublished material that may be available. 
Consequently, it is rather her influence on Jacques in terms of his spiritual life 
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that I will discuss in later chapters. Given the biographical nature of these 
explorations, I make use of Maritain’s own Notebooks, his correspondence and 
Raïssa’s autobiographical works We Have Been Friends Together and 
Adventures in Grace as well as his philosophical work. Maritain’s private 
reflections and Raïssa’s records are important precisely because they are not 
necessarily attempts to systematize or, we might say, ‘ontotheologize’, being 
instead accounts of existential development and searching. As Maritain writes 
in December of 1905: 
 
It is not for their intrinsic value that I have drawn these notes of 
youth from the jumble of my old notebooks. It seems to me that 
they give some idea of the state of a soul which searches in the 
night, and of the spiritual journey of a young man hungry for the 
absolute who, until his meeting with Léon Bloy (1905), believed 
himself an atheist or completely agnostic (if he then happened 
to sometimes use the word ‘God,’ the meaning of this word 
remained for him merely poetical or mythical).3 
 
Maritain’s later life, following Raïssa’s death in 1960, is also informative in a 
number of ways. The period from Raïssa’s death in 1960 up until his own death 
in 1973 was Maritain’s most difficult period.4 Yet it was also one of profound 
transformation and creativity. Almost immediately after Raïssa’s death, 
Maritain moved to Toulouse to live with the Petits Frères de Jésus, becoming 
a brother in 1970. Maritain worked further on the problem of evil, deepening 
his previous insights, and wrote books on the divinity of Christ and the mystery 
of the Church. His articles and lectures given to the Petits Frères are wide-
ranging, and include subjects such as negative or ‘dark’ knowledge of God and 
the possibility of making predications of God. Maritain also returns to Bergson 
in Moral Philosophy (completed before Raïssa’s death and published after) 
and discusses mysticism as Bergson and Aquinas conceived it respectively, 
such that, Barré writes, ‘his [Maritain’s] work as a philosopher seemed to find 
once again its primary sources at the moment it was drawing to a close.’5  
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 I believe it can be rightly said that as Maritain endured this new kind of 
suffering and despair—new because he believed firmly in God and now faced 
intense loneliness—he took a religious and mystical direction. It is the same 
movement, albeit stretched over thirteen years, as that of Aquinas’ following 
his revelation. As far Maritain was concerned, he had nothing else to lose, and 
as such held back no punches in his criticisms of modern philosophy and 
liberal Catholicism, beginning with The Peasant of the Garonne—which, like 
The Two Sources of his previous master, destroyed his standing and 
popularity with his contemporaries. Caputo writes that ‘The life of St. Thomas’, 
for Rousselot, ‘bears testimony to his increasing distrust of merely earthly 
knowledge and an increasing recourse to contemplation and mystical prayer.’6 
However, whereas Aquinas only authored one work after his final mystical 
experience and before his death, a commentary on the Song of Songs that has 
since been lost, there are many works of great value written during this final, 
excruciating period in Maritain’s life, and these should be considered along 
with the more well-known works of earlier years. Amazingly, these include the 
‘Song of Songs’, again a translation of and commentary on the Biblical Song 
of Songs, originally published privately as Le Cantique des cantiques in 1971 
and republished posthumously in Maritain’s final work in 1973. John Dunaway 
writes that ‘it is most certainly not happenstance that the twentieth century's 
greatest disciple of Saint Thomas wrote the very last chapter of his very last 
book on the very same subject.’7  
 In support of my thesis, I will not only use well-known works of Maritain’s 
such as The Degrees of Knowledge and Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry, 
but also lesser-known works such as the very early Prayer and Intelligence 
(written with Raïssa), the Introduction to Pilgrim of the Absolute (a selection of 
Léon Bloy’s writings), and essays and lectures in Maritain’s final and 
posthumously published work Untrammeled Approaches, such as ‘Reflections 
on Theological Knowledge’ and ‘Song of Songs’. 
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2. Encountering the Absolute 
 
Heidegger writes that ‘the understanding of being has itself the mode of being 
of the human Dasein.’8 It is the nature of the human being to know being 
through its own being. It is, Heidegger writes, ‘in a certain sense earlier than 
the experience of beings’,9 meaning that a pre-conceptual awareness of being 
(an a priori horizon of all presencing and withdrawing) is necessary in order to 
know the modes of being of all other beings. Yet Being and Time teaches us 
that our very attitude to the question of the meaning of being determines who 
and what we become. For our enquiry, Heidegger’s most significant insight is 
that most of us, most of the time, fall into the ontotheological rut of classical 
philosophy and religion. The mystery of being, for Heidegger, as we have seen, 
does not need to be ‘solved’, but taken for what it is and lived, and this requires 
an attitude of openness and letting-be (Gelassenheit). I claim that as much as 
Maritain wanted to know the truth of things from an early age, his life is defined 
by a surrender to mystery in the face of what both Maritains felt as an 
overpowering need for meaning—to what is nothing less than a 
Kierkegaardian ‘leap of faith’. I will argue that this leap of faith is both congenial 
to Bergson’s intuition and the source and end of Maritain’s philosophical 
system building such that, by probing this essentially mystical movement, we 
can find what Caputo found impelling the philosophical and theological system 
of Aquinas, namely, something like the mystical or contemplative attitude that 
Heidegger calls for in his later years.  
 In his last public lecture, Yves Simon says of Maritain:  
 
Although there have been considerable changes in the attitudes 
and ideas of Maritain, one feature is present in all periods of his 
life: he has always been in warm contact with the existential 
man, and his excellence in the rational analysis of the soul has 
never interfered with his intuitive relation to men such as they 
are here and now, such as they have been shaped by history, 
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by grace and be suffering, and such as they behave by their 
eternal destiny.10 
 
What makes Maritain both unique and persuasive in both his work and life is 
that for him the question of existence, of its meaning for human beings, is not 
first of all a philosophical question per se. It is not, in Thomist terms, merely 
possessed by means of abstraction on the basis of an explicit or even implicit 
notion of causality in Maritain (the latter of which will nevertheless be 
important), but rather felt as imposing upon the human person an inescapable 
need for meaning. This is why he writes in A Preface to Metaphysics of 
multitudinous ‘metaphysical intuitions which are a natural revelation to the 
soul, invested with the decisive, imperious and dominant character, of a 
“Substantial word” uttered by reality.’ 11  Maritain makes clear that these 
intuitions need not have the character of mystical grace, or that they must be 
interpreted as what he calls the ‘intuition of being’. Nevertheless, Maritain 
claims, in order for it to be an intuition of being, we must ‘become sufficiently 
disengaged, sufficiently empty to hear what all things whisper and to listen 
instead of composing answers.’12  
 For Maritain, if one can somehow cease the internal chatter that seeks 
to dissect the world into manageable conceptual chunks and become 
sufficiently appreciative and responsive to extramental reality as a pulsating, 
living, undivided, whole, one can (to put it somewhat anthropocentrically), 
recognize that is speaks to, or addresses the individual. The information 
imparted does not take the form of words or even images. Nevertheless, it 
bears directly upon the meaning of the life of the individual, capable thereafter 
of being imperfectly expressed as the individual becomes acutely aware of 
their all too evanescent place in the world. On this particular mode of 
experience of the intuition of being (Maritain makes clear that it is not the only 
possible experience),13 I shall quote Maritain at length, for what he says allows 
                                                 
10 Yves Simon, ‘Jacques Maritain: The Growth of a Christian Philosopher’, in Joseph W. 
Evans (ed.), Jacques Maritain: The Man and his Achievement (New York, NY: Sheed & Ward, 
Inc., 1963), p. 5. 
11 Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, p. 48. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., pp. 49–51. 
  93  
us to have a flavor of what he means, and the difficulty of putting the 
experience into words: 
 
I will not try and describe what escapes any restraint and is 
beyond any word (although the simplest of concepts and 
simplest of words are a valid sign of it), nor to lead someone 
where access is given only in purest solitude of soul. But is it 
not possible to resort to the language of metaphor, as 
inadequate as it is, to convey, not, to be sure, that which the 
intelligence grasps, but an inkling of the experience of this 
grasping? . . . What I perceive is like a pure activity, a 
consistency, but superior to the whole order of the imaginable, 
a vivid tenacity, at once precarious . . . and fierce . . . by which 
things surge up against me and triumph over a possible 
disaster, stand there, and not merely there, but in themselves, 
and by which they shelter in their thickness, the humble 
measure meted out to what is perishable, a kind of glory 
demanding to be recognized.14 
 
Maritain is clearly trying to arrive at a position between total apophaticism and 
naïve metaphysical conceptualization of this mysterious experience, but what 
he makes clear is that extramental reality is not a dumb mass but rather filled 
with intelligibility which, if we are disposed to recognize it, can be existentially 
overpowering. This imposing address to the individual on the part of being 
Heidegger calls the ‘call of conscience’, which is also connected with the notion 
of the ‘uncanny’, the feeling of the dislocation of Dasein from the world, a 
feeling of not knowing what or why we are and a feeling of being ‘“not-at-
home”.’15 Heidegger writes that ‘This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, 
and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the “they”, though not explicitly.’16 
This ‘they’ of which Heidegger writes is the public mass, in which the question 
                                                 
14 PG, p. 111. 
15 BT, 54–59/314–335, 40/233. 
16 Ibid., 40/234. 
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of the individual’s existence is not raised in virtue of the fact that what I am and 
what I do I leave to the accepted norms of the community I live in, precisely 
without question.17 However, Heidegger writes that the ‘call of conscience, 
existentially understood, makes known for the first time . . . that uncanniness 
pursues Dasein and is a threat to the lostness in which it has forgotten itself.’18 
 Central to Sartre’s existentialism is a similar notion to the ‘call of 
conscience’ upon a feeling of ‘not-being-at-home’ but whereas, as we shall 
see, for Heidegger, the call is instigated by the realization of Dasein’s 
immanent death, for Sartre the call is rather had through a spontaneous and 
mind-bending intuition of the arbitrariness and apparent meaninglessness of 
existence as such. Sartre illustrates this intuition most powerfully through the 
experience of the character Roquentin in his novel Nausea. In the novel, 
Roquentin suddenly becomes aware of the objective meaninglessness of the 
world and of his own existence most keenly upon gazing at a tree root.  
 For Sartre, the world is meaningless because meaning can only be 
given by a human intelligence and because God, who would otherwise provide 
a moral and metaphysical grounding to human life and decisions, does not 
exist. The central insight is this: there is no necessity in anything or anyone’s 
existence, and therefore all is contingent.19 The estrangement of oneself from 
the world, vividly conveyed in image as a gluey mass of dumb objects in 
Nausea, is indeed the ‘nausea’ that the novel is named after. Things first exist, 
and I exist as aware of my distinctness from the external world toward which 
my consciousness is intentional, without necessity or meaning. This intuition 
of existence is pre-reflective, and not deduced. In his philosophical work, 
Sartre follows Heidegger in describing the human situation as being ‘thrown 
into the world’, and ‘abandoned’,20 without purpose and without one’s prior 
consent (Heidegger calls this ‘thrownness’). Sartre argues that with this 
intuition of the gratuitousness of the existence of the world and oneself, as 
lacking any meaning or purpose given by God or a teleology, it is in light of 
                                                 
17 Anthony Camele, ‘Heideggerian Ethics’, Philosophy Today, 21 (3) (1977), pp. 285–286. 
18 BT, 57/322. 
19 Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, pp. 28–29. 
20 Ibid., pp. 22, 34. 
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becoming aware of one’s freedom and one’s own desires that one must give 
the world and one’s self one’s own meaning, casting off as arbitrary the social 
and moral norms of our society and peers.21 This conviction Sartre famously 
sums up as ‘existence precedes essence’22—‘essence’ here referring to the 
meaning that one gives to one’s life in the face of a dumb and indifferent 
external world.  
 Now, Raïssa relates that when she first met him, ‘Jacques Maritain had 
the same profound concern as I; the same questions tormented him, the same 
desire for truth wholly moved him. . . . He was entirely without prejudice: his 
soul was as though brand new, and seemed constantly to discover for itself its 
own law. He was not in the least a respecter of persons, because he had the 
greatest respect for his own conscience.’23 Maritain’s disdain for received 
opinion, for the uncritical existence of what Heidegger calls the ‘they’, is evident 
throughout his life, but is particularly stark in his early years, from socialist 
activist to Catholic convert. As the Maritains progressed through their 
education at the Sorbonne, which was saturated, as they claim, by atheistic 
and scientistic currents of thought, the question of the meaning of life and of 
reality itself similarly pressed in on them. It was what Raïssa Maritain aptly 
called a ‘metaphysical anguish’24 that led them to make a suicide pact in 1902, 
vowing to end their lives if they could not find meaning—or if meaning would 
not find them—within a year.   
 
Thus we decided for some time longer to have confidence in 
the unknown; we would extend credit to existence, look upon it 
as an experiment to be made, in the hope that to our ardent 
plea, the meaning of life would reveal itself, that new values 
would stand forth so clearly that they would enlist our total 
allegiance, and deliver us from the nightmare of a sinister and 
useless world.25 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 22–31. 
22 Ibid., pp. 22–24. 
23 WHBF, p. 42. 
24 Ibid., p. 74. 
25 Ibid., p. 77. 
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The degree to which this sounds similar to Heidegger’s notion of the uncanny 
and Sartre’s ‘nausea’ is remarkable and I argue in Part II that this consonance 
is one of the most direct routes to Maritain’s immanent mysticism. There is in 
Maritain, a similar intuition but with different parameters—what he calls the 
intuition of [B]eing and which he regards as a superior and more global type of 
contemplative experience of Being that makes the true metaphysician—which 
occurs upon the violent confrontation between the human person and what 
was before perceived as an indifferent extra-mental reality. On multiple 
occasions when discussing the intuition of being and the consciousness of 
one’s own finite existence it induces, Maritain quotes Raïssa: 
 
It also often happened, before I knew the things of faith, that I 
experienced through a sudden intuition the reality of my being, 
of the profound, first principle which placed me outside of 
nothingness. The violence of this powerful intuition sometimes 
frightened me, and first gave me the knowledge of a 
metaphysical absolute.26 
 
As well shall see, for Heidegger, it is the conscious recognition of one’s finitude 
and inevitable death that brings the feeling of uncanniness to a head, 
culminating in the call of conscience that allows Dasein to begin to take up an 
authentic, self-directed existence. While Maritain acknowledges this 
experience as one instance or aspect of the intuition of being, again, he argues 
that for the content of the intuition to come to fruition as a genuine insight into 
the nature of reality, a leap into the contemplation of being must be taken.27 
 Yet metaphysical contemplation differs essentially from mystical 
experience, and here my thesis needs to be stated, that what we see in 
Maritain’s youth as well as in his older years, it is his existential need to know 
and align himself with the meaning and mystery of Being that is the source of 
what I claim is an immanent mysticism in his life and philosophy. We thus see 
                                                 
26 WHBF, p. 144. 
27 Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics, p. 50–54. 
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in a clearer manner the underlying connection between the existentialisms 
considered here and the question of the mystical in Maritain; it is simply the 
preoccupation with the meaning of life.  
 Now, to return to the Maritains’ suicide pact made in light of the 
perceived meaninglessness of the world, Raïssa relates that at this time 
Jacques still thought it worthwhile to fight for socialism, but eventually his 
despair reached the level of her own.28 The Maritains held out for ‘some true 
light on existence.’29  
 
What saved us then, what made our real despair still a 
conditional despair was precisely our suffering. That almost 
unconscious dignity of the mind saved our minds through the 
presence of an element which could not be reduced to the 
absurdity into which everything seemed to be trying to lead us.30 
 
This simultaneous resistance to meaninglessness and surrender to whatever 
meaning may come to them, is, I believe, also crucial for the argument I 
present in this study. For, as we see in Heidegger’s later works, Gelassenheit, 
the meditative attitude that he promotes, does not require total quietism and 
the cessation of reflection. In fact, Heidegger believed that the move from 
phenomenology to Denken meant that he was able to participate in the mystery 
of being at a deeper level. Of this paradoxical seeking and surrendering, 
Raïssa Maritain continues: 
 
From instinct we fought against a relativism that led nowhere, 
against a relationship to nothingness, for no absolute was 
admitted. Despite all that might have turned us from it, we 
persisted in seeking the truth . . . in continuing to bear within 
ourselves the hope of the possibility of a full adherence to a 
fullness of being.31 
 
As I said earlier, it was then that the Maritains attended the lectures of Bergson, 
which staved off despair at least for a time. And as argued earlier, Bergson 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 76. 
29 Ibid., p. 77. 
30 Ibid., p. 75. 
31 Ibid., p. 80. 
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served to revive the possibility of attaining truth for the Maritains. Again, Raïssa 
writes: 
 
This philosophy of truth, this truth so ardently sought, so 
invincibly believed, was still for us only some sort of unknown 
God. We kept an altar for it in our hearts, we loved it ardently 
even though we did not know it; we acknowledged beforehand 
all its rights over us, over our lives. But what it would be, by 
what road, by what means it might be attained, we knew not.32  
 
It was after reading the novel La Femme Pauvre that the Maritains first met 
Léon Bloy, their future godfather, in 1905. The meeting with Bloy, who was a 
writer living in almost desperate poverty, was to change their lives forever, and 
in my estimation, served to shape Maritain’s conception of mystical knowledge 
to a great extent. Maritain came to define his life according to the personal 
example set by Bloy, rather than merely on the philosophical doctrines of 
Bergsonian intuition or Thomism. In a famous passage, he writes: 
 
June 1905, two children of twenty mounted the sempiternal 
stairway which leads up to the Sacre-Coeur. They carried in 
themselves that distress which is the only serious product of 
modern culture, and a sort of active despair lightened only (they 
did not know why) by the inner assurance that the Truth for 
which they hungered, and without which it was almost 
impossible for them to accept life, would one day be shown to 
them. . . . Meanwhile they were cleansing from their minds, 
thanks to Bergson, the scientific superstitutions on which they 
had been nourished at the Sorbonne—although they were well 
aware that Bergsonian intuition was but a too flimsy refuge 
against the intellectual nihilism logically resulting from all 
modern philosophies. . . . They were going toward a strange 
beggar who, distrusting all philosophy, cried divine truth from 
the rooftops. . . . Not a shade of curiosity was in them, but 
another and graver feeling filled their souls: compassion for 
unsheltered greatness. . . . Once the threshold of this house 
was crossed all values were dislocated, as though by an 
invisible switch. One knew, or one guesses, that only one 
sorrow existed here—not to be of the saints. And all the rest 
receded into the twilight.33 
                                                 
32 Ibid., p. 82 
33 Jacques Maritain’s preface to Letters of Léon Bloy to his Godchildren, quoted in WHBF, pp. 
118–119. 
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It is significant that in the previous year, 1904, Maritain’s father, Paul Maritain 
committed suicide. The Maritains had been saved from despair, but Maritain’s 
father had not, and this event undoubtedly influenced Maritain’s actions. 
Maritain’s conversion to Catholicism had scandalized his mother, who was in 
fact anti-religious, and who, for Jacques, had been overly-controlling during 
the years before he met Raïssa. The immediate rapport between Jacques 
Maritain and his future Godfather, Bloy, with his religious orthodoxy and 
prophetic urgency, was undoubtedly made possible by Maritain’s dire family 
circumstances. C. A. Tsakiridou writes that ‘Bloy’s apocalyptic, anti-modern, 
and anti-bourgeois ideas, his conflicted personality, and claims of divine 
election and extreme suffering, gave him unprecedented psychological 
authority over the young couple and captured their imaginations for years to 
come.’34 Raïssa Maritain herself writes that, soon after meeting Bloy, they 
soon felt ‘enriched by a unique friendship, so gentle on the part of this violent 
man, that all fear had left us from the day of our first meeting, and our respect 
became daring and familiar, like that of children who feel that they are loved.’35 
It is very reasonable to judge that Maritain saw in Bloy a father figure, someone 
who not only endured suffering but offered it to God for the sake of his 
sanctification. 
 
3. Conversion and The Early Catholic Years 
 
(i) Faith and Philosophy 
 
Perhaps Claude Lorentz puts it best when he writes: ‘Returning from the 
heights of the Sacré-Cœur, Jacques and Raïssa not only feel enriched by a 
friendship both familial in closeness and utterly novel with the mystical savage 
                                                 
34 Cornelia. A. Tsakiridou, ‘Spiritual Expressionism: Léon Bloy, the Maritains, and the Mystery 
of Israel’, in John J. Conley (ed.), Redeeming Philosophy: From Metaphysics to Aesthetics 
(Washington, D.C., American Maritain Association and The Catholic University of America 
Press, 2014), p. 203. 
35 WHBF, p. 120 
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of Montmartre. It is the question of God that poses itself to them.’36 Jacques 
Maritain gives scant details on this period of his life, so to learn more we will 
also have to draw on Raïssa Maritain’s accounts. Nevertheless, what we see 
in Maritain is not a coming to new religious conviction on the basis of having 
been rationally or philosophically persuaded, but conversion after having been 
deeply impressed by the sheer presence of character of someone quite other-
worldly. Bloy’s language was unadorned at best, and in the name of divine 
truth he would lambast and insult his contemporaries in letter and speech with 
a viciousness that became quite famous among French literary and Catholic 
circles. But Raïssa Maritain writes that they were not just fascinated by the 
literary ability and Bloy’s bizarre way of living: ‘We had to go further, we had to 
consider the principles, the sources, the motives of such a life. This time we 
were brought face to face with the question of God’.37 Bloy was nothing less 
than a prophet for the Maritains. They felt that through Bloy’s example, they 
‘were shown heroic Catholicism—sanctity in its terrible trials, in its humility and 
its divine charity, in its asceticism, in the beatitude wherein it reaches its 
fulfilment, in its pure harmony, in its power, in its beauty.’38  
 It interesting to note that, according to Raïssa’s testimony, both the 
Maritains attempted to integrate the act of faith with Bergsonian intuition, 
allowing for the subsequent systematization of which Bergsonism itself was 
incapable: 
 
We thought that Faith itself could be considered as higher gift of 
intuition, and that invoking the idea of an absolute truth, faith 
would also imply and permit the elaboration of a doctrine of 
knowledge which would assure the human intelligence its grasp 
on reality.39 
 
                                                 
36 « En redescendant des hauteurs du Sacré-Cœur, Jacques et Raïssa ne se sentent pas 
seuelement enrichis d’une amitié fraternelle et inédite avec le mystique sauvage de 
Montmartre. C’est la question de Dieu qui se pose à eux. » Claude Lorentz, ‘Jacques et Raïssa 
Maritain : origines, itinéraires’, in Claude Laurentz (ed.), Maritain et les artistes : Rouault, 
Cocteau, Chagall. . . , (Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire de Strasbourg, 2016), p. 27. 
37 WHBF, p. 120. 
38 Ibid., p. 152. 
39 Ibid., p. 149. 
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Yet we have the clearest possible evidence demonstrating that Maritain’s life 
as a Catholic was not determined by philosophy, but rather by a need for 
meaning that reached down to the depths of his being, and was expanded to 
such a power that it overwhelmed him in the example of Bloy and the sufferings 
of Raïssa in what was a lifetime of constant ill health. Raïssa records two 
decisive moments in Maritain’s leap of faith. She tells of the first, that ‘thinking 
it was fair to put to a test by an act of the soul the promises of the unknown 
God, he started praying in the following way: “My God, if you exist, and if You 
are the truth, make me know it,” and then one day decided to kneel down to 
recite the Lord’s prayer for the first time.’40 The second key moment was one 
during which Raïssa was particularly ill:  
 
My illness, which last for several weeks, was for Jacques 
especially the occasion of decisive reflections and gave him the 
feeling that the time had come to awake from sleep. It was 
during those days of anguish that he had thrown himself on his 
knees. . . and had for the first time said the Lord’s Prayer. His 
resistance gave way, and he felt himself ready to accept 
Catholicism, if he must.41 
 
It was then in 1906 that the Maritains received baptism. In regard to Maritain’s 
relationship to philosophy at this time, what we find is quite surprising, but most 
relevant for the argument presented in this study. At least for a brief time, 
Maritain actually saw faith and philosophy as quite opposed to one another: 
 
To ask for Baptism was also to accept separation from the world 
that we knew in order to enter into a world unknown: it was, we 
thought, to give up our simple and common liberty in order to 
undertake the conquest of spiritual liberty so beautiful and so 
real among the saints. . . . Jacques remained despite everything 
so persuaded by the errors of the ‘philosophers,’ that he thought 
that in becoming Catholic he would have utterly to forswear the 
intellectual life.42 
 
                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 145. 
41 Ibid., p. 171. 
42 Ibid., p. 174. 
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As Maritain found himself wrestling with conflicting claims of allegiance from 
the Bergsonism that had saved his life and the Catholicism of propositions and 
declarations of faith that had saved his soul, he entered a phase of what may 
be fairly judged as the fanaticism of the new convert. He writes: 
 
This same Sunday I resolved to abandon all ‘personal inquiry’ 
in philosophy, all desire to know by myself, being sure to know 
everything essential and everything necessary by the Word of 
God, and trusting for the rest on the blessed night of faith. I am 
in the night, I know in an absolute manner what the Lord Himself 
has told me, and I will know also at such or such moment what 
it will please Him to show me for the refutation of error.43 
 
These records are significant because they reveal that what was most 
important to Maritain—at that time twenty-six years old—was not the 
construction of a philosophy or the synthesis of ideas to form an overarching 
framework of truth, but rather religious faith. And we know that that religious 
faith was itself instigated by personal examples rather than philosophical 
argumentation. Raïssa Maritain therefore writes: 
 
For two years, ever since our baptism, the starting point of all 
our thinking, whether about philosophy or life—and for us the 
one has always been inseparable from the other—the starting 
point had been the faith by which we now lived . . . whose power 
to give order to all things we ceaselessly admired. . . . we left 
the philosophers for the time being to argue among themselves. 
. . . we set aside all their philosophies until further notice. . . . to 
let our human reason grow strong again, to let it repair itself in 
the sunlight of eternal truths.44 
 
Later in life, Maritain would always refer to himself as a ‘mere philosopher’, 
conceiving philosophy, following Aquinas, as possessing its own method and 
dignity while remaining in service to theology.45 As he writes in his relatively 
                                                 
43 N, p. 46. The note is from 21st January 1908. Maritain adds: ‘At this time I thought that the 
essential task of philosophy was to refute error. I have made headway since, I have understood 
that refutation is only a secondary task, and one most often fruitless and useless (and which 
has so harmed Thomism). One must not refute, but "enlighten" and forge ahead.’ 
44 AIG, p. 14. 
45 Jacques Maritain, An Essay on Christian Philosophy, trans. Edward H. Flannery (New York, 
NY: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 40. 
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early but extremely significant The Degrees of Knowledge, theology is a 
wisdom of a higher degree that philosophy, with higher epistemic veracity: 
 
Inasmuch as it [theology] proceeds according to the method 
and sequences of reason but is rooted in faith (from which it 
gets its principles—themselves borrowed from God’s 
knowledge), its proper light is not the light of reason all by itself 
but the light of reason illumined by faith. For that very reason, 





It [theology] does not have as its object God as expressed by 
His creatures, nor God as the first cause or author of the natural 
order, but, rather, God in the guise of mystery, as inaccessible 
to reason alone, in His own essence and inner life.47 
 
Returning to Maritain’s very early intellectual development, however, it was 
only after Father Clérrisac, the Maritains’ first spiritual director, recommended 
Aquinas’ Summa Theologiæ to Raïssa and she had in turn recommended it to 
Jacques that Maritain became fully aware of the medieval Doctor and began 
his lifelong attempt to retrospectively systematize, justify, and deepen the faith 
that he arrived at in his twenties—a movement about which much has been 
noted in the literature on mysticism and which will be included in the subjects 
for discussion in Part II of this study. When Maritain came to grips with the 
Summa, there was, he believed, a choice to be made between the secular 
philosophy of Bergson and the Catholic faith, and he chose the latter: 
 
It was in 1908—while I was deliberating, in the country around 
Heidelberg, whether I could reconcile the Bergsonian critique of 
the concept and the formulas of revealed dogma, that the 
irreducible conflict between the ‘conceptual’ pronouncements of 
the religious faith which had recently opened my eyes, and the 
philosophical doctrine for which I had conceived such a passion 
during my years as a student and to which to which I was 
indebted for being freed from materialistic idols, appeared to me 
as one of those only too certain facts which the soul, once it has 
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begun to admit them, knows immediately it will never escape. . 
. . The choice had to be made, and obviously this choice could 
only be in favour of the Infallible, confessing therefore that all 
the philosophical toil which had been my delight was to be 
begun again. Since God gives us, in concepts and conceptual 
propositions (which reach us dripping with the blood of martyrs. 
. . ) truths transcendent and inaccessible to our reason, the very 
truth of His divine life, that abyss which is His, it is because the 
concept is not a mere practical instrument incapable of 
transmitting the real to our mind. . . . in thus completely 
accepting . . . the authentic reality value of our human 
instruments of cognition I was already a Thomist without being 
aware of it. When a few months later I came upon the Summa 
theologica [or Theologiæ] its luminous flood was to find no 
opposing obstacles in me.48  
 
Aquinas, and the priests with whom Maritain shared a passionate interest in 
Aquinas, such as Father Clerrisac, served as a tempering influence on 
Maritain. The implication of this is that while he was indeed heavily influenced 
by Bloy as far as personal spirituality and mysticism is concerned, in his early 
years Maritain appears to remain within orthodox teaching when it came to 
classifying and validating mystical experience(s). This is confirmed by Raïssa 
Maritain, who, in reflecting on Jacques’ philosophical development, writes that 
‘At the time Jacques published his first articles and his first book, the ardour of 
the intellectual combat and of the Thomistic “apostolate” covered over 
everything else.’49 She records Jacques as proclaiming in an early lecture on 
Bergson: 
 
There is but one region where the soul and the intellect can live 
in the peace of God and grow in grace and truth: it is in the light 
of Thomism. . . . In destroying Intelligence and Reason . . . one 
destroys the foundations of Faith. That is why a philosophy 
which blasphemes the intellect will never be Catholic.50 
 
 
Yet, as I will show, Maritain’s views on mysticism became ever more complex, 
and we come to see that there is less emphasis on reason and more emphasis 
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on intuition in its many forms, including the intuition of being, connatural 
knowledge, and love as a formal means of knowledge. In this connection, it 
will be seen that Bergson is in fact crucial in Maritain’s understanding of the 
mystical.  
 
(ii) Angels and Saints 
 
In Aquinas and Heidegger, Caputo’s first step in deconstructing Thomas 
Aquinas’ metaphysics is to bring to the forefront the religious context and 
motivations of Aquinas as a Dominican of the 13th century. Aquinas was first 
of all a Catholic, then a Dominican, and then a philosopher and theologian, 
and as such, his world and his thought is concerned first of all with God and 
the Catholic faith. It is a world and a system inhabited by angels, saints, 
demons, replete with heaven, hell, purgatory, miracles, charisms and divine 
revelations—the latter of which, as we have seen, was to define Aquinas’ life 
work in his eyes.  
 It is no overstatement to say that while Maritain was living and writing 
in the secular France of the twentieth century, and over the course of two world 
wars, his post-conversion life was just as singularly directed toward God and 
just as full of angels and saints as that of Aquinas. As Trapani writes, ‘While it 
is true that Maritain always referred to himself as a philosopher, it is helpful to 
remember that the primal source of energy and inspiration that propelled his 
life’s work derived from his burning love for, and unassailable confidence in, 
the truth of Jesus Christ and His Gospel.’51 Raïssa Maritain, in fact, relates 
that at around the time of the Second World War, the Maritains decided to 
orientate their lives ‘toward the work of contemplation’, withdrawing from the 
normal aims in life that laypeople pursue and living ‘like a little religious 
community, in which the study of spiritual things was given first place.’52 The 
Maritain household was ran on a tight schedule and Jacques, Raïssa and 
Raïssa’s sister, Vera, who lived with them, all became oblates of Saint 
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Benedict, with the motto ‘Ora et Labora’: work and pray.53 The Maritains, it 
was well-known, got permission from the Church to install a chapel in their 
house in Meudon, at which mass, devotions, and perpetual adoration of the 
Blessed Sacrament were held.54 Ralph McInerny puts it well that the Maritains’ 
rationale for their highly regimented life consisted of a ‘dual purpose—the 
pursuit of truth and the pursuit of sanctity.’55 Here we see in full display the 
role of the devotional and the liturgical in the religious life of Maritain that I 
argued was essential to the cataphatic element of his mysticism. Jacques 
takes up the issue of the role the liturgy in this regard in a collaborative work 
with Raïssa simply entitled Liturgy and Contemplation—a work which I will 
return to in chapter seven in building up a complete picture of Maritain’s 
mysticism. The precise meaning of the term ‘contemplation’ and its relationship 
with mysticism will also be a subject of later discussion in Part II. 
 For now let it be said on the basis of these considerations that despite 
the vast array of subjects covered in Maritain’s work, there is always a thread 
leading back to God, whether through the doctrine of analogical being in 
metaphysics, connatural knowledge and natural law in ethics, or the 
transcendental of beauty in aesthetics. With Maritain, faith implied 
uncompromising acceptance of the reality of miracles such as apparitions of 
Mary (Maritain spent years writing a book about the much-disputed apparition 
at La Salette, in which he believed strongly), faith healing (as we see 
repeatedly in his statements about Raïssa’s repeated recoveries in her health 
following earnest prayer) and, indeed, the intercession of saints.  
 Raïssa Maritain relates that ‘From Léon Bloy to Father Clerissac we had 
been led from one man of the Absolute to another man of the Absolute’,56 but 
after the Maritains’ baptism, the saint to which Jacques and Raïssa came to 
model their lives on above all was Thomas Aquinas, whose thought, with the 
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call of Leo XIII, was to be reanimated for the re-Christianization of modern 
France. In 1919, after Maritain had taken up a position at the Institut Catholique 
de Paris, he and Raïssa sought to establish a lay organization for the study 
and propagation of the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas.57 This 
group, whose members varied from time to time, met as the ‘Cercles d’études 
thomistes’, created in Maritain’s words, for ‘propagating in the world, and 
particularly among laymen, the doctrine of St. Thomas in its purity.’58 Inspired 
by one title of Aquinas, Doctor Angelicus, Jacques and Raïssa decided to call 
one of their early collaborative works on Aquinas the ‘Angel of the Schools’. 
So strong was the Maritains’ intention to dedicate the intellectual life in service 
of the spiritual life that they established statutes for the organization under the 
auspices of the Catholic Church, which included a total commitment to the 
teachings of Aquinas and a vow of prayer: ‘The members would have to 
declare themselves resolved to follow the guidance of St. Thomas with an 
entire fidelity, to read the Summa at least a half-hour a day’.59  
 The result, in Maritain’s philosophical work, was a marriage of 
commentary on Aquinas’ doctrines and radical innovation in light of the 
influence of the subjective turn of modern philosophy, Bergson’s philosophy of 
intuition, the witness of the human subject in modern art, and Bloy’s 
extraordinary personal spirituality in particular. These influences made 
Maritain not only a thoroughly ‘modern’ philosopher, despite being a disciple 
of the medieval Doctor, but also more aware of the contemporary centrality of 
the human subject and the pre-eminence of mystical knowledge. Yves Simon 
continues in his appraisal of Maritain:  
 
At this point it is relevant to note that the great epistemological 
work of Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge, which includes 
long chapters on the natural sciences, ends with studies on 
mystical experience. This association—infrequent in the history 
of epistemology—expresses a disposition which has been that 
of Maritain ever since his early progress in philosophy and in 
faith. He knows St. John of the Cross as well as St. Thomas 
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Aquinas.60 
 
This curious amalgamation of influences and interests was apparent at the 
meetings of the Cercles d’études thomistes at the Maritains’ home. Simon 
recalls that ‘[t]he living room was generally crowded, less by teachers or 
students than by writers, poets, painters, musicians, persons interested in 
mysticism, missionaries and friends of the missions. Most of the artists were 
of the vanguard description.’ 61  We see here, in the most concrete way 
possible, the ‘composition’ of intellectus of which Caputo spoke, the movement 
from the one to the many in an all-encompassing resolution which began not 
with demonstration proper to ratio, but insight.62 Maritain writes of the central 
importance of intuition as befitted the diversity of the gatherings: 
 
[I]t was understood instinctively that the whole carapace of 
words is absolutely nothing when the words are employed to 
facilitate some intuitive discovery. I must add that the 
experience of our study meetings taught me a very precious 
thing: namely, that discursive and demonstrative 
argumentation, doctrinal erudition and historical erudition are 
assuredly necessary, but of little efficacy on human intellects 
such as God made them, and which first ask to see. In actual 
fact, a few fundamental intuitions, if they have one fine day 
sprung up in a mind, mark it for ever (they are intemporal in 
themselves), and they suffice, not doubtless to make a 
specialist in Thomist philosophy or Thomist theology, but to 
make a man unshakably strengthened in the love of St. Thomas 
and in the understanding of his wisdom. I observed this in a 
good number of our friends, whose example I take to be 
decisive.63 
 
Yet the roads to the insight, what Maritain calls the intuition of being, are 
multitudinous. Maritain writes in Approaches to God that ‘For man there are as 
many ways of approach to God as there are wanderings on the earth or paths 
to his own heart.’64 For this reason he was involved in a vast array of interests 
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and vocations—and perhaps that of the artist most deeply. As Cornelia 
Tsakiridou writes, ‘In Art and Scholasticism, Maritain made it clear that 
aesthetics would be an integral part of his philosophical mission. The reason 
was his belief that at the basis of Thomistic realism is “an inexhaustible center 
of intuitivity” that precedes and grounds discursive reasoning.’ 65  Maritain 
wrote to the artist Jean Cocteau that ‘contemplatives and poets understand 
each other’,66 and given that my established aim in this study is to deconstruct 
Maritain’s metaphysics to reach a definitively pre-metaphysical, pre-
philosophical instance of contemplation, Maritain’s philosophy of art and his 
relationships with artists who were major influences are relevant.  
 
4. Art and Faith 
 
As was made evident in the launch of the newly-located Maritain archives at 
the Bibliothèque nationale et universitaire in Strasbourg in 2016, Maritain 
maintained strong friendships and correspondence with a vast number of 
artists, from painters to poets, musicians to novelists. Such artists included 
Léon Bloy, Georges Rouault, Jean Cocteau, Max Jacob, Igor Stravinsky, Jean 
Hugo, Gino Severini, Marc Chagall, André Girard, and Erik Satie, to name 
some among the most well-known. Given limitations of space, I must confine 
myself to Maritain’s relationship with one artist, in one medium (in large part). 
That artist ought to be the most influential in Maritain’s thought on art, if it is 
possible to discern such. 
 Other than Léon Bloy, whom we have already mentioned, the most 
influential artist in Maritain’s life was the painter Georges Rouault, whom 
Maritain met at Bloy’s home in 1905 and with whom he remained friends for 
fifty-two years.67 Other artists, such as Jean Cocteau and André Girard are 
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relevant insofar as they both inspired and gave practical application to 
Maritain’s insights on the visual arts, music and the vocation of the artist in 
general, but Rouault is undoubtedly the most important and as such deserves 
the most attention in this study. Claude Lorentz, director of the Maritain 
archives at the University of Strasbourg, relates that Maritain’s first public work 
on art was the preface to a catalogue of Rouault’s work in exhibition in 1910, 
written at the request of Rouault and under the pseudonym Jacques Favelle. 
Lorentz writes that ‘This text prefigures all of his [Maritain’s] reflection on art. 
Maritain detects in Rouault the spiritual kinship that connects him to the great 
artisans of the Middle Ages, an identical love of technique and gesture’ and 
that as such ‘It is equally with Rouault in mind that Maritain wrote his first entire 
work devoted to art.’ 68  Maritain was later to write that Rouault was ‘the 
greatest religious painter of our time.’69 
 Rouault was a Catholic artist whose paintings are notoriously difficult to 
interpret. His career is roughly divisible into two periods, with the first period 
being what Maritain called the ‘dark period’,70 depicting prostitutes, nudes, 
clowns, and menacing judges, and the second period, particularly during the 
last seventeen years of his life, being defined by religious images, the Passion 
and Biblical landscapes in particular.71 Rouault’s style, perhaps close to the 
Fauves and exploiting his experience as a stained-glass window apprentice, 
consisted of crude forms of vivid colors (often in pastel) outlined in thick black, 
and remained consistent throughout his life. However, whatever the content or 
title of the piece, Rouault’s work has a mysteriousness that defies rational 
commentary and description. He refused to comment on the meaning of his 
work in any concrete or direct way, though, as a one-time stained-glass 
window apprentice who was impressed by the anonymity of glass-makers,72 
Rouault was, William Dyrness writes, ‘an artisan . . . in the long line of 
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craftsmen who demonstrate their reflections by their hands.’ 73  As such, 
Rouault’s work is ‘fleshly’ to an imposing degree, and even when it concerned 
with religious subjects, displays, as Maritain warmly writes, ‘the obscure 
splendor and vitality of earthly matter.’74 
 Within his broader philosophy of art and his notion of connatural 
knowledge, the underlying themes and ideas that are made incarnate in a work 
by the artist Maritain names ‘creative emotion’, and for him there is, when the 
artist is in the midst of creation, something which amounts to a suspension of 
rational discourse—even while the artist quite rationally applies the techniques 
he or she has learned through years of struggle. Maritain writes of Rouault in 
this connection: 
 
[The] unity of creative emotion and the working reason—with 
unconditional primacy of creative emotion over all the rest—is 
a native privilege of any great artist. But it comes to perfection 
only as the final victory of a steady struggle inside the artist’s 
soul, which has to pass through trials and ‘dark nights’ 
comparable in the line of the creativity of the spirit, to those 
suffered by the mystics in their striving toward union with God. 
Such was the case with Rouault.75 
 
Rouault’s life was one of depression, and like Bloy’s, one of poverty, having 
been ostracized by the artistic community because his works were regarded 
as simply too grim and grotesque. With regard to his early work, Léon Bloy, a 
mutual friend of Rouault and Maritain and who actually shared a similarly 
pessimistic view of the world, mocked that his paintings featured ‘always the 
same slut and the same clown, with the single and lamentable difference that 
each time the worthlessness appears greater. . . . you are attracted exclusively 
by the ugly; you seem to be enthralled by the hideous.’76 In what is a very 
critical piece on Bloy, Tsakiridou highlights the similarity of the views of Bloy 
and Rouault as expressed in their artistic work, and also their cumulative 
influence on Maritain: 
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A morbid, and obsessively dolorist spirituality, arbitrarily 
exercised and dispensed, and prone to the exaggerations and 
extremes that we find in Bloy, lacks the moderation, humility, 
and joy that permeate the great Mysteries of the Trinity, the 
Incarnation, and the Person of Christ himself, and seems 
oblivious to the healing power of love with which Christ 
transfigures all beings. . . . There is in Bloy an oppressive 
monotony, something that we also see in the work of Rouault. 
Rouault, termed Fauve and an expressionist (by Maritain), was 
criticized in the 1904 Salon d’Automne, for eliminating light from 
his ‘black pictures’ (tableaux noirs) in contrast to the 
Impressionists, ‘for whom light was everything.’77 
 
Expressing his own inner sufferings and, as Maritain writes, ‘searching for 
himself . . . his own inner harmony’,78 Rouault felt the necessity of traversing 
suffering to reach meaning, and eventually, God.  
 Tsakiridou writes that ‘The Bloy-Rouault relationship is important 
because it serves as a key link to Maritain’s aesthetics and his idea of the artist 
as saint and mystic.’79 Rouault himself decided to meet Bloy after reading his 
La Femme Pauvre, and the two soon discovered, according to Pierre 
Courthion, that they ‘shared the same vision of reality, apparently terrible and 
relentlessly sordid.’ 80  Artistically, despite Bloy’s repudiation of Rouault’s 
paintings, ‘Bloy’s style was loaded with the same explosive expressiveness 
that marked Rouault’s new manner of painting’, and the prostitutes of Rouault’s 
early phase can be regarded, ‘to certain extent, [as] sisters and daughters to 
Bloy.’81 It was the life-long occupation of both artists to depict and transmute 
the darkness and suffering in life—in the world and in themselves—into 
profound, if disturbing, Christian art. Maritain’s own philosophical interpretation 
of the peculiar vocation of these Catholic artists, informed by the philosophy of 
art of Aquinas, will be one of the main subjects dealt with in Part II of the study. 
With this, we now turn to the place of suffering in knowing for Maritain, and 
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how all of this relates to my argument.  
 
5. Petit Frère de Jésus 
 
The Christian notion that suffering, if offered in abandonment to God, can be 
an especially profound way of reaching closer union with God is a theme that 
runs through the entirety of Maritain’s life. This is perhaps because of the 
intense sufferings and overwhelming spiritual power of those closest to him, at 
least in the years of his formation as a Catholic thinker—namely his wife 
Raïssa, Léon Bloy, and Georges Rouault. Raïssa Maritain relates that for her 
and Jacques, Bloy’s example in the face of suffering ‘placed before us the fact 
of sanctity’ and that ‘he brought us to know the saints and mystics.’82 The 
theme of the ‘dark night of the soul’ from John of the Cross, of apparent 
abandonment by God in the face of suffering, and the need to surrender 
oneself to the mystery of God and God’s providence—of what we might call 
‘not-knowing’ (what will later be called ‘the cloud of unknowing’ after the 
medieval mystical text of the same name)—is often seen in Maritain’s work 
and keenly felt in his correspondence. Reflecting on the years immediately 
following his conversion, when he was torn between Bergsonism and the 
propositional Catholic faith, Maritain wrote in 1961: 
 
And my own solitude?. . . . One will never know to what 
temptations of black sadness and despair a philosopher can be 
exposed in proportion as he descends into the knowledge of 
himself and of the great pity which is in the world. His rest here 
on earth will finally be in the night, if in this night, which is nearer 
to God than the day, and more desolate too, an invisible hand 
which he loves leads him like a blind man.83 
 
What this quote suggests is that in times of inner confusion and suffering, 
Maritain does not turn to Thomism but to the Christian faith that is the 
wellspring and core of Thomism. In other words, he ceases to be a philosopher 
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and instead becomes a man of prayer—perhaps a mystic. Let us explore this 
further. 
 I said that the years after Raïssa’s death were Jacques Maritain’s most 
difficult. Maritain wrote to the writer Julien Green: ‘Happy, Julien, how could I 
be happy? I have lost the physical presence of her whom I have love more 
than myself. I have witnessed the slow and implacable destruction of her poor 
body’.84 Maritain confessed to Green that he was in a state of ‘bewildered 
aberration’;85 he kept a note about Raïssa written by a friend as a ‘talisman 
against despair’86. During this time, Maritain did publish a work addressing the 
problem of evil and suffering, Dieu et la permission du mal (God and the 
Permission of Evil) in 1963, expanding the arguments of previous works 
touching upon the same issue, but despite the aid of a lifetime’s philosophical 
learning and a thorough knowledge of Thomist positions in the problem of evil, 
a philosophically supplemented understanding of the nature of evil and God’s 
providence was not enough, and from Maritain’s correspondence we learn that 
he had to rely on friends like Green and Thomas Merton and the resources of 
his faith, going to live with the Little Brothers of Jesus, writing that ‘I need to be 
protected from myself. . . . I will try to live a bit of their contemplative life’.87 
Writing in October of 1960, a month before Raïssa’s death, Merton did not 
appeal to Maritain’s Thomism in the depths of his suffering, but offered 
friendship and necessary silence: 
 
You have entered into the great mystery of the Cross which no 
one comprehends and which one should speak only in few 
words, and in a low tone, as it were in passing, with reverence 
and fear.  
 All I can do then is to stand mutely by your side, and nod 
to you . . .88 
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Here the element of mystery at the heart of Catholic faith and mysticism that 
was spoken of in the introduction of this study comes to the fore. Maritain’s 
premium on ‘reason’ falls away, because what is required, as he and his 
friends see it, is total commitment to faith in Christ and the redemptive value 
of the Cross. Nor was a fully-fledged theory of suffering (‘evil’, metaphysically 
speaking and ‘sin’, theologically speaking) and divine providence—that is, a 
theodicy—ultimately possible, because for Maritain, as for Aquinas, evil is a 
privation of being, the willful ‘nihilation’ of God’s influx of being as the First 
Cause.89 Because God is Being and Goodness, ‘in God there is no idea of 
evil’,90 with the logical consequence that evil is that that non-reality which 
cannot be known or caused by an omniscient and omnipotent God—an 
absurdity. This Maritain believed was absolutely necessary, for, he writes, ‘The 
fundamental rock to which we must cling, is the absolute innocence of God.’91 
If God has knowledge of evil, he must, by virtue of his eternality and 
omniscience, be the author of evil. The question of how God knows evil, if he 
is not its original cause and is yet unchanged in his being through the 
introduction of evil by those with free agency is a ‘mystery’ for Maritain, which 
nevertheless, he writes, ‘does not worry me excessively, since I know in any 
case, and with certain knowledge, that God is absolutely not the cause of 
evil.’92 Here we find again the priority of faith over reason in Maritain. 
 Even so, it seems that for Maritain, knowing that God is innocent of evil 
did not provide him with sufficient pastoral resources to deal with evil and 
suffering as experienced in his life. Though classical Christianity affirms divine 
aseity, that is, God’s fundamental separation from his creation and creation’s 
fundamental dependence on God for its being such that God cannot be 
influenced in His essence or knowledge of Himself by creation, Maritain could 
not reconcile this with faith in a God for whom evil is ‘inadmissable’ and who 
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truly suffers with us and for us as evidenced, he believed, in the Incarnation. 
During a seminar with the Little Brothers of Jesus, Maritain explored the mercy 
attributed to God, mercy being defined by Aquinas as the quality of character 
that one has if one is afflicted with sorrow at the misery of another, as if that 
misery were one’s own.93 Maritain was reminded of what Léon Bloy once said 
to him, that ‘All the rapes of reason, as we are accustomed to call that faculty, 
can be accepted from a God who suffers’94 and said: 
 
How can one help from asking if there is not in God something 
that corresponds in a supereminent way to that reality which in 
actual existence implies incompletion and imperfection, but 
which is also rich with how many treasures, which here below 
is called suffering… And when love is betrayed, is there not in 
him who loves a suffering whose depths is proportioned to the 
immensity of his love?... What do we mean by the expression 
‘an offence against God’ if not that our betrayals pierce to the 
very heart of subsistent Love itself?95  
 
In virtue of divine aseity and the fact that God is Love itself, we cannot 
understand this to mean that in virtue of His mercy God in His essence 
undergoes emotional changes in response to our actions. On the other hand, 
Maritain believes that we must take God as suffering at least analogously to 
human beings (passionate suffering in fact often being a noble element of 
love). For if God only ‘suffers’ to the extent that what He eternally wills for 
human beings out of love can be deprived of actualization or effectuation by 
the free abuse of human free will,96 then ‘that leaves the mind unsatisfied’, 
because the mercy of God, as ontologically one with His love, Maritain writes, 
exists ‘not according to what it does, but according to what it is’.97 
 Following Bloy and Raïssa Maritain, the latter of whom writes of the 
necessity of a ‘mysterious perfection which pertains to the suffering of the 
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creature’,98 Jacques offers a solution to this dilemma in suggesting that the 
passionate suffering we ourselves undergo in loving mercy is in fact a 
participation in an ‘unnamable’ of God, an unnamable splendor of God which 
implies no imperfection, no diminishing of God in His essence in virtue of His 
mercy, no risk of undermining divine immutability or aseity, but in virtue of 
which it can truly be said that God suffers with us.99 
 
What sin ‘does’ to God is something which reaches God in the 
deepest way. . . . [T]his mysterious perfection which in God is 
the unnamed exemplar of suffering in us, constitutes an integral 
part of the divine beatitude—perfect peace at the same time 
infinitely exultant beyond what is humanly conceivable, burning 
in its flames what is apparently irreconcilable for us.100 
 
Suffering, for Maritain, then, is not only one of the ways that we can reach a 
more fully realized union with God. It is also that which makes God that reality 
which deserves to be loved and worshiped—what Maritain calls ‘the great 
mystery’ of that which corresponds to sorrow in ourselves and which is both 
‘the sign of our misery . . . and the sign of an incomparably fecund and precious 
nobility’.101 It is plain that we cannot begin to explicate this reality within a 
philosophical framework employing Thomist terminology such as ‘perfection’ 
and even such terms as ‘divine aseity’. As Maritain writes, ‘there is only one 
solution, that of faith . . . And at the heart of this faith rests the certitude that 
God, and this is after all what Jesus said, has for us the feelings of a Father’.102 
 To bring to bear the resources of Caputo’s thesis, this mystery which 
Maritain speaks of—the unknowability of both how God knows evil and how 
He can suffer—seems to correspond to the mysterious realm of the ‘Godhead’ 
of Meister Eckhart—the ‘God beyond God’103 in virtue of the complete inability 
of our intellect to comprehend the divine reality even while we place moral and 
spiritual predicates on it (such as that God loves us and in so doing, actually 
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suffers with us). In addition, the surrendering in faith on the part of Maritain 
before the mystery of suffering seems also to correspond to the notion of 
‘detachment’ (Gelassenheit) that we find in Meister Eckhart. Both of these 
were taken by Caputo to the culmination of the latent mysticism in Thomas 
Aquinas that revealed Aquinas to be in close kinship with Eckhart and 
Heidegger, once the scholastic machinery was stripped away. 
 In his analysis of Maritain’s attempts at theodicy, Michael Torre 
concludes with the following: ‘What, then, does sin mean for God? This is the 
meditation towards which all Maritain’s work here tends. Perhaps this was 
really Maritain’s central spiritual preoccupation throughout his life, from his 
encounter with Léon Bloy and his devotion to Our Lady of La Salette to one of 
his final reflections on theological wisdom.’104 I do not agree with Torre that 
the problem of evil is the source and summit of Maritain’s thought, but I do 
believe that it is one of the most direct routes to what is: the question of the 
meaning of being.  
 Yves Simon said in his lecture on Maritain that ‘Under the influence of 
such a man as Léon Bloy, the faithful understood better that the center of 
Christian life is the beatific vision of the Divine persons and that, in this world, 
there is nothing greater than the contemplation of supernatural truth in the 
charity of Christ.’105 I believe this justifies these extensive investigations into 
the people and events that most influenced Maritain in the service of this study 
and we shall continue on this path as we examine Maritain’s conceptions of 
moral knowledge, artistic knowledge, and mystical knowledge.  
 Before doing so, though, I want to sum up what has been achieved in 
the whole of the first part of this study. The first part is entitled ‘Philosophical 
Foundations’ for the reason that here the principal tasks are to determine 
Maritain’s philosophical and religious influences and set out the broad 
trajectories of both Maritain’s and Heidegger’s philosophical projects for the 
purpose of later demonstrating a certain rapprochement between the two 
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Jacques Maritain: The Man and His Metaphysics (Mishawaka, IN: The American Maritain 
Association, 1988), p. 210. 
105 Griffin and Simon, Jacques Maritain: Homage in Words and Pictures, p. 5. 
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pertaining to the mystical. By way of a biographical introduction, I first revealed 
Maritain’s underlying realist concern to understand extra-mental reality or 
being. This realist preoccupation Maritain shared with Heidegger, as both 
stand in complete opposition to philosophical schools which place self-
reflective knowledge of the subject as their point of departure, namely, 
Cartesianism and Kantianism. At the same time, Maritain’s Bergsonian stress 
on the centrality of intuition in coming in to contact with being, as well as in a 
variety of pre-conceptual, ‘connatural’ modes of knowing, were also 
demonstrated.  
 I argued that in virtue of these two facts—Maritain’s realism and the 
priority of intuition over abstraction—even Maritain’s ‘intuition of being’ rests 
on a more primordial experience and aspiration, which is communion with 
ultimate reality. I argued that successfully identifying such a mystical aspiration 
in Maritain, however, cannot be achieved by recourse to Maritain’s Thomistic 
metaphysics, for like Aquinas’ thought, Maritain’s thought is also 
‘ontotheological’ in nature, not concerned, primarily, with the meditative 
attitude towards reality of which Heidegger speaks. We must, then find it 
elsewhere, in what Maritain did not say, as what was left unthought in his life 
and writings. To this end, Maritain’s religious formation and most significant 
religious and artistic influences—Léon Bloy and Georges Rouault—were 
discussed. What has so far been discerned is the importance of suffering and 
the chief role occupied by the artist in the development of what I will argue is 
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4 
 
Levels of Relation to Being 
 
 
1. The Transcendentals and  
‘Natural Analogies of Mystical Experience’ 
 
(i) Maritain’s Map of Being 
 
In demonstrating that in Maritain’s life and philosophy there is an immanent 
mysticism, one of my aims in this part of the study is to draw the similarities 
while acknowledging the differences between Maritain’s and Heidegger’s 
approaches to thinking about and experiencing Being. These approaches both 
illuminate and deepen the mystery of the meaning of Being that both thinkers 
pursue—progressively, from philosophy, including metaphysics and 
phenomenology, to thinking Being in the case of Heidegger and to 
supernatural, mystical union with God in the case of Maritain.  
 In classical Thomist fashion, Maritain provides what we may consider 
as a kind of map of Being in what are known as the ‘transcendentals’: the one, 
the true, the good and the beautiful. In Thomist language, the transcendentals 
are properties of being qua being, which is to say manifestations of being in 
ways by which we can relate to it, i.e. by analogy. The transcendentals, for 
Maritain, are available at the third degree of abstraction following the intuition 
of being. Here I will quote from an unlikely and lesser-known text by Maritain, 
An Introduction to the Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy, to demonstrate just 
how important these metaphysical considerations are to Maritain, even in the 
realm of ethics, which is the subject of this chapter: 
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The very first human concept is the concept of being. When 
being is considered as being, not as particularized being . . . or 
as vague being (as understood by common sense), but 
precisely as supra-universal and analogical being, that is to say 
when we have perceived in a flash of intuition what 
inexhaustible reality is signified by the word ‘being’ or ‘that 
which exists,’ then we see that being is the first metaphysical 
concept.1 
 
The movement or oscillation between the intuition of being and its abstraction 
via analogy that Maritain sketches here mirrors the same movement between 
the intuition of duration and the formulation of concepts in Bergson, though, as 
we saw in Part I, in Maritain intuition and abstraction or the use of concepts 
are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily temporally sequential. He 
writes: 
 
Every thing is being; and yet every thing differs from every other 
thing by a characteristic which is also being, thereby 
demonstrating the essential polyvalence of the concept. It takes 
in all things and is itself intrinsically varied; this is the classical 
doctrine of the analogy of being.2 
  
Analogical abstraction allows for the notion of the transcendentals, which in 
turn clarify and deepen the intuition of being, making the metaphysician proper, 
given that even the word ‘being’ is, as only one concept, only one 
objectivization of the experience and as such is limited in comprehensible 
application. As Maritain further reflects: 
 
[T]his very reality which I reach in the notion of being is richer, 
more charged with intelligible value than what I saw 
immediately in the idea of being alone. An internal necessity 
requires it to overflow, in a sense, the very idea where it is 
objectivized. It is objectivized in a multiplicity of other ideas, the 
idea of the True, the idea of the Good, etc. . . . This is how we 
came to have those modes or universal aspects of being, as 
ample and infinite as being itself, which are called the 
                                                 
1 IBPMP, p. 29. 
2 Ibid., pp. 29–30. 
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transcendentals (the ‘properties of being’).3 
 
Maritain lists the transcendentals as the one, the true, the good, and the 
beautiful. This pattern itself—that is, the ‘one’ and the ‘true’ being prior to the 
‘good’ and the ‘beautiful’—determines the pattern of Maritain’s thought as 
manifest in his great studies in ethics, art, metaphysics and mystical 
experience, with metaphysics as first philosophy underlying all other enquiries 
and subject areas in philosophy. Moral knowledge, artistic knowledge and 
mystical knowledge (in that order) also repeatedly feature as the three 
instances of connatural knowledge—again, being developments of Bergson’s 
notion of intuition, as we saw in Part I.  
 Maritain writes that ‘The one is being itself insofar as it is undivided’ and 
that ‘beauty is the splendor of all the transcendentals combined.’ 4  This 
splendor, or grandeur, as manifest to both our sense and intellectual faculties, 
therefore also features as one of the highest principles in Maritain’s philosophy 
of art and aesthetics as a constituent of the clear radiance of the beautiful. 
Following Aquinas, Maritain argues that the beautiful consists in three 
properties of ‘integrity’, ‘proportion’ or ‘harmony’ and ‘clarity’ or ‘radiance’, the 
latter of which encompasses the former two and which denotes the intelligibility 
and splendor of the form of the beautiful object as a distinct object.5 We should 
not be surprised to find that such an unblemished clarity or radiance 
characteristic of the beautiful is also characteristic of mystical experience for 
Maritain, when all mediation falls away and one directly experiences the 
absolute. 
 What follows the present chapter are three chapters which take the 
transcendentals and the modes of connatural knowledge as their respective 
themes. The connatural modes of knowing of the moral good and beauty 
Maritain calls ‘natural analogies’ of mystical experience. It should be noted, 
however, that Maritain also extensively discusses other natural analogies to 
mystical experience—mystical experience being taken by Maritain as 
                                                 
3 Ibid. p. 30. 
4 Ibid. 
5 AS, pp. 24–25. 
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immediate knowledge of God in union through love and also coming under the 
name of ‘supernatural contemplation’. These are (among others) 
‘metaphysical experience’ and love between human persons. One example of 
a metaphysical experience is the ‘intuition of being’ which has been discussed 
and will be discussed further in relation to Heidegger. I believe, however, that 
Maritain regards human love as the most important of the natural analogies of 
mystical contemplation: 
 
[W]e must not forget the most obvious and natural analogies of 
mystical contemplation, the ones that mystical language 
currently uses: human love, with all its trials and joys, with the 
dim though profound experience of another person which it 
produces—even with its most deadly madness; for things divine 
are so exalted and transcendent that sometimes they can find 
the means of showing forth some of their analogies only in the 
negative guises of sin.6 
 
I will discuss love along with moral knowledge in the next chapter before taking 
it as a guiding theme in the final chapter. 
 
(ii) Persons as Revealers of Being 
 
My intention is to follow Maritain in the trajectory of his thought as already laid 
out, which, on the basis of a pre-philosophical apprehension of Being as 
inescapable mystery as such (the one), takes the form of a progressively more 
profound investigation of the transcendentals as Being that can be known and 
conformed to the intellect (the true, understood and grasped as adaequatio) 
which eventually collapses by necessity in the unmediated, unitive, and 
eminently practical experience of the good not so much in moral acts per se 
but through moral exemplars—particularly saints—whose lives are testimonies 
to the highest reality of love and the supra-rational experience of divine beauty. 
Again, I will return to love, or charity, in the final chapter as the condition for 
the highest and most authentic mystical experience of union with the divine.  
 A progression in the experience of Being is also present in Heidegger. 
                                                 
6 DK, p. 300. 
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As Silvia Benso has shown, Heidegger’s Kehre can perhaps be defined by a 
move away from Dasein manifesting and returning to Being towards a 
conception of Being giving itself to Dasein, and a focus on the need for what 
Heidegger calls a ‘shepherd of Being’ or guardian of Being who, thanks to a 
meditative attitude, is in a position to receive the self-giving of Being and help 
us human beings recover the difference between Being and beings and 
mystery of the meaning of Being as such.7 Some scholars, such as Benso, 
argue that as Heidegger’s writing develops in his later years, this guardian 
figure increasingly seems to be the poet more than the ‘thinker’.8 Others, such 
as George Pattison, stress the difficulty one immediately meets upon 
attempting to define Heidegger under any label—be it a poet, mystic, or deep 
ecologist—and Pattison points out that in his later writings in particular, 
Heidegger ‘consistently refuses to adopt any kind of hierarchisation’9 of terms 
and ways to come to into contact with original truth. Indeed, in the essay ‘The 
Origin of the Work of Art’, Heidegger offers multiple examples of how truth 
establishes itself, including the founding of a political state, a sacrifice, and 
thinking (Denken) Being.10 
 For my analysis, and to demonstrate Maritain’s affinity with Heidegger 
in the overcoming of metaphysics, I shall therefore take as already granted the 
philosophical apprehension of the true in Thomistic metaphysics as the 
correspondence or adequation of mental idea to extra-mental reality 
(adaequatio rei ad intellectum). I shall also reverse the order of progression of 
the transcendentals, journeying through the good and the beautiful and their 
corresponding modes of connatural knowledge to arrive once more at the one. 
In his treatments of connatural knowledge, Maritain in fact lists artistic—or 
what he will call ‘poetic’—knowledge first. I will discuss moral knowledge first, 
however, because experience, human interrelatedness and interpersonal 
action, in my estimation, have logical priority over the production and 
appreciation of beautiful objects or performances. The latter, as we will see, 
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8 Ibid., p. 180. 
9 TLH, p. 192. 
10 PLT, p. 60. 
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are the two defining features of Maritain’s philosophy of art and the beauty.  
 In this connection, Maritain acknowledges: ‘The practical intellect does 
not deal exclusively with artistic creation. It also, and first of all, has to do with 
the moral life of man.’11 Of course, the act of creating a certain object can 
never be totally separated from the moral and existential considerations of the 
artist in the first place—a point on which Maritain is most emphatic in The 
Responsibility of the Artist. 12  The key point is that, as Maritain writes, 
connaturality ‘necessarily intervenes in prudential judgements wherein the 
intellect has to judge through conformity with right will’,13 and for Maritain what 
ultimately determines the rightness of the will, besides its immediate singular 
object, is the very rightness of that object in reference to the ultimate end of 
human life, namely, God.14 Let us summarize, however, that where we are 
dealing in instances of connaturality, we are also dealing, implicitly, with God, 
as the ground and ultimate good of the human person.  
 Taking the human person as my focus, I also intend to demonstrate that 
Maritain provides phenomenological analyses of the good and beautiful (in the 
basic sense of being descriptive) as he, like Heidegger, traverses beyond the 
realm of traditional philosophy, and later, beyond philosophy per se. Let it be 
said, though, that regarding the good and the beautiful as they pertain 
practically to spiritual life as an order of experience below the singular mystical 
experience of the divine, there is no ontological or epistemological order or 
priority for Maritain, for one who participates in either the good or the beautiful 
is participating in and doing the will of God, and of course, according to Maritain 
as a Thomist, God is the Good and the Beautiful, so there can be no hierarchy 
of participation among the two. Mystical knowledge for Maritain, on the other 
hand, is the highest degree of spirituality insofar as it encompasses the whole 
human being, mind, spirit, and body, given that these are what the human 
being is, as opposed to merely one of them. Neither the participation in the 
good through the moral life alone nor the beautiful in the artistic life alone 
                                                 
11 AG, p. 57. 
12 Jacques Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist (New York, NY: Gordian Press, 1972), p. 
26, 29. 
13 DK, p. 298 
14 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 26–36. 
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encompass the whole human being, and therefore cannot by themselves make 
the holiness or sanctity of a person, the ‘full spirituality that belongs to those 
who are called by St. Paul the “perfect” and the “sons of God.”’15  
 For Maritain, holiness or sanctity is only possible if two ontological 
conditions are met: that the soul receives sanctifying grace and that there is 
an ‘indwelling of the Divine Persons within the soul in the state of grace’.16 
Heather McAdam Erb writes that for Aquinas, ‘mystical experience is the 
natural crown of the life of grace’,17 and Maritain, in following Aquinas, writes 
elsewhere: ‘Grace orders us to the vision of the Divine Essence, or Deity itself 
which is beyond being, whereas, by nature, we are ordered only to a 
knowledge of being in general and, in the first instance, of the being of sensible 
things.’ 18  We might ask exactly what grace is, and the question will be 
addressed later. As will be made apparent in this part of the study, the 
necessity of grace will be a decisive factor in determining the precise 
relationship between Maritain’s and Heidegger’s respective conceptions of the 
highest aspirations of the human being—resulting in their related but divergent 
notions of ‘mystical experience’ and Denken respectively.19  
 The matter is very much complicated by the fact that even before 
Maritain fully developed his notion of the ‘intuition of being’, which we have 
already discussed, he admits of potentially infinite ‘natural analogies’ of 
mystical experience or ‘experience of things divine’.20 Every kind of natural 
knowledge through inclination or sympathy—what Maritain calls 
‘connaturality’—is, according to him, a ‘more-or-less remote analogy of 
mystical experience.’ 21  My intention is to compare Heidegger’s notion of 
Denken to these natural analogies, as well as Maritain’s conception of mystical 
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experience itself, to gauge the extent to which there is resemblance insofar as 
there is an overcoming of metaphysics.  
 
2. Heidegger and Maritain on Authenticity 
 
(i) Heidegger and the Question of Ethics 
 
Before we begin to make our way to the first natural analogy of mystical 
experience which is experience of the good, however, it needs to be said that 
while my ultimate aim is to demonstrate a certain rapprochement between 
Maritain and Heidegger (the first step of which is through an analysis of the 
moral life), Heidegger, unlike Maritain, never developed an ethics in the form 
of a system of moral rules or laws governing human action and which are 
grounded on a metaphysical system or philosophical anthropology. 
 John Macquarrie has argued that Heidegger ‘consistently avoided 
ethical questions.’22 Caputo argues that Heidegger, particularly in his later 
writings, ignores ethical questions to the extent that his philosophy is ‘ethically 
tasteless, insensitive, scandalous—thoughtless’ and, in a world sometimes 
beset with the worst kinds of suffering, actually ‘neutralizes good and evil.’23 
This study is not the place to determine whether Caputo is right on this matter, 
but it is important to understand the context which underlies his motivations to 
accurately delineate and juxtapose areas of enquiry for comparison between 
Maritain and Heidegger and clarify Maritain’s understanding of the relationship 
between metaphysics and mystical experience and Heidegger’s Denken. 
 In Being and Time, Heidegger offers a phenomenological analysis of 
Dasein’s modes of being. Heidegger transforms Husserl’s transcendental Ego 
into the necessarily social being of Dasein who, rather than being defined by 
modes of intentionality or consciousness of objects is defined by a pre-
conscious use of the a priori structures of existence, which he groups as the 
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‘primordial structural totality’ of ‘care’ (Sorge).24 Because Heidegger provides 
such a thorough description of Dasein through a phenomenological analysis 
of care, again moving from Husserl’s Cartesian distancing of conscious and 
object and employs what may strike one as normative terms such as 
‘fallenness’, ‘guilt’, ‘authenticity’, ‘inauthenticity’, and ‘resoluteness’, it would be 
a mistake to believe that Heidegger has nothing to say about how human 
conduct relates to human existence or even to the relationship between human 
being (Dasein) and the Being of beings. Heidegger’s project in Being and Time, 
writes George Pattison, is ‘bringing to view the kind of being that is disclosed 
in Dasein’s own (unique) capacity to question itself as to its manner of 
existing.’25 Pattison also writes that in speaking of the fallenness of Dasein, ‘it 
is hard not to hear something like a tone of moral judgment in Heidegger’s 
account of ‘das Man’ [the they], especially, indeed precisely, because of the 
possibility of choosing instead the way of authentic existence.’26 If we recall, 
Heidegger’s central problematic is the question of the ‘meaning of being’, and 
he begins Being and Time by asserting that that question has been forgotten. 
The constant theme in Heidegger’s writings is that the question of the meaning 
of being should be taken up.   
 One of Heidegger’s key theses is that it is by realization of the 
inevitability of death, not as a specific object that one ‘meets’ or that ‘happens’ 
but as utterly indeterminate and yet inevitable,27 that Dasein can be woken up 
to the fact that its being is its own and not the possession of the ‘they’. For 
Heidegger, death, as the end of all possibilities,28 forces Dasein to take into 
consideration the meaning of what possibilities have been and remain still 
possible for it, with this looking ahead and taking account of possibilities 
referred to by Heidegger as ‘projection’ (an aspect of ‘care’).29 In other words, 
its life, which, like death, is not something that happens to Dasein or others, 
                                                 
24 BT, 41/238. 
25 George Pattison, Heidegger on Death: A Critical Theological Essay (Farnham: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, 2013), p. 20. 
26 TLH, p. 19. 
27 BT, 40/230–231. 
28 Ibid., 52-52/299-311. 
29 Ibid., 41-42/238–243 
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but which is each Dasein’s alone.30 Heidegger calls the exclusive existential 
possession Dasein’s ‘ownmost’; death reveals itself as the ‘potentiality-for-
Being’ which is one’s ownmost, nonrelational, and not to be outstripped.’31 
Both the imminence and immanence of death force Dasein to consider its life 
as a whole and in this also force Dasein to regard its life as distinct from every 
other Dasein, and indeed, the rest of the world. This radical realization of one’s 
individuality, not numerically but existentially, as one who holds one’s life in 
one’s hands, brings Dasein out of the hypnosis of fallenness and brings about 
an anxiousness (or what Heidegger calls ‘anxiety’) for authentic living.32 In 
Heidegger’s own words: ‘Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is 
anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Anxiety 
individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something 
that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.’33 
 But this individualization of Dasein is by no means isolation from others. 
Whereas for Descartes and Husserl, to realize one’s being required shutting 
oneself off from the world and all our ideas about it, for Heidegger, the process 
involved in seeking authentic existence rather brings one in a more meaningful 
relationship with the world: 
 
Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ‘solus 
ipse’. But this existential ‘solipsism’ is so far from the 
displacement of putting an isolated subject-Thing into the 
innocuous emptiness of a worldless occurring, that in an 
extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face to 
face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with 
itself as Being-in-the-world.34 
 
Such is Heidegger’s description of the process by which Dasein takes up 
authentic existence and what that authenticity consists in. Dasein’s 
consciousness of and inner confrontation with death, understood to be the total 
lack of future possibilities, along with the implications for authentically taking 
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33 Ibid., 40/232. 
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one’s own existence as one’s own, Heidegger calls the mode of ‘being-
towards-death’ (a component of ‘care’).35 This is all possible because of the 
most fundamental a priori condition for Dasein’s unique being which is 
‘temporality’, that Dasein’s existence is always set in reference to the 
experience of time—hence the title of Heidegger’s major work Being and Time. 
 
(ii) Maritain on Authenticity 
 
As a self-proclaimed existentialist, Maritain also has much to say on the matter 
of authenticity. Here I shall have recourse to ‘Man and the Human Condition’, 
the last and arguably most important chapter of Maritain’s work Moral 
Philosophy, as it appears in the edited collection Challenges and Renewals. 
The content and character of the present chapter is fundamentally 
phenomenological, that is, descriptive, and bears much similarity to 
Heidegger’s approach as just exposited.  
 Maritain begins by writing that ‘The considerations that follow do not 
have to do with doctrines and systems, they bear on human conduct itself and 
on the most general options with which our attitude in life is linked.’36 For 
Maritain, each moral system is a call for the human being ‘to go beyond his 
natural condition’, but given the vast array of approaches to the human 
condition which remains implicit in every system even while it offers precepts 
for action, that the effort to transcend the human condition ‘involves so 
profoundly the individual subjectivity, that it depends, to tell the truth, on a sort 
of metaphysics of conduct which precedes moral theories and 
systematizations.’37 
 This ‘metaphysics of conduct’ reminds one of Heidegger’s notion of 
care, of our fundamental relation to our own existence, and of our relation to 
the world and others. This is in fact, what Maritain appears to mean, for he 
writes:  
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36 CR, p. 369. 
37 Ibid. 
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The fact is, I believe, that in the background of all our moral 
difficulties there is a fundamental problem which is ineluctably 
posed for each of us, and which in practice is never fully 
resolved, except in those who have entered into the ways of 
perfection: the problem of the relation of man to the human 
condition, or of his attitude in the face of the human condition.38 
 
For both Maritain and Heidegger, then, there are more basic ways of being in 
the world than those ways which are the products of conscious construction 
by means of philosophical and theological systems. Heidegger conceptualizes 
this being in the world most fundamentally as ‘care’, whose structure is a web 
of temporality, thrownness, projection, fallenness, temporality, being-toward-
death. For Heidegger, these components of care are not without any 
modification whatsoever, but are constantly changing as both influencing and 
influenced by an individual’s attitudes which are assumed in their day-to-day 
existence. These attitudes are rarely brought to conscious attention as they 
reflect or constitute the residue of philosophical and theological perspectives 
given to Dasein by ‘the they’ and determine authentic and inauthentic living. 
 In ‘Man and the Human Condition’, Maritain delineates four such basic 
attitudes or ways of being in the world, and like Heidegger, distinguishes the 
authentic from the inauthentic. The first two are ‘The temptation to refuse the 
human condition’ and ‘The temptation to accept purely and simply the human 
condition’. The ‘human condition’, it should be noted, is characterized more 
negatively than positively by Maritain. It is a condition, Maritain writes, ‘of a 
spirit united in substance with flesh and engaged in the universe of matter. It 
is an unhappy condition. In itself it is such a miserable condition that man has 
always dreamed of a golden age when he was more or less freed of it, and so 
miserable that on the plane of revelation, the Christian religion teaches that 
mankind was created, with the grace of Adam, in a superior condition in which 
it was free of sin, of pain, of servitude, and of death, and from which it fell 
through its own fault.’39 Maritain’s defining the human condition in religious 
terms through means of data provided by Christianity (in particular the Fall) is 
                                                 
38 Ibid., pp. 369–370. 
39 Ibid., p. 370. 
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noteworthy, for, unlike Heidegger, what Maritain’s conceptions of authenticity 
and a holistic ethics of human conduct are determined by his Catholic faith. 
Yet it would be a mistake to take Maritain’s outlook as totally negative, because 
for Maritain, the human being, made in the image of God, possesses a nature 
which is ‘good in its essence’ and a dignity that the rest of the entire material 
universe does not possess.40 This goodness and this dignity, as we shall see, 
rests upon the capacity of love that is both human and divine. More on this 
shortly. 
 To return to the first two ways of being that Maritain describes, he takes 
them both to be irrational and essentially impossible to live by. Totally refusing 
the human condition is, for Maritain, to refuse in some way the inescapable 
aspects of our existence such as vulnerability and temporal finitude—
inescapable because we are bodies and not pure spirits. Maritain warns us 
that such a tendency is particularly strong in intellectuals because the mind (or 
intellect) is a spiritual faculty, and the spirit, unlike the body, is immortal. Yet, 
‘there is no sadder and more fruitless distress than the distress of men who 
under the pretext of wanting to live according to the intellect allow themselves 
to be carried away by the temptation to refuse the human condition. They are 
vanquished beforehand, and their defeat aggravates their subjection.’41 
 The temptation to ‘accept purely and simply the human condition’, 
Maritain says, is irrational and contradictory because the human being always 
desires improvement—individually and societally. Every society and every 
person, Maritain argues, sets out prohibitions and punishments for actions 
which are deemed unworthy of the community or the human person as such.42 
Even if a person accepts the inadequacies of and suffering resulting from 
human nature and its limitations, there is always some standard to which the 
human being refers their actions. In sum, there is always a lived acceptance 
of the distinction of good and evil.43 
 Maritain’s assertion—again, made in the light of Christian revelation—
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41 Ibid., p. 373. 
42 Ibid., pp. 374–375. 
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is that ‘What is asked of man is neither to accept purely and simply nor to 
refuse the human condition—it is to transcend it.’44 Maritain offers ‘The answer 
of Indian spirituality’ as one instance of transcending the human condition, but 
a transcendence ‘by the means of refusal.’ 45  Maritain claims (rightly or 
wrongly) that the spiritual pursuit most characteristic of India, Hindu or 
Buddhist, essentially consists in pure effort or ‘spiritual energy’ even as they 
strive to dissolve the sense of individual self,46 and that given that the effort is 
aimed at the cessation of the suffering of transmigration brought about by the 
self, it is precisely an effort ‘to deliver oneself from the human condition.’47 
Maritain detects in this pride as much as courage, and this pride, which leads 
the Hindu or Buddhist to attempt to transcend the human condition, is in fact 
self-frustrating, because by the sage’s very efforts they demonstrate their 
humanness and their condition of finitude. Not only that, however, but the fact 
that the sage still has to die, that ‘he is not delivered from that which is the 
most tragically human in the human condition’, reveals a weakness of ‘Indian’ 
spirituality.48 
 Now for the fourth way of being in the world, Maritain perhaps 
unsurprisingly offers Christianity as ‘an authentically rational attitude toward 
the human condition’ 49  with consists in both its acceptance and 
transcendence. Unlike secular systems of thought that ‘attempt to go beyond 
the human condition by the sole means of man’ and which are ‘doomed either 
to futility or to illusion’,50 ‘It is only with Christianity’, for Maritain, that the effort 
to go beyond the human condition comes to real fruition.’51 The Christian, if 
they have an authentic faith, accepts the human condition in terms of its 
suffering, including the suffering brought about by sin, but does not take sin or 
moral evil as in any way desirable.52 It is by faith in God and love of God that 
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the Christian (and in the fullest sense, according to Maritain, the saint) can be 
transformed in the grace of God as ‘a participation in the divine life itself.’53 
This, Maritain says, is the other aspect of Christianity: the promise of salvation 
and eternal life in God as the hope that guides one in a life saturated with 
suffering and evil which result from our condition of fallenness. The eternal 
significance of even our most seemingly mundane actions and the fact that 
God has entered into human history and taken upon himself the sufferings of 
our condition, Maritain says, gives life meaning and suffering a meaning too, 
because it is given the new sense of Christ’s redemptive work and self-
annihilation, this being the source of the peace of saints.54  
 Maritain writes that the person who has been given and has fully 
developed the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity, which are gifts of 
grace, has entered into the ‘regime of supra-ethics’.55 The moral virtues reside 
in the order of nature, whereas the theological virtues have their source and 
object in the very life of God.56 Whereas the moral virtues have to do with the 
regulation of action in the human world, the theological virtues have to do with 
life in relationship to God, a measure which is utterly different in kind: 
 
Unlike moral virtues, the theological virtues do not consist in a 
mean between excess and defect; no excess is possible in the 
exercise of these virtues—one never believes too much in God, 
one never puts too much hope in Him, one never loves Him too 
much. For Christian ethics the theological virtues are superior 
to the moral virtues. The latter are still required, but they are no 
longer supreme. The supreme virtues are of a supra-moral 
order, and the highest of them, on which the perfection of 
human life depends, is charity.57 
 
The differentiation between natural moral virtues and supernatural theological 
virtues and the differentiation between the moral and the ‘supra-moral’ allows 
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us to conceptualize what Maritain and Heidegger share on a larger level 
pertaining to how human beings relate to Being. 
 
(iii) Three Levels of Relation to Being 
 
What can be gleaned from Maritain’s and Heidegger’s doctrines of authenticity 
as expounded above with regard to the question of the meaning of Being for 
Maritain and the rapprochement between Maritain and Heidegger that I claim 
can be found? It is that both Maritain and Heidegger posit, for lack of a better 
word, different ‘levels of relation’ between the human being and Being as such, 
what I will call the pre-moral, the moral, and, with Maritain, the ‘supra-moral’.  
 I posit that these levels of relation to being all relate to authenticity and 
determine the essential nature of mystical experience. Maritain writes, 
following Aquinas, that divine grace can endow people with ‘infused’ moral 
virtues which stand above ordinary moral virtues, but more importantly, that 
divine grace can bring the theological virtues to an ‘experimental stage’ by also 
endowing the person with supernatural ‘gifts’ such as wisdom (the highest of 
the gifts). 58  This experimental knowledge is knowledge of God and a 
‘contemplative experience through union of love.’59 Here, above the pre-moral 
and the moral (consisting of the moral virtues and infused moral virtues), we 
have the supra-moral: mystical experience. But—and this is a crucial point—
we must not mistake the supra-moral to be the amoral. Such a statement 
appears to border on paradox, but is not, in fact, paradoxical, for the reason 
that the supra-moral is, in its essence, love. The Latin suffix supra has various 
meanings of ‘above’, ‘beyond’, ‘greater than’, ‘exceeding the limits of’ and 
‘outside of’, but these do not suggest a nihilation of what is lower. The supra-
moral is important to consider as we examine the relationship between morality 
and mysticism in Maritain and the role of the supernatural theological virtue of 
love or charity in the transformation of our moral lives. The supra-moral level 
of mystical experience through union of love clearly influences both the pre-
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moral and the moral levels given that Christianity is a religion for which 
mysticism is only one vocation. Intimations of mystical union in love can be felt, 
however, through the example of ordinary people insofar as they exude moral 
and spiritual wisdom and insight. Such people Maritain calls the ‘friends of 
God’,60 and they will be the subject of later discussion. There it will again be 
seen that Maritain is very much influenced by Bergson, particularly in his 
discussion of the Christian mystics in The Two Source of Morality and Religion. 
 
3. Heidegger’s Denken as Supra-Moral 
 
(i) Dasein and Ethics  
 
Having indicated what the supra-moral consists of for Maritain, we shall now 
do the same for Heidegger, as an important step in determining the relationship 
between Maritain and Heidegger as pertaining to the mystical. 
 For Heidegger, death allows for the call of conscience or guilt that 
Dasein needs to take its own being and time into its own hands (authenticity) 
and decide its present and future being according to its own desires, not out of 
duty to the collective nor to the allegedly universal moral laws given by the 
collective (resoluteness).61 For Heidegger, Dasein becomes aware that it and 
it alone can really take a stand or decide upon beliefs and ways of being in the 
world, rather than attributing these to society or a universal moral law which 
denies the individual as the locus of value.62 Anthony Camele summarizes the 
implications of such a thesis:  
 
[The] wedding of authenticity and resoluteness seems to be a 
wedding of absolute subjectivism with absolute voluntarism—a 
wedding which can issue only in the denial of all socially 
conceived ethics. This is true but it does not mean that moral 
responsibility is denied. Authenticity and resoluteness are 
formal and pre-ethical in much the same way that Kant’s 
categorical imperative was formal and pre-ethical. Conscience, 
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or authenticity and resoluteness, has no content, dictates 
nothing, does not prudentially evaluate alternatives, nor does it 
after the fact judge the actual choice vis-a-vis the proposed 
one.63 
 
The most general implication of Heidegger’s position in Being and Time 
relating to ethics is that it is not a moral one in the ordinary sense. Heidegger 
does not aim to provide a moral system. His project is perhaps what analytic 
philosophers would call ‘metaethical’ insofar as it deals with the foundations 
(or lack thereof) of ethics itself, but which I have called ‘pre-moral’. We might 
look at it as a philosophical anthropology which, as a prerequisite 
understanding of human nature, then allows us to contextualize human action 
and then to establish an ethics. On Heidegger’s view, though, this would be a 
mistake, for fundamental ontology operates on a deeper level than any 
philosophical anthropology which would be formulated for the sake of correct 
action or praxis. This is why Heidegger disavowed Sartre’s claim that the 
former’s existential philosophy should be viewed as a ‘humanism’. Heidegger 
argued that conceiving the relationship between Dasein and being and the 
conditions for authentic existence as a humanism would be to reduce Being in 
a metaphysical, univocal manner, for the purpose of commodifying and 
manipulating it according to the designs of human beings. Such a move would 
amount to an insidious anthropomorphism which is, in fact, symptomatic of the 
oblivion of being.64 
 The result is that, as Camele argues, Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein 
does not serve to explicitly and directly provide an ethics or even a 
‘philosophical anthropology’65 and, moreover, that whatever Heidegger has to 
say is provisional.66 In Being and Time and in later works, Heidegger refuses 
the classical Aristotelian delineation of the spheres of theoria, praxis, and 
poiesis—that is, between the spheres first of theorizing, second of right moral 
or political action for the good (or happiness, eudaimonia) of both the individual 
                                                 
63 Camele, ‘Heideggerian Ethics’, pp. 288–289. 
64 BW, pp. 225–226. 
65 Camele, ‘Heideggerian Ethics’, p. 284 
66 Ibid., p. 290. 
  141  
and the collective, and third, of the production or objects. The analysis 
operates on a deeper level and as such, is not concerned with either what is 
today known as ‘normative ethics’ nor with what is called ‘applied ethics’. As 
Camele says, ‘How Dasein stands with beings and what course of action he is 
or ought to take depends upon the true understanding and interpretation of 
Being.’67  
 We have seen that for Maritain there is a ‘metaphysics of conduct’ that 
was prior to any moral system. The authentic metaphysics of conduct for 
Maritain was Christianity, and this corresponded to Heidegger’s notion of 
‘being-toward-death’ in terms of the level of relation to being rather than to 
content. Maritain also never offers Christianity as a ‘system’, and maintains, 
as we shall see in greater detail, the independence of philosophy and religion. 
Ethics (Thomistic ethics, in the case of Maritain) builds upon Christian faith as 
the second level of relation to being, and here lies Maritain’s notion of the 
‘moral knowledge of God’ that I intend to examine later in this chapter.  
 Another point of contact between Maritain and Heidegger is the role of 
death in human life. I claim that Maritain, in both his life and his written work, 
viewed the realization of one’s inescapable death as an instructive (what he 
would call metaphysical) experience insofar as it leads us to search for the 
truth of human being and being as such. We have in fact already seen 
evidence of this in Maritain’s life. As he and Raïssa considered suicide, there 
was at the same time a striving and longing for meaning and absolute truth, 
though they did not know what these were.68 More importantly, however, I 
claim that Maritain provides his own phenomenology of authenticity rooted in 
the example of saints and spiritual exemplars in his life such as Léon Bloy. 
This corresponds to the supra-moral level of relation to Being which is also the 
mystical, supra-conceptual level of knowledge. At both the pre-moral and 
supra-moral levels, then, conceptualization is not present, though it is present 
at the moral level.  
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(ii) Being, Thinking, Poetry, Ethics 
 
In his later writings, Heidegger clarifies his position on how we should 
approach Being as that of ‘thinking’ (Denken), and in so doing helps us 
determine the way forward. Denken, according to Heidegger’s idiosyncratic 
use of the term, is neither merely cognition, as in the ordinary meaning of 
thinking, nor merely a representing of what is actual. It is rather a special 
relating to Being; in Heidegger’s own words: ‘To think “Being” means: to 
respond to the appeal of its presencing. . . . The responding is a giving way 
before the appeal and in this way an entering into its speech.’69 For Heidegger 
it is no longer the case that Being is held or indeed grasped as an object of 
philosophical assessment, accessed via the reflections of Dasein as in Being 
and Time. For the later Heidegger, it is more the case that Being reveals itself 
to the human being and, as revelation, is and must be expressed in ways that 
are properly human. Hence, Heidegger writes, ‘Being’s poem, just begun, is 
man’.70 As such, we can see that the task of thinking for Heidegger is not so 
much a systematization of Being (which amounts to the mastering of being 
typical of ontotheology) but an appreciation of and a reveling in the mystery of 
Being, of its presencing, and, as we come to think Being, its withdrawing. 
Insofar as thinking is not concerned with explanation, it is related to the 
phenomenology of the earlier Heidegger, but insofar as it is appreciative, 
meditative, expressive, and has no concern for logic or internal consistency, it 
is far more analogous to poetry, which, for Heidegger, is ‘the saying of the 
unconcealedness of what is’71 and why Heidegger writes that 
 
Singing and thinking are the stems 
neighbor to poetry. 
  
They grow out of Being and reach into 
its truth.72 
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It is also why for Heidegger the poet replaces the philosopher or the sage as 
the one who preserves an intimation of the mystery and question of being, for 
the poet is concerned by virtue of the meditative attitude demanded of their 
unique art, transcends a solely propositional understanding of the conveyance 
of meaning through language.73 This, as Albert Hoftstadter says, is not to say 
that any poet engages in thinking in Heidegger’s sense, nor that thinking is 
always poetic, but it is to say that the best poets think and the best thinkers 
think poetically.74  
 In fact, any and all language ‘in which beings are brought into the 
opening clearing of truth’ 75  can be said to be poetry. In Heidegger’s 
terminology, poetry is language which allows for the presencing of beings, their 
genuinely coming forth and not merely being represented. Heidegger’s 
interpretation of the Greek term poiesis, as the ‘setting-into-work’ or ‘founding’ 
of truth,76 truth is here understood not as adaequatio rei ad intellectum but in 
a more fundamental sense of the emergence or unconcealedness of beings 
that is the precondition for any and all relatedness to human beings, prior to 
the question of which among them are better or worse, real or mere 
counterfeit.77 When Heidegger speaks of ‘truth’ of the being of Dasein or of 
Being itself, he is speaking, as Pattison says, ‘in terms of bringing the matter 
at issue out of a state of concealment or forgetfulness so that it could be seen 
for what and how it is’.78 Poetry, or poiesis, is therefore that which makes all 
art possible, and as we shall see, the artwork has a special function with regard 
to truth as Heidegger conceives it in this more primordial sense. 
 It is worth noting here that Maritain also has much to say about poiesis, 
albeit as distinct from praxis. Maritain writes that poetry, most fundamentally, 
is the ‘intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner 
being the human Self which is a kind of divination’79 and as such, is the ‘secret 
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life of each and all the arts.’80 It is this specific type of ‘bringing-forth’ that is 
specific to art and the artist that will be a subject of the next chapter. I hope to 
show that there are similarities between Maritain’s and Heidegger’s 
conceptions of artistic knowledge and the artist’s relationship to being in terms 
of poetry, as well as differences in their respective conceptions of poetry and 
what Maritain calls ‘poetic intuition’, which will in turn determine how Maritain 
thinks of Heidegger’s later work and his notion of thinking. There will in fact be 
some continuation from the present chapter because we will be concerned with 
the vocation of the artist in terms of that which makes it possible to be an artist 
and the context in which the artist works. In Maritain’s view, the latter inevitably 
involves moral considerations.  
 
(iii) ‘Original Ethics’ 
 
Heidegger’s notion of thinking, we have thus far seen, is not philosophy as 
traditionally conceived. It is therefore unlike moral philosophy or ethics as an 
academic discipline, being ‘neither ethics nor ontology’81—and therefore also 
neither metaphysics nor philosophical contemplation, but something different, 
which I call supra-moral. Herman Philipse says that given this, Heidegger's 
later writings are ‘equally destructive with regard to moral theory.’82 I will quote 
Herman Philipse at length for the purpose of greater clarity in pinpointing 
exactly where the issue lies in Heidegger’s later work insofar as we are unable 
to locate any type of ethics as an antidote to ontotheology, subjectivism and 
enframing: 
 
Heidegger now says that moral precepts cannot be binding for 
human beings unless they are issued by Being itself (das Sein), 
that is, by a transcendent non-entity or agent that is both 
concealed in human history and sends (shickt) to us humans 
the historical epochs that are our destiny (Geschick) and 
constitute history (Geschichte). This doctrine resembles 
traditional religious views on ethics, according to which moral 
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rules cannot carry authority unless they are God’s commands. 
Yet there is a crucial difference between Heidegger’s 
heteronomous doctrine and religious conceptions. Whereas 
religions provide ethical content to their doctrines of God's 
command by spelling out divine commandments, Heideggerian 
Being never issues moral precepts. As a consequence, 
Heidegger’s heteronomous doctrine exterminates ethics by 
investing a transcendent non-entity (Being) with a moral 
monopoly, but without specifying moral rules so authorized.83 
 
Heidegger in fact distinguishes between the moral (das Moralische) and the 
ethical (das Sittenhafte) and argues that a more primordial way of relating to 
being, rooted in traditions (perhaps oral and ritualistic) and serving as a 
historical formation of human beings and which the Greeks called ethos, was 
gradually degraded to ‘morality’. What began as a natural, spontaneous 
relating to and way of being in the world was reduced to conscious methods of 
shaping our being according to various models—these models are what we 
still call moral or ‘ethical’ systems, but which conceal a deeper foundation.84  
 As such, Heidegger does not attempt to provide an ethical or moral 
theory, but does, by 1947, with the publication of the Letter on Humanism, 
have recourse to what he calls ursprüngliche Ethik—translated as ‘original 
ethics’ or ‘originary ethics’,85 the source of which is the ethos that Heidegger 
speaks of, with the ‘original’ denoting that which is most primordial in the 
human being: the ‘thinking which thinks the truth of being’.86  
 In the essay ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, Heidegger writes that thinking 
is an authentic way of being (or, as the later Heidegger says, ‘dwelling’ in the 
world). Heidegger gives an etymological analysis of the German word bauen, 
tracing its origin in the High German and Old English word Buan. In so doing, 
he identifies its original meaning as dwelling (both noun and verb), signifying 
‘to remain, to stay in a place’, but the true meaning of which, he admits, ‘has 
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been lost to us.’87 Heidegger proceeds: 
 
Where the word bauen still speaks in its original sense it also 
says how far the nature of dwelling reaches. This is, bauen, 
buan, bhu, beo are our word bin in the versions: ich bin, I am, 
du bist, you are, the imperative form bis, be. What then does 
ich bin mean? The old word bauen, to which the bin belongs, 
answers: ich bin, du bist mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in 
which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are 
on the earth, is Buan, dwelling. To be a human being means to 
be on the earth as a mortal. It means to dwell. The old word 
bauen, which says that man is insofar as he dwells, this word 
bauen however also means at the same time to cherish and 
protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soul, to 
cultivate the vine. Such building only takes care—it tends the 
growth that ripens into its fruit of its own accord. Building in the 
sense of preserving and nurturing is not making.88 
 
Cultivation is contrasted with construction, and here we come again to 
Heidegger’s contrast between thinking and ontotheology, the latter of which 
emerges from the Latin lexicon; hence, the Latin colere and cultura Heidegger 
identifies with the ‘raising up of edifices.’89 The dwelling that Heidegger is 
concerned with is habitual in that it signifies an inhabiting in something, which, 
insofar as human beings are bodily, world-situated beings, is nothing less than 
their nature, and, it has been subject to the oblivion of being ‘in favor of 
foreground meanings.’90  
 In pursuing this notion of dwelling in the later Heidegger, we begin to 
glimpse the convergence of the supra-moral, poetic and something like the 
mystical. For Heidegger suggests that human beings do not just dwell in or on 
the earth, but in a ‘fourfold’ of earth, sky, divinities and mortals (the latter of 
which they are). This fourfold is a central idea of the later Heidegger and he 
writes that ‘Mortals dwell in the way they preserve the fourfold in its essential 
being, its presencing. . . . Mortals dwell in that they save the earth. . . . receive 
the sky as sky. . . . await the divinities as divinities. . . . [and] intitiate they own 
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nature—their being capable of death as death.’ 91  Heidegger goes on to 
describe dwelling as a preserving and safeguarding of the fourfold in which 
human beings reside. 
 We can, by now, see that dwelling is a relation of the human being to 
the Being of beings and that, for Heidegger, it is to be regarded as prior to 
conceiving moral systems, for moral systems are one means by which human 
beings attempt to shape Being (as the horizon of human experience) and 
constrain its possible manifestations through conceptual nets (for example, 
those of psychology, anthropology, politics and biography).92 They are not the 
simple, appreciative—and to some extent—mystical relating to Being that 
characterizes thinking and dwelling. Heidegger thus conceives moral 
philosophy as essentially metaphysical, and therefore an instance of 
ontotheology. What began as an original ethics of dwelling was, according to 
Heidegger, gradually appropriated for the purpose of shaping Being in our 
image, given that Being, as we saw, is increasingly seen as a product that is 
made actual.  
 
The condemnation of ethics decayed to morality is thus present 
in Heidegger in a polyvalent form: condemnation of ethics 
insofar as it is a particularistic science; condemnation of the 
subjectivistic character of the evaluation—which makes out of 
Being an object to which to attribute a value; condemnation of 
the limitation of Being to ought-to-be—by which act morality 
claims its own autonomy, forgetful of the ontological primacy of 
Being (and of the ontological difference to which such primacy 
leads). A threefold blasphemy of a metaphysical discipline.93 
 
Because the concepts we employ are always the product of some intended 
control of events, morality, Heidegger argues, operates on the ‘ontic’ level, that 
is, the realm of individual entities, and as such the human, even as it tries to 
transcend the human, as with ‘Plato’s ‘science of the good’. Heidegger has 
therefore almost nothing to say about morality as the discipline with which 
Maritain is concerned. On the other hand, original ethics operates on the 
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‘ontological’ level, the realm of the structure of meaning which grounds and 
renders possible the ontic. Heidegger’s oft-repeated distinction between 
beings (on the ontic level) and the Being of beings is mirrored in these two 
different realms. We also see that while Heidegger is not concerned with ethics 
or morality in the normal, everyday sense, the ‘original ethics’ of dwelling 
corresponds to the pre-moral level of relation to being. This is why thinking is 
‘neither ethics nor ontology.’  
 But, as the Heidegger scholar Silvia Benso argues, precisely because 
Heidegger has much to say about the ontological comportment toward Being 
which can be clearly seen to guide human life with some innovative application 
of his thought, there can be discerned in Heidegger an ‘ontological ethics’.94 
Benso offers further justifications and suggestions for determining a way 
forward in developing such an ethics: 
 
Heidegger’s constant nonengagement in any sort of ethical 
project. . . . is structural to his thought which is concerned more 
with Being in its abstractness and vagueness than with Being 
considered as what enables the interweaving of human 
relationships, where by ‘human’ one should understand not only 
interpersonal relationships but, more fundamentally, any kind of 
relationships human beings can entertain with the world in 
which they live. Heidegger’s neglect of ethics, however, should 
not prevent exploring that path that he has laid open for us, 
even against his intentions. The openings Heidegger lets us 
glimpse must be sounded and asserted even when they work 
against the letter of Heidegger’s thought.95 
 
Benso seems to argue that this ontological ethics is distinct from original ethics 
only insofar as it directly applies original ethics to the ontological situation of 
the human today. She argues: 
 
By withdrawing from any claim of normativity, the ontological 
ethics, by the same move, recedes from the claim of defining 
and delimiting the reality into categories always and anyway too 
narrow and artful. It unlearns the nomos as a product of reason 
in order to follow ‘the assignment contained in the dispensation 
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of Being,’ since only ‘from Being itself the assignment of those 
directions that must become law and rule for man.’96 
 
But I am not persuaded by Benso’s project here, for she herself follows 
Heidegger in his use of normative terms such as ‘evil’97 and provides practical 
examples by which the efficacy of an adequate ethics is determined, such as 
the prevention of horrific events like Auschwitz.98 It should also be pointed out 
that even such notions as ‘letting-be’ (Gelassenheit) contain moral overtones. 
The assignments given to human beings from Being, according to Benso, ‘take 
the linguistic form, not of the imperative, but rather of the injunction, of the 
appeal which presupposes—and implores—listening and answering. The 
injunction to let it be has a performative character: it absolutely summons the 
one who listens to the appeal to change, to transform his way of being.’99 
Again, one sees here the employment of normative terms such as ‘injunction’ 
and ‘appeal’, and, if we recall, as Herman Philipse argued, a moral monopoly 
being given to Being, precisely as it commands us.  
 I believe we are now sufficiently justified to claim that there exists in the 
later Heidegger the same three levels of relation to Being as we found in 
Maritain, namely, the pre-moral, moral, and supra-moral, which are all mutually 
influential. One example of where the pre-moral (the comportment to Being) 
can serve to inform the moral in Heidegger’s later thought (and which Benso 
herself identifies) is the statement that ‘we can affirm the unavoidable use of 
technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, 
confuse, and lay waste our nature’.100 It is by thinking that the one escapes 
the enframing mindset at the root of technology and ‘ponders the abode of 
man.’101 This statement of Heidegger’s can be seen to be ‘ethical’ in the sense 
of ethos—in contradistinction to the ontological attitude of technological 
control, being a fundamental relating or comportment towards being that 
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appreciates its mystery. As such, thinking is neither ethics not ontology, argues 
Benso, 
 
because actually it is both ethics and ontology: not only ethics 
because it is more than ethics in providing access for a possible 
encounter with Being; not only ontology because it is more than 
ontology in approaching Being through a dwelling which lets it 
be. Certainly from a metaphysical perspective it would be 
declared a nonethics: but such ‘ethics’ seems to be able to 
stand beyond the metaphysics of the subject, of the will, of 
reason, with respect both to—using a metaphysical term— the 
ethical ‘categories’ it proposes and to its manner of 
proceeding—which is descriptive and not normative—and also 
to the relationship it entertains with Being.102 
 
Anticipating the counter-argument that Heidegger is most emphatically against 
‘ethics’ as conceived in philosophy since Plato, and as such has nothing to do 
with any enterprise called ‘ethical’, Benso remarks: 
 
[S]uch ‘ethics’ would be declared a nonethics: but such ‘ethics’ 
seems to be able to stand beyond the metaphysics of the 
subject, of the will, of reason, with respect both to—using a 
metaphysical term— the ethical ‘categories’ it proposes and to 
its manner of proceeding— which is descriptive and not 
normative—and also to the relationship it entertains with 
Being.103 
 
Here we have a clue as to the trajectory of Heidegger’s later thought and a 
better understanding of Heidegger’s levels of relation between the human 
being and the Being of beings. We have here delineated original ethics as the 
pre-moral, and the moral precisely as moral. What about that which was 
referred to as ‘supra-moral’? I suggest that Heidegger’s Denken, as the 
meditative activity beyond philosophy but which is an entirely conscious 
undertaking, constitutes the supra-moral relation of the human being to Being, 
for it is not concerned with action, not concerned with production of any sort, 
and is therefore not concerned with justifying itself, but is rather, as Maritain 
will say of genuine art, for the sake only of itself. And it also bears some relation 
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to some relation to mysticism insofar as it is in no way analogous to the science 
of philosophy, and both thinking and mystical experience, as Maritain 
conceives the latter, operate on the supra-rational, supra-conceptual level. The 
principal difference between thinking and mysticism, however, is that for 
Maritain, mystical experience is a gift of supernatural grace and operates 
through love, transformed as a formal means of knowing.104 Heidegger is most 
emphatic on the absolute independence of thinking from all previous 
(ontotheological) conceptions of it since Plato: 
 
[W]e must free ourselves from the technical interpretation of 
thinking. The beginnings of that interpretation reach back to 
Plato and Aristotle. They take thinking itself to be a techne, a 
process of reflection in service to doing and making. But here 
reflection is already seen from the perspective of praxis and 
poiesis. For this reason thinking, when taken for itself, is not 
‘practical.’ The characterization of thinking as theoria and the 
determination of knowing as ‘theoretical’ behavior occur already 
within the ‘technical’ interpretation of thinking. Such 
characterization is a reactive attempt to rescue thinking and 
preserve its autonomy over against acting and doing. Since 
then ‘philosophy’ has been in the constant predicament of 
having to justify its existence before the ‘sciences.’ It believes it 
can do that most effectively by elevating itself to the rank of a 
science. But such an effort is the abandonment of the essence 
of thinking. Philosophy is hounded by the fear that it loses 
prestige and validity if it is not a science. Not to be a science is 
taken as a failing that is equivalent to being unscientific. Being, 
as the element of thinking, is abandoned by the technical 
interpretation of thinking.105 
 
The supra-moral relation of thinking to being leads back to the pre-moral level 
of dwelling, given that, as Heidegger makes clear in ‘Building Dwelling 
Thinking’, thinking does not attempt to attain a particular experience, but is 
rather concerned with the grateful and patient appreciation of what is: ‘Dwelling 
preserves the fourfold by bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things. 
But things themselves secure the fourfold only when they themselves as things 
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are let be in their presencing.’106 Moving from the ontic to the ontological, 
‘Thinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the essence of man. It does 
not make or cause the relation.’107 
 Heidegger changes his emphasis away from temporality as the primary 
a priori condition of human being to dwelling, although this is not as simple as 
a mere change of emphasis away from what can or will be to what is, for 
Heidegger’s understanding of thinking, which serves to guard Being in its 
essential mystery, is also a waiting for its presencing. As expressed by the 
teacher in the dialogue ‘Conversation on a Country Path About Thinking’: 
‘Waiting, all right; but never awaiting, for awaiting already links itself with re-
presenting and what is re-presented. . . . In waiting we leave open what we are 
waiting for.’ 108  The essence of thinking, then, is what Heidegger calls 
Gelassenheit, or letting-be,109 which is in fact the original German title of 
Discourse on Thinking. Hence, Heidegger says in the essay ‘Language’, that 
as against the ‘understanding that is schooled in logic, thinking of everything 
in terms of calculation. . . . we do not want to get anywhere. We would like 
only, for once, to get to just where we are already.’110  
 Heidegger’s ideas about the way by which we get to where we are 
already, and who leads us there and why, lead us away from moral philosophy 
and toward the mystical element which Caputo identifies in Heidegger’s notion 
of thinking. Having examined Maritain’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of 
authenticity and identified three levels of relation to Being, I will now turn to the 
second level of relation to Being, of moral philosophy or ethics in the ordinary 
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5 
 
Moral Knowledge of God, Love 
and the Spiritual Marriage 
 
’A person possesses absolute dignity because he is in direct relationship  
with the absolute, in which alone he can find his complete fulfilment.’1 
 
 
1. Maritain’s Phenomenology of Good and Evil 
 
(i) Maritain as Personalist 
 
I do not intend to provide a complete survey of Maritain’s moral system, for 
such a task demands a study itself. Instead, the focus here and in the next 
chapter is on the elements of Maritain’s thinking which are most relevant to the 
lived reality of the person—in particular, moral exemplars and saints, who 
Maritain calls ‘friends of God’2 and what I will call, in explicit comparison with 
Heidegger’s shepherd of Being, ‘revealers of Being’.  
 Maritain, especially in the context of his political and educational works, 
writes from the perspective of ‘personalism’,3 by which is meant that persons, 
human and divine, are the locus of all philosophical explanation and 
justification. They are, in a word, the source and end of value, given that with 
persons comes a world of freedom that is unknown to the physical world, 
determined as it is by regular or fixed laws.4 Following Armando Rigobello, 
Thomas D. Williams helps to delineate two different types and operative 
                                                 
1 RMNL, p. 6. 
2 AG, p. 63. 
3 RMNL, p. 10. 
4 IBPMP, pp. 54–73. 
  154  
meanings of personalism. The first is a ‘strict’ type that places an intuition of 
the person’s own self and analyses of the experience of the self at the center 
of a philosophical system.5 The second is a ‘broad’ type, to which Maritain’s 
Thomistic brand of personalism is presumed by Williams to belong. Williams 
writes: 
 
In its broader sense, personalism integrates a particular 
anthropological and ethical vision into a global philosophical 
perspective. Here the person is not considered as the object of 
an original intuition, nor does philosophical research begin with 
an analysis of the personal context. Rather, in the scope of a 
general metaphysics the person manifests his singular value 
and essential role. Thus the person occupies the central place 
in philosophical discourse, but this discourse is not reduced to 
an explicitation or development of an original intuition of the 
person. In this context, the person does not justify metaphysics 
but rather metaphysics justifies the person and his various 
operations. More than an autonomous metaphysics, 
personalism in the broad sense offers an anthropological-
ontological shift in perspective within an existing metaphysics 
and draws out the ethical consequences of this shift.6 
  
With the qualification that Maritain agrees with existentialists such as 
Heidegger and Sartre that the intuition of one’s own finitude is a valuable 
metaphysical experience insofar as it can open the door to more global 
contemplation, his philosophy does seem to be of the broad type. Maritain’s 
analyses of moral knowledge, artistic knowledge, and mystical knowledge, as 
possible by means of connaturality, are always set in a realist and theistic 
framework. What Maritain calls ‘pre-philosophical’ or ‘natural knowledge’ of 
moral values, as distinct from reflexive, philosophical knowledge of moral 
values is not, according to Maritain, to be used as proof for the validity of a 
moral system.7 One needs moral philosophy, which Maritain calls ‘knowledge 
of the second look’, to first verify pre-philosophical intuitions and second, to 
place them within a greater framework for advancements in individual and 
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collective moral life.8  
 For Maritain, moral values are neither heralded nor created by 
philosophers, as in the cases of Kant and Sartre.9 They are rather perceived 
as external obligations and acted upon by persons connaturally. Moral 
experience, including the experience of the ‘second look’, then, has to be our 
focus here. For Maritain, this includes natural law, which is a natural disposition 
or connatural knowledge of the objective principles of avoiding evil and to do 
good derived from one’s essence as in the imago dei. Maritain writes that 
‘knowledge through connaturality plays an immense part in human existence, 
especially in that knowing of the singular which comes about in everyday life 
and in our relationships of person to person’.10 Indeed, it is because direct 
experience and the second look are not mutually exclusive that Maritain can 
speak of a ‘moral knowledge of God’ in acting according to and manifesting 
the moral good. 11  And understanding the experience of moral goodness 
allows us to understand the experience of human love.  
(ii) The Task of Ethics 
For Maritain, the determination of what happiness consists in is the task of 
moral philosophy.12 Ethics or moral philosophy for Maritain, must, in light of 
Christian revelation, be ‘subalternated’ to moral theology, because Christian 
revelation has provided human beings with the most crucial facts possible with 
regard to the human condition as such.13 These facts include the fallenness 
of human beings, the immortality of the soul, and the universal call to the divine 
life and the beatific vision.14 Joseph Pappin writes that, for Maritain, ‘It is 
impossible to escape from the results of the irruption of faith into the structures 
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of our knowledge.’15 And yet, as Ralph Nelson points out, ‘a purely natural 
moral philosophy lacks the knowledge of man’s true ultimate end, to which all 
his actions are to be ordered.’16  
 Maritain believes that ethics has its own subject-matter and its own 
methodology as distinct from theology or moral theology, because moral 
philosophy and moral theology will approach the ultimate end of the human 
being differently; the former regarding the question of the ultimate end from 
the perspective of the perfection of human nature by means of nature’s own 
resources and the latter regarding the question from the perspective of the 
participation by human beings in the life of God.17 Yet, precisely because 
Christianity granted human beings the knowledge that ultimate happiness lies 
in Beatitude through the love of God—delivering the human being from the 
‘egocentricity in which Aristotelian eudemonism remained’18—the existential 
condition of the human being must be considered in a totally different light. We 
consequently find that the differences in points of departure and subject-matter 
between Christian ‘existentialists’ such as Maritain and atheistic existentialists 
such as Heidegger and Sartre in the totality of the field of ethics—the pre-
moral, moral and supra-moral—are marked indeed. 
 In light of Christian revelation, for Maritain, the notion of freedom is 
transformed into a positive notion of freedom for or to, toward right and proper 
action for proper goods. Maritain’s ethics is Aristotelian or ‘eudaimonist’ in that 
it holds that the human will is necessarily ordered to the fulfilment of human 
nature, which is happiness or well-being, with the result that one’s actions are 
always, whether consciously or subconsciously, ordered to that end. For 
Maritain, as for Aquinas, the ultimate end of human action and human life is 
God and one’s union with God, or ‘beatitude’.19 Freedom of will and action do 
not include the possibility of changing this essential ordering of human nature 
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towards happiness and God, but rather consists in the freedom to choose 
among means to attain the end. 20  That said, for Maritain one does not 
necessarily need a conscious knowledge of God as one’s ultimate end, and 
here we come to experience of the moral good as a natural analogy of mystical 
experience.  
 Maritain attempts to show that a ‘purely practical, non-conceptual and 
non-conscious knowledge of God’ is possible in moral experience. 21  To 
ascertain the epistemic and ontological relationship between God and moral 
acts for Maritain, we should begin by recapitulating the notion of the moral 
good as ‘a particular analogue’ of the transcendental of the ontological Good, 
or ‘a certain fullness of being in a particular given line, the line of what 
specifically human, so that the moral good remains related to being and to the 
transcendental realm of being’.22  
 For Maritain, as for Aquinas, God is the first cause and preserver in 
existence of all that is not Himself. God is esse ipsum subsistens, that which 
is subsisting being itself, or Being as such, without modification(s) such as 
contingency or supervenience upon a substance. God, though, is not just 
Being as such, or the One, but is also supreme metaphysical Goodness—a 
doctrine which Maritain utilizes in approaching the problem of evil. Holding that 
God, as ipsum esse subsistens, is the absolute Good and cannot therefore be 
the source of evil either by creating or willing it—whether natural or moral, non-
conscious operations in the natural world or conscious decisions in human 
life—has the implication that moral goodness is at the heart of, and expresses, 
ultimate reality. It also has the implication that moral evil, as Augustine, 
Aquinas and Maritain held after them, is a ‘privation’ of being, a vacuum, 
because it is not created positively and sustained in existence by God.23 This 
is the classical Catholic doctrine of privatio boni.  
 The doctrine of privation boni applies to all of creation, but here we have 
to limit our scope to the categories of good and evil as they pertain to ethics or 
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the moral life of human beings. In his celebrated lecture, St Thomas and the 
Problem of Evil, Maritain expresses the doctrine by describing moral evil as a 
‘nihilation’ of being, the opposite of positive creation.24 The human being, 
through free volition of the will, nihilates being and introduces nothingness, or 
a vacuum in being, when he or she fails to act according to the moral good. 
Maritain follows Aquinas and Augustine in affirming that moral evil is a privation 
of being, of some good, but crucially, a due good, ‘the absence of or lack of a 
certain good, a certain being which should be there, which is unconditionally 
required by a thing by virtue of its nature’25—a normative statement involving 
a value judgement. For Maritain, given that God creates us and sustains us in 
our being and given that God can only will the good due to his nature, God 
must be the primordial or first cause of all morally good action, and it is we who 
have the secondary initiative of aligning ourselves to the moral good, thus 
doing God’s will.26 
 Maritain explains that evil action, however, is a privation of the good, a 
‘nihilation’ of being, of which it would be logically impossible for God to ‘cause’, 
because God can only create and will something that can participate in His 
essence. Only human beings, therefore, can be the first and only cause of 
evil.27 Evil or sin is action performed in the willful absence of the good, of the 
natural law, of God’s commandments—of God’s will, more generally. Moral 
evil for Maritain, then, is rooted in the nature of the human will insofar as it is 
free. It consists not, however, in the free decision to pay heed to the moral 
‘rule’, given that the prior decision to pay heed to the moral rule is a pre-moral 
question of deciding which conception of reality will guide our pre-moral and 
moral lives. Moreover, we cannot say the human will itself is evil, but the 
decision to thereby produce an action in the knowledge of the absence of one’s 
consideration of the moral rule, taking the first initiative away from God.28 Any 
morally good action, however, is also made possible by God’s own action, and 
God can therefore be said to be the first cause of any morally good action. 
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Maritain’s doctrine here can be summarized by a rather beautiful passage in 
Existence and the Existent: ‘There is not in the world a shadow of beauty, a 
trace of actuality, a spark of being of which the subsistent Being itself is not 
the author. The more so where it is a question of that singular nobility and 
ultimate flowering of being which is the morally good act of the free will.’29 
 Maritain refers to John 15:5: ‘I am the vine; you are the branches. If you 
remain in me and I in you, you will bear much fruit; apart from me you can do 
nothing.’ The passage is important for understanding Maritain’s views on good 
and evil and how they pertain to moral experience. Maritain points out what he 
believes is a significant pun in the phrase ‘do nothing’.30 The first meaning is 
that without God’s primordial act of creation as the first cause of all that is 
actualized, human beings could neither be nor act. The second meaning is that 
when we do not respond to the moral law as made evident to us in natural law 
or revealed law, we nihilate being, introducing nothingness.  
 How does this pertain to moral experience? Certainly all of the above is 
assumed to be the case by Maritain prior to his writing on what he calls the 
‘Ways of the Practical Intellect’ to know God’s existence.31 Maritain proceeds, 
however, not with such an abstract and theoretical framework, but by a 
reconstruction of the existentially defining experience of recognizing the moral 
good and deciding to act upon it, what he calls ‘the first act of freedom’. How 
this plays out exactly, Maritain calls an ‘immanent dialectic’.32 He writes: 
I am considering any first or primal free act, any free act through 
which a new basic direction is imposed on my life. Such an act 
goes down to the sources of my moral life; through it I take hold 
of myself so as to project myself in a spray of ulterior actions 
which may be indefinite. Nevertheless, I am not necessarily 
aware of the profundity of what is happening; the available 
evidence may be but a very slight impact, a mere ripple on the 
surface of the waters.33  
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Maritain begins, following Aquinas, by considering the example of a child who, 
having arrived at the age of reason, truly morally deliberates about his or her 
actions for the first time, and we know from our own experience that this can 
occur without explicit conceptualization or any discursive analysis whatsoever. 
The case is by no means limited to childhood and in fact can occur at any time 
in life. Nevertheless, in the example, the child refrains from telling a lie, Maritain 
relates, not out of fear of punishment, not out of upsetting his relations, or from 
any conditioned reflex, but out of an intuitive and compelling perception that 
lying is not good.34 Of paramount importance for Maritain, as he explains, is 
that in recognizing and acting upon—one may say submitting to—the good, 
the child, despite the fact they do not know the greater significance of the 
decision upon their life in the longer term, has answered the question, ‘What 
do you live for?’35 
 The immanent dialectic contained implicitly and non-consciously in the 
act of choosing the good, the bonum honstum, is threefold. The first movement 
or implication is the distinction between good and evil, and the 
acknowledgement that the good ought to be acted upon not for some practical 
purpose or in virtue of conditioning, but solely in virtue of itself as good. It is, 
as Maritain writes, ‘a formal motive which transcends the whole order of 
empirical convenience and desire.’36 
 The second implication is that because the value of the moral object 
and act passes beyond the empirical order of cause, necessity, desire, and 
utility, to what ought to be done, there is ‘an order of proper consonance 
between our activity and our essence, a law of human acts transcending all 
facts.’37 Maritain continues: 
Such a law carries in the world of actual existence the 
requirements of an order that depends on a reality superior to 
everything and which is Goodness itself—good by virtue of its 
very being, not by virtue of conformity with anything distinct from 
itself. Such a law manifests the existence of a Separate Good 
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transcending all empirical existence and subsisting per se, and 
subsists primarily in this Separate Good.38 
Maritain’s position is that the order which is revealed to us between human 
conduct and the intuitively perceived precept that my conduct ought to be 
morally good is an ideal order and, as such, must have an ontological ground, 
which is God, its creator and sustainer. Elsewhere, in An Introduction to the 
Basic Problems of Moral Philosophy, Maritain offers two other cases, of people 
observing fair treatment of others, the first being someone observing an 
employer paying his employees fair wages, and the second, someone 
observing a tribal chief ruling strictly but justly. Here Maritain employs such 
examples to illustrate the existence of moral inclinations that serve as the 
expression of the unwritten, natural law, and says that ‘Reason takes a certain 
pleasure in such examples’, suggesting an intuitively perceived consonance 
between action and moral law which is the measure of the action.39 As we 
found with prudence and moral knowing by connaturality, the reason that is 
operative here is not that which is present in theoria but praxis, ‘embodied in 
the situation itself, inseparable from it, and preconscious, not expressed in a 
mental word (concept), but which, translated into abstract terms, would be 
something like “Give to each his due.”’40  
 Such a thesis amounts to nothing less than a phenomenology of the 
good, for Maritain offers a description of the phenomena of the moral good 
precisely as it is manifest to us in experience as obligation, fairness, and 
justice, and not just as it can be thought in moral philosophy and moral 
theology. Moreover, in speaking of evil as a nihilation of being, perhaps 
Maritain also provides a phenomenology of evil. Maritain’s thesis is that 
‘ontological evil—suffering—is a natural fruit of moral evil’ and that as a 
‘metaphysical law’, ‘Evil can only engender evil.’41 He continues: ‘Sin spreads 
evil in the world—evil radiates from the sinner like the waves on the surface of 
a lake when a stone drops in the water. Sin produces moral evil, hate for hate, 
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murder for murder.’42 Most significantly, according to Maritain, moral evil, as 
nihilation ‘must flow back upon the agent himself’ 43  according to the 
aforementioned metaphysical law of evil engendering evil. This law, as it 
pertains to the author of evil, is a law of punishment, rather than being merely 
retributive. However, it is primarily restorative insofar as the suffering which 
the wrongdoer experiences existentially re-orders them into alignment with the 
whole of being, of which they are a part—by their destruction or by their inner 
healing (the latter being possible if the wrongdoer can accept the punishment 
as just through humility and love).44 Whether Maritain’s description of evil 
amounts to a phenomenology of evil or can be used to provide a 
phenomenology of evil is a worthy question for further research. 
 A more pressing concern must be dealt with, though. How, Maritain 
asks, can one both recognize the Good and commit oneself to it as one’s own 
Good, or, we might ask, why exactly do we choose to be morally good if there 
can be no other reason to choose the good than the good itself? Is there a 
contradiction present if we choose the good to be good? Maritain’s answer is 
no, and that whether we are aware of it or not, in the same act of acting upon 
the good, we choose the Good as our ultimate end. We believe, Maritain says, 
that by acting in a way that serves the moral good, we will be happier.45 
 To connect what has been said about Maritain’s conception of the good 
as transcendental and the immanent dialectic of the first act of freedom, what 
needs to be said is that Maritain believes that the person who chooses the 
good—and by implication, the ontological Good and their ultimate end, 
chooses, by further implication, God. In willing and loving the Separate Good, 
one’s intellect, Maritain writes, ‘has of God a vital and non-conceptual 
knowledge. . . . independently of any use possibly made or not made of the 
idea of God, and independently of the actualization of any explicit and 
conscious knowledge of man’s true last End.’46 God is the terminus of the will’s 
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movement.47  
 Maritain insists that the practical knowledge of God under discussion 
here is by no means mystical knowledge, for it is not a ‘fruitional experience of 
the absolute.’48 We can now confidently infer that by ‘fruitional experience of 
the absolute’, Maritain means a conscious experience-knowledge of mystical 
union with God. Nevertheless, here, as elsewhere in discussing connatural 
knowledge (especially poetic knowledge, which we have yet to examine), 
Maritain lapses into semi-poetic or mystical language. I mean mystical 
language in its apophatic element, such as when Maritain refers to a ‘night 
without concept and without utterable knowledge’. 49  And perhaps he is 
inspired by 1 Corinthians 13:12 when he refers to this practical knowledge of 
God as achieved by the ‘“dark mirror”’ of the moral good.50 He does, however, 
also quote John 3:21: ‘Those who do what is true come to the light’.51   
 Maritain plainly distinguishes himself from the medieval scholastics and 
so-called manualists as a modern philosopher working in the Thomist 
scholastic tradition in writing that scholastic doctors such as John of St. 
Thomas were preoccupied with ‘analyzing the objective requisites of the act of 
faith in themselves and in theologically elucidated terms rather than looking for 
the psychological modalities in which they are realized in the subject’, which, 
as he continues, ‘limited his [John of St. Thomas’] study to the sphere of 
conscious thought and of conceptual or notionally expressed knowledge.’52 
Maritain is a Thomist, but he is also a modern philosopher of the post-
Cartesian, post-subjective turn and scientific era, obviously concerned like 
Heidegger with the inner life of the individual and the types of knowledge that 
are present in situation but also hidden. He writes that we must 
consider the innermost recesses of mental functioning and to 
use, as a prerequisite philosophical equipment of ours, those 
more complex and deeper views on knowledge which are not 
new to the experience of the experts in the human heart’s 
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mysteries, but which have been given scientific consistency 
through the progress of psychological research with regard to 
the unconscious or pre-conscious life of the mind.53 
Maritain insists that while the ‘metaphysical content with which it is pregnant is 
not grasped,’54 what is achieved in the immanent dialectic is ‘a practical and 
volitional knowledge of God’ 55  which, as John of St. Thomas believed, 
according to Maritain, is the ‘inner inspiration revealing the things that are 
necessary for the act of faith’. 56  For Maritain, a person who knows and 
chooses the good, knows and chooses God—has faith and charity, and even 
if they claim they do not believe in God is, in fact, only a ‘pseudo-atheist’ who 
‘knows with a natural, volitional and merely practical knowledge that same God 
Whom he denies in his words and explicit, formulated thoughts.’ 57  It is 
precisely because the moral good subsists ideally, beyond physical necessity 
and convenience, that the good is necessarily spiritual or religious in nature, 
even if the idea of God or a certain conception of God according to the 
specifications of a religion is absent:  
[T]he moral virtues—and even the natural beginnings of such 
virtues within us—create a certain affinity in the soul with the 
spiritual order, in the most indefinitely sense of that term. In this 
way they can incline the intellect, with scant efficacy however, 
to instinctive judgements about the great truths of natural 
religion.58 
Maritain here reveals his affinity to phenomenologists such as Heidegger and 
Sartre insofar as he is concerned above all with description. He describes in 
detail the experience of choosing and valuing the good with concrete examples 
before proceeding to retrospectively explain the phenomena, and he does not 
claim that a proof of God’s existence can be mounted upon such descriptions 
and analyses.59 
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(iii) The Transcendent as Personal Savior 
There is a further specification to be made regarding the relation between 
moral knowledge and knowledge of God. As a Catholic and a Thomist 
philosopher, Maritain always signifies the divine as the Christian God as 
construed by orthodox Catholic theology and retains the distinction between 
nature and grace, which underlies his metaphysics and phenomenology of 
good and evil. Taking the cardinal facts of human existence as revealed, 
Maritain believes that human beings are fallen and are thus unable, by the 
natural strength of their will, to choose the good and to love God.60 Given that 
God is the first source of all that is good, his sanctifying grace is what makes 
choosing the moral good possible in the first place.61 Maritain claims that when 
a person chooses the good, supernatural grace and charity are in operation, 
and when someone does not choose the good in the first act of freedom, it is 
because they refused God’s healing grace.62  
Whatever the land of his birth, whatever may be the tradition 
handed down to him, whether or not he knows Christ, a child 
born of woman can initiate his moral life rightly only in the grace 
of Jesus Christ. And without that grace, as Saint Thomas 
taught, his primal act of freedom can only be a sin which turns 
him away from his ultimate End.63  
It was related that Maritain argues that we choose the good because we 
believe we will be happier for it, consciously or subconsciously. But 
considering the fallen state of human beings and the influx of sanctifying grace 
that God’s initiative consists in, Maritain goes further than this, claiming that 
what appears to the intellect in the perception of the good as that which ought 
to be done is also the perception of ‘the good by means of which “I shall be 
saved”’.64 This, Maritain claims, amounts to an implicit recognition, which is 
now speculative yet still beyond formulation and reflective consciousness that 
the Good is a ‘refuge and salvation’ and precisely because it is personal, this 
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is the Christian God who is savior. What all of this amounts to is that the 
opening up of the self to that Good which calls us from beyond allows us to 
place our happiness and our hope in the transcendent, which can only be 
personal, and which, for Maritain is the Christian God.  
 Heidegger, on the other hand, repeatedly affirms an ‘ontological 
difference’ between Being and beings,65 but refuses to identify Being as any 
kind of God. He therefore vehemently refuses to identify God as pure Act, as 
Maritain does, following Aquinas. This fundamental difference is crucial in 
determining the characteristics of the levels of relation to Being in both 
philosophers, and in this connection the notion of grace, which is always at 
work for Maritain, again becomes significant. Whether Heidegger’s Being is 
analogous to the Christian conception of God without this Thomistic 
metaphysical underpinning is a question that will have to be addressed in the 
last chapter. Indeed, one question that will have to be addressed as part of this 
overall theme of a possible identification of God and Being in Heidegger is 
whether Heidegger affirms what orthodox Catholic theology refers to as the 
distinction between nature and supernature, or ‘nature’ and ‘grace’, particularly 
as it pertains to mystical experience, and not merely metaphysics.  
2. The Primacy of Persons 
(i) Individuality and Personality 
It was said that the focus of this chapter is on the elements of Maritain’s 
thinking which are most relevant to the lived reality of the person. The person, 
for Maritain, it was said, was the revealer of being. We have examined 
Maritain’s notion of the moral knowledge of God through experience of the 
good, but we have yet to push through to the most profound element in the 
idea, which is experience of God in and through love—love between persons. 
We shall examine the knowledge of God through love first of all as a natural 
analogy of mystical experience, and second as the supernatural virtue of 
charity, which takes us even beyond the cloud of unknowing to union with God. 
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The first step is an analysis of Maritain’s conception of the human person as 
that which loves and is loved. In the West, the innermost being of a human 
being—ourselves and others—is normally conceived as the person, and 
everyday language, as well as legal and political discourse, presupposes 
persons and personhood. Maritain writes in this connection: ‘We know that an 
essential characteristic of any civilization worthy of the name is respect and 
feeling for the dignity of the human person.’66  
 According to Maritain, personality rests in the spiritual nature of the 
human being: The human being’ ‘is caught between two poles; a material pole, 
which in reality, does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of 
personality or what . . . is called individuality, and a spiritual pole, which does 
concern true personality.’67 In saying this, Maritain is keen to point out early 
on that this is equatable neither to Platonic nor Cartesian dualism, which posit 
substance to be only two homogeneous, mutually-exclusive and self-existent 
wholes, of two kinds, matter and mind, or soul, and claim an identity between 
person and soul. Plato, at least in some dialogues such as the Phaedo, puts 
forward the view that the soul abhors matter and the body, so much so that for 
him philosophy is conceived to be a way of purifying oneself from the prison of 
the body. While Descartes affirms that the body and soul constitute a unity in 
the manner of a pilot and a ship, he also maintains an identity between person 
and mind or soul, and claims that the soul exists as a whole independently of 
the body, because it is pure thought (its essence is thinking, as expressed in 
Descartes’ ‘Cogito ergo, sum’), whereas matter is mere extension. Maritain 
accepts, as Aquinas did, Boethius’ definition of person as rational substance, 
that is, as a conscious entity,68 and soul and matter are ‘two substantial co-
principles of one and the same being’:69 
                                                 
66 RMNL, p. 5. 
67 PCG, Chapter 3: ‘Individuality and Personality’. In virtue of my only having access to the 
online version provided by the University of Notre Dame’s Maritain Center, which is not 
paginated, I reference the name of the chapter. 
68 J. Marenbon, Boethius (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 72. 
69  Jacques Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics, translation edited by Mortimer J. Adler 
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940), p. 60. 
  168  
[W]e must emphasize that they are not two separate things. 
There is not in me one reality, called my individual, and another 
reality, called my person. One and the same reality is, in a 
certain sense an individual, and, in another sense, a person. 
Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which 
derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which 
derives from spirit.70 
If one brackets out what is the Aristotelian hylomorphism of matter and special 
form of the human soul, such a view of the psychosomatic unity of the human 
being seems to be coherent and in agreement with common sense and 
experience. For one is one’s body as much as anything some might be inclined 
to call ‘mind’, and we and other people experience us to be exactly that. It is 
the whole person who feels angry, sad, hungry, thirsty or sexually aroused, 
just as it is the whole person who feels at peace after meditation or prayer, 
refreshed after a shower or a swim, and the whole person who can 
psychologically change if their brain is physiologically damaged. Moreover, 
morally speaking, habituation creates certain personalities, moral characters 
and characteristics, such as a politeness or impoliteness, greediness or 
charitableness. Finally, the continuity of an individual’s personhood is plain for 
other people when they visually perceive that individual, and they do not in 
general make a distinction between mind and body and identify different 
persons according to different mental states. 
 And yet, for all this, the person cannot be defined totally by their body 
or their behavior, for there is an interior realm that cannot be entered into from 
outside, or objectively. Just as one cannot think what another person thinks as 
they think it as this person (Daniel, for instance), one cannot feel what they are 
feeling, that is, as it feels to them. Edith Stein, a student of Husserl’s in her 
early career and later a Thomist and friend of the Maritains, infers a spiritual 
dimension that is the seat of personality from apparently non-physical 
phenomena such as valuing and willing.71 Maritain similarly repeats Aquinas’ 
argument from intentionality—the mind’s being the locus of intentional being 
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insofar as understanding an object is to ‘intend’ a non-sensible essence—for 
the immateriality and immortality of the human soul, as well as arguing from 
knowledge by analogy for the immateriality of the function of understanding.72 
We may also say with Stein that personality—the self, or the ‘I’—is a ‘zero point 
of orientation’, non-spatially localized ‘in’ the body. 73  And again Maritain 
agrees with this, saying that ‘the human intellect does not reside in any special 
part of the body.’74 Nonetheless, there is an undeniable exclusivity of personal 
experience, and persons—except perhaps God—are coextensive with 
spatially exclusive bodies. 
 So, for Maritain, personality derives from what is spiritual in nature, but 
what, for Maritain, is spiritual in nature—the soul or form—cannot exist apart 
from the matter which it informs. That, as mentioned in Part I, essence for 
Aquinas stands in potency to act, is mirrored here in matter standing in potency 
to form. However, while matter is the principle of potency, Aquinas and Maritain 
say it is also the principle of individuation or designation of form, such that by 
it Cole, or Rebecca, as individual human beings, can exist.  
 It appears that nothing here in Maritain’s metaphysics and philosophy 
of mind precludes anything that physiology and neurology have told us, 
including the central role of the brain in human consciousness and intellection, 
which Maritain admits. 75  Maritain also accepts the existence of the 
subconscious, as well as a ‘spiritual subconscious’ or ‘preconscious’76—which 
is particularly important for his thinking on artistic knowledge and experience. 
As such, at the outset of his considerations on personhood in The Person and 
the Common Good, Maritain cautions that while personality is essentially 
spiritual, the person does not equate to ego, as the source and activity of 
thought, as for Descartes. Rather Maritain writes: 
Metaphysically considered, personality is . . . ‘subsistence,’ the 
ultimate achievement by which the creative influx seals, within 
itself, a nature face to face with the whole order of existence so 
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that the existence which it receives is its own existence and its 
own perfection. Personality is the subsistence of the spiritual 
soul communicated to the human composite. Because, in our 
substance, it is an imprint or seal which enables it to possess 
its existence, to perfect and give itself freely, personality 
testifies to the generosity or expansiveness in being which an 
incarnate spirit derives from its spiritual nature and which 
constitutes, within the secret depths of our ontological structure, 
a source of dynamic unity, of unification from within.77 
Maritain continues that while personality ‘signifies interiority to self’, this by no 
means implies that the self is shut off from the world or from others, as in the 
case of the Cartesian cogito or Husserl’s transcendental Ego. Maritain holds 
that one’s actions are not all determined by one’s essence, that ‘A thing . . . 
does not act solely in accordance with its archetypal or primarily intelligible 
being, but also as it is subject to particular conditions and possessed a 
particular individuality’.78 The implication is that an individual human being 
possessing a universal essence does not in principle preclude their having a 
unique personality, and it also does not preclude their freedom. Maritain 
distinguishes between the primary act of existence (esse) of the human being 
(or ‘suppositum’, as ‘that which exercises existence and actions . . . that which 
subsists)79  and the others, the accidents, which it is able, in virtue of its 
subsistence and free will as an individual, to perform and possess.80 This 
includes anything from mental or emotional states to actions or behavior that 
bear upon the way one lives one’s life, such that certain modes of existing—
for example, being an artist—we can say define how one takes hold of one’s 
own (act of) existence.81 It is by virtue of the communicability of one’s being 
to others through the perception of the ‘act’ or existence of the accidents one 
performs (such as drawing a portrait of someone if one is an artist), is made 
possible by interaction with others. For Maritain, human beings have a 
common essence, but are also able to transcend their essence in virtue of 
taking hold of their existences (their individual esse) and manifesting qualities, 
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or accidents which truly make them an individual. It is when a being is endowed 
with freedom and autonomy, Maritain says,  
suppositum [the subsisting human substance] becomes 
persona [a person], that is, a whole which subsists and exists 
in virtue of the very subsistence of its spiritual soul, and acts by 
setting itself its own ends; a universe in itself. . . . Only the 
person is free; only the person possesses . . . inwardness and 
subjectivity—because it contains itself and moves about within 
itself.82 
We know each other in virtue of the accidents—appearances, activities, 
vocations, and actions and behavior—by which we become who and what we 
are. But such accidents rest upon the esse of the human subject, who, in virtue 
of freedom of the will, can, particularly in the moral realm, make the accidents 
their own. This transcendence of esse over essentia is why the eminent 
Maritain scholar and translator Joseph Evans writes: 
In Maritain’s social and political philosophy, the primary of esse 
in being is supplemented by, or even translated into, the 
primacy, in the ultimate analysis, of the human person. Maritain 
has a profound grasp of what it means to be a person; he knows 
what it means to be endowed with intellect and will, to be 
capable of understanding and loving, to be capable of knowing 
and deliberating about ends; and he has gradually come to see 
that his knowing the true import of the person has far-reaching 
implications in the field of social and political philosophy.83 
And Williams remarks of Thomism’s hylomorphism: ‘No matter what other 
elements are emphasized—the person’s freedom, his creativity, his action, his 
self-consciousness, his interiority, his sociability, and so forth—they all have 
their objective base in an intellectual, and thus a spiritual, nature.’84 What I 
want to argue in what remains of this chapter is that esse—considered under 
its dimension as the perfection or capacity to take hold of one’s own existence 
and thereby transcend supposita to render possible persona—is the key to the 
most important natural analogy of mystical experience for Maritain: human 
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love. 
 For Maritain asserts that personality ‘requires the communications of 
knowledge and love. By the very fact that each of us is a person and expresses 
himself to himself, each of us requires communication with other and the 
others in the order of knowledge and love. Personality, of its essence, requires 
a dialogue in which souls really communicate.’85 For Maritain, to be a human 
person is to be capable of taking one’s existence as incarnate as one’s own, 
and the positive conditions for doing so are relationships with others and self-
giving through charity. In other words, personhood is essentially relational and 
human existence is essentially dialogical. This, as we have seen, also seems 
to be the case with Heidegger because of the essential situatedness of Dasein. 
This will be most important when it comes to mystical experience.  
 We might wonder, however, what Maritain means when he writes: ‘In 
each of us, individuality, being that which excludes from oneself all that other 
men are, could be described as the narrowness of the ego, forever threatened 
and forever eager to grasp for itself. Such narrowness in flesh animated by a 
spirit derives from matter.’86 Maritain believes in accordance with Genesis that 
matter, as the principle both of potency and individuation, is potentially good. 
In fact, it is in virtue of the substantial form of a particular body that individual 
characteristics or accidents are able to emanate from the soul, distinguishing 
persons from each other even as they belong to the species of human being.87 
With regard to the relation between individuality and personality, Maritain 
offers the analogy of a painting, which by reason of all its materials is a 
physico-chemical complex, but is no less a work of beauty and meaning in 
virtue of the painter’s art. 88  Rather, Maritain’s point is that as material— 
embodied—beings, we suffer the threat and knowledge of inevitable death and 
we have an array of material needs, including food, drink, shelter, and 
companionship. Insofar as we are physical substances, we are, like everything 
else, also subject to physical determinisms, and in the case of the human 
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being, this includes biological and social determinisms.89 The fact of individual 
material existence implies the fact of a fundamental selfishness, a regard for 
the self which is often the cause of conflict, and as we have seen, much 
suffering and eventually death—and this is not a normative statement. As 
such, Maritain sees the body as necessarily involved in the spiritual life and of 
the healing work of grace. Quoting from an edition of his publication Le Roseau 
d’or, Maritain argues that true spirituality must involve the body: 
‘Man has a spiritual soul, but it informs a body, when it is a 
question of rising to a wholly spiritual life, his reason does not 
suffice; his attempts at angelism have always broken down. His 
only authentic spirituality is bound up with grace and the Holy 
Ghost.’ We mean here spirituality in the pure and simple sense 
of the word, that fires and takes hold of the entire being.90 
This taking hold of the entire being will be seen to be of the utmost significance 
when Maritain discusses love between human persons as a natural analogy of 
mystical experience and the love between God and the human being. He 
writes, for example that ‘The human person can give itself to another, or find 
ecstasy in the other, to the point of making that other its All, only if it gives, or 
is ready to give, its body to the other at the same time that makes the offering 
of its soul.’91 Maritain is speaking of making a complete gift of self to the 
beloved and this is what defines the experience of the saint in their love of 
God, for God’s own sake. 
 (ii) The Knowability and Value of the Person 
Maritain assures us that, despite the aforementioned exigencies that 
individuality places upon us, it ‘is not something bad in itself’ and is indeed ‘the 
very condition of our existence.’92 Of course the same thing is to be said for 
our social existences, our lives as persons with and among persons, and 
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Maritain has much to say that is similar to the insights of leading 
phenomenologists. He writes: 
By sense or experience, science or philosophy, each of us . . . 
knows the environing world of subjects, supposita, and persons 
in their role as objects. The paradox of consciousness and 
personality is that each of us is situated precisely at the centre 
of this world. Each of us is at the centre of infinity. And this 
privileged subject, the thinking self, is to itself not object but 
subject; in the midst of all the subjects which it knows only as 
objects, it alone is subject as subject. We are thus confronted 
by subjectivity as subjectivity.93 
That said, while there is an exclusivity of subjective experience, we can, 
nevertheless, encounter foreign mental life as other and not merely apprehend 
and use other human beings as objects. It is precisely because other human 
beings are endowed with intellect and will and those properties, in the function 
of capacities, are manifest in their actions, that Aquinas writes: ‘“Person” 
means that which is most perfect in the whole of nature, namely what subsists 
in rational nature.’94 Human beings, because they possess intellect and will in 
virtue of being made in the image of God, are unique in the world and are of 
irreducible value. As Maritain himself says: ‘no equivalent is to be found in the 
physical world. . . . in the flesh and bones of man there lives a soul which is a 
spirit and which has a greater value than the whole physical universe.’95 
 And while the human person is made by God and shares with God the 
properties or capacities of intelligence and free will, what the person is in its 
inmost essence—what Maritain calls the persona on the basis of 
suppositum 96 —is unknowable, precisely because it is that in which we 
participate and which is the necessary background of all acts of knowing. 
Maritain writes: 
[T]he intuition of subjectivity is an existential intuition which 
surrenders no essence to us. We know that which we are by 
our phenomena, our operations, our flow of consciousness. The 
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more we grow accustomed to the inner life, the better we 
decipher the astonishing and fluid multiplicity which is thus 
delivered to us; the more, also, we feel that it leaves us ignorant 
of the essence of our self. Subjectivity as subjectivity is 
inconceptualisable; it is an unknowable abyss. It is unknowable 
by the mode of notion, concept, or representation, or by any 
mode of any science whatsoever—introspection, psychology, 
or philosophy. How could it be otherwise, seeing that every 
reality known through a concept, a notion, or a representation 
is known as object and not as subject? Subjectivity as such 
escapes by definition from that which we know about ourselves 
by means of notions.97 
Here we see the influence of Bergson, for whom the self could only be 
immediately intuited and not be made into an object of knowledge—that is, 
relative knowledge.98 Maritain writes that ‘To objectivise is to universalise’,99 
which, in the case of the self, is impossible in virtue of its singularity. This is 
consonant with Gabriel Marcel’s view that the self (my self and the self of 
another) cannot be defined in virtue of its primordial presence, of its being the 
point of departure for all knowing and doing, unable to be converted into an 
‘it’—its essence being ‘to be more than an essence’, just as the essence of the 
‘thou’ ‘is to be more than an essence.’100 
 The closest Maritain gets in examining the essence of personhood is 
the notion of ‘subsistence’—of self-possession and self-existence—but this, as 
characteristic of both the human person and of God, neither defines 
personhood nor explains how it comes about. Nonetheless, the properties and 
indefinability of the human person imply that human beings represent a 
singularity. Again, human beings are unique in nature, and for Maritain, of 
course, they are made in the image of God. We might say that they are, 
therefore, in a word, sacred (although Maritain does not use this word). 
 At this point, a question might be justifiably posed: Is the dignity or 
sacredness of human beings known not just objectively but also subjectively, 
in subjective experience, for Maritain? It is of some consequence for us that 
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he is not clear about this. For while he appears to imply that the person is radial 
in nature—that its nature is to be open and disposed to communion not just 
with things but with other persons—he also seems to say that human persons 
can only apprehend other human persons as subjects rather than objects 
through love or charity. It is useful here to return to a passage in which Maritain 
writes of the communicative nature of the person and at the same time of the 
difficulty of actual interpersonal communication: 
[T]he subjectivity of the person has nothing in common with the 
isolated unity, without doors or windows, of the Leibnizian 
monad. It requires the communications of knowledge and love. 
By the very fact that each of us is a person and expresses 
himself to himself, each of us requires communication with 
other and the others in the order of knowledge and love. 
Personality, of its essence, requires a dialogue in which souls 
really communicate. Such communication is rarely possible. 
For this reason, personality in man seems to be bound to the 
experience of affliction even more profoundly than to the 
experience of creative effort.101 
Is our capacity to perceive others as subjects inherent or is it conditional upon 
the cultivation of charity? Gabriel Marcel speaks of a ‘metaphysic of we are as 
opposed to a metaphysic of I think’,102 of a ‘transubjectivity’ which is given in 
our experience, because it is only in virtue of the existence of the other that 
one can identify and give definition to one’s own existence—the person, when 
egocentrism is overcome, being given to oneself as ‘presence-in-
communion.’103 Let us return to Maritain’s Existent and the Existent. Maritain 
writes: 
Being the only subject which is a subject for me in the midst of 
a world of subjects which my senses and my intelligence can 
know only as objects, I am at the centre of the world. . . . With 
regard to my subjectivity in act, I am the centre of the world (‘the 
most important person in the world’). My destiny is the most 
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important of all destinies. Worthless as I know myself to be, I 
am more interesting than all the saints.104 
Here Maritain acknowledges the motivations of the Cartesian and Husserlian 
projects, which are concerned precisely with the self who is the ‘center of the 
world’, and which are dogged by the problem of solipsism. This, however, is 
the ‘metaphysics of conduct’, the attitude, that defines many of our everyday 
lives. William Rosser writes that for the normal human person ‘These two 
perspectives, that of himself as subject and that of his situation in respect to 
other objects, will not coincide. He oscillates rather miserably between 
them.’105 But here, precisely at the point at which we are tempted to stagnate 
in isolation, caught between the dualism of self and other, Maritain offers love 
as that which enables us to enter into genuine communion with other selves 
and with God.  
3. Maritain’s Phenomenology of Love  
 
(i) Human Love 
To complete the analysis of the moral knowledge of God and the natural 
analogies of mystical experience pertaining to the lived experience of the 
human person, what follows is an analysis of Maritain’s conception of human 
love as one of the natural analogies of mystical experience. If we recall, 
Maritain said that it was the most important among those he lists, and we are 
now in position to examine his reasons for such a claim. In this regard, I shall 
quote Maritain at length to get a fuller picture of his position on the role of love 
in the knowability and value of persons. 
By love, finally, is shattered the impossibility of knowing another 
except as object. I have emphasized this impossibility above at 
length and noted that it directly concerns the senses and the 
intellect. To say that union in love makes the being we love 
another ourself for us is to say that it makes that being another 
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subjectivity for us, another subjectivity that is ours. To the 
degree that we truly love (which is to say, not for ourselves but 
for the beloved; and when—which is not always the case—the 
intellect within us become passive as regards love, and, 
allowing its concepts to slumber, thereby renders love a formal 
means of knowledge), to this degree we acquire an obscure 
knowledge of the being we love, similar to that which we 
possess of ourselves; we know that being in his very subjectivity 
(at least in a certain measure) by this experience of union. Then 
he himself is, in a certain degree, cured of his solitude; he can, 
though still disquieted, rest for a moment in the nest of the 
knowledge that we possess of him as subject.106 
While Maritain does not specify what kind of love is necessary for us to be able 
to perceive others as subjects in Existence and the Existent, I believe it can be 
justifiably inferred that he is speaking of a kind of love which is selfless and 
other-regarding, rather than self-regarding, and which is clearly spiritual in its 
source, rather than instinctive or animalistic. This, however, requires further 
specifications. We shall now have recourse to Maritain’s essay ‘Love and 
Friendship’ as featured in his final book, Untrammeled Approaches. 
 Here Maritain delineates an array of subtly different forms of human 
love, but one of the first things that is made clear is that he is not concerned 
with purely sensual or carnal love. While he has something to say regarding 
the role of the body and sexual attraction, mere carnal love, or perhaps mere 
sexual attraction and ‘love-making’, has nothing to do with what he is seeking 
to examine. In this regard, Maritain makes a fundamental distinction between 
love of dilection or ‘love-for-the-good-of-the-beloved’ (amor amicitiae), which 
is a ‘gift of oneself’, and ‘covetous’ or ‘possessive’ love, or ‘love-for-the-good-
of-the-subject’ (amor concupiscentiae).107  
 For Maritain, the kind of love that is necessary for the perfection of 
human life is love of dilection, or other-regarding love. It is this love that 
Maritain places highest existential and epistemic value on throughout his work 
and contrasts with what he perceives as a Cartesian isolation of self, even if in 
most places he is concerned with the love of human beings for God (what he 
refers to as ‘charity’) and God’s love of human beings (what he refers to as 
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‘uncreated Love’).108 Here Maritain distinguishes between two aspects of love 
of dilection, which are themselves taken to be love as a self-giving ‘directly, 
openly, and in complete nakedness’,109 and ‘friendship’ which is ‘the deep 
desire for the good of one’s friend that goes as far as giving one’s life for that 
friend.’110 Whereas the former is a direct giving of self, the latter is an indirect 
giving of self, in the sense that the lover gives what they possess, rather than 
what they are (though, Maritain admits, in the case of the giving of one’s life, 
this is in a way a giving of what one is).111 Nevertheless, both kinds of love of 
dilection are necessary aspects of true love among human beings, as opposed 
to mere possessive love.  
 Taking what was said earlier in this essay about the distinction between 
individuality and personality as our point of departure in considering what we 
normally call ‘romantic love’, for Maritain, love is not merely love for the 
physical attributes of a person but for their very being as a person, ‘endowed 
with a spiritual existence, capable of containing itself thanks to the operations 
of the intellect and freedom, capable of super-existing by way of knowledge 
and of love.’112 Maritain continues: ‘For this reason, the metaphysical tradition 
of the West defines the person in terms of independence, as a reality which, 
subsisting spiritually, constitutes a universe unto itself, a relatively independent 
whole within the great whole of the universe, facing the transcendent whole 
which is God. For the same reason, this tradition finds in God the sovereign 
Personality whose existence itself consists in a pure and absolute super-
existence by way of intellection and love.’113  Recognition of the essential 
independence of the person, as a somebody who holds their existence in their 
own hands but who can nevertheless give themselves to another in love, not 
as an object to be merely subjectively enjoyed, possessed or—perhaps the 
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combination of both—controlled like material objects, but rather appreciated 
as absolutely unique, is the source of genuine love: 
‘Not the person but only its qualities do we love,’ Pascal has 
said. This is a false statement, and exhibits in Pascal a trace of 
the very rationalism against which he strove to protect 
himself. Love is not concerned with qualities. They are not the 
object of our love. We love the deepest, most substantial and 
hidden, the most existing reality of the beloved being. This is a 
metaphysical center deeper than all the qualities and essences 
which we can find and enumerate in the beloved. The 
expressions of lovers are unending because their object is 
ineffable.114 
What appears to define the deepening of a romantic relationship according to 
Maritain’s description in ‘Love and Friendship’ is an increase in the intensity 
and effectuation of the romantic partners’ willingness to give of themselves for 
the benefit of the other. To be sure, there is a part to play for romantic attraction 
and carnal pleasure, but devotedness, a gift of self and a union in flesh which 
is more than merely for the sake of pleasure for one of the parties characterizes 
the maturation of a romantic relationship and are key constitutive elements of 
marriage.115 In its most extreme, this kind of love Maritain calls ‘amour fou’, 
meaning ‘mad love’, because at this point the romantic partners live in, through 
and for one another, against all logic. 
This love in which the very person in each case gives itself to 
the other in all truth and reality, is in the order of the ontological 
perfections of nature, the highest point of love between Man 
and Woman. Then the lover gives himself to his beloved and 
the beloved to her lover, as to his or her All, in other words is 
ecstatic in the other, makes himself or herself—even though 
remaining ontologically a person—a part which no longer exists 
except through and in that All which is his or her All. This 
extreme love is amour fou; and this name fits it very well 
because it does (in the special order or, if you like, in the magic 
and the spiritual ‘superexistence’ of love) precisely what is in 
itself impossible and makes no sense in the order of mere 
existence or simple being, in which each person continues to 
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be a whole and could not become a real part of another 
whole.116 
Maritain writes that amour fou, because it is such a total self-giving of person 
to person and ‘both flesh and spirit’, also requires the giving of the body, of 
‘union in the flesh as well, at least in desire, with all the carnal joy and pleasure 
of the senses par excellence, which are associated with that union. The human 
person can give itself to another, or find ecstasy in the other, to the point of 
making that other its All, only if it gives, or is ready to give, its body to the other 
at the same time that makes the offering of its soul.’117 Nevertheless, precisely 
because the beloved comes to occupy the center of the lover’s life and 
existence, the sexual pleasure of the lover recedes in the order of their 
priorities. Maritain goes so far as to say that while loving persons give their 
bodies to one another, to the degree that persons are above all spirits, ‘the 
same degree amour fou, authentic love in its ultimate form, surpasses 
passionate [or sensual] love.’118 On this ‘mad’ union, Maritain continues: 
This is the paradox proper to love; on the one hand it demands 
the ontologically unbreakable duality of the two persons; on the 
other hand it demands, and, in its own way, brings about a 
faultless unity, the effectively consummated union of these 
same two persons (‘in a single spirit and love’ as St. John of the 
Cross says of supernatural mystical union, but this is already 
true, on an entirely different level and in analogical sense, of the 
natural union between man and woman in amour fou).119 
Maritain’s teaching regarding human love as an analogy of mystical union with 
God is original in its descriptive, phenomenological quality, but also strictly in 
line with Thomistic doctrine. ‘St. Thomas’, William Rossner writes, ‘made the 
same distinction [between natural love and charity] . . . but St. Thomas did not 
fully develop the concept of natural love by explicitly studying the hypothesis 
of nature considered in abstraction from the gifts of grace. M. Maritain, by 
making an explicit study of natural love in this more restricted sense, offers a 
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considerable development of the doctrine.’120 In discussing a ‘faultless unity’ 
through the connatural mode of knowledge of love, Maritain is applying the 
notion of intentionality to this sphere of human experience, but with this 
essential difference to ordinary acts of knowing, that whereas in ordinary acts 
of knowing the knower becomes the known in virtue of intentional being (esse 
intentionale or esse spirituale) of the known in the knower’s mind, the beloved 
becomes another self who permeates the lover’s being in every aspect. The 
beloved enters into the will of the lover such that ‘the beloved becomes the 
principle of action, the “weight” of the lover.’121 Love, then, as Rossner says, 
is more ‘unitive’ than other modes of knowledge ‘in uniting with things in the 
very subjectivity of their existence.’ 122  This difference of modes of 
intentionality between acts of knowing and acts of loving will be essential in 
the final chapter as I turn to the question of apophatic knowledge and whether 
God is known in mystical experience as an ‘object’ in virtue of intentionality or 
known in a non-representational manner in virtue of the ‘faultless unity’ of love. 
(ii) Person as Mystery, Love as Self-Giving 
We can now understand why, for Maritain, human love is the most perfect 
natural analogy to mystical experience. It is because love concerns relations 
between persons and is self-giving:  
What reveals subjectivity to itself is. . . . self-mastery for the 
purpose of self-giving. When a man has the obscure intuition of 
subjectivity, the reality, whose sudden invasion of his 
consciousness he experiences, is that of a secret totality, which 
contains both itself and its upsurge, and which superabounds 
in knowledge and love. Only by love does it attain to its supreme 
level of existence—existence as self-giving.123 
Self-giving, as Maritain says, is the human person’s supreme level of 
existence. To the degree that we love, we give of our self, and in virtue of this 
self-giving, also enrich our own self. This is where the connection between 
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human love and the love between God and human persons lies. Maritain 
writes: 
It is something to know that God is a transcendent and 
sovereign Self; but it is something else again to enter oneself 
and with all one’s baggage—one’s own existence and flesh and 
blood—into the vital relationship in which created subjectivity is 
brought face to face with this transcendent subjectivity and, 
trembling and loving, looks to it for salvation. This is the 
business of religion.124 
‘Religion’, Maritain continues, ‘is essentially that which no philosophy can be: 
a relation of person to person with all the risk, the mystery, the dread, the 
confidence, the delight, and the torment that lie in such a relationship’.125 ‘In 
each of us there dwells a mystery, and that mystery is the human 
personality.’126 Maritain elsewhere calls this ‘the abyss of subjectivity’.127 We 
see that the mystery of personality taken as constitutive of the human being is 
amplified to an infinite degree in God, and the only authentic response, lest we 
be caught up in self-isolation, is a surrendering of self-will in love. Here we 
glimpse the triumph of love even over the indefinable abyss of God and 
apophaticism in Maritain’s mystical thought, which, as we will see, follows in 
the footsteps of the mysticism of St. John of the Cross.  
 For now, however, we observe that for Maritain, a relationship between 
persons born of love is the only answer to the isolation and fearful selfishness 
that unfortunately characterize many of our lives, and which is often answered 
by the prizing of one’s unique subjectivity above everything else or dissolving 
oneself in the activities and desires of the world. 128  As Rossner writes, 
paraphrasing Maritain: ‘the antinomy can be resolved only from above. God is 
the center, not in relation to a particular perspective’,129 being ‘like that in 
which each created subjectivity is the centre of the universe it knows, but 
speaking absolutely, and as transcendent subjectivity to which all subjectivities 
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are referred. At such time I can know both that I am without importance and 
that my destiny is of the highest importance.’130 Here we come to a most 
crucial point in our considerations. 
 Maritain writes that human love is the most obvious natural analogy of 
mystical experience. For Maritain it is also the most important, for he also 
writes that the analogy of human love is that which mystical language uses.131 
Maritain’s interpretation of the Song of Songs, which we will examine in the 
final chapter, represents the spiritual marriage of Christ and the Christian 
Church through images of humanly love which are not merely erotic but, as 
Maritain says, ‘love of dilection’, an encounter and a union between persons. 
The purpose of marriage, says Maritain, is not merely to bring to fulfilment 
romantic attraction but to ‘transform romantic love, or what was there at the 
beginning, into a real and indestructible human love, a love that is radically 
free of all self-centeredness,” which by no means excludes sensual desire and 
passion, but which in itself and by its essence is principally spiritual’.132 Here 
it helps to bear in mind Maritain’s own vocation, not only as a lay philosopher, 
but more importantly, as a married man. For both Jacques and Raïssa 
Maritain, as we have seen, the married life is no less a vocation through which 
people can be called to a holy and contemplative life than the priesthood or 
religious life. The vocation of marriage demands that one partner be ‘really 
dedicated to the good and the salvation of the other, and consenting to be 
entrusted completely with the revelation of and the care for, all that the other 
is in his or her deepest human depths.’133 Maritain explains: 
If the image [of human marriage] is so overpowered by the 
burden of its likeness that a creature can scarcely be truly loved 
without a demand for the infinite wherein human love immolates 
itself, why may not the trials and mutual give-and-take of such 
a love, the gift that love demands of those persons who 
constantly reveal themselves to one another, why may not 
                                                 
130 EE, p. 76 
131 DK, p. 300. 
132 UT, p. 184. 
133 Ibid., p. 185. 
  185  
these be the most direct analogy of the trials, exchanges and 
mutual gifts of mystical love?134 
In his writings on love and mysticism, Maritain relies heavily on St. John of the 
Cross, who, regarding the highest mystical state attainable in this life, also 
wrote of the spiritual marriage of the soul and God, analogous to two lovers 
transformed in their union of love, after the Song of Songs. But it should be 
said that this is neither merely affective nor cognitive on the part of the soul; 
there is a total transformation of the being through charity, made possible, as 
we saw earlier according to Maritain, by faith:  
The soul thereby becomes divine, becomes God through 
participation, insofar as is possible in this life. And thus I think 
that this state never occurs without the soul’s being confirmed 
in grace, for the faith of both is confirmed when God’s faith in 
the soul is here confirmed. It is accordingly the highest state 
attainable in this life.135 
Now, enough has probably been said for human love as the pre-eminent 
natural analogy of mystical experience for now, for it is only an image of the 
divine marriage between Christ and his Church, it is by its nature imperfect. 
Being known by and among other human persons, even in a loving 
relationship, is at the same time to experience the disappointments and 
sufferings which are necessarily attendant to communication and co-existence 
among creatures who are fallible and who have an array of limitations and 
needs. To know ourselves but never to be fully known by another, Maritain 
writes, is always to some degree to be in ‘desperate solitude’.136 For this 
reason Maritain writes: 
[T]o know that I am known as subject in all my dimensions of 
my being is not only to know that my truth is known, and that in 
this knowledge justice is done me; it is also to know that I am 
understood. Even though God condemn me, I know that He 
understands me. . . . [H]ow can we keep from thinking that God 
Who knows all these [human beings] in their subjectivity, in the 
nakedness of their wounds and their secret evil, must know also 
the secret beauty of that nature which He has bestowed upon 
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them, the slightest sparks of good and liberty they give forth, all 
the travail and the impulses of good-will that they drag from the 
womb to the grave, the recesses of goodness of which they 
themselves have no notion? The exhaustive knowledge 
possessed by God is a loving knowledge. To know that we are 
known to God is not merely to experience justice, it is also to 
experience mercy.137  
In his late work, Moral Philosophy, Maritain gives an analysis of Bergson’s last 
major work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, as constitutive of his 
own exposition of the relationship between Christianity and ethics. In that work, 
Bergson distinguishes between a ‘closed morality’ which consists in the 
pressure of societal rules for the preservation of society, and an ‘open morality’ 
which is a communion with the principle of life, or élan vital, which, as we saw 
for Bergson, was nothing other than reality itself. It is by virtue of the latter, 
Bergson posits, that spiritual exemplars such as the Christian mystics, are able 
to exude love for humanity as such, and go beyond the self-centeredness that 
was remarked earlier as characteristic of everyday life.  
 In this connection, Maritain writes that ‘It is by virtue of an emotion 
analogous to the creative emotion of the poet, but higher and more 
transforming—and with which the person “becomes one”—that the mystics, 
says Bergson, stir up in humanity the “irresistible attraction” which draws it 
beyond nature.’138 We recall at this point that it was love, in the modality of 
charity, or caritas, that defines supernatural experience and mysticism for 
Maritain. ‘This emotion tears us away from our ego, decenters us from 
ourselves, centers us in another. It is essentially spiritual. Bergson knew its 
name; it is called charity.’139 Love, as we shall see in the final chapter, is not 
only that which defines mystical experience for Maritain, but also the key to 
transcending the ontotheological nature of the mystical experience he 
conceives.  
 Maritain, however, levels this criticism at Bergson: that ‘Having decided 
to ignore all theology, he says nothing either of the supernatural order on which 
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such “emotion” depends, or of the faith which is at the root of it, according to 
the testimony of the great mystics whose experience he has examined.’140 
The necessary constituent of love, but as rendered possible and under the 
modality of faith, is that which undergirds Maritainian mysticism, and the 
primacy of both love and faith distinguishes it from a Heideggerian mysticism, 
even as both are instances of a supra-moral relation to being. Maritain 
contends: 
It is a disastrous illusion to seek mystical experience outside of 
faith, to imagine a mystical experience freed from theological 
faith. Living faith, illumined by the gifts, is the very principle of 
this experience, and, to recall the royal words of St. John of the 
Cross, which no philosophical commentary will ever efface, it is 
the only proximate and proportioned means of mystical 
union.141 
But once again, we should not mistake the love which Maritain speaks of as 
an irrational emotion, any more than a supra-moral relation to being which is 
amoral, for, as we have seen, an adequate moral philosophy, in Maritain’s 
view, must take into account the data provided by Christian revelation and 
moral theology, and Christian revelation and moral theology teach us that love 
is both reality itself and the meaning of human life: ‘perfection consists in 
charity . . . [and] each of is bound to tend towards the perfection of love 
according to his condition and in so far as it is in his power. All morality thus 
hangs upon that which is most existential in the world.’142 Thus St. John of the 
Cross also writes of the spiritual marriage as the highest mystical state in this 
life: 
Just as in the consummation of carnal marriage there are two 
in one flesh, as Sacred Scripture points out [Gn. 2:24], so also 
when the spiritual marriage between God and the soul is 
consummated, there are two natures in one spirit and love, as 
St. Paul says in making this same comparison: Whoever is 
joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him [1 Cor. 6:17].143 
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Now having come so far and arrived at the supra-moral union of love—of which 
human marriage is the most perfect analogy—have we overcome 
ontotheology? If the supra-moral level of the relation to Being of Heidegger’s 
Denken has its parallel in the supra-moral mystical union of God and the 
human soul, we may come to expect such a result. Caputo, however, would 
argue that this is not the case. 
 
(iii) The Spiritual Marriage, the Beatific Vision and Ontotheology 
In light of the preceding discussion, we can see that esse, as the principle of 
the self-existence or subsistence of the person, undergirds Maritain’s 
phenomenology of love, his understanding of human love as the most 
important natural analogy of mystical experience, and the spiritual marriage. 
This is because esse, as the ontological principle by which an entity surpasses 
suppositum and becomes persona through taking hold of its existence and 
sharing existence with another through the esse intentionale of love, is the 
highest principle the human mind can conceive. It is, as Maritain says, ‘the 
supreme perfection’ of all perfections, given that all other perfections, that is, 
actions and capacities of a thing, supervene on esse. God’s esse is precisely 
what He is, such that all possible perfections find their source and supreme 
analogate in God, in which or in whom they participate for their being. As the 
sovereign metaphysical principle of all things, including the transcendentals 
(though we have yet to explore the transcendental of beauty), we may 
therefore regard esse as Maritain’s master philosophical concept. Concerning 
mystical union and the beatific vision, the soul becomes ‘united’ and ‘absorbed’ 
in God, Maritain says, by the same principle of participation: ‘the substance of 
the soul, although it is not the substance of God, for into this it cannot be 
changed, is nevertheless united in Him and absorbed in Him, and is thus God 
by participation in God.’144   
 While St. John of the Cross speaks of becoming divine, he does not, 
however, by this imply ontological identity. Even in the transformation of the 
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mystical experience, even if the soul, in an absolute and total giving of self is 
‘transessentiated’, as Maritain says,145 the mystic remains a creature, and the 
distinction between nature and grace also remains. Regarding the spiritual 
marriage, Maritain writes: ‘From the point of view of entity, in the register of the 
proper being of things, there is always a duality, nay, say an infinite distance 
between the soul and uncreated love.’146 The same applies even in the beatific 
vision, in which ‘the created intellect and the uncreated essence remain 
entitatively distinct to infinity’.147 
 It is in virtue of this emphasis on the entitative distinction between the 
soul and God in mystical experience that there is also repeated recourse to 
the language of vision: 
[T]he soul is transformed into God. Not transformed . . . by an 
entitative changing of its being into the being or substance of 
Deity . . . no; the transformation is effected in a ‘physical’ or 
ontological manner, but in order of the relation of the to God as 
object, inasmuch as by grace the soul is made capable of God 
and turned towards God to see and to love as He sees and 
loves Himself.148   
With all this, Maritain’s conception of mystical union and the beatific vision do 
not, at least in the way they have thus far been presented, transcend 
ontotheology. For God remains an object which (or who) is ontologically 
distinct precisely insofar as He is ipsum esse subsistens, the ‘First Cause’ in 
whom we participate in becoming divine and, on the basis of what Maritain 
says, is an object of cognition. 149  The mystical aspiration with which 
metaphysics is imbued, and to which I have pointed at the outset of this study, 
Maritain in fact calls the intellect’s ‘desire to see the first cause in itself’ and 
says that ‘The Christian who has the notion of the mystery of the beatific vision 
knows that “knowing the First Cause in itself” is, in fact or materially (identice), 
the same thing that theology calls “seeing Deity face to face” or “as it is.”’150 
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Here God is, then, still considered here from the perspective of his causal 
transcendence and, moreover, seems to be an intentional object of 
consciousness, as something or someone external to oneself even as one is, 
in virtue of the connatural knowledge and esse intentionale of love, united with 
Him in ‘one spirit’—as something, as Heidegger would say, considered in 
terms of a presence, even while transcendent. In this connection, Caputo 
writes (and I quote him at length): 
[F]or Heidegger . . . this [Aquinas’, and therefrom, Maritain’s] 
conception of eternal happiness is not Christian but Greek. It 
moves within the framework of the Greek conception of θεωρειν 
[theorein, or ‘seeing’] and hence of the metaphysical conception 
of Being as presence and of thought as pure seeing, ‘looking 
at.’ In metaphysics Being means what is permanently and 
enduringly present (stetige Anwesenheit), and thinking means 
making it present. It assumes a temporal conception of Being 
where time is conceived primarily in terms of the present: time 
is a series of present moment, the past and future are a lack of 
presence, and eternity is a present which does not flow. But in 
a genuinely alethiological conception, absence and 
concealment belong to the very structure of appearance. . . . 
And so what Being and Time and the later works ever more 
clearly say is that Being is an emergent process in which the 
concealment from which they [beings] emerge is intrinsic to 
their appearance. Absence is inscribed in the essence of Being; 
concealment, in the essence of un-concealment. Being is a 
present which lingers for a while between absence, and thinking 
is a continual openness toward absence, a resistance to the 
illusion that thought makes present, renders transparent. 
Thinking releases itself [that is, partakes in Gelassenheit, or 
letting-be] to the emergence of things and stays open to their 
ever-concealed depths, the mystery from which they spring.151 
Here in Maritain’s conceptions of mystical union and the beatific vision, God is 
conceived as the enduring presence of non-contingent eternal Being. Maritain 
seems clear on this when he quotes St. John of the Cross in saying that ‘the 
beatific life . . . consists in seeing God.’152 Even here, then, metaphysics as 
ontotheology is still not overcome. Even if, as Caputo says, ‘ratio leads to 
intellectus’, as the simple, intuitive and unitive insight to which metaphysics 
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strives, ‘and that intellectus is the seat of mystical (and indeed of beatific) 
union, still the intellectual union of the soul with God belongs to the 
metaphysics of seeing and presence. This is true even if it is no longer a 
question of conceptual seeing and even if what is present is not an object.’153  
 This latter point is important, for though Maritain affirms that it is through 
love as a means of connatural knowledge (the esse intentionale as opposed 
to mere entitative being) that the human being becomes one in spirit with God, 
nevertheless there remains an inviolable ontological distinction between God 
and the human being. This seems to apply to the mystical union or spiritual 
marriage which is attained by souls infused with the gifts of the Holy Spirit as 
well as the beatific vision itself. Maritain says that ‘The end of the journey is 
transformation into God, which is begun here below by grace, faith and love, 
and will be consummated in vision’,154 and that ‘all souls, by the fact that they 
are called to heavenly beatitude, are also commonly called in a general way to 
enjoy the beginnings of beatitude on earth by means of infused 
contemplation.’155 And because of the entitative distinction which Maritain 
maintains, there remains, to reiterate, the repeated use of visual language, as 
if two extended objects come to be present before one another, even if in an 
embrace. In this connection, Maritain writes that ‘faith is a movement towards 
vision’, that faith ‘demands to be vitally complemented by other supernatural 
virtues—the gifts of the Holy Spirit—which, thanks to the connaturality of love, 
make faith penetrate and experience the divine reality, and so to speak give 
eyes to faith—fides oculate . . . So divine contemplation is here below a token 
and shadow, an experienced promise of vision.’156 
 If there is an overcoming of metaphysics in Maritain, it has to be sought, 
as Caputo seeks with regard to Aquinas, in a deconstruction of his 
metaphysics. This will be, in light of the insights of the mystics with which 
Maritain was acquainted personally and philosophically (as Heidegger was 
with Eckhart and Eckhart with Aquinas), a seeking of ‘possibilities’ that are 
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immanent throughout his life and philosophy. These mystics, as I will show 
over the course of the next two chapters, are Léon Bloy and St. John of the 
Cross. But it will not be those mystics considered from the perspective of 
‘mysticizing’ metaphysical beliefs about God. Rather it will be from the 
perspective of those mystics artistically, that is, poetically, conveying the 
mysteries of their Catholic faith and mystical experiences of God. 
 Caputo writes of Eckhart that he ‘works out a possibility which is latent 
in the historical actuality of Thomas Aquinas’,157 and gives two examples. The 
first is a radicalizing of Aquinas’ thesis that ‘God is his own act of being [esse] 
(deus est suum esse)’ to form the thesis that ‘Being is God (esse est deus)’, 
which is suggested stresses the total dependence of creatures on God.158 
Caputo is presumably referring to the doctrine of participation, given that one 
metaphor which Eckhart uses is that ‘Created things have being . . . the way 
air holds light . . . The air does not “possess” the light; it simply receives it for 
as long as the sun illuminates it.’159 Another implication is that if Being is God, 
and is, as such, the ground of the being of beings and which they do not 
possess of themselves, God is necessarily an abyss which withdraws from 
their understanding, much in the same way, I take Caputo to mean, that the 
lens of the eye, in providing the eye the ability to see color, has no color itself. 
Hence, Eckhart says, in the famous fifty-seventh sermon, that ‘if my eye is to 
perceive color, it must be free of all color. If I see a blue or white color, the sight 
of my eye which sees the color, the very thing that sees, is the same as that 
which is seen by the eye. The eye with which I see God is the same eye with 
which God sees me: my eye and God's eye are one eye, one seeing, one 
knowing and one love.’160 God is therefore closer to beings than they are to 
themselves but remains concealed in the same way that the human self 
refuses essentialization upon introspection.  
 This self-concealing and withdrawing is the element in Eckhart on which 
Heidegger is particularly focused when he appropriates Eckhart’s term of 
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Gelassenheit as essential to Denken which is ‘meditative’ and apophatic in its 
method of approaching the nature of something, such as a work of art.161 In 
this connection, Caputo writes of Eckhart’s distinction between ‘God’ and the 
‘Godhead’: 
For ‘God’ is everything we say of Him, whereas the Godhead 
remains behind, its essential Being untouched by this 
discourse. For if ‘God’ is Father, Son, and Spirit, causa prima, 
creator, omniscient and omnipotent, then the Godhead is none 
of these things; it is prior to these things, deeper, not yet 
manifest . . . All the names of ‘God,’ whether they are drawn 
from philosophy or faith, metaphysics or theology, fall short of 
the divine abyss.’162 
Because the Godhead is true mystery lying far beneath or beyond the ‘God’ 
which we manifest in our concepts, Eckhart says that ‘I ask God that He rid me 
of God.’163  
 The second way that Eckhart radicalizes Aquinas according to Caputo 
pertains to intellectus. As was said in the introduction, intellectus, for Aquinas, 
is a simple, unitative insight towards which, Caputo argues, ratio tends. As 
unitive, intellectus is not the faculty of concept-making but is rather a faculty of 
divine union, consummated in the Beatific Vision when all mediation of 
concepts becomes unnecessary. Following Rousselot, Caputo takes the 
unifying nature of intellectus to amount to a critique of metaphysics insofar as 
metaphysics is a science that, by the mediation of concepts, cannot provide 
the soul with intimate union with God but only approach God as an object at a 
distance. As the unitative, divine faculty, intellectus serves as the hidden 
principle animating metaphysics, and demonstrates the unity of mysticism and 
metaphysics of the Middle Ages (though it is not clear whether Caputo is here 
referring to the entire period or a particular time or place).164 Nevertheless, 
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Heidegger acknowledged a medieval unity in some form far before he claimed 
the metaphysics of Aquinas to be guilty of the oblivion of Being: 
In the medieval world-view, scholasticism and mysticism belong 
essentially together. The two pairs of ‘opposites’ [which are 
allegedly] rationalism-irrationalism and scholasticism-
mysticism do not coincide. And where their equivalence is 
sought, it rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. 
Philosophy as a rationalist creation, detached from life, is 
powerless; mysticism as an irrationalist experience is 
purposeless.165 
As I will show in the final chapter, Maritain is of similar mind when it comes to 
the unity of scholasticism (that is, Thomism) and mysticism. But we must bear 
in mind why Heidegger still changed his views on the matter. We saw above 
that even in the mystical union of the beatific vision, towards which intellectus 
itself tends, God is conceived, in Heidegger’s terms, ontotheologically. For this 
reason, Caputo says, intellectus, while serving as a critique of metaphysics, 
only does so insofar as it also serves as its crown. A critique, though, does not 
suffice to be a deconstruction.166 As such, Caputo briefly mentions Eckhart’s 
inversion of intellectus from a faculty of presence and Being—the intuitive and 
ascending movement ‘from the light of reason (lumen naturale to the light of 
faith (lumen fidei) to the light of glory (lumen gloriae)’167—to a faculty that is 
openness to Being, of detachment or Gelassenheit. 168  This because, as 
Eckhart argues, using the same metaphor of the eye, the intellect itself is not 
knowledge, but that in which knowledge occurs: 
[Th]e intellect inasmuch as it is intellect must be none of those 
things which it understands; rather it is necessary that it be 
‘unmixed,’ ‘having nothing in common with anything’ as it is said 
in the Third Book of the De anima [by Aristotle], just as it is 
necessary that the power of sight have no color, in order that it 
may see every color. If therefore the intellect is nothing, then 
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consequently the act of intellection . . . is not any form of 
being.169   
Having followed Caputo thus far, I now, however, must make my critique. 
Unfortunately, even if Caputo, as he says,170 sets out to provide a religious 
way out of ontotheology and a ‘religious alethiology’ by means of reference to 
Eckhart’s apophaticism as a radicalization of Aquinas’ own teachings, he fails 
to provide any specific reasons as to why this mysticism is in any sense 
Christian or, indeed, Catholic. Toward the end of Heidegger and Aquinas, 
Caputo writes that ‘We must learn to think of God not as the cause of the world 
but as that fullness of presence which is to the Being of things’, that we must 
learn to see in the reflected light of the Being in creatures ‘a light which is also 
a primordial darkness’, and, as such, ‘reinvest God and the world with their 
religious mysteriousness.’171 I agree with Caputo’s sentiments, but what does 
the deconstruction of Aquinas’ metaphysics mean for the latter and his lived 
religion? Caputo fails to even mention the inevitable question of how the total 
negation of all positive ascriptions of God as we saw in Eckhart can indeed be 
reconciled with propositional Christian belief. He fails to provide a 
phenomenological description of how a Christian mystical experience occurs 
upon the divesting of positive ascriptions of God that is allegedly necessary for 
a retrieved Aquinas who escapes ontotheology. How precisely is the Christian 
God mystically experienced? And with these comes another question which 
Caputo does not consider: why Aquinas (or Maritain, or anyone else) would 
commit to belief in a God who, if what has been said is true, is not in fact the 
ultimate reality which or whom Christians think He is.  
 The danger with Caputo’s view, setting aside the question of whether 
Caputo is representative of Heidegger, is that in the name of ridding us of God 
understood as prima causa, it seems to obliterate any distinction between the 
human and the divine—precisely that which human beings neither see nor feel 
they possess but to which they orientate themselves in order to give meaning 
                                                 
169 Meister Eckhart, Die lateinische Werke, Vol. V, quoted and translated in John D. Caputo, 
‘The Nothingness of the Intellect in Meister Eckhart’s “Parisian Questions”’, The Thomist: A 
Speculative Quarterly Review, 39 (1) (1975), p. 98. 
170 HA, p. 283. 
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to life. This is despite the fact that Caputo actually aims to press Heidegger’s 
distinction between Being and beings. I believe that from Maritain’s 
perspective, there may be the risk of a species of pantheism in Caputo’s 
project, for there is a levelling out of divinity such that it either ceases to exist 
or exists in all things without differentiation. Again, ‘Being’ is not a God for 
Heidegger, in virtue of the fact that he considered both the notion of God and 
the individual pursuit of faith in a God (that is, a goal-orientated and 
normatively-governed relating to personal belief in an entity) as operating 
merely on the ontic level.172  
 What makes God God, for Maritain at least, is an essential 
transcendence in the order of existence and in virtue of which God is that 
infinite absolute to which we can look to direct our lives. Maritain’s comments 
in a little-known lecture to the Little Brothers of Jesus in 1972 are particularly 
pertinent in this regard, and, I think, justify my reading. If one abolishes the 
‘who art in heaven’ in the prayer of the Our Father that Christ gave as the 
paradigmatic prayer, Maritain says, we are left with nothing other than a god 
who ‘swims about in the ocean of immanence’.173 We need not, Maritain says, 
consider heaven to be a place in space and time but as conveying ‘to our 
minds, in metaphors . . . the infinite transcendence of God.’174 Admittedly, this 
seems to contradict the language of vision in Maritain’s description of the 
dynamics of the Beatific Vision. Nevertheless, it is not coincidental that in 
discussing Heidegger Maritain argues that a species of ‘natural mysticism 
plays the part of a stand-in in a role that metaphysics ought to play him.’175 For 
while Heidegger affirms the ontological difference between Being and beings, 
and, as we saw, granted Being a moral monopoly, he refuses to identify Being 
as any kind of god which is transcendent, and for that reason, the object of 
metaphysics. Rather, Heidegger abandons metaphysics and philosophy per 
se and opts for Denken, which, with Being, is concerned ‘to respond to the 
appeal of its presencing’.176 What Heidegger means by this requires some 
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unpacking.  
 Being, as Heidegger says, is that which allows for the ‘unconcealedness 
of beings’177 in what he calls the ‘Open’—that is, the dynamic sphere in which 
beings both reveal themselves as present and at the same time dynamically 
conceal themselves insofar as their mode of being can never be completely 
grasped and insofar as beings simulate and replace one another such that the 
question of what is real is never completely answerable.178 Things, or beings, 
have to come to be before we can be puzzled by them, but equally, and 
perhaps paradoxically, we can only know that they are because we are puzzled 
by them, because they stand out as mysterious. This standing out, we shall 
see, is what makes the artwork special for Heidegger. Putting that aside for 
now, in my estimation it is because Being for Heidegger is that unknown 
absolute which pervades all beings in both their presence and their 
concealment—such that Heidegger says that the ‘truth’ of the 
unconcealedness (aletheia) of beings ‘is never itself but, viewed dialectically, 
is always also its opposite’179—that Being, as ultimate reality, is immanent, and 
only ‘transcendent’ in the sense that it cannot be an object of cognition. 
Regardless of whether Caputo’s interpretation of Eckhart’s most mysterious 
and difficult writings is accurate, he writes that the unconcealedness of things 
‘functions quite explicitly for him [Eckhart] as the λήθη [lethe] in ἀλήθεια 
[aletheia], the concealed and withdrawn depths in the manifest God.’180 If 
Heidegger’s Being, which seems to take the place of God, according to 
Caputo’s interpretation, is impersonal, then Maritain would be correct to call 
Heidegger’s Denken a natural mysticism, for it has nothing of supernatural 
communion in charity between persons human and divine about it. 
Heidegger’s Denken shares with Christian mysticism a certain passivity and 
apophatic element, but does not, as Pattison makes clear, make any claims to 
attaining or experiencing Being as such, only of ‘beings in Being’, and ‘There 
is nothing to see, nothing to intuit beyond the world.’181 
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 My point in saying all of this is that after laying down Caputo’s book, we 
are left with no reason to believe this retrieved Aquinas via Eckhart—via 
Heidegger—is the medieval Catholic friar he was. And if we apply Caputo’s 
deconstruction of Aquinas to Maritain without due reflection, we are also left 
with no reason as to why Maritain would call himself Catholic—a Catholic of 
the Nicene Creed which affirms an objectively existing triune God who 
communicates with us precisely as transcendent. After having gone into detail 
about Maritain’s biography, it cannot be doubted that Maritain was such a 
Catholic. Through what was an apparent digression, the lines of demarcation 
between Heidegger’s Denken—possessing, as Caputo says, a ‘mystical 
element’—and the Catholic mysticism of Maritain have been firmly established 
as we go forward. 
 It is clear that we cannot take Aquinas’ apophatic experience in 
isolation, as we cannot take the apophatic mystics’ statements in isolation from 
the propositional faith which made them the Catholic mystics they in fact were. 
Caputo’s efforts in this regard are one-sided, with the end of demonstrating a 
superiority of the apophatic over the cataphatic, in virtue, I think, of his strong 
commitment to Heidegger’s own commitment, echoing Eckhart, that Being 
(Eckhart’s ‘Godhead’), can never be an object or item of knowledge. As 
Pattison says: ‘Being is never identifiable with any particular entity or 
aggregate or level of entities, divine or mortal, earthly or heavenly’,182 and this 
may indeed constitute a radical apophaticism in Heidegger.  
 Having said that, this one-sidedness is doubly evident when we 
consider that Aquinas is said to have had another mystical experience of 
completely different character but of no less importance than the one referred 
to by Caputo, and which is much beloved among Dominicans especially. 
Robert Barron relates: 
 
It has . . . been reported that when he [Aquinas] was struggling 
with a particularly thorny intellectual difficulty, he would go to 
the tabernacle, resting his head on it and begging for 
inspiration. Toward the end of his relatively short life . . . 
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Aquinas composed, as part of his Summa theologiae, a treatise 
on the Eucharist. When he had finished this remarkably 
thorough and complex text, he was still unconvinced that he had 
done justice to this great sacrament. Therefore he laid his 
treatise at the foot of the crucifix in the Dominican chapel in 
Naples and he prayed. A voice came from the cross: ‘Bene 
scripsisti de me, Thoma’ (You have written well of me, Thomas), 
and then, ‘What would you have as a reward?’ Aquinas said 
simply, ‘Nil nisi te’ (nothing except you).183 
The treatise features an analysis of the ‘real presence’ of Christ in terms of 
‘transubstantiation’, of substance changing from that of the bread to that of 
Christ while appearing to remain bread in virtue of the accidents.184 Here we 
find Aquinas having no less a profound mystical experience than the one in 
which is claimed to have compelled to say that his Summa amounted to 
‘straw’—a mystical experience in which God Himself is supposed to have given 
his approval to an analysis of the Eucharist which deploys Aristotelian 
categories!  
 This other, no less moving, mystical experience of Aquinas, in its 
apparent contradictory nature to the one that Caputo mentions, goes right to 
the heart of the problem of the possibility of a religious overcoming of 
metaphysics, for it also cuts to the heart of the apparent tension between the 
apophatic and the cataphatic. As such, it also cuts to the heart of the conflict 
that Maritain saw between Bergsonian intuition and the validity of the concept 
presupposed by the Catholic faith. Supposing for the sake of argument that 
this other mystical experience did occur (for both are reported by Aquinas’ 
Dominican brothers, and not by himself), it raises the question of how it can be 
that the technical, ontotheological writings of Aquinas can at once be as much 
worth as straw and worthy of divine approval. In the following two chapters, I 
will show how in Maritain there is an immanent pre-metaphysical, mystical 
tendency which suffices to overcome ontotheology and which is nonetheless 
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both apophatic and cataphatic—and which, for that reason, is eminently 
Catholic.  
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6 
 
The Artist and the Mystic: 
Overcoming Metaphysics 
 
‘Prayer, holiness, mystical experience—poetry, even pure poetry,  
is none of these things. But it is their most beautiful and  
most dangerous moral symbol.’1 
 
 
1. Art and the Mystical 
 
Of the many remarkable things about Jacques Maritain are the vast number of 
subjects he approached and the massive effort of synthesis that he undertook 
throughout his life. This synthesis was not just of philosophy but also of 
personal and religious experience. In Part I, it was discerned that the two most 
important artistic figures in Maritain’s life were his godfather, the novelist and 
diarist Léon Bloy, and Georges Rouault, who inspired his first writings on art. 
In this chapter, I am concerned with Maritain’s philosophy of art and the artist 
as it pertains to what I am claiming is an immanent mysticism and an 
overcoming of ontheotheology in Maritain’s life and writings. I argue that it is 
when we go beyond artistic knowledge or experience of the beautiful as an 
analogy of mystical experience to the instances in Maritain’s reflections in 
which the vocations of the Catholic mystic and the Catholic artist converge in 
poetic expression of mystical experience that we are able to retrieve a Maritain 
who, while remaining a Catholic philosopher, is a mystic. It is when Maritain’s 
thought is situated in its wider existential and religious context of his deep 
yearning for communion with ultimate reality and of poet-mystics who serve as 
‘revealers of Being’ for him, that his thought escapes the charge of 
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ontotheology. Essential in demonstrating this are Bloy and Rouault, but also 
St. John of the Cross. 
 Touching upon novel developments in contemporary Maritain 
scholarship, such as John G. Trapani’s clarification and expansion of the 
seldom-used Maritainian notion of ‘Poetic Contemplation’ (capitalized for 
reasons which will be made clear) and Cornelia Tsakiridou’s notion of 
Maritain’s ‘mystical aesthetics’, I will first build up a picture of artistic knowledge 
as an analogy of mystical knowledge and of the artist as an analogy of the 
mystic in Maritain’s thought. I argue that philosophically, the analogies rest on 
the artist playing the role of what I have called a ‘revealer a being’—not, 
however, in terms of moral action and love as in the previous chapter but in 
his or her unique capacity to reveal the beautiful as an artist, and that 
religiously, the analogies rest on asceticism and the role of suffering in the 
Christian and contemplative life. These analogies will be shown to serve as 
markers for some similarities but also irreducible differences between Maritain 
and Heidegger pertaining to the artist and the mystical. Later in the present 
chapter (from section five), however, I will show that at least in three cases, 
those of Bloy, St. John of the Cross and Jacques’ wife Raïssa, we see that 
when the artist explicitly directs their work to Christian mysteries, they in fact 
simultaneously take on the role of the mystic. I call this convergence ‘Infused-
Poetic Contemplation’ and argue that it is here where we witness a religious 
overcoming of metaphysics in Maritain. This will then allow us to gather the 
essential components of Maritain’s immanent mysticism in the final chapter. 
 
2. Historical Foundations 
 
Like all other areas of Maritain’s philosophy, his thought on art and on the 
vocation of the artist owes most of its conceptual foundations to Aquinas. Yet, 
if one surveys the copious secondary literature on Maritain, one finds that, 
along with his writings on political philosophy, his writings on art (the term 
‘aesthetics’ being descriptively insufficient, as we shall see)—garner much 
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praise for their originality and much scholarly commentary because of this.2 
As John G. Trapani writes, Maritain’s thinking on art is not merely an exegesis 
or exposition of that of Aquinas: ‘Though deeply rooted in the Thomist tradition, 
Jacques Maritain was also an original thinker; he applied in a fresh and 
innovative way many of the basic insights found in the thought of his great 
mentor St. Thomas Aquinas.’3 As with Bergson and the centrality of intuition 
in Maritain’s epistemology and metaphysics, the inspirations behind Maritain’s 
philosophical developments in the area of art must, therefore, derive at least 
in part from sources outside of the Thomist framework Maritain sought to 
revitalize and apply in all its force to the issues facing the modern world. These 
sources, I suggest, are the key to discovering a pre-metaphysical, mystical 
tendency in Maritain that escapes the charge of ontotheology.  
 Maritain, being the grandson of Jules Favre, who was one of the 
architects of the Third Republic, was born into a highly respected bourgeois 
family at the heart of Parisian intellectual and artistic life. Raïssa Maritain 
relates that, growing up, Jacques’ world was one characterized by 
republicanism and liberalism—‘the free play and glory of thought’ 4  that 
extended to all areas of life, from art to politics. As we saw, later in Maritain’s 
life, this freedom of thought and artistic taste was manifest in the Cercles 
d’études thomistes held at the Maritains’ home in Meudon and which attracted 
all manner of artists, including those of the avant-garde. In fact, from an early 
age Maritain had shown a deep love for the arts, and an aptitude for painting 
and poetry. As an adolescent he and his friend Ernest Psichari would 
collaborate in writing sonnets and go out into the countryside of Brittany to 
paint together, and they were influenced by, among others, Baudelaire, 
Verlaine, and Mallarmé.5 As Raïssa relates, during the early days of her and 
Jacques’ relationship, they would spend countless hours walking around the 
galleries of Paris, and it was Jacques ‘who opened up to me the boundless 
world of painting.’6 These biographical facts are important when we consider 
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how Maritain came to the subject of art. As with philosophy, in this area 
Maritain is a ‘modern’ in the fullest sense, and this implies necessary 
developments of Aquinas’ approach to art. 
 Maritain opens his first book on the philosophy of art, Art and 
Scholasticism, with the claim: ‘The Schoolmen composed no special treatise 
with the title “Philosophy of Art”. . . . There is nevertheless a far-reaching theory 
of Art to be found in their writings’.7 But, Maritain goes on to say, the ‘art’ with 
which the Schoolmen (the medieval scholastics) were concerned was not ‘art’ 
as we consider it today—that being the ‘fine arts’ of painting, sculpture, music 
and poetry—but rather the way of doing or craft (physical or mental) of a certain 
discipline or trade, such as ship building, grammar, or logic. 8  This is the 
classical Aristotelian-Thomistic definition of art as a habit, disposition of the 
mind, or ‘virtue’ (habitus) of the ‘practical intellect’, which consists in making, 
that is, the creation of objects, again physical or mental. Maritain retains this 
conceptual foundation all the way from Art and Scholasticism to his last work 
on art, The Responsibility of the Artist (1960). Maritain thus defines art not in 
terms of the ontology of an artefact or performance first, but epistemologically, 
within the artificer, as techne, a habit of the production of objects involving skill 
and the adherence to rules attained by the intellect (for instance, perspective 
in drawing). In other words, the foundation of Maritain’s definition of art is first 
describing how artworks can come into being. In elucidating Maritain’s 
philosophy of art, I will rely in part on my published work on the topic.9 
 Whereas most contemporary philosophers working on the philosophy 
of art attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to be 
a work of art (the ‘ontology’ of art), Maritain flips the picture around and instead 
asks what it is to make art precisely as work. While Heidegger operates with a 
very different philosophical framework, he does, by pursing the 
epistemological conditions for the production of an artwork rather than an 
ontological grounding of art or aesthetic theory, pursue the same strategy of 
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Maritain, writing in ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ that ‘we must . . . go into the 
activity of the artist in order to arrive at the origin of the work of art.’10 More on 
this later. 
 Unlike the medievals, though, Maritain’s focus is on the fine arts that 
were his first love and, in the case on Bloy’s La Femme Pauvre and Mon 
Journal, the reason for his coming to faith: ‘We got and at once read this 
strange novel [La Femme Pauvre] which is unlike any other. And for the first 
time we found ourselves before the reality of Christianity.’ 11  In order to 
understand the fine arts, Maritain argues, we need to combine the classical 
understanding of art as an activity of making (factibile) along with an 
ontological analysis of beauty and the beautiful.12 For while art is indeed a 
habitus of making, that to which it is ordered—the reasons for making 
something and the rules employed—obviously varies according to the nature 
of what is to be made (a landscape obviously differs from a table in the manner 
in and purpose for which either is made).  
 In this connection, Maritain differentiates between crafts or what have 
traditionally been called the ‘useful arts’ and what have traditionally been called 
the ‘fine arts’. The difference is that whereas the useful arts serve a practical 
purpose, such as meeting a practical need or the improvement of an invention 
which serves a practical need, the ‘purpose’ that the fine arts serve is beauty, 
which is in fact held to be self-sufficient or valuable in itself.13 For this reason, 
Maritain chooses to call the useful arts ‘subservient’ arts (serving a practical 
purpose, performing practical functions) and the fine arts ‘free’ or ‘self-
sufficient’ arts. 
 At this point, however, we might wonder why Maritain insists on beauty 
as being the object of the free arts, this insistence amounting to the claim that 
an artefact or performance can only be an instance of art if it is beautiful. As 
he begins chapter five in his much later Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry 
(L’intuition créatrice dans l’art et dans la poésie), ‘I am aware that it is old-
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fashioned to hold forth on beauty apropos of art, almost as much so as to 
speak of truth apropos of philosophy.’14 I want to elucidate the reasons for this 
insistence on beauty and how it relates to the present study on the mystical in 
Maritain by first returning to the salient biographical details. 
 As previously noted, Maritain was led to meet his eventual godfather 
Léon Bloy in 1905 through the latter’s religious literary works, and before he 
published writings on academic philosophy, he wrote an introduction for an 
exhibition of Georges Rouault’s paintings. Rouault’s art, we know, was born of 
a profound religious feeling for the sin and suffering that permeate human 
reality, at its early stage characterized by disturbing images of clowns, 
prostitutes and judges. In virtue of these facts we should therefore expect the 
work and personal examples of Bloy and Rouault to be significant in Maritain’s 
religious formation and in the formation of Maritain’s philosophy of art and the 
vocation of the artist as well, in a way that complements the philosophical 
foundation provided by Aquinas. 
 When in 1909 the Maritains moved to Versailles to be in closer proximity 
to their spiritual director, Fr. Humbert Clérissac, they were delighted to discover 
that they had the painter Georges Rouault for a neighbor. This was a 
determining factor for Maritain, and as his friendship with Rouault grew and 
they shared weekly meals together, he was to write Art and Scholasticism with 
him in mind.15 Of the significance of this relationship for Maritain, Julie Kernan 
writes: 
 
Because they did not force his confidence, [Rouault] talked to 
them freely, telling of his struggles for an ‘inner order’ that would 
enable him to express in original forms his exasperation with 
bourgeois values and his intense religious feeling. To do this, 
he said, he had to depart from accepted forms of beauty, go his 
own way at no matter what cost, and accommodate himself to 
the consequent lack of understanding and to poverty. Through 
this friendship the Maritains were steeped in many problems of 
                                                 
14 CI, p. 122. 
15 PBC, p. 23. 
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aesthetics which they sought to interpret in the light of Aquinas’ 
philosophy.16 
 
It is significant for our purposes that the works of Bloy and Rouault were not 
just instances of modern art with a view to self-expression of the subject that 
was beyond the psychological and philosophical horizon of Aquinas and the 
medieval scholastics and thus requiring a new appreciation of the subject to 
be incorporated in a Thomistic philosophy of art.17 Both the writings of Bloy 
and paintings of Rouault were rejected by the literary and painting 
establishments of the time as being outlandish. The artists themselves were 
perceived in like manner. Why was this the case? Because both Bloy’s vitriolic, 
prose and Rouault’s apparently hideous paintings were designed to serve 
beauty—beauty not in terms of a mere ‘aesthetic’ experience of pleasant 
colors and subjects suited to the popular taste of Parisian bourgeois society, 
but a shining forth of the deep mysteries of reality. In Bloy’s and Rouault’s 
cases, the mysteries with which they are concerned are those of God and 
human life and the relationship between the two.  
 In all of Rouault’s paintings of Christ, it is by means of particular artistic 
techniques and the bringing forth of powerful emotions that makes Christ’s 
presence ‘a presence of suffering in and with our sufferings.’18 This ‘unity of 
creative emotion and the working reason’ manifest in great artists that was 
mentioned in the first part of the study will be discussed in much further detail 
in this chapter. Of Rouault’s paintings, Maritain says that ‘It is religion that is at 
the origin of his tenderness and revolt, of his hatred against all sorts of 
pharisaism.’ 19  And in Bloy’s case, says Maritain, he ‘does not argue, he 
affirms. Not in his own name, but in the name of the first Truth that speaks to 
us through the Church. A writer of genius, devoted to beauty as to one of the 
names of Him who is, jealous of the purity and integrity of his art—which he 
                                                 
16 Julie Kernan, Our Friend, Jacques Maritain (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1975), p. 
48. 
17 Thereby mirroring the need of Thomistic anthropology to develop an adequate ‘personalism’ 
in light of the growing awareness, as we saw in the previous chapter, of the ‘psychological 
modalities . . . realized in the subject’. 
18 Dyrness, Rouault, p. 186. 
19  Jacques Maritain, Art and Poetry, trans. E. de P. Matthews (London: Editions Poetry 
London, 1945), p. 15. 
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never prostituted—he makes of that very art, in perpetual magnificence and 
splendor, a monstrance of truth.’20  
 It is reasonable to ask if all of this suggests that Maritain only regards 
explicitly religious (Christian) art as genuine art, owing such a status to an 
explicit directedness to God in its subject-matter. And if there is a subordination 
of artistic expression to religious expression, there is the additional question of 
whether or not there is a risk of stifling artistic creativity in the name of an all-
absorbing Christian morality. These two questions require an elucidation of the 
key operative terms of Maritain’s philosophy of art and their relationships. In 
the process, it will be shown that for Maritain, all genuine artistic experience is 
at the very least an analogy of supernatural mystical experience, and, as the 
opening quote suggests, of the highest kind. Following this, I will show that 
when the Catholic artist possesses the grace and gifts of the mystic, their 
artistic experience can also be mystical experience. 
 
3. Epistemological Foundations: Poetry  
and Intentional Emotion 
 
Elsewhere, and in ‘analytical’ philosophical terms, I have said that ‘Maritain’s 
definition of art is “descriptive” because it spells out the meaning of the word 
“art” while accommodating existing usages—semantically and in artistic 
practices.’21 With respect to the free arts, Maritain’s descriptive definition of art 
as a practical virtue of making something beautiful (together, both necessary 
and sufficient conditions) is broad enough that it encompasses historical 
variety in artistic traditions, functions and contexts, and narrow enough to tell 
us why an artwork is to be distinguished from non-art. With respect to these 
two necessary and sufficient conditions, detail needs to be given on how an 
artist creates something beautiful such that it can be called an artwork and how 
that process of creation relates to its audience recognizing the object as an 
                                                 
20 Jacques Maritain, ‘Introduction’, in Léon Bloy, Pilgrim of the Absolute, ed. Raïssa Maritain, 
trans. John Coleman and Harry Lorin Binsse (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1947), pp. 18–
19. 
21 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 533. 
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artwork. Deal Hudson remarks that as we trace the development of his 
philosophy of art from his early work Art and Scholasticism to the later works 
Creative Intuition and Art and Poetry and The Responsibility of the Artist, 
‘Maritain’s emphasis shifted from the philosophy of art to the philosophy of 
poetry, and finally, to the philosophy of creativity.’22 For Maritain, what art is 
depends very largely on the cognitive and affective activity on the part of the 
artist in the act of creation itself. 
 For Maritain, the artist is inspired by being able to figuratively see the 
world through emotion, such that the knowledge that the artist has is intuitive 
or ‘connatural’ knowledge, and which, like intuitive moral reasoning ‘in the 
moment’, as we have seen, is preconceptual and both cognitive and 
affective. 23  Maritain holds that the artist has an ‘experience-knowledge’ 
through the senses in divining the ‘secret meaning’ of things, in virtue of 
emotion. 24  Central to his later thought, Maritain’s concept of ‘poetry’, as 
distinct from the art of writing verses, denotes the ‘intercommunication 
between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self which 
is a kind of divination’25 (hereafter capitalized for clarity, following Trapani’s 
example). 
 Maritain writes that ‘There are two kinds of unconscious, two great 
domains of psychological activity screened from the grasp of consciousness’.26 
He accepts the existence of the Freudian subconscious, but also posits a 
‘spiritual preconscious’, which rests on his assumptions regarding the 
existence of the human intellect and ideas in a spiritual manner, and for whose 
unknown activities and operations (performed by what he calls the ‘Illuminating 
Intellect’) he believes a spiritual preconscious to best explain.27 The artist’s 
activity is intellectual or intellective in a practical, connatural way, because the 
resonance between the artist’s self and things such as objects, events and 
                                                 
22 Deal W. Hudson, ‘“The Ecstasy Which Is Creation”: The Shape of Maritain’s Aesthetics’, in 
Deal W. Hudson and Matthew J. Mancini (eds.), Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and 
Friend (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), pp. 236–237. 
23 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, pp. 533–534. 
24 CI, p. 3. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 67. 
27 Ibid., pp. 70–71; Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 533. 
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other people is more than emotion as we normally conceive it—as irrational. 
Maritain posits that the Illuminating Intellect, when in contact with an emotion, 
turns the emotion toward the subconscious and spiritual preconscious, which 
by association, then transforms the emotion into a ‘spiritualized’ or ‘intentional 
emotion’, giving it aspects of the object of which it is an emotion. 28  The 
emotion that is associated with a thing becomes one with it in the mind of the 
artist, and they in turn become one with the thing, such that they are able to 
manifest the spiritualized emotion in an artwork, that is both about a thing in 
itself and the artist’s own emotions about it.  
 ‘The first of these “stages” is cognitive, and the second is creative’,29 
and these correspond to ‘Cognitivity and creativity’ as ‘the two essential 
aspects of the intellectual nature [of human beings].’30 In an artwork, the 
difference between an irrational emotion and a spiritualized emotion is that 
between ‘sentimentality’ which is not only contrived but lacks logic or lacks any 
informative power for ascertaining the meaning or the artist’s ‘intentions’ in a 
work, and ‘sentiment’, which is a spontaneous, sincere, ‘affective response to 
a valued situation or object.’31 For Maritain, I wrote elsewhere, ‘art that moves 
us is filled with intentional emotion. Such genuine aesthetic experiences are 
contrasted with those experiences of art which do not move us because we 
recognize its contrived or shallow nature. The difference between these 
aesthetic experiences forces us to affirm skill and sincerity in artistic creation 
and the possibility of critiquing aesthetic taste.’32 Poetry is natural to all human 
beings, because it is possible for everyone with functioning cognitive faculties 
to identify intentional emotion. In this connection, Maritain writes that ‘[o]ne can 
be a poet and still produce nothing.’33 
 Because Poetry allows the artist to penetrate the mystery of things and 
allows their audience to share in such manifestations of meaning in things, it 
                                                 
28 Ibid., pp. 87–89; Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 533. 
29 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 534. 
30 CI, p. 168. 
31 Sean M. Sullivan, Maritain’s Theory of Poetic Intuition (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
University of Fribourg, Switzerland, 1963), p. 59. 
32 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 534. 
33 Maritain and Cocteau, Art and Faith, p. 90. 
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is, Maritain says, the ‘secret life of each and all the arts’.34 Poetry serves as 
the condition for an artwork’s being imbued with ‘true sentiment’ rather than 
‘sentimentality’, and, as we shall see in connection with beauty, even the 
ascription of meaningfulness, and thereby good quality, to an artwork, as 
opposed to superficiality and poor quality.35 The ‘cognitive’ ‘stage’ of aesthetic 
experience is therefore universal and allows all of us to appreciate and 
contemplate art. However, given that art is generally a virtue of making, the 
creative ‘stage’ is the province of the artist. Maritain makes a distinction 
between the universal capacity to apprehend and share in intentional emotion 
as ‘[P]oetic intuition’ and the incitation to produce an artwork in virtue of 
intentional emotion as ‘creative intuition’, for the sake of a work to be 
produced.36 But while the cognitive and creative ‘stages’ may be logically 
distinguished for the sake of non-creative audiences of art who can have 
Poetic experiences and Poetic insight without creating artwork, they are 
temporally and logically one for the artist, together constituting ‘Poetic 
Knowledge’.37 Poetic Knowledge can, though, still be understood best in terms 
of the cognitive and creative elements of the intellect. Maritain writes: 
 
Poetic knowledge, as I see it, is a specific kind of knowledge 
through inclination or connaturality—let us say a knowledge 
through affective connaturality which essentially relates to the 
creativity of the spirit and tends to express itself in a work. So 
that in such a knowledge it is the object created, the poem, the 
painting, the symphony, in its own existence as a world of its 
own, which plays the part played in ordinary knowledge by the 
concepts and judgements produced within the mind.38 
 
This difference between the cognitive and creative elements of the intellect will 
be crucial in determining the relationship between artistic experience and 
mystical experience for Maritain. For just as in ordinary knowledge the object 
of cognition and that which is produced on the basis of knowledge of the object 
                                                 
34 CI, p. 3. 
35 PBC, p. 164. 
36 CI, pp. 78–80, 91–93. 
37 Ibid., pp. 83–98.  
38 Ibid., p. 86. 
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(the concept) are different to the object and work produced in virtue of Poetic 
Knowledge, so will the object and that which is produced in mystical 
experience differ from those of Poetic Knowledge. For the artist, though, ‘The 
practice and honing of one’s abilities in inspiration and creation—the virtue of 
art—to see in things their “secret meanings” and create objects that are filled 
with the personal significance of intentional emotion’, I wrote elsewhere, is the 
reason why for the artist, the virtue of art that they possess is their ‘most 
treasured possession.’39 While everyone enjoys a share of participation in 
Poetry, the artist creates, or they are not an artist, and for this virtue of art to 
be truly alive as a habitualized skill (habitus), poetic intuition, or creative 
intuition,40 it must be present and relied upon by the artist: 
 
Poetic intuition [or creative intuition], for instance, is born in the 
unconscious, but it emerges from it; the poet is not unaware of 
this intuition, on the contrary, it is his most precious light and 
the primary rule of his virtue of art. But he is aware of it sur le 
rebord de l’inconscient, as Bergson would have said, on the 
edge of the unsconscious.41 
 
What Maritain says here also has important implications. The fact that the 
emotional dynamism between the artist’s self and the world and the 
transformation of such emotion into pieces of art are known by the artist as the 
conditions of their vocation and yet lie somewhere on the border between the 
conscious and the unconscious, means that Poetic Knowledge, as the unifying 
mode of knowledge here, cannot be consciously made into a set of 
propositions or a set of syllogisms. Poetic Knowledge, then, as art, cannot be 
forced into the mold of a science such as philosophy. For reasons that I will 
later show, Maritain argues that Heidegger’s mistake is attempting to make a 
philosophical system on the basis of the poetic intuition which is proper to art. 
Against this, he writes: 
 
Such divination of the spiritual in the things of sense, which also 
                                                 
39 Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 534. 
40 Maritain, Trapani tells us, is never consistent with terminology, particularly given numerous 
revisions of his works. See PBC, p. 90. 
41 CI, p. 67. 
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will express itself in the things of sense, is what we properly call 
POETRY. Metaphysics also pursues the spiritual, but in a very 
different way, and with a very different formal object. Whereas 
it keeps to the line of knowledge and the contemplation of truth, 
poetry keeps to the line of making and the delight procured by 
beauty.42 
 
For Maritain, we know, free art must be beautiful art, by definition. There must, 
then, as he suggests in the passage just quoted, be an underlying relationship 
between Poetic Knowledge whose operative principle is the translation of 
intentional emotion into artworks and the beautiful, which is beyond utility. Here 
we arrive at the dynamic between meaningfulness and beauty and the 
analogical relationship between artistic experience and mystical experience.   
 
4. Beauty, the Splendor of all the Transcendentals 
 
What is the quality of the intentional emotions in an artwork? Why do we value 
artworks as distinct from other objects? Maritain asserts that the artist creates 
beautiful objects by definition, and, moreover, that beauty is valuable in itself. 
Some elaboration and exploration of this element of Maritain’s definition of art 
is needed by way of defining the beautiful, describing how the artist pursues it 
in relation to Poetic Knowledge and also seeing how this key element of 
Maritain’s thesis stands up to objections.  
 Maritain follows Aquinas in his declaration that ‘the “beautiful” is 
something pleasant to apprehend’.43 Now, while ideas can be beautiful, the 
beautiful specific to human beings as material-spiritual composite creatures is 
accessible through the senses. However, sensual delight only accompanies 
an intellectual delight upon the perception of the beautiful. For Maritain, as for 
Aquinas, the beautiful consists in three properties: ‘integrity’, ‘proportion’ or 
‘harmony’ and ‘clarity’ or ‘radiance’, with the latter encompassing the former 
two and denoting the intelligibility and splendor of the form of the beautiful 
                                                 
42 AS, pp. 96–97. 
43 Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Ia-IIae, 27, 1, ad. 3. 
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object.44 These properties are intelligible through the senses in virtue of the 
spiritual-material composite nature of human beings and the many layers of 
consciousness such that the senses can be called ‘intelligentiated’. For 
Maritain, when the mind recognizes matter so intelligibly arranged as to be 
beautiful, it recognizes its own nature and the ‘intellective appetite’ or 
‘intellectual appetite’, which seeks after intelligibility is satisfied and rejoices in 
delightful contemplation (gaudium).45 It is because of this that the intellect, in 
what is the creative impulse of its creative element, longs to create the 
beautiful, as the process of creating the beautiful and the object itself are 
‘cleared of all adventitious elements’ and is thus a matter of pure intellectual 
delight, hence the name of the free arts.46 
 However, what some find beautiful others do not, and this apparent 
relativity constitutes one possible objection to Maritain’s thesis that artists 
produce the beautiful by definition. For Maritain, that ‘beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder’ is a half-truth. Beauty is clearly an object of universal experience 
and delight, which can, I suggest, be contrasted with its opposites, the 
disgusting and morally repugnant (the latter bearing upon the relationship 
between the beautiful and the good, which I shall touch on later in discussing 
Poetic Contemplation and Tsakiridou’s notion of Maritain’s ‘mystical 
aesthetics’). For now, let us also note that there are things which are always 
beautiful for everyone, such as a sunset or a rainforest. For that reason, beauty 
is only relative to the nature and purpose of an artefact or performance—an 
artwork. For Maritain, beauty is a transcendental, a property of Being as Being, 
which is God.47 Beauty is a divine name, and while the perception of beauty 
is not immediate contact with God, it is for Maritain a participation in a reflection 
of God, natural beauty manifest in nature or artwork being a participation in the 
divine beauty. Maritain writes: 
 
Analogous concepts are predicated of God pre-eminently; in 
Him the perfection they designate exists in a ‘formal-eminent’ 
                                                 
44 AS, pp. 24–25. 
45 PBC, p. 132; Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 535. 
46 CI, p. 40; Haynes, ‘Jacques Maritain’s Definition of Art’, p. 535. 
47 Ibid., pp. 25–26. 
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manner. . . . God is their ‘sovereign analogue’ and they are to 
be met with again in things only as a dispersed and prismatized 
reflection of the countenance of God. Thus Beauty is one of the 
divine names. 
 God is beautiful. He is the most beautiful of beings. . . . 
He is beautiful through Himself and in Himself, beautiful 
absolutely.  
 He is beauty itself, because He gives beauty to all 
created beings, according to the particular nature of each, and 
because He is the cause of all consonance and all brightness.48 
 
Here Maritain is not defining God simply as what we call the beautiful, such 
that if something is beautiful, it is God, or that God is whatever is beautiful, for 
this would confuse the distinction between creatures and the Creator and 
identify God as the genus of the beautiful—an idea which Aquinas explicitly 
rejects for the reason that as pure Act, God is beyond any genus.49 It would 
also be to forget the distinction between esse and ens, and, in Heidegger’s 
terms, the ontological and the ontic, the distinction between Being and beings. 
The transcendentals of the true, the good and the beautiful are, as we have 
seen, analogies of the perfection of the divine essence, which can never be 
defined, even while, according to Maritain, it can be partially and analogously 
expressed and experienced in the things of the world and, as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, in morally good acts and love between two human 
persons.  
 It seems, then, that here we are very much in the realm of ontotheology, 
given that God, as Beauty, serves as both the formal and causal ground of that 
which is beautiful. What was ascertained in the previous chapter was that if 
metaphysics is somehow to be overcome in Maritain, it cannot, as Caputo 
makes clear with regard to Aquinas, be overcome by operating on the level of 
Maritain’s metaphysics—a metaphysics in which the master concept of esse 
and its attendant principles of transcendental being, analogical being and 
participation reign. Rather, the overcoming of metaphysics must be sought in 
a deconstruction of Maritain’s metaphysics, seeking out ‘possibilities’ in its 
operative principles. This methodological condition being granted, we recall 
                                                 
48 PBC, p. 151. 
49 Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ, Ia, 3, 5 s.c.; Ibid., 3, 7 co. 
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that it was by means of esse and intellectus that Caputo made the case for a 
rapprochement between Aquinas and Heidegger, through Eckhart’s 
radicalization of the terms following biographical considerations of Aquinas’ 
apophatic mystical experience. My intention in this chapter is to conduct a 
similar deconstruction of Maritain’s metaphysics but to do in reverse order, 
presenting the operative principles of Maritain’s philosophy of art and the artist 
before having recourse to the other sources and seeing how the principles 
elucidated are hermeneutically transformed. With this in mind, it is worth noting 
what Maritain says in a little-known lecture called ‘Man’s Approach to God’: 
 
What is signified by our analogous concepts pertains to God, 
and in a better way than to things. But the manner in which we 
conceive them, with the limitations it inevitably involves . . . the 
modus significandi does in no way pertain to God. God is truly 
ipsum esse per se subsistens . . . but He does not suffer any of 
the circumscribing marks implied in our manner of conceiving 
Being, insofar as we conceive Being as distinct from Goodness, 
Truth, or Beauty.50 
 
Maritain here affirms the Thomistic doctrine of absolute divine transcendence 
or ‘divine simplicity’, the doctrine that God’s essence, as self-subsistent Being, 
cannot be contained in human concepts that are formulated on the basis of 
comparison and composition. He continues even more forcefully: 
 
God exists, but He does not exist as do any of the existing 
things. God is good and just and merciful, God knows, God 
loves, but He is not good, just, or merciful. He does not know or 
love as any of the beings are or do which have taught us what 
is goodness, justice, mercy, knowledge or love. In the very 
degree to which they make the divine essence known to us, our 
concepts, while keeping their proper meaning, are absorbed 
into its abyss. In God, what is signified by them breaks loose—
we don’t know how—from our manner of conceiving.51 
 
With respect to the present discussion on art, beauty, and Poetic Knowledge, 
such a strongly apophatic statement totally precludes any reduction of the 
                                                 
50 MAG, p. 30. 
51 Ibid., pp. 30–31. 
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divine to instances of the beautiful or aesthetic delight, for God is their source 
and in His essence, absolutely unnamable, and even the analogous concepts 
of the transcendentals leave the divine reality as ‘uncontained and 
uncircumscribed’ by them.52 This suggests severe limitations on predications 
and any knowledge of God whatsoever, with the apparent paradox that the 
transcendentals, while subsisting in analogical relation to God also do not 
touch upon his essence. God is the source of everything beautiful as their 
supreme analogate, even while He remains beyond any concept of beauty. 
This is a point to which I will return later in the light of reflections on Bloy, 
Rouault, St. John of the Cross, and the convergence of the vocations of the 
artist and the mystic.  
 One of the most important principles in Maritain’s philosophy of art is 
that as the source of the perfections which inhere in things, such as beauty, 
God can be indirectly apprehended in natural features and artworks in which 
‘integrity’, ‘proportion’ and ‘radiance’ are present. What precisely these terms 
themselves mean Maritain admits is a difficult question, but he claims that 
radiance is ‘the most important’, even if it is ‘also the most difficult to explain.’53 
He states that the scholastics referred to radiance as the ‘splendor of the form’ 
(splendor formae) and that the form, as the ontological principle ‘which 
determines things in their essences and qualities, and through which they are, 
and exist, and act’, amounts to a revelation of the ‘splendor of the secrets of 
being radiating into intelligence’54 (hence the form of a thing is an ‘intelligible’, 
that which enables us to gain knowledge about a thing). However, ‘The 
Schoolmen [the scholastics], when they defined beauty by the radiance of the 
form, in reality defined it by the radiance of a mystery.’ 55  While form is 
intelligible, that which is beautiful is form which is infinitely intelligible, and is 
therefore never known in its entirety, even as it is known in part. 
 We can see that as with the other transcendentals beauty is 
omnipresent but also subject to ‘proper proportionality’:56 just as everything in 
                                                 
52 Ibid., p. 30. 
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creation is good and good in its own way(s), there are no fixed meanings of 
beauty with regard to artworks. Rather, each artwork is beautiful on its own 
terms, subject to varying tastes, education and abilities of aesthetic 
appreciation of its audience. From the above considerations, we can see that 
Maritain affirms the ontological and epistemological objectivity of beauty, and 
while affirming difference of taste, he qualifies this with respect to genuine 
aesthetic experience engendered by intentional emotion as opposed to 
feigned aesthetic experience engendered by sentimentality.  
 As an inexhaustible transcendental, beauty can be expressed in an 
infinite number of ways by artists. Maritain vehemently disagrees with the view 
that art is Christian only in virtue of its explicit subject-matter or theme, 
affirming in Art and Scholasticism that truly Christian art is defined not by its 
material content or subject-matter, but rather that ‘the work will be Christian in 
proportion as the love is alive. Let there be no mistake: it is the actuality of 
love, contemplation in charity, which is here required. A Christian work would 
have the artist, as man, a saint.’57 What this means precisely is that the work 
be defined by that which is lovable—that the purpose for which and the method 
by which an artwork is made is able to be loved. We shall soon see in clear 
detail that the lovable is beauty, or the beautiful. Maritain believes Rouault to 
best exemplify the quality of the beautiful in his work and proclaims that, insofar 
as the artist creates the beautiful, which can be instantiated in an infinite 
number of artworks, they can be a co-creator with God.58  
 As will become increasingly clear, as both his thinking and religious life 
matures, Maritain does what all mystics do, which, to quote William Harmless, 
is to ‘gradually bring to speech their personal experiences of mystery and their 
distinctive vision of a God-drenched world’,59 for God shines through all that 
is beautiful. The implication for a Heideggerian critique is that the beautiful is 
not (and cannot) be understood by Maritain solely in a metaphysical or 
ontological manner. The beautiful must first be apprehended in a pre-
metaphysical and predominantly affective manner—an experience which 
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58 MAG, pp. 24–25. 
59 M, p. 236. 
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Thomist metaphysical machinery covers over as Maritain begins to 
systematize his thoughts on beauty in Art and Scholasticism, and continues to 
do so into later works. In any case, with respect to the question posed earlier 
about whether, for Maritain, genuine art needed to conform to explicit codes of 
composition to express a Christian conception of truth and beauty, we are now 
in a position to answer in the negative. 
 This qualification on the condition of the necessary presence of beauty 
in an artistic artefact or performance opens Maritain’s thesis of art as a virtue 
of making beautiful works up to a second objection. It could be argued that 
many ‘artworks’ are, in fact, ugly, disturbing, and some are disgusting or 
grotesque. In this connection we might mention Piero Manzoni’s Artist’s Shit 
(1961) or many of Fred Einaudi’s paintings, which often feature what would 
otherwise be an innocent and uplifting scene but which include some horrific 
or obscene element, such as a child in forest holding a mutilated embryo or an 
artist painting a landscape which includes a woman and a swan having sexual 
intercourse. Clearly, some of these works are also designed to shock. Again, 
following Marcel Duchamp and Arthur Danto, many today believe that 
something can not be beautiful but still be an instance of art, and this, I 
suggest, presents a potential problem for Maritain’s classical thesis, especially 
given the fact the that he did not consider give much consideration to such 
artistic and theoretical developments in his reflections on art. If the artist 
produces beautiful works by definition for Maritain, these works seem to be 
counter-examples to Maritain’s definition of art. What follows, then, is an 
application and extension of Maritain’s principles for an adequate response. 
 What can be said first of all is that artefacts or performances made 
primarily to shock are not made for their own sake and therefore do not belong 
to the free arts. In such cases, the work serves the practical purpose of 
shocking its audience and is thereby not created spontaneously. It is therefore 
analogous to other kinds of work created for practical purposes, such as 
propaganda or commercial publicity stunts. This certainly seems to be the case 
with works such as Marc Quinn’s Self—a series of frozen sculptures, beginning 
in 1991, of the artist’s own head, made entirely out of his own blood. And while 
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Andres Serrano’s 1985 Blood Cross—which is a photograph of a blood-filled 
cross—may be granted some religious message connected to the Passion of 
Christ, his 1987 Piss Christ and Piss Light are photographs of crucifixes 
submerged in the artist’s own urine. Such works, which are only two instances 
of many in which the artist submerges objects of religious significance in his 
own body fluids, are clearly designed to shock. Any attempt to find intended 
meanings and messages beyond this immediately strike one as forced and, at 
best, disingenuous, regardless of the fact that Serrano has been the recipient 
of artistic awards for such works. 
 Let us observe that being shocked by these artworks is a visceral affair, 
and an appeal to gut reactions, biological impulse and base emotions, such 
that there is no ‘meaning’ or ‘point’ to it. In this sense, an artwork that is 
shocking is analogous to a merely aesthetically or sensually pleasing artefact 
or performance in that it, as Trapani writes, ‘like fireworks, dazzles the 
beholder’ and ‘consort[s] with the spectacular or, in the realm of the emotions 
. . . are given by brute or raw emotions, depicted or aroused.’60 There is, of 
course, art that shocks incidentally and art that is intended to shock. Indeed, 
we might refer to both Bloy’s and Rouault’s work as examples. Maritain clearly 
says that the works of these two artists are, nevertheless, imbued with 
intentional emotion—emotion which serves to invoke the divine and its 
redeeming power. Bloy’s hyperbolic language and Rouault’s misshapen 
subjects are intended to serve this purpose. What can be said, then, is that 
‘art’ that merely shocks is therefore not primarily concerned with intentional 
emotion. These considerations permit us to reject it as an instance of free art.  
 Second, concerning the ugly, I would argue that Maritain’s definition is 
broad enough to accommodate most examples of ugly work in the free arts, 
given his doctrine of proper proportionality and the free development of the 
rules of art. For example, what is superficially ugly, such as an anatomical 
deformity can also be beautiful, in the way that a person bears it, changes, and 
becomes a stronger, perhaps more compassionate person. This also applies 
to the audience of the artwork insofar as they contemplate the disfigurement 
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and suffering that the artist wishes to convey. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that it is precisely one of the purposes of the artist to bring out such beauty. In 
this regard, Maritain takes Rouault to be a pre-eminent example in his 
‘searching for himself . . . his own inner harmony’61 through expressing the 
darkness and suffering he perceived in the world and in himself. Again, even 
in Rouault’s work, which first shocked audiences with a style and with forms 
completely at odds with the aesthetic tastes of the time, intentional emotion is 
present, and strikingly so, making Rouault’s early work at once beautiful and 
disturbing, highly abstract and yet full of messages of universal appeal: human 
suffering and mercy, fallenness and the possibility of redemption.  
 It therefore seems that work that exhibits the most extreme ugliness—
the disgusting or the grotesque—is the main challenge for Maritain’s definition, 
and to which I finally turn. What works could be regarded as instances of 
grotesque art? Today, popular culture and entertainment—especially music 
and television shows, movies and video games—are saturated with extreme 
violence and gore, as well as with highly offensive language. The Saw movie 
trilogy is one example among innumerable examples of a work of popular 
entertainment that exhibits such phenomena. If we seek examples among 
those considered to be artists, works in the category of ‘body horror’, such as 
Peter-Joel Witkin’s 2007 Ars Morendi—which is a photograph of a nude 
woman lying among decomposing, severed human heads—seems to one 
clear case of art that is intended to disgust. Others are James R. Ford’s Bogey 
Ball (2002–2004), consisting of a ball of nasal mucus, and Jonathan Payne’s 
Fleshlettes series. 
 I noted earlier that Poetry is natural to all, and it explains how both an 
artist is inspired in their work and how an audience appreciates it. It was said 
that the intellect, when free, longs to create the beautiful, because the beautiful 
is a manifestation of Being as Being—an inexhaustible wellspring of 
intelligibility in which the mind, spontaneously and non-self-consciously, 
delights. However, concerning the Poetry that is a prior condition for the artist’s 
Poetic Knowledge, Maritain writes that ‘Poetry stands in the line . . . of the 
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delight procured by beauty’.62 This quote, which seems to place the natural 
ability of the appreciation of the beautiful on equal terms to Poetry as seeing 
the hidden meaning in things, suggests that a proper mental or spiritual state 
is required to be able to see beauty in the world in oneself, and thus create 
and appreciate art. It also suggests, as Trapani says, that the relationship 
between Poetry and beauty is one of mutual dependence and presence, that 
‘where there is one, there also will the other be found.’63 
 On the basis of these considerations, just as for Aquinas and Maritain 
evil is a privation of the good, I suggest that the grotesque, in its generation in 
the mind of the artist, is a privation of peace of mind and right emotion, 
materialized in artefacts or performances and best characterized in this regard, 
like shocking work, by our psychosomatic detestation of it. Hence the 
grotesque or ‘disturbing’ is characterized by both sensual and psychological 
revolting properties. If, as a cognitive activity, Poetry is a kind of contemplation 
of the ‘secret meaning’ of things and experiences in the world and a unification 
of our mind and those things through intentional emotion, one has to admit that 
there are healthy, good thoughts about the world and ourselves, and states of 
mind which are natural and desirable, in contradistinction to disturbing or 
upsetting thoughts about the world and ourselves. This is not to deny the 
necessary existence of the latter in the world or in human life, but it is to assert 
that the latter should not be dominant, and if they are, this is an unnatural and 
veritably unfree state of mind. As I write elsewhere, ‘Extreme ugliness of the 
mind we recognize as undesirable and senseless, and the senseless—such 
as sentimentality—in art we recognize as ugly.’64  
 Of course, as with the beautiful, there are no hard and fast rules for 
determining what the threshold for unacceptable degrees of ugliness in cases 
of shocking, disturbing and grotesque ‘artworks’ might be—at which point we 
could easily designate a work as ‘merely’ grotesque, etc. Nevertheless, if 
artistic creation is fundamentally free, as Maritain claims, it is ordered to beauty 
and delight, and smothered to death by sentimentality, practical concerns, 
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repulsion, self-doubt, despair and neuroses, which is why grotesque ‘artworks’ 
are never treasured as beautiful artworks are. ‘What is most real in the world 
thus escapes the notice of a darkened soul’, writes Maritain.65  Whatever 
grotesque artefacts and performances are, they cannot be instances of free 
art, and this, I suggest, is as far as we can go in making reliable lines of 
demarcation for what genuine art ought to be, in the light of contemporary 
artistic trends.  
 With this we come to the unity of Poetry and Beauty, and in this 
connection I will quote Maritain at length. 
 
Poetry, as distinct from art, has no object. I mean to say that in 
the case of [P]oetry, there is nothing to which the creativity of 
the spirit tends so as to be specified and formed, nothing which 
originally plays with regard to this creativity a specifying or 
formally determining part; nothing, then, which may exercise 
command or mastery over it. In [P]oetry, there is only the urge 
to give expression to that knowledge which is poetic intuition, 
and in which both the subjectivity of the poet and the realities of 
the world awake obscurely in a single awakening . . . .  
 But the free creativity of the intellect, as soon as it comes 
into play, cannot help tending, by virtue of an implied necessity, 
toward that in which the intellect has its ultimate exultation, in 
other words, that which causes the pleasure or delight of the 
intellect. Thus beauty is not the object of [P]oetry, it is—here I 
am groping for an appropriate word; I shall say that beauty is—
the transcendental correlative of [P]oetry. Beauty is not an 
object, even infinite (as Being is for science), which specifies 
[P]oetry, and to which [P]oetry is subordinate. But beauty is a 
necessary correlative for [P]oetry. It is like its native climate and 
the air it naturally breathes in, nay more, it is as life and 
existence are for a runner running toward the goal—an end 
beyond the end. For [Poetry] there is no goal, no specifying end. 
But there is an end beyond. Beauty is the necessary correlative 
and end beyond any end of [P]oetry.66     
 
We can now see why for Maritain the artist creates the beautiful, by definition, 
for the beautiful is that which the intellect most desires. As we saw in the 
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introduction to this thesis, for Aquinas, the Beatific Vision, as knowledge of the 
essence of God and the ultimate end of human life, is the fulfilment of 
intellectus as intuitive and unitative. As such it is primarily cognitive or 
intellectual, rather than affective, for it does not rely on the mediation of the 
senses for composition of its content as knowledge.67 Trapani argues that 
Maritain follows Aquinas in this regard, and that for Maritain, ‘our ultimate 
happiness and fulfilment is obtained through the satisfaction of the natural 
desire of the intellect for beholding the fullness of Being.’68 I think one can 
understand this notion of the satisfaction of the natural desire of the intellect 
by the beautiful in the following way. The intellect desires what is most real, 
and the beautiful, unlike the merely sentimental or the grotesque, as the 
shining forth of the infinite mystery and analogously manifesting Being of 
everything, gives us the opportunity to delight and contemplate the mystery of 
Being itself. This is why Maritain says that ‘if poetic intuition is really expressed 
it will inevitably be expressed in beauty, even without meaning it, for any real 
expression of poetic intuition derives from it integrity, consonance [or 
proportionality], and radiance.’69 Put simply, the beautiful is lovable. All this 
amounts to saying that for Maritain, the hidden source of art is Poetry, which 
aims for the beautiful, and the beautiful is what is true. 
 Coming now to the subject of the relationship between art and the 
mystical, it is because this contemplation of the beautiful, corresponding to the 
cognitive rather than the creative aspect of the intellect, is not merely an 
instance of sensual pleasure but first of all an intellectual delight, that Trapani 
chooses to take up a notion that Maritain rarely used and never developed: 
‘Poetic Contemplation’.70 According to Trapani, Poetic Contemplation bears 
an analogous relationship to supernatural contemplation or mystical 
experience in that it is a species of contemplation of Being through the 
analogate of the beautiful, but unlike supernatural contemplation in love, does 
not have God in His very essence as its object and, as such, does not consist 
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of direct, immediate communion with God. ‘For supernatural contemplation’, 
says Trapani, the object ‘is the infused nature of the Divine itself, Eternal and 
Abiding Love, while the natural contemplation of beauty, it is that manifestation 
of the Divine that shrines through God’s glorious creation, or in participation 
with the spiritual nature of the human artist’s own creative Self, it shines forth 
in a bona fide work of art.’71 Trapani’s development of Poetic Contemplation 
is a useful and legitimate extension of Maritain’s philosophy art, for it clarifies 
the role of the beautiful in knowing God, not just at the point of the production 
of an artwork, about which Maritain seems mostly concerned, but at the 
ontologically prior stage of Poetry.  
 What needs to be added other than the fact that both Poetic 
Contemplation and supernatural contemplation are two species of 
contemplation of Being, is that they both share at least one of William James’ 
‘marks’ of mystical experience, which is that of passivity. We know that for 
Maritain supernatural mystical experience is the result of the gratuitous gift of 
the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit: ‘He it is Who, when we 
have come under the habitual regime of the gifts of His Spirit, takes pains to 
complete our purification and to raise us, by the ways of passivity, to the 
heights of contemplation.’72 But the production of a beautiful artwork, as we 
have seen, also requires that the artwork be produced as an end in itself, and 
this is why the free arts are to be distinguished from the useful arts. Not only 
that, but the very ground of both artistic production and appreciation, which is 
Poetry, lies at the ‘edge of the unsconscious’, with the implication that it can 
never be reduced to list of items of knowledge or a recipe for repetition. ‘It is 
precisely to the extent to which [P]oetry is useless and disengaged that 
[P]oetry is necessary’, Maritain writes, ‘because it brings to men a vision of 
reality-beyond-reality, an experience of the secret meaning of things, an 
obscure insight into the universe of beauty’.73 Thus we have another reason 
to consider poetic experience to be an analogy of supernatural mystical 
experience, but also a sort of preparation for the latter in virtue of a passive 
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opening of oneself to the movements and inspirations gifted to us by reality.      
 It is in virtue of the fact that Poetry essentially correlates to beauty and 
in virtue of the transcendental nature of beauty as pointing to that which lies 
beyond it, that the Poet, Maritain says, ‘completes the world of creation; he 
cooperates in divine balancings, he moves mysteries about; he is in natural 
sympathy with the secret powers that play about in the universe. A slide down 
the inclined plane of heaven, a push from grace: the sleeper will change sides, 
and will wake up with God.’74 The tendency of the free arts is to transcend the 
division between aesthetic beauty in the sense of sensually pleasing qualities 
and transcendental beauty as a shining forth of the divine. God, argues 
Maritain, is implicitly known and sought after in the beautiful, much in the same 
way as in experiences of the moral good—whether performed by oneself or 
witnessed by another person—as we saw in the previous chapter in the 
example of choosing the good as one’s existential anchor. We see here that 
the moral and the artistic modes of connatural knowledge correspond to the 
transcendentals of the good and the beautiful. 
 ‘In the last analysis’, Maritain writes, ‘all genuine [P]oetry is religious. 
Even if a [P]oet has no conceptual knowledge of God, even if he is or believes 
he is an atheist, it is toward the primary source of Beauty that in actual fact his 
spiritual effort is orientated. And thus . . . he will naturally be led by poetry to 
some conscious notion and awareness of the existence of that God at Whom 
he is unconsciously looking, in and through his art and his work.75 Not only 
this, but the same can be said for the audience of an artwork imbued with 
beauty as they apprehend the intentional emotion in the artwork and are led to 
participate in Poetic Contemplation. As with moral goodness and love, in which 
persons serve as ‘revealers of Being’, here the artist, in exercising their virtue 
of art, also serves as ‘revealer of Being.’ Raïssa Maritain herself writes, long 
before Jacques became acquainted with the philosophy of Aquinas, that ‘It is 
because we read the poignant pages of this journal [of Bloy’s] that we dared 
to write to Léon Bloy and send him a small sum of money.’76 Maritain himself 
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was led to Catholicism through the free arts. As Maritain writes in the 
introduction to Pilgrim of the Absolute, a collection of Bloy’s letters, ‘Bloy draws 
. . . souls out toward the light by very reason of the union in his work between 
the tangible and the spiritual.’77 And in this connection Bloy wrote to Henriette 
Charasson: ‘Your love of the Beautiful shows you to have a lack of certainty 
which cannot help make your suffer. You have too much insight to hope that 
works of art will be able to satisfy your heart. You know very well that beyond 
the masterpieces there is a burning hearth of Love from which artists must 
necessarily draw their inspiration, without ever becoming satisfied, and that 
they cannot, even with genius, give more than a very faint echo, a most pallid 
reflection of that thunder and that furnace.’78 
 With this, I suggest that Maritain’s doctrine of the transcendental nature 
of beauty, leading the soul to God, was possible only in virtue of his own 
personal experience through Bloy. As Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis says regarding 
Bloy, ‘Jacques Maritain owed the shape of his religious destiny to the 
“phenomenon of Léon Bloy” just as he owed the shape of his intellectual 
destiny to Saint Thomas. Indeed, Jacques found Thomas’s love of objective 
truth anticipated in the very unphilosophical Bloy’.79 With this, I move to the 
subject of the relationship between the vocations of the artist and the mystic, 
using Bloy and Rouault as case studies.  
 
5. The Artist and the Mystic 
 
Quoting Garrigou-Lagrange, Maritain teaches that ‘it is at once on the 
theological virtues, supernatural in their essence, and on the gifts of the Holy 
Spirit, “doubly supernatural—supernatural not only in their essence, like the 
theological virtues, but in their mode of action,” that infused contemplation and 
the mystical life depend.’80 We have seen that Poetry, as correlative to the 
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transcendental of the beautiful, is not to be identified with this infused 
contemplation. In virtue of its sharing in the contemplation of the mysteries of 
Being, and, as Maritain writes, ‘because it detects the spiritual in things’ and is 
a ‘knowledge of the mirrors of God’, Poetic experience serves as an ‘obscure 
and vulnerable beginning, not of mystical experience, but of the natural 
knowledge of God.’81 Here however, I intend to demonstrate that at least in 
the cases of the Catholic artists such as Léon Bloy and St. John of the Cross, 
there is a unity of infused (mystical) contemplation and Poetic experience 
which Maritain did not elaborate upon, but which nevertheless has radical 
implications for how we can understand the mystical in both his life and 
philosophy. 
 I want to ask two different questions, which Trapani does not address, 
but to which the notion of Poetic Contemplation points and which the two 
questions posed at the beginning of the chapter foreshadow: what the precise 
relationship is between the religious (in this case Catholic) artist and the mystic 
is, and what the relationship is between religious Poetic Contemplation and 
supernatural contemplation. Here I use the examples of Bloy and Rouault to 
suggest a blurring of boundaries and overlapping of concepts when it comes 
to natural and the supernatural contemplation, Poetic Contemplation and 
mystical experience. This blurring of boundaries, I argue, supports my 
contention that in Maritain’s life and writings, there is an immanent mysticism. 
 
(i) Bloy as Mystic 
 
Maritain writes that an artwork is ‘always nourished by the experience of the 
man’. 82  We have seen evidence of this pertaining to all three cases of 
beautiful, ugly and grotesque art. We see that the artist’s psychological and 
moral character influences their work for better or worse. In the case of Bloy, 
though, Maritain reflects: 
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In him [Bloy] were confronted as in their pure state, as if outside 
the climate of human reason—whether it take on the clothing of 
philosophy or the clothing of prudence—the privileges of the 
Christian and those of the Poet. The theological virtues and the 
gifts of the Holy Ghost planted in a profound and intuitive soul 
famished for the divine vision, a soul whom genius oppressed; 
a poor human heart preyed upon by all that is superhuman in 
the divine requirements, and by all that is inhuman in the 
despotism of art; the great storms, the nights, the tears of a 
most harsh mysticism in an atmosphere of violence and 
passion.83 
 
As well as Poetic Knowledge enabling Bloy to use the tangible as signs of the 
divine, Maritain ascribes to him the fundamental elements of mysticism, which 
are the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In speaking of ‘divine 
requirements’ and the ‘despotism of art’, Maritain seems to bring together the 
moral and spiritual demands of the mystic and the moral and psychological 
demands of the virtue of art as that produced for the sake of the beautiful, 
suggesting, in the case of Bloy, a unity of vocation, with the mystical 
characterizing his writings and making those writings possible. In my view, this 
is quite remarkable, because everywhere in his philosophical writings Maritain 
makes a strict distinction between the artistic vocation and the mystical 
vocation, between the natural species of contemplation which is poetic 
experience and the supernatural contemplation of God in love, which, in this 
life, is the sole preserve of mystics.  
 With this unity of vocation, what is particularly interesting is the mode of 
expression and the role of suffering in Bloy’s life and work. With regard to the 
former, Maritain has this to say: 
 
‘I only understand what I guess,’ Bloy would often say. Having 
no taste for the rational discursus or the demonstrative virtues 
of the intellect, backing with the three theological virtues and 
the mere organism of the infused gifts the most powerful gifts 
of intuition, his natural habitat was dissatisfaction, in the 
intellectual order as in all the others. Disconsolate at not 
possessing now on this earth the vision of the divine glory, he 
did not use human language, as do metaphysicians and 
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theologians in their formulas, to try to express, according to the 
imperfect mode of our concepts, whatever we are able to know 
of transcendent reality, but on the contrary he used it to try to 
evoke that which in this reality goes beyond the mode of our 
concepts, and remains unknown to us. In other words, he made 
use of the signs of language and reason only to make up for 
being deprived here below of the beatific vision—which 
precisely no sign will ever be able to express—and his words 
tended less to state truths directly than to procure, as he used 
to say, that feeling of mystery and of its actual presence. As he 
used reason and intellectual speculation according to a mode 
more experimental than demonstrative, to express reality in the 
very darkness that joins it to this feeling, the writers among 
whom Léon Bloy can suitably be classed necessarily make use 
of the parables and hyperboles to which mystical expression 
has recourse.84 
 
We see here two important things. The first is that Maritain regards Bloy as 
possessing the three theological virtues necessary for infused contemplation. 
This is not an isolated or one-off affirmation, for we read in Maritain preface to 
Georges Cattui’s Léon Bloy that ‘the true secret of Léon Bloy is the intensity of 
the three theological virtues in him, the absolute firmness and ador of his faith, 
in a soul belonging to poet and prophet’.85  
 The second important insight we gain from what Maritain says is that he 
classifies Bloy’s literary language along the same lines as mystical language, 
which, as we saw in the introduction, is for Maritain markedly different to that 
of ordinary propositions and especially of metaphysical propositions in virtue 
of the use of the symbolic and overstatement to convey existentially important 
truths. ‘For example’, writes Maritain, ‘the mystic, in describing his experience 
of created being is before God, would say that the creature is nothing, that it is 
nothing at all. Yes, but these expressions have a mystical, not an ontological 
meaning.’86 In this connection, I will quote Bloy: 
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At bottom what should you do to avoid being an idiot or a swine? 
Merely this: you should do something great, you should lay 
aside all the foolishness of a more or less long existence, you 
should become resigned to the fact you will seem ridiculous to 
a race of janitors and bureaucrats if you are to enter the service 
of Splendor. Then you will know what it means to be the friend 
of God. 
 The Friend of God! I am on the verge of tears when I 
think of it. No longer do you know on what block to lay your 
head, no longer do you know where you are, where you should 
go. You would like to tear out your heart, so hotly does it burn, 
and you cannot look upon a creature without trembling with 
love. You would like to drag yourself on your knees from church 
to church, with rotten fish strung from your neck, as said the 
sublime Angela of Foligno. And when you leave these churches 
after speaking to God as a lover speaks to his beloved, you 
appear like those poorly designed and poorly painted figures on 
the Way of the Cross, who walk and gesticulate, against a 
background of gold. All the thoughts that had been pent up 
unknown within you, in the caverns of your heart, run out in 
tumult suddenly like virgins who are mutilated, blind, starving, 
nude and sobbing. Ah! Surely at such moments the most 
horrendous of all martyrdoms would be embraced, and with 
what rapture.87 
 
Leiva-Merikakis writes that, taking this striking passage above as one example 
among many, in Bloy’s writings, ‘both the fury and the lyricism are vehicles of 
love. What gives . . . all his works, a fundamental unity is this passionate love 
of God, what Jacques would later call amour fou (mad, frenzied love)’88 and 
this notion of the ‘friend of God’ that Bloy speaks of, I have claimed, is 
important for Maritain. When listing the ‘practical ways’ of coming to knowledge 
of God, he lists the ‘testimony of the friends of God’ along with good moral acts 
and Poetic experience.89 His brief discussion concerning the friends of God in 
Approaches to God highlights, quoting Bergson, the role of the saints in 
pointing us to a transcendent meaning of life by means of their service done in 
and through a love which is beyond measure,90 which, as we saw in another 
context, Maritain called ‘supra-moral’.  
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 Friends of God serve as what I call ‘revealers of Being’ in Maritain’s life 
and work, and this is most clearly the case with Bloy, whose personal example 
and literary work had a profound influence on Maritain. Il n’y a qu’une tristesse: 
‘the only sadness is not to be a saint’, reads the last sentence of Bloy’s novel 
La Femme Pauvre, a proclamation celebrated by Maritain in his reflections on 
Bloy.91 As we have seen, Maritain’s attraction and eventual conversion to 
Catholicism were not primarily philosophical but existential, and the result of a 
desperate search for the meaning of Being. It is, then, the mysterious power 
of the Catholic faith to provide such a meaning, through the medium of Bloy’s 
example of Catholic piety and lay mysticism that led Maritain to become 
Catholic. And here we come to the necessary part played by mystery in 
mysticism or supernatural contemplation. In this connection, and concerning 
how the young Maritains came to regard their first meeting with Bloy, Raïssa 
relates: 
 
What he was revealing to them is not capable of repetition in 
words: the tender of love of Christian brotherhood, that kind of 
trembling from mercy and fear which seizes, in the presence of 
another soul, a soul marked with the love of God. Bloy seemed 
to us the very opposite of other men—who hide their 
deficiencies in the things of the spirit as well as so many 
invisible crimes under the carefully maintained daubing of the 
social virtues. Instead of being a whited sepulcher like the 
Pharisees of all times, he was a charred, blackened cathedral. 
The white part was inside, deep in the tabernacle.92 
 
‘“Mystery is luminous and impenetrable”’, Maritain quotes Bloy.93 The mystery 
of the personal example of the mystic corresponds to the mysterious, 
sometimes baffling notions and turns of phrase of mystical language. Another 
aspect of mystical language in this connection, in writers such as St. John of 
the Cross, Meister Eckhart and the anonymous author of the Cloud of 
Unknowing, for example, is the use of negative propositions about God in order 
to speak about Him (via negativa), or refusing to ascribe any knowledge of 
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God in His essence whatsoever (apohasis). Bloy also exhibits this aspect of 
Catholic mysticism in calling the main character of his early 1887 novel Le 
Désespéré (‘The Despairing’) ‘Marchenoir’ (meaning ‘the one who walks in 
darkness’). And in a letter to Maritain in the early days of their friendship: 
 
You are seeking, you say. O professor of philosophy, O 
Cartesian, you believe, with Malebranche, that truth is 
something one seeks! . . . . I declare that I never sought or found 
anything, unless one wishes to describe as a discovery the fact 
of tripping blindly over a threshold and being thrown flat on 
one’s stomach into the House of Light.94 
 
‘All his [Bloy’s] literary efforts’, Maritain says, ‘consisted in projecting in the 
mirror of enigmas and similitudes the rays of this substantially luminous light.’95 
Having seen examples of Bloy’s literary techniques, what are the themes and 
subject-matter of the novels and journals serving as rays of the divine light? 
As we see in Le Désespéré, Mon Journal, La Femme Pauvre and his letters, 
they are poverty, spiritual anxiety and purity, and suffering. These three mirror 
and give expression to Bloy’s life, who saw his poverty and suffering as a 
necessary part of his Poetic vocation: ‘Man has places in his heart which do 
not yet exist and into which suffering enters so that they may come to be. I 
would never finish if I wanted to describe the marvelous effects of suffering on 
man’s faculties and on his heart. It is the handmaiden of creation.’96 Bloy also 
sees suffering as a necessary part of his vocation to sanctity: ‘Faith, Hope and 
Charity, and Sorrow which is their substratum, are diamonds, and diamonds 
are rare, as you have learned. They are very expensive, never forget.’ He 
continues: ‘Diamonds of such sort cost Prayer, which is, itself, a priceless jewel 
only wrested by conquest.’97 
 Given Bloy’s influence on Maritain’s religious and mystical formation, 
this leads Leiva-Merikakas to say that ‘For both of them [Bloy and Maritain], 
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suffering is the primary activity engaged in by the saints as lovers of God for 
so long as the work of redemption remains incomplete; and this is not because 
of some hankering after Baroque dolorism but because they have clear insight 
into the necessary bond of identity uniting the believer to the Savior and his 
redemptive work.’98 That suffering is at the core of the Christian who aspires 
to sainthood for Maritain, as deeply influenced by Bloy, is abundantly clear 
when we read a letter that he wrote in reply to an anonymous girl, after 
Raïssa’s death: 
 
The Christianity you were taught is a child’s religion. At 
seventeen your eyes have begun to open on the world as it 
really is. You are asked to realize that Christianity is a terrible 
mystery of love, and that the Cross is not a pleasant and 
comfortable figure of speech protecting those joys over which 
popular preachers wax so eloquent, but actually a gallows of 
horror on which God was hanged for love of us—because all 
the abomination of this world comes not from Him, but from 
man’s freedom, which is the prime cause of evil. And God 
restores all things—invisibly by His love, and the love of His 
saints who lay down their lives for their friends. Perhaps what I 
am writing you here seems to make no sense, but I am writing 
it all the same because it is the truth, and someday you will see 
that it is.99 
 
For the Catholic, suffering is a means to participate in the Cross of Christ and 
consequently a means of purification and purging of the soul’s desires. For 
Maritain it is the vocation of the saint to suffer for, and in the name of, Christ. 
Again: ‘The saints participate throughout the course of time in the redeeming 
work of Jesus on behalf of the world. Their personal relation to the world is 
paradoxical and mysterious. For them, it seems to me, the world is above all 
an occasion for dying to themselves in order to be entirely delivered up by love 
to Love.’100 The saint does this because ‘things as they are are intolerable’, 
and it is only by total self-renunciation, to the extent that the saint gives away 
their clothes, that the saint can enjoy freedom from the goods and pleasures 
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of the world, ‘infected’, as they are, for Maritain, ‘with lying, injustice, 
wickedness, distress and misery.’101  
 As such, self-renunciation and the suffering which plays a major part in 
it—what may be called ‘asceticism’—constitute a central element in Christian 
mysticism, and it is especially pronounced in St. John of the Cross. For 
example, he writes 
 
[T]he purest suffering causes and entailed the purest 
knowledge, and, in consequence, the purest and loftiest joy 
which comes from deepest penetration. . . . Oh, that it might be 
perfectly understood how the soul cannot attain to the thicket of 
the wisdom and riches of God, save by entering into the thicket 
of many kinds of suffering. . . . the thicket of the Cross!102 
 
In this connection the saint speaks of both an actively endured and a passively 
endured ‘night of the senses’ as well as an active and passive ‘night of the 
spirit’ or soul, in which the soul, trusting of God, walks in darkness, relying 
upon no mental representation of God or of divine union.103 The emphasis on 
ascetic means for reaching spiritual perfection is represented best in what 
Maritain refers to as the ‘doctrine of the void’ on the basis of St. John’s todo y 
nada: ‘everything and nothing’. In rather sublime poetic form St. John of the 
Cross teaches:  
 
To reach satisfaction in all 
desire satisfaction in nothing. 
To come to possess all 
desire the possession of nothing. 
To arrive at being all 
desire to be nothing. 
To come to the knowledge of all 
desire the knowledge of nothing. 
 
To come to enjoy what you have not 
you must go by a way in which you enjoy not.104 
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Of this ‘nothing’ that St. John of the Cross speaks of, the doctrine of the void, 
Maritain explains:  
 
He is preaching neither mutilation nor suicide, nor the slightest 
ontological destruction of the least vein in the wing of the 
smallest gnat. His point of view is not that of the structure of our 
substance and its faculties: it is the point of view of our 
ownership of ourselves in the free use and moral exercise of 
our activity. And there he asks for everything. There we must 
give us all. The death he preaches is very real, more subtle and 
more delicate than material death and destruction, a vitally 
active and efficacious death, savored, free, which strikes to the 
heart of our most immanent activity, is accomplished in and by 
it, grows with it, adheres to it in the deepest intimacy. This death 
is called self-surrender. This death does not obliterate 
sensibility, it refines and makes it more exquisite; it does not 
harden the fibers of being, it softens and spiritualizes them, it 
transforms us into love.105 
 
In concluding his considerations of the death that is self-surrender, St. John of 
the Cross also brings them to a climax when he writes: 
 
In this nakedness the spirit finds its quietude and rest. For in 
coveting nothing, nothing tires it by pulling it up and nothing 
oppresses it by pushing it down, because it is in the center of 
its humility.106 
 
Nothingness, which here also means self-surrender, as Maritain suggests—or 
better yet, the nihilation of the self in all desire unrelated to sanctification and 
all descriptions of God’s nature—becomes a positive force, rather than a mere 
absence. It is the rest attained only by a humbling of self, by ways which one 
‘enjoys not’, meaning ascetic purgation and suffering, which, as essential to 
what Maritain calls ‘heroic passivity’ as opposed to quietism,107 allows for the 
gathering and focusing of spiritual energy and God’s entering the soul. This we 
have seen in Bloy and it is with all of this—the use of hyperbolic and apophatic 
mystical language and of the sanctifying and creative role of suffering—that 
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we arrive at the unity of the Poet and of the mystic in the case of Bloy. The 
implication of this unity is that in at least in this case, unlike in the case of the 
obscure knowledge of God through the moral act, God is known directly by 
Bloy, in a contemplative union of love that, as we saw earlier according to 
Maritain’s philosophy of art, ‘inevitably’ finds expression in the artwork.  
 In Bloy, precisely because there is the purging of knowledge and a 
humbling of self in the face of the mysteries of the divine, God is not an object 
of consciousness like a being in the world, but is an immediately felt, personal 
reality, the love of which (or of whom) can never be directly expressed, only 
suggested. Maritain writes poignantly in this regard: 
 
[Bloy] was never willing to renounce completely the splendors 
of the tangible, in order to seek beyond, in the darkness of a 
purely spiritual contemplation, Him who is above all images and 
all thought. Perceptible and tangible signs of God—such were 
the objects of his never-stated hunger. Thus it is in the world of 
forms and images that the mystical keys have their 
repercussion, and there take shape the melodies of a most 
genuinely Christian sense of the absolute requirements of the 
Lord.108 
 
As late as 1968, Maritain affirms that the case of Bloy is unique in that in him 
there is a unity of the Poet and mystic, a dual vocation which requires that even 
in its most sublime forms, violence must be done to language and the art of 
the Poet in order for it to be ordered to Christian truth. 
 
It is the office of all great [P]oets to surmount in some way or 
other, and at whatever price, this inadequation of the sign with 
respect to the mystery of life immanent in the reality signified. 
But in the case Léon Bloy—and it is, I believe, a unique case—
since the reality signified is the infinite fire of the unfathomable 
God, it was necessary to do violence to art and to the works 
which the poet fashions in words, in order to bring them to a 
superhuman excess, which is still unworthy of the reality which 
they evoke . . .  
 Such is the task that Bloy had assigned himself as artist, 
and in which consumed himself: a supreme effort of [P]oetry 
which overflowed from his contemplative prayer and which, in 
comparison to the treasures glimpsed in that prayer, was like a 
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resplendent rag. For Bloy knew very well that the silence of 
adoration will always praise God better than any word.109  
 
We have here the overcoming of metaphysics, through the art and person of 
Bloy—God not known ontotheologically but by mystical insight in what I call 
‘Infused-Poetic Contemplation’ (capitalized for the reason that I refer to the 
Poetry at the heart of all artistic creation already described, and seek to 
emphasize the creative function of the infusion of grace in this case, as 
opposed to infused contemplation per se). It is evident that such mystical 
insight is apophatic in virtue of its refusal to apply concepts and images to God 
as an item of knowledge. God is not known here, by Infused-Poetic 
Contemplation, in terms of causality, esse or actualitas, or even primarily as a 
maker or creator of the world.  
 On this point, it is worthwhile pausing to consider that in ‘The Origin of 
the Work of Art’, Heidegger persuasively argues against the conception of 
thinghood as a unity of a manifold of sense impressions by pointing out that 
we never first perceive a series or even a jumble of sensations such as tones 
and noises but, rather experience things in the midst of the world in which we 
live, taken together and readily intelligible. 
 
[W]e hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three-
motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction 
from the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are 
the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and 
never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order 
to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert 
our ear from them, i.e., listen abstractly.110 
 
Such an argument is clearly phenomenological in its essence,111 and by this 
we come full circle, as it were, for the same argument can be made when it 
comes to God and how God is experienced by the mystic. What could be more 
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obvious that God is not experienced as the ‘causa prima’ or ‘esse’, or any of 
the perfections or transcendentals of which He is the supreme analogate, 
whether it be the true, good, or beautiful? In speaking of God in such a way, 
we remain in the language of the metaphysician and not the mystic, and 
despite the fact that throughout the essays on mysticism in The Degrees of 
Knowledge, Maritain makes the case that the teachings of Aquinas and St. 
John of the Cross are complementary, he insists on distinguishing between 
ontological and mystical statements.112 This because he not only wants to 
prevent heretical readings of St. John of the Cross (with whom he is mostly 
concerned), but also, and primarily, because he wishes to convey the way and 
the experience of the mystic insofar as it is possible.  
 It is true that a person can have a ‘metaphysical experience’ of God 
such as Maritain’s describes with the intuition of being, but phenomenologically 
speaking, this is experience only of an unknown, impersonal X, as we see in 
both Jacques and Raïssa’s descriptions of the intuition. Such an experience 
has nothing of the character of the supernatural mystical experience of intimate 
existential communion. In the case of the mysticism of Bloy, God is known and 
experienced as mystery and suffering savior and this is the phenomenology of 
mystical experience that Caputo fails to provide upon his deconstruction of 
Aquinas. There is the co-happening of the presencing of God (‘suffering 
savior’) and a withdrawal of God (God, revealed in the life, Passion and death 
of Christ withdrawing in ineffability, mystery). This, in my view, is at least one 
possible configuration of what Caputo calls an ‘alethiological’ experience of the 
presencing and withdrawal of God, who is Being. 
 Bloy’s mysticism is therefore simultaneously and paradoxically also 
cataphatic in virtue of the fact that it remains strictly within the tradition of the 
Catholic religion, with a view to meeting the ‘absolute requirements of the Lord’ 
and to sainthood. Key to this is the necessary role of suffering in artistic 
creation and sanctification. Yves Simon, a friend of Maritain’s for over fifty 
years, writes that ‘From the beginning Maritain had the soul of a contemplative 
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and that of an artist.’ 113  We can now see why this remark is so fitting. 
Something I wish to add in the context of visual art in the next section is Bloy’s 
strong belief in the value and essential mystery of the Sacraments in the 
Catholic spiritual life, and how this relates to Maritain’s mystical thought.  
 
(ii) Tsakiridou’s ‘mystical aesthetics’ 
 
It useful to consider Cornelia Tsakiridou’s notion of the ‘mystical aesthetics’ 
because, while I do not adopt the term, the reflections that go into conceiving 
it provide an excellent way to push the insights thus far attained to their most 
radical conclusion. The sources which Tsakiridou employs are those I have 
just discussed—of the immanent relationship between the artist and God 
through the beautiful and of the role of suffering in the spiritual life of the Poet 
manifested in their artworks—but with a specific focus on explicitly Christian 
art, that, is, in both form and content, and Rouault’s in particular. I began this 
chapter by noting that it was adherence to a Christian conception of beauty as 
‘a shining forth of the deep mysteries of reality’ which defined the work of Bloy 
and Rouault and that those mysteries were ‘those of God and human life and 
the relationship between the two.’  
 In this connection, Tsakiridou writes that for Maritain, Rouault’s religious 
art functions in an analogous manner to Byzantine icons in that the artist 
participates, in making an object for contemplation of divine things, such as 
the Crucifixion, in the Cross of Christ themselves—that, as Maritain quotes Fra 
Angelico, ‘to paint the things of Christ, the artist must live with Christ’—and this 
means that the virtue of art in this instance is ascesis (spiritual discipline) and 
the work of art is an aesthetic object for nothing less than mystical 
contemplation. 114  This mystical contemplation upon what defines the 
artwork—its Christ-centredness, even while the artist need not employ a 
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‘religious technique’115  and the artwork need not adhere to strict rules of 
production as is the case for the production of Byzantine icons—Tsakiridou 
calls ‘visio divina’ (‘prayerful seeing’) as analogous to lectio divina (‘prayerful 
reading’).116  
 ‘From Maritain’s standpoint’, writes Tsakiridou, ‘the Cross is the locus 
mysticus (mystical place) of communion, the intersection and union of God and 
man, in which the theanthropic mystery is both finalized and opened to 
humanity.’117 As the artist approaches the divine as the subject of their art, any 
and all egocentric preoccupations that the artist may have are revealed and 
shattered by the ‘charismatic being’ of the religious artwork as participative in 
‘What in [B]eing is transcendental, its goodness, beauty and truth’118 and 
activated by grace. Here we are reminded of why Poetry tends to the beautiful, 
which is that unlike sentimentality and the grotesque, the beautiful is eminently 
lovable and worthy of contemplation. Hence, the artwork that is at least in some 
way directed to the divine functions in the same way as the Cross in laying 
bear human weakness and sin insofar as the mysteries of the divine 
overwhelm all of our attempts to define, contain, or use it for our own 
advantage.   
 In the case of the artist, they must undergo an analogous kenosis (self-
emptying) as that of Christ, as they find that their work inevitably fails to 
express the infinite mysteries of God.119 For this reason Maritain writes to his 
friend, the artist Jean Cocteau, that ‘contemplatives and [P]oets understand 
each other’.120 And this is why I claim elsewhere that in The Responsibility of 
the Artist—which deals with the relationship between art and morality—
Maritain ‘offers the Christian spiritual gift of Wisdom as the means to a positive 
freedom for the artist in his artistic and ethical life, precisely because wisdom 
and art are two independent absolutes, and art, while imitating the moral and 
spiritual virtues and the discipline required to attain them, is of [a] different 
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order altogether insofar as its activities and ends are concerned [with the 
source and end of wisdom being God contemplated and the end of art being 
the work to be made].’121 In this connection, Maritain writes in The Degrees of 
Knowledge of the infusion of wisdom into the soul through love and grace as 
occurring ‘secretly and in darkness, so as to be hidden from the work of the 
understanding’,122 and quotes St. John of the Cross’ Dark Night of the Soul: 
 
And it [the gift of wisdom] is not for this reason alone that it may 
be called secret, but likewise because of the effects which it 
produces in the soul. For it is secret not only in the darknesses 
and afflictions of purgation, when this wisdom of love purges 
the soul, and the soul is unable to speak of it, but equally so 
afterwards in illumination, when this wisdom is communicated 
to it most clearly . . . for, apart from the fact that the soul has no 
desire to speak of it, it can find no suitable way or manner or 
similitude by which it may be able to describe such lofty 
understanding and such delicate spiritual feeling.123 
 
And yet the great Spanish mystic wrote the most sublime tomes of mystical 
theology. If we follow Harmless in his call to always situate the mystic in the 
context of their lived experience, we ought also to remember that it was in fact 
during St. John of the Cross’ most painful periods, such as his imprisonment 
by his Carmelite brothers in Toledo between 1577 and 1578, that he wrote 
most of The Spiritual Canticle. In many cases, there is, in the mystic (like the 
artist, as we have seen), a compulsion to express their experiences or feelings 
of the beautiful and the true. ‘For all the hand-wringing about the ineffability of 
the mystical’, Harmless points out, ‘mystics rarely abandon words or lapse into 
silence. They are a singularly talkative lot and a singularly gifted group of 
talkers.’124 Even ineffable mystical experiences, then, by no means preclude 
expression. How precisely Catholic mystics and artists express their feelings 
of the true and beautiful will, of course, be colored by their religious beliefs, 
and the mere fact of this confluence of positive religious belief and expression 
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of so-called ineffable mystical experiences reveals the mutual dependence of 
the apophatic and the cataphatic in Catholic art and religion. This will be seen 
most clearly regarding the Holy Trinity, which Maritain calls the ‘holiest 
mystery’ of the Catholic faith.125 
 In living according to charity and directing their work to the beautiful, the 
artist, says Maritain, can ‘give himself totally twice at the same time, first to his 
God and second to something that is a reflection of his God.’126 This kenosis 
in the Catholic artist and the mystic, wherein the dynamism of purgation, the 
stripping of knowledge and divine illumination of secret wisdom occurs, is why 
for Maritain even between non-Christian artists and mystics there is a ‘distant 
analogy between aesthetic emotion and the mystical graces’127 and why, as I 
quoted Maritain earlier, in genuine Christian art there is a ‘final victory of a 
steady struggle inside the artist’s soul, which has to pass through trials and 
“dark nights” comparable, in the line of the creativity of the spirit, to those 
suffered by the mystics in their striving toward union with God. Such was the 
case with Rouault.’128 We see the unity of artistic and mystical insight in 
Rouault’s paintings of Christ. In the 1929 Christ en croix or, as Tsakiridou 
suggests, in the 1932 Christ Mocked by Soldiers, ‘the expansion of the line 
itself is made into an expressive object’ and Christ is outlined in the same 
rough, powerful strokes of the bodies and faces of those around him—be it the 
soldiers mocking him or the distraught Mary and John—which implies, as 
Tsakiridou notes, that there is no ‘marked domain of ugliness of virtue’ and that 
the Cross gathers all in both suffering and the transcendence of suffering and 
redemption.129 In Rouault’s artworks, the Cross is the locus mysticus and 
invites visio divina. The Cross, says Maritain, is a ‘place of supreme torments 
and the beatitudes of peace.’130 The object which is the inspired artwork, the 
process of creating the work, and other kinds of participation in an artwork, 
such as appreciating and contemplating it, are all nothing less than 
                                                 
125 Ibid., p. 403. 
126 Maritain, The Responsibility of the Artist, pp. 108–114. 
127 PBC, p. 152 
128 Ibid., p. 8. 
129 Tsakiridou, ‘Vera lcona’, pp. 243–244. 
130 DK, p. 385. 
  244  
sacramental, an act of worship. The Sacraments themselves have a central 
place in the Catholic faith, understood as outward signs of inward or invisible 
divine grace. The most important Sacrament being the Mass, at which is 
believed to occur the transubstantiation of the bread into the Body of Christ, 
the Sacraments represent a clear cataphatic component to Catholic spirituality 
and mystical life in the sense that they are only understood and partaken in 
within the context of propositional religious beliefs. But, says Bloy, they are no 
less mysterious: 
 
We are created that we may be saints. If anything is written, this 
surely is. Sanctity is so required of us, it is so inherent in human 
nature, that God presumes its existence, so to speak, in each 
of us, by the means of the sacraments of His Church, that is, by 
means of mystical signs invisibly making operative in souls the 
beginning of Glory. ‘Sacramentum nihil aliud nisi rem sacram, 
abditam atque occultam significant.’ (A Sacrament is nothing 
other than a sacred, withdrawn and mysterious thing.) This 
sacred and mysterious thing thus alluded to by the Council of 
Trent has the effect of uniting souls to God. The most 
transcendent theology contains nothing stronger than this 
affirmation.131 
 
Now, if the mystical artwork is sacramental in the same way as the seven 
Sacraments of the Catholic faith—that is, being an act of worship and 
mysterious outward sign of the grace of God, it is not unreasonable to infer 
from this that here we come across a different configuration of the presencing-
withdrawing, ‘alethiological’ experience’ of God, or Being. For mystical 
artworks, such as those by Rouault, reveal to us the presence of God in Christ, 
and yet the Cross represents mystery in all its darkness, of the divine, in virtue 
of an ineffable love, emptying itself of all power to redeem sin and suffering. 
This same kenosis must be the kind of ‘comportment’, to use Heidegger’s term, 
that the Christian artist must embody in approaching the Cross.  
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(iii) The Artwork as Locus Mysticus and Site of Truth 
 
Heidegger writes that the artwork is a ‘setting-into-work of truth’132—truth, 
again, not being understood as the correspondence between mental 
representation and extra-mental reality, but rather the unconcealment 
(aletheia) of beings. For Heidegger, the work of art is a happening of truth in 
this sense in virtue of a conflict, a ‘rift’ (Riss) immanent within truth itself, of 
‘world’ and earth’, wherein ‘world’ represents that nexus or horizon within 
which human beings live and die, and ‘earth’ represents that out of which 
‘world’ is possible, and to which ‘world’ always sinks back. 133  One of 
Heidegger’s most famous examples in this connection is a Greek temple, 
which, as something built, a work, ‘gathers around itself the unity of those paths 
and relations in which birth and death, disaster and blessing, victory and 
disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny for human 
being.’134 The temple is a world for an historical people.  
 Heidegger also introduces to the conflict of the ‘world’ and ‘earth’ other 
elements, such as divinities, which consequently, as we have in fact seen, 
gives rise to a ‘fourfold’ of earth, sky, mortals and divinities.135 We perhaps 
see the notion in embryonic form in the relatively ‘early’ later Heidegger in the 
essay ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, in which the Greek temple, as it stands 
on the rock of a valley, ‘encloses the figure of the god, and in this concealment 
lets it stand out into the holy precinct through the open portico’, ‘lets the god 
be present’.136 This by way of consecration of the site in an activity that is one 
with the building of the temple, honoring the god’s ‘dignity and splendor’.137  
 This world of the temple however, necessarily stands in relation to the 
earth on which it rests and out of which it is made. And in the putting to work 
the materials for the temple’s construction, those materials, and the earth that 
surrounds the temple, are made to shine forth, not as mere stuff, as with 
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equipment, but as having a primordiality that defies definition and any 
reduction to any world which is erected upon it.138 Thus, even the divinities 
have as their ground that which is indefinable and ever-concealing. The 
temple, as holy site, is the site of the unconcealment of things and beings, but 
also, and necessarily, concealment— which, as we know, is essential for 
Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia.  
 We here find ourselves, then, back to the concept of ‘de-severing’, of 
the lack of distance or availability of things in the world to Dasein. But in a 
negative sense, because the art work, as the location of the conflict between 
world and earth and the site of unconcealment of the way all the beings in the 
work are at play, is not merely present like other objects in the manner of 
equipment, but rather stands out, as an object of truth and beauty. 139 
Beginning also with the activity of the artist—whether painter, sculptor or 
poet—but going far beyond the artist and the conception of art for the 
satisfaction of mere subjective, aesthetic taste, Heidegger thus shares with 
Maritain the essential insight concerning the nature of genuine art as ‘the 
becoming and happening of truth.’140 In this connection, and on the basis of 
the preceding discussion, I posit that the Cross, both symbolically and 
existentially understood through what I have formulated as the connatural 
mode of Infused-Poetic Contemplation, and as a simultaneous unconcealment 
of the presence of God and the concealment of the divine in the mysteries of 
the Incarnation would be for Maritain what Heidegger is referring to by the rift 
and fourfold in which revelation and mystery are always in play (as, for 
example, in the Greek temple). Understood in this way, by the formal means 
of knowledge of Infused-Poetic Contemplation, the poetic-mystical experience 
of the Cross can also be taken as what Caputo means by an ‘alethiological’ 
experience of Being.  
 We thus arrive once more at the essential relationship between artistic 
experience and mystical experience. But if it seems that I am claiming too 
much for Heidegger’s thoughts on art insofar as it can be used for a pre-
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metaphysical interpretation of Maritain’s central notions of connaturality and 
Poetry, perhaps we ought to look to Heidegger’s own claims regarding Poetry.  
 It was said in Part I that Heidegger took the poet as the model for the 
meditative attitude, of the thinking of Being—Denken. Heidegger says: ‘Poetry 
and thinking meet each other in one and the same only when, and only as long 
as, they remain distinctly in the distinctness of their nature.’141 This means that 
whatever Heidegger takes poetry in this instance to be, there is a very strong 
connection between it and Denken.  
 In the passage just quoted, Heidegger makes an important distinction 
between sameness and identity, with sameness being ‘the belonging together 
of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference’, that is, of 
elements that can be brought together in virtue of their very differentiation into 
‘an original being-at-one.’ 142  In contrast, identity or equality reduces the 
elements ‘into the dull unity of mere uniformity.’143 Denken and poetry are the 
same but not identical, or, it could be said, synonymous terms. The implication 
is that if Denken contains a mystical ‘element’, and Denken is the same but 
not identical with poetry, the mystical element in Heidegger contains at least 
something analogous to poetry. Is this Poetry, understood in Maritain’s terms, 
such that Maritain and Heidegger meet on the relationship between Poetry and 
mystical experience? 
 Poetry, or poiesis, is, for Maritain, ontologically prior to both Poetic 
Knowledge and Infused-Poetic Contemplation and as such it is what makes 
the vocation of the artist possible. Poetry, as we know, is the ‘secret life’ of all 
the arts, the intentional and affective communication between the human self 
and the things of the world and with an essential tendency to creation of 
beautiful works. For Heidegger, by comparison, ‘All art, as the letting happen 
of the advent of the truth of what is, is, as such, essentially poetry.’144 He also 
says, more directly, that ‘Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry’ and 
that the ‘nature of poetry . . . is the founding of truth.’145 Here Heidegger is 
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referring, like Maritain, to ‘poetic composition’ in a ‘wider sense’, as that which 
mysterious making which brings the artwork to presence.  
 But, as we have already seen, Heidegger goes further than this, and 
says that poetry is the meditative attitude for the letting-be of Being par 
excellence. For Heidegger language is the ‘house of Being’, and poetry, ‘by 
naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to appearance’, 
is a ‘projecting’ into the clearing of what can come to be present, so long as, 
and on condition that, language is not conceived as a mere tool to be 
manipulated and for the manipulation of the world. Heidegger goes so far as 
to say that contrary to the view that human beings are the ‘master and shaper 
of language’, ‘language remains the master of man.’146 How this can be the 
case can be understood when we consider again the fact that it is only in virtue 
of the power or capacity of language given to human beings (or Dasein) that 
any conscious, self-reflective experience of the world as world is at all possible. 
Language gives us the opportunity to ask the question of the meaning of 
being—of our own being, of beings, and the Being of beings; and for this 
reason, we owe language a great debt.  
 With language considered as poiesis, rescued from the conception of it 
as tool, we can begin to see why Heidegger would describe poetry as the 
‘saying of world and earth, the saying of the arena of their conflict and thus of 
the place of all the nearness and remoteness of the gods’ and that ‘Poetry is 
saying of the unconcealedness of what is.’ 147  We can also see why, for 
Heidegger, poetry—or, as he also calls it ‘poesy’148—in the narrow sense of 
writing verses, ‘has a privileged position in the domain of the arts.’149 As 
George Pattison says: ‘Heidegger experienced the work of art as offering a 
way to break the grip of technologically orientated thinking, a way to a more 
originary encounter with things, and, in that encounter, to a disclosure of the 
world constituted as and by the fourfold of earth, sky, mortals and gods.’150 In 
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this connection, poetry, as ‘the art of language’,151 a peculiar form of language 
that typifies poiesis as a making and ‘setting-into-work’, is uniquely suited to 
self-effacement on the part of the human speaker (the poet)—uniquely suited 
to listening and waiting upon the disclosure and unconcealment of beings in 
Being.152 Poetry, more than any other art form, allows for the unconcealment 
and shining forth of beings. This is because, as we have seen, the poet 
transcends a propositional understanding of the conveyance of meaning 
through language, but also the conception of truth as univocal and in terms of 
adequatio.153  
 For Heidegger, it is with the poetry of Hölderlin in particular that we can 
not only have a pre-metaphysical, pre-ontotheological experience of Being, 
but, because Hölderlin was a modern with the uniquely modern experience of 
alienation from Being, also begin to make new paths in Denken. 154  In 
Hölderlin’s case, ‘the poet’, as Pattison says, ‘speaks what the philosopher is 
to think.’155 And in his discussions of Hölderlin’s words, ‘poetically, man/Dwells 
on this earth’, Heidegger describes poetry as a ‘mysterious’ ‘measuring’ of the 
human being or Dasein’s dwelling on earth, understood, again, not as mere 
building but as ‘the manner in which we humans are on the earth’ and which 
takes account of their rootedness on the earth—a rootedness that is only 
possible by virtue of the existential anchor (that is, source of meaning) that are 
the divinities and gods which the poet makes manifest even as they withdraw 
in mystery.156 Perhaps here we find Maritain and Heidegger again meeting on 
the profoundest of elements of genuine art and poetry: the contact between 
the artist and the divine, and the concealment of the divine even as the poet 
pens their poem or, as in the cause of Rouault, paints their painting. 
 Yet, as Heidegger continues to ‘follow in thought’ what Hölderlin writes 
of the ‘poetic dwelling’ of Dasein, such as in the essay ‘ . . . Poetically Man 
Dwells . . .’, the ideas and terms that Heidegger brings into play—such as 
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‘“spanning” the “on the earth” and the “beneath the sky”’, and ‘the sights of the 
sky’157—become increasingly vague and perhaps quite mystifying, with no 
clear structure of articulation of what Heidegger means to say, such that one 
never feels one comfortably comprehends what he writes. This is because, to 
borrow a quote of Gerald Bruns that Pattison employs: ‘His [Heidegger’s] 
writings on language and poetry do not represent the unfolding of a theory. 
They are rather a lingering with a subject matter . . . acknowledging 
Parmenides’ judgment ‘that everything that lies before us is ambiguous’.158 
And consequently: 
 
The folly of trying to follow closely . . . his later writings, comes 
out very forcefully when you try to stop, because there is no 
natural stopping place, no place of arrival, where everything 
falls into place and you can say, ‘Well now that’s done: and I’m 
glad it’s over’.159 
 
But partly because of the dazzling array of vague concepts and turns of phrase, 
it is also never clear as to whether Heidegger is attempting to delineate the 
themes and concerns of Hölderlin or delineate the lines of his interpretation of 
Hölderlin’s poetic expression. This, as Pattison suggests, however, would be 
what sets Denken apart from a merely representational understanding of both 
truth itself and philosophical discourse. With regard to Hölderlin in particular, it 
is not that Heidegger sets out to formulate and summarize some sort of 
philosophical system underpinning their writings, for such an undertaking 
would be to reduce each of Hölderlin’s poems and to ignore the fact that what 
is said actually ‘overreaches the self-understanding of the poet’ and that, 
following the principle of deconstruction set out in the introduction, ‘the truth of 
poetry is not only in what is said, but also in what is left in silence’.160 
 Both of the concerns outlined above are the very ground of Maritain’s 
critique of Heidegger’s later thought. Even if there is, as Caputo suggests in 
The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, a certain analogy with 
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Heidegger’s ‘poetic’ thinking and mysticism, Heidegger attempts, according to 
Maritain, to make a philosophical system out of an essentially poetic intuition, 
which, in the end, leads to a species of natural mysticism in the attempt to 
enter into contemplation of Being in itself.161 In Heidegger, Maritain argues, 
‘intuivity . . . takes on the whole work of conceptualization’, but ‘to expect from 
poetic intuitivity the elaboration of philosophic concepts and their organization 
into a formal body of knowledge is to ask the impossible.’162 Why this is the 
case for Maritain is clear from the foregoing discussions of Poetry and 
metaphysical knowledge. Whereas Poetry in virtue of its being a connatural, 
affective intercommunication between the human soul and the things of the 
world tends towards the creation of a work, metaphysical or philosophical 
knowledge reaches for truth, which for Maritain is not something made but is 
rather an atemporal, unchanging, divine name. Maritain goes into further 
detail:  
 
Far from working on intelligible natures grasped in a mental 
word, thought (Heidegger’s obscure Denken) concentrates on 
what it can still hold on to of the fleeting content of its intuition 
when it tries to desubjectivize that intuition before (and for the 
purpose of) conceptualizing or intellectualizing it in 
metaphysical terms.163 
 
In virtue of the fact that Denken can never take Being as an object of thought, 
that it can only ever be concerned with beings in the world, we might agree 
with Maritain in his assessment. In discussing Heidegger’s approach to 
Nietzsche, Pattison discerns Heidegger’s fundamental hermeneutical 
principles, one of which is that Denken ‘do justice to time’, by which is meant 
thinking does not attempt to capture reality in static images or representational 
concepts.164 For Heidegger, as we have seen, time is the horizon of all human 
experience, of all presencing of beings. For the later Heidegger, therefore, 
attempting to capture reality in a philosophical system ‘necessarily belies the 
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temporality that utterly permeates the human way of being-in-the-world and 
from which thinking itself cannot be excepted.’165 
 In this sense we can see a clear analogy between Denken and 
mysticism, for as Denken is not an attempt to define or contain but to express 
and explore Being, the mystic attempts to express their experience of divine 
reality—in inadequate terms, precisely insofar as the experience is ‘ineffable’ 
and ‘transient’, to use William James’ ‘marks’. But we also have even more 
reason to insist on a gulf that exists between Maritain’s Christian mysticism 
and the mystical element in Heidegger’s Denken, for Denken is not concerned 
with a personal relationship between the thinker or the poet and divine reality 
also conceived in terms of personality. While Maritain’s mysticism and 
Heidegger’s Denken both operate on the supra-moral level, Denken, we have 
seen, is neither concerned with the human person of the thinker or poet nor 
with producing anything like recognizable and existentially relatable content by 
which to live our lives. While Heidegger speaks of the presencing and 
concealment of Being in human life and human history, there appears to be no 
dialogue between the thinker or poet and divine reality, but only a retrospective 
‘monologue’, as Pattison says,166 on the movement and revelation of Being 
on the part on the part of the thinker. The degree to which Heidegger’s lack of 
any search for relationship, or, indeed, communion with ultimate reality, as well 
as the conception of the divine in the plural and in terms of the ‘sky’ is due to 
the influence of Hölderlin’s Hellenism,167 would, I suggest, be an interesting 
theological subject for further investigation, but which must be set aside here. 
 It is in complete contrast with Heidegger, that for Maritain, the artist, in 
approaching such religious works, must be overwhelmed by fear and 
trembling, must be aware, passively but intensely, of divine inspirations which 
demand expression in some figuration. The artist, then, must approach the 
artwork as nothing less than sacramental, and, in the case of Rouault’s 
paintings of Christ, Tsakiridou says, ‘as an invitation to prayer.’168 Because 
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the divine must be approached and contemplated by the artist in such a 
manner, what we see here is James’ ‘marks’ of the mystical, which are at least 
three in this instance: ineffability, passivity and a noetic quality. Unlike what I 
identified as the ‘core’ emphasis of James, however, we also see explicit 
Christian subject-matter, employing distinctly Christian theological and 
mystical notions, such as the divine kenosis. I therefore believe Tsakiridou’s 
notion of ‘mystical aesthetics’ in Maritain is legitimate insofar as it focuses on 
explicitly Christian art. That said, however, precisely because the term 
‘aesthetics’ focuses on the sensual aspects of art rather than on the 
transcendental of beauty and therefore on the ontological, I prefer my concept 
of ‘Infused-Poetic Contemplation.’ Tsakiridou is certainly not unaware of the 
distinction between the aesthetic and the ontological, because she writes that, 
for Maritain, it is in virtue of grace that the artist is inspired to create an artwork 
that is truly Christian, and that it is in virtue of this ‘that its ontology is mystically 
formed and awaits recognition.’169  
 The upshot of Tsakiridou’s exploration of Maritain’s conception of 
mystical in Christian visual art (such as in Rouault), is that we come to see in 
a far clearer manner the role of the cataphatic, doctrinal, and sacramental in 
Maritain’s mysticism as present in Infused-Poetic Contemplation. And because 
of this, we might disagree with Maritain as to whether Bloy is a ‘unique’ case 
when it comes to the convergence of the vocations of the Catholic artist and 
the Catholic mystic in possession of the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the 
theological virtues of faith, hope and charity. For in The Degrees of Knowledge, 
Maritain relies on both the poems and mystical exegesis of no less a figure 
than St. John of the Cross for his mystical theology, and of course both the 
poems and commentaries of the latter are some of the most celebrated in 
Western Christianity for their beauty and profundity. In St. John of the Cross, 
then, we have another example of the convergence of vocations and Infused-
Poetic Contemplation. Are there more? Potentially all Catholic poet-mystics 
who are sufficiently advanced in the mystical life to enter the spiritual marriage.  
 One possible case is Jacques’ wife Raïssa, who, as an accomplished 
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poet and spiritual writer herself, collaborated with Jacques on other works 
pertaining to contemplation and mysticism. These include the early work 
Prayer and Intelligence and the later Liturgy and Contemplation, with the 
former, first privately printed in 1922, ten years before The Degrees of 
Knowledge, heavily relying on the mystical theology of St. John of the Cross. 
In fact, Maritain relates in The Peasant of the Garonne that he owes his 
understanding of contemplation to Raïssa and her sister Vera: 
 
They taught me what contemplation in the world is. I myself was 
a laggard, a laborer of the intellect, risking by the very fact to 
think I was really living certain things because my head 
understood them a little and my philosophy could dissert upon 
them. But I have been taught, and taught well, by the 
experience, the sorrows and the insights of these two faithful 
souls. That is what gives me the courage to try to give witness 
to them, in speaking there of things that are above me, knowing 
well that to have been instructed by example and on the job 
does not make it easy, far from it, to translate what one has 
learned into ideas and words.’170 
 
While I did not include a study of the religious thought of Raïssa Maritain in 
this study for reasons which were made clear, it is not unreasonable, on the 
basis of Maritain’s testimony and the biographical facts alluded to throughout, 
to regard Raïssa as a major influence on Maritain’s thinking—not just in the 
obvious sense of being his wife, but also a mystic with whom he lived his own 
mystical vocation. That one of Maritain’s earliest works—Prayer and 
Intelligence—was a short text on mysticism written with Raïssa is important for 
my thesis, for it shows a preoccupation with the mystical even as Maritain 
rejects Bergsonianism and becomes a devotee of Aquinas some fourteen 
years prior. There is, I argue, a clear trajectory in Maritain’s life and thought, 
an evident privileging of mystical experience over metaphysical knowledge—
even if he was unaware of it.  
 With this in mind, it is, however, to Maritain’s reflections on St. John of 
the Cross which I return to conclude this study. For what Maritain says on the 
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basis of St. John of the Cross’ writings of mystical experience and the Holy 
Trinity will serve to clarify the contours of the relationship between the 
apophatic and cataphatic in his mystical theology and fully establish his 
mysticism as immanent throughout his life. With this the deconstruction of 
Maritain’s metaphysics and the overcoming of metaphysics in Maritain through 
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7 
 
 Love Gleaming in the Dark:  
The Mystical in Maritain 
 
‘The light of God-given contemplation is the ardor of love  
gleaming in the dark.’1 
 
 
1. Apophasis and Caritas  
 
In this concluding chapter, I build upon what has been said in the previous 
chapter of the overcoming of metaphysics and ontotheology through Poetic-
Infused Contemplation by way of identifying instances of Infused-Poetic 
Contemplation in Maritain himself. I want to show, by means of recourse to the 
mystical poetry of St. John of the Cross, that it is only when two conditions are 
met in Maritain’s writing that there can be a decisive overcoming of 
metaphysics. The first is that the vocations of the mystic and the poet converge 
in art born of Infused-Poetic Contemplation. The second is that Maritain 
speaks in the same poet-mystical language, not just of mystical experience of 
God, but even the highest kinds of mystical experience of God. This, for him, 
is an experience of the life of the Holy Trinity. I will show, in addition, that it is 
through the Infused-Poetic-Contemplative experience of God in Maritain that 
we can best understand what I have called the mutual dependence of the 
cataphatic and the apophatic in Maritain’s mystical theology. 
 
(i) An Inspired Verse 
 
In light of the discussion of Infused-Poetic Contemplation in the wider context 
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of Maritain’s philosophy of art, it is nothing other than a statement of fact to say 
that both technical artistic knowledge and religious or theological knowledge 
are applied by the Catholic poet-mystic in providing what Heidegger calls the 
essential createdness of the artwork. But precisely insofar as the creation of 
an inspired or even mystical artwork is a sacramental event, the technical and 
theological knowledge employed in its createdness are not, for Maritain, the 
end or purpose of the work. For if art is by definition ‘free’ insofar as it is ordered 
to the self-sufficient, transcendental value of the beautiful, how much more so 
is a mystical work ordered to experience of the divine?  
 ‘If to know is what you want—and knowledge must be desired—study 
metaphysics, study theology’, Maritain says.2 But this is not what makes the 
Catholic artist or the Catholic mystic who seeks mystical union. ‘If divine union 
is what you want’, Maritain continues,  
 
and you succeed in attaining it, you will know a great deal more, 
but precisely in the measure that you go beyond knowledge—
and in such a dispossessed fashion that you should in truth say: 
I was reduced to nothing and I knew no more. Beyond knowing? 
That is to say, in love; in love transilluminated by the Spirit, 
compenetrated by intelligence and wisdom. For now my 
exercise is in loving alone.’3  
 
Here Maritain seems to be suggesting that mystical union with God, which 
takes place through love, requires some sort of abandonment of positive 
knowledge of God—the kind of knowledge yielded by metaphysics and 
theology. With this quote, then, we arrive at the extraordinary relationship 
between (i) the love or charity (caritas) shared by God and human persons, (ii) 
positive Christian belief engendered by propositional and cataphatic 
statements of God’s nature (such that we know with what divine reality we want 
a union of love), and (iii) the apparently necessary transcendence or negation 
of positive knowledge about God and self (apophasis) in Maritain’s mystical 
theology. 
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 Now, it is not accidental that it is only in the final pages of The Degrees 
of Knowledge that Maritain explicitly turns to St. John of the Cross’ descriptions 
of mystical union with the three divine Persons of the Holy Trinity. As has been 
related, for Maritain, the Trinity is the ‘holiest mystery’ of the Catholic faith, and 
for much of the history of Western Christianity since the Councils of Nicaea 
and Constantinople in the fourth century, belief in the Trinity has defined the 
Christian. Mystical experience of the Trinity, according to St. John of the Cross, 
who is the ‘Mystical Doctor’ of the Catholic Church, is the ‘fruition’ that the soul 
‘will enjoy in the beatific vision’ but is also possible for those who have entered 
the spiritual marriage in this life.4  As such, it is also the highest kind of 
experience-knowledge humanly possible. Maritain writes: 
 
At this summit of the spiritual life and of mystical experience the 
soul emerges expressly into the depths of the holiest mystery 
of Christian revelation . . . The reason is that from the very 
outset, its contemplation . . . has led the soul, not to the One of 
the philosophers, not to God unknown as if from without and by 
His effects, but to God attained in His own divine essence, to 
the Deity Itself and as such, who in His absolutely proper and 
intimate life, is a Trinity of Persons, a resplendent and tranquil 
society of Three in the same indivisible essence of light and love 
. . . Essentially supraphilosophical, because its proximate and 
proportioned principle is faith illuminated by the gifts, mystical 
experience tends from the beginning to loving and fruitful 
knowledge of three uncreated Persons.5 
 
As shall see, for Maritain and St. John of the Cross, the mystical experience of 
the Holy Trinity is expressible only in language that is at once mystical and 
poetic. In this connection, Maritain focuses in on two lines from a stanza of a 
later redaction of The Spiritual Canticle by St. John of the Cross himself. I shall 
present them in the original Spanish, followed by the English translation of the 
original Spanish by Kavanaugh and Rodriguez, Maritain’s French translation, 
and finally the English translation of Maritain’s French version by Gerald 
Phelan. 
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aspira por mi huerto,  
y corran sus olores,6 
 
breathe through my garden,  
let its fragrance flow,7 
 
Souffle à travers mon jardin  
pour que ses parfums se résplendent.8 
 
Breathe through my garden 
That its perfumes may breathe forth.9 
 
Maritain has recourse to this verse on three occasions, which is suggestive of 
its importance. On the basis of Maritain’s brief exegesis, it seems that the 
‘garden’ St. John of the Cross speaks of refers to the entire being of the soul.10 
The fragrances, on the other hand, refer to the gifts of the Holy Spirit: the 
‘[s]pirit of filial fear, the spirit of piety, spirit of understanding, spirit of counsel, 
spirit of fortitude, spirit of knowledge, spirit of wisdom; by the seven gifts which 
it touches off and animates in the soul, the Spirit brings the soul to mystical 
union and exhales within it the sweetness of God.’11 More important for the 
present discussion on mystical experience of the Holy Trinity, however, is the 
dynamism that strikes us in the second line of Maritain’s French and Phelan’s 
English versions of the stanza. Whereas in Kavanaugh and Rodriguez’s 
translation, the fragrance of the garden of the soul appears to be passively 
waiting for God to breathe into the garden so that it may act or move, in both 
Maritain’s French version and Phelan’s translation we see that the fragrance 
or perfumes are themselves agents, breathing forth. The reflexive pronoun se 
in the French clearly indicates that the fragrances are themselves agents, and 
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act upon themselves. The difference, while apparently negligible, is in fact of 
central importance. As St. John of the Cross himself writes:  
 
It should be noted that the bride [the soul] does not say ‘breathe 
into my garden’ but ‘breathe through my garden,’ for there is a 
considerable difference between God’s breathing into the soul 
and his breathing through the soul. To breathe into the soul is 
to infuse graces, gifts, and virtues. To breathe through the soul 
is to touch and put in motion the virtues and perfections already 
given, renewing and moving them in such a way that of 
themselves they afford the soul a wonderful fragrance and 
sweetness. . . .12 
 
At the height of the spiritual marriage the soul is utterly passive as God acts 
upon the will through the theological virtues and gifts which have already been 
attained by the human person.13 But if the theological virtues have already 
been attained, is this attainment not in contradiction to the passivity just spoken 
of? If the soul is passive, how exactly have they been ‘attained’?  
 Following Aquinas, Maritain distinguishes between ‘acquired’ 
contemplation and ‘infused’ contemplation. It should be noted that both types 
of contemplation are supernatural in having God as their object. Now, the 
former Maritain describes as an intermediary degree of contemplation 
‘between metaphysical speculation and infused contemplation’ and which is 
‘like the fruit of the exercise of meditation’—meditation being understood here 
not as analogous to the wordless Buddhist samadhi but rather the mental 
concentration on an object. Examples of the meditation involved in acquired 
contemplation include all discursive prayer, such as the Rosary and the liturgy 
of the Mass.14  
 Infused contemplation, by contrast, only occurs, Jacques and Raïssa 
write, quoting Garrigou-Lagrange, ‘when the three signs mentioned by Saint 
John of the Cross, and before him by Tauler [disciple of Eckhart], are clearly 
present: 1) meditation becomes impossible; 2) the soul has no desire to fix the 
imagination on any particular object, interior or exterior; 3) the soul delights in 
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finding itself alone with God, fixing on Him its loving attention.’15 We have 
already seen that for Maritain, infused contemplation, as essentially 
supernatural, presupposes the activity or infusion of divine grace in the soul 
and the possession of the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The defining characteristic of 
infused contemplation I wish to focus on in relation to St. John of the Cross’ 
mystical verse is, therefore, its non-discursive quality.  
 In Liturgy and Contemplation, Jacques and Raïssa write of the ‘prayer 
of the heart’, in contradistinction to ‘prayer of the mind’, which correspond to 
infused and active contemplation respectively. Unlike the prayer of the mind, 
which ‘requires all of our attention . . . and the actual exercise of our faculties’,16 
the prayer of the heart is a silent, even ‘unconscious’ prayer in which the 
person is ‘constantly recollected in God’.17 And in this connection, Jacques 
and Raïssa quote the verse of Psalm 45, ‘Be still, and know that I am God!’,18 
to suggest the need for inner silence for any recollection of self in God 
whatsoever (which Christianity would demand for spiritual perfection).19 Non-
discursive contemplation, Maritain relates, was insisted upon by St. John of 
the Cross for the reason that inner silence allowed the soul to be aware of the 
workings of God within itself.20 This is the apophatic element that Maritain, St. 
John of the Cross and Eckhart share. For Eckhart, combining the texts of 
Wisdom and Job, says: ‘In the midst of silence there was spoken within me a 
secret word.’21 This is Eckhart’s famous doctrine of the birth of God in the 
soul—the ‘word’ referring to the logos, which is Christ.22 And it is here where 
the importance of Maritain’s interpretation of St. John of the Cross’ image of 
the ‘breathing’ of the fragrances of the soul’s garden lies for the overcoming of 
metaphysics through Infused-Poetic Contemplation. For Maritain writes that 
this breathing is associated with the operations of the Holy Trinity, and, as 
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such, is ‘what is most mysterious in the Saint’s teachings’.23  
 Again, in the spiritual marriage there is a total self-surrendering and self-
giving in love to God on the part of the soul, but even this self-giving is not to 
be understood as the sovereign act of the soul alone. It is because God is the 
‘principal agent’, as Maritain says, 24  infusing the soul with grace and 
bestowing the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the theological virtues, that, as 
Maritain quotes St. John of the Cross: 
 
The will of the soul that is converted into the will of God is then 
wholly the will of God, and the will of the soul is not lost but 
becomes the will of God. And thus the soul loves God with the 
will of God, which is also her own will; and thus she will love 
Him even as much as she is loved by God, since she loves Him 
with the will of God Himself. . . . [T]herefore the love of them 
both is one love.25 
 
Note, however, that nowhere do Maritain or St. John of the Cross say that the 
human soul is annihilated or destroyed. The human persona remains. It does 
not fall like a drop in a vast ocean of divinity or become a mere automaton, 
even if God is the ‘principal agent’. As such, there remains a multifarious 
horizon of experience for the human persona. Concerning the beatific vision, 
Aquinas himself makes the distinction between (a) the object of praise and 
worship, which is God, and (b) the act of worshipping.26 From this we can also 
intuit (c) the worshipper, such that the persona is not merely subsumed into 
God, ceasing to exist. To live in heaven, according to the New Testament, is 
‘to be with Christ’,27 but we retain our identity as persons, and as such, are 
given ‘new name . . . which no one knows except him who receives it.’28 When 
we consider that there remains some kind of personal human experience in 
the divine union, the distinction between entitative language and mystical 
language in fact proves invaluable for a phenomenology of mystical 
                                                 
23 DK, p. 400. 
24 Ibid., p. 364, 366. 
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experience. For in virtue of the extant persona there remains a conscious 
participation, the active living (and not merely existing) of the soul such there 
is a genuine relationship (or rather, marriage) between the soul and God. And 
it is because of this that the soul gives 
 
Not only itself and its all, but that which is its all [and] more than 
its all, its inward self and its life more than its own life and 
inwardness. For God has given to the soul, as to a true spouse, 
rights over Him, and made her the proprietor of His goods; she 
may dispose of them, give them to whomsoever she will. Thus, 
she gives God to God; her act of love, measured and finite in 
itself, gives to God, by the infinite love of God, the infinite 
Himself, an immeasurable gift. This gift evidently must not be 
understood as of the entitative order, as if the soul had the 
power of exercising an act upon God and adding to His 
perfection, enriching God’s being by its own being; for this 
would be absurd. It is a very real gift, but a gift which is effected 
in the . . . actuality of love, of the wholly immanent immaterial 
activity which takes place without involving the slightest 
entitative mutation (for it is actus perfecti) and achieves what 
matters most in the world, within the universe which the soul is 
to herself.29 
 
There is, then, action on the part of the human persona, and, as such, a 
genuinely mutual self-giving in the relationship between it and God. This 
underlies the dynamism of the second line of St. John of the Cross’ verse, 
‘That its perfumes may breathe forth’, for the human persona, even if through 
the will of God, effects the breathing, the transformative power of the gifts of 
the Holy Spirit. But having come so far with no positive conclusive answer to 
the pressing question of ontotheology in mystical experience as of yet, there 
arises this preliminary question: Does this underlying ontology of God and 
human persona mean that for Maritain ontology in fact determines the 
experience of the mystic? That is, do the inviolable ontological distinctions 
between God and human soul, as Creator and creature, eternal and finite, 
ipsum esse subsistens and ens, in the end serve to set the parameters of what 
can be experienced in union with God? Put more directly, do we remain in the 
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realm of ontotheology even as pertaining to the spiritual marriage and the 
beatific vision?  
 To all three questions, it can be answered ‘yes’, as long as we speak in 
the language of Maritain the metaphysician. But in another, and much more 
important sense, it can, I claim, be answered with a definitive ‘no’. There is in 
Maritain, I argue, an alethiological experience of the Trinity when the 
experience is had through what is the prior field of Infused-Poetic 
Contemplation, prior to—and this is crucial—metaphysics, but not religious 
faith, as we see in the manner of Maritain’s initial coming to faith as related in 
chapters three and four, and to which I shall return later.    
 
(ii) Mystical Experience as Trinitarian Experience 
 
It is of the breathing of fragrances of the soul’s inner garden that St. John of 
the Cross writes that the ‘Holy Spirit . . . raises the soul so that “she may 
breathe in God the same breath of love that the Father breathes in the Son 
and the Son in the Father, which is this same Holy Spirit that they breathe into 
her in the said transformation.”’30 Maritain follows St. John of the Cross in 
appealing to John 27:24, where Christ prays ‘Father, I desire that those also, 
whom you have given me, may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which 
you have given me because you loved me before the foundation of the world.’31 
The crucial point of interpretation for Maritain is when St. John of the Cross 
says that when Christ is praying to God the Father that the souls entrusted to 
him by the Father be with Him, Christ means also by this ‘that they [human 
souls] may work in Us by participation the same work which I do by nature, 
namely, breathe the Holy Spirit’.32 Taken in light of the foregoing mystical 
statements that the soul becomes God by participation, in a union of ‘one spirit 
and love’, Maritain writes: 
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[T]he Father, wishing us to be one as They [the Father and the 
Son] are one, the Son in us and He in the Son, and loving us 
as He loved the Son, will bestow upon us [as says St. John of 
the Cross] ‘the same love as to the Son, though not naturally, 
as to the Son, but . . . by unity and transformation of love. . . .’33   
 
And we recall Maritain saying: 
 
At this summit of the spiritual life and of mystical experience the 
soul emerges expressly into the depths of . . . God attained in 
His own divine essence, to the Deity Itself and as such, who in 
His absolutely proper and intimate life, is a Trinity of Persons, a 
resplendent and tranquil society of Three in the same indivisible 
essence of light and love. . . . [M]ystical experience tends from 
the beginning to loving and fruitful knowledge of three 
uncreated Persons.34 
 
The human persona, then, has a very real experience of, and really does 
partake in, the life of the Holy Trinity. Maritain quotes St. Augustine: ‘The 
realities we will one day enjoy are the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.’35 
How precisely does this occur? Maritain as philosopher-theologian is keen to 
point out, as is St. John of the Cross himself, that in all of this there is no 
entitative or ‘natural’ transformation of the soul into that of the Persons of the 
Trinity. Whereas Eckhart engages in theory and system building, St. John of 
the Cross ‘strictly adheres to what alone is warranted by his experience’, and 
with this qualification on the nature of his mystical statements, the notion of the 
soul’s participation in the operations of the Holy Trinity does not occur ‘in an 
entitative manner, even by participation, with the divine processions [of the 
three Persons of the Trinity].’36 ‘[T]he saint is not using the language of the 
speculative theologian; there is absolutely no question here, from any point of 
view, of an entitative participation of the creature in the uncreated act of love 
by reason of which the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.’37 
Both Maritain and the saint are evidently relying here upon the Patristic notion 
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of ‘perichoresis’, ‘circumincession’, or what Robert Barron calls ‘coinherence’, 
which refers to the interrelating and interpenetration of the Persons of the 
Trinity.38 The Persons of the Trinity, because they are considered, in light of 
divine revelation and the Magesterium of the Church to be one God, rather 
than three different gods, are considered not in an Aristotelian manner as 
separate substances juxtaposed to one another but rather as ‘a communion of 
love’ such that God is ‘like a harmony or a musical cord.’39 ‘At the most 
fundamental level of existence’, says Barron, ‘substance and relationship 
utterly coincide. To be is to be in rapport with another, for the Father is the 
Father only in relation to the Son, and the Son is the Son only in relation to the 
Father, and the Holy Spirit is nothing but the relationship between the Father 
and the Son.’40   
 But if the question ‘How precisely does this occur?’ is pressed, we can 
go no further, for we find ourselves standing, or rather swimming, in the ‘depths 
of the holiest mystery of Christian revelation’,41 which is the nature of the Holy 
Trinity. Consequently, the question of how the human soul experientially 
participates in the life of the Trinity is equally unanswerable on a metaphysical 
level. As St. John of the Cross says: ‘No knowledge or power can describe 
how this happens, unless by explaining how the Son of God attained and 
merited such a high state for us, the power to be children of God, as St. John 
says [John 1:12].’42 We can thus only go in a circle, for St. John of the Cross 
immediately follows this with the same interpretation of the prayer of Christ 
given above. There is, then, no understanding beyond this point. 
 Even so, Heidegger and Caputo would certainly claim, Maritain and St. 
John of the Cross conceive the Trinity as pure and eternal presence. Moreover, 
there remains the ontological distinction between God and the human persona 
and even an experiential differentiation between God and the human persona 
in the field of experience of the persona, such that God is an intentional object. 
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To this, again, I say ‘True’. Maritain even says that the union of love is rendered 
possible by ‘an act inwardly referring the soul to the Trinity as object’.43 Yet, 
almost in the same breath, Maritain also says: 
 
The soul may be said to breathe forth the Spirit of love with the 
Father and Son inasmuch as, turned toward the Father and Son 
as objects of her love, she loves them (the while the Holy Spirit 
receives absolutely nothing from her) with the same love which 
in God breathes forth the Holy Spirit and in the same sense in 
which it ‘gives God to God.’44 
 
If one is not too dazzled, what is one to make of all this? It is not an 
overstatement to say that in half of what Maritain says, his conception of 
mystical union—the spiritual marriage and the beatific vision—is pure 
ontotheology, but in the other half, God is not mere presence, but a dynamic, 
communion. This is a communion of Persons, as Barron says, of 
‘coinherence’, in contradistinction with juxtaposed objects—and the soul’s 
union with God is expressed poetically in the mystical verse and prose as a 
‘breathing’, the mystical-poetic expression being fully adopted by Maritain not 
as a mere rhetorical device but as a metaphor which is nonetheless true. On 
the one hand, we see Maritain constantly reminding the reader of what he 
takes to be the inviolable laws of Thomistic metaphysics—necessary to 
prevent heretical interpretations of St. John of the Cross’ profound statements 
of mystical theology (such as taking the soul’s participation in the life of the 
Trinity as ontological union with God). On the other hand, however, God, even 
as Trinity, is conveyed to us as absolutely ineffable and infinite mystery, but 
mystical union with God seems to be expressible in mystical and poetical 
language employing the metaphor of the soul’s ‘breathing’ in dynamic union 
with the Persons of the Holy Trinity. Indeed, Maritain also affirms God’s 
capacity to suffer, in virtue of the fact that as an essential element of their faith 
the Christian must believe that God has ‘for us the feelings of a Father’.45 This 
particular conviction must be also affirmed but admitted to be beyond human 
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understanding—or at least within the conceptual framework of Thomism. The 
ability of God to suffer, Maritain says, leads us, ‘beyond theology’,46 leaving 
‘us blind when we try to discern, except metaphorically, what its exemplar is 
like in God.’47  
 And this is worth noting, for we surely do not simply remain in the 
domain of the problem of the inability of analogical concepts to capture the 
divine essence—that is, the moment, as Maritain says, when ‘our concepts’, 
referring to the divine and ‘while keeping their proper meaning, are absorbed 
into its abyss’ in virtue of the fact that ‘what is signified by them breaks loose—
we don’t know how—from our manner of conceiving’.48 It is not just that, in 
virtue of the infinity of the supreme act or esse of God that ‘each of the 
concepts by which we come to know God’s divine perfections opens out, like 
a river does into the sea, into an infinity of splendors unknown to us.’49 For 
what power would Heidegger’s critique of Western metaphysics as 
ontotheology have if all of this simply amounted to a misunderstanding of 
Thomistic doctrine? Caputo’s confrontation between Heidegger and Aquinas 
would have no grounds. John Knasas, however, argues that just such a 
misunderstanding is indeed at work.  
 Knasas is a contemporary Thomist who has written in support of 
Etienne Gilson’s criticism of Maritain’s intuition of being as that which typifies 
metaphysics. Knasas, however, argues for a Gilsonian rather than Maritainian 
defence of Aquinas against Heidegger’s charge that Aquinas is guilty of the 
‘oblivion of being’. Knasas argues, in congruence with Caputo, that for 
Heidegger, being is the a priori transcendental horizon for the coming-to-be of 
all beings.50 As Knasas renders Heidegger, the transcendental horizon is that 
which allows all beings to be, including God, for God, modelled on the ability 
to make actual—as we saw earlier—is regarded by Heidegger as the ‘highest 
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being’. The claim that Aquinas and Maritain’s ‘real distinction’ between 
essence and existence sufficiently provides for an acknowledgment of an 
ontological difference between Being and beings would, therefore, only play 
into Heidegger’s hands. Caputo himself therefore argues that ‘The Scholastic 
who wishes to respond to Heidegger's critique has to come to grips with the 
whole premise of transcendental philosophy.’51  
 Knasas rejects this call to concede to Heidegger and instead affirms an 
a posteriori, abstractive approach based on the distinction between sensible 
and immaterial objects. Knasas argues elsewhere that while esse is always 
the act of some entity or body experienced by the subject, it is not given in 
experience that esse can actuate more than bodies (i.e. immaterial realities 
including souls, angels, and other such forms). For Knasas, therefore, 
Maritain’s conception of the intuition of being ‘claims more from experience 
than experience can give’ and in fact presupposes prior knowledge of an 
immaterial being or power able to actualise immaterial things.52 According to 
Knasas, Heidegger argues that the common being (ens commune) of the 
metaphysician—that in which all beings share in order to be—should be 
regarded as an a priori, and given that God is that which in which all other 
beings, sensible and immaterial, participate for their existence, God is to be 
identified with this ens commune. But, Knasas says:  
 
Aquinas relates God to ens commune not as an instance 
thereof but as the transcending cause of ens commune. God 
is not under ens commune but above it. It is true that Aquinas 
sees esse as analogically common to God and creatures. But 
again one must be careful to conceive this position correctly. 
The analogon of esse is not even intelligibly prior to God. 
Rather, the divine analogate instantiates the analogon. God is 
esse subsistens. All other esse is esse accidentale.53  
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It is because esse allows us to abstract to the cause of beings, to the esse 
subsistens at a later stage in metaphysics rather, that Knasas believes 
Heidegger to be wrong in his insistence that the ground or horizon of beings 
be an a priori. The implication, and Knasas’ point about Maritain’s approach, 
even though he never makes it so explicit, is that if a total perception or intuition 
of being as that by which beings are beings is required at both the outset and 
summit of the metaphysical enterprise, as it is in Maritain, then this constitutes 
a more or less a priori conception of being—which contradicts the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic epistemology that Maritain intends to defend and which renders 
God a mere being among beings. This is why Knasas prefers a ‘much less 
ample notion of being’, which, as abstractive, begins with sensible experience 
and the simple apprehension that a thing is and that that is different from what 
it is before proceeding to posit immaterial realities and their cause. This, for 
Knasas, Heidegger cannot possibly conceive, because he insists (and 
arbitrarily so) that being is an a priori: 
 
Contrary to Caputo’s opinion, Gilson's thesis in Being and 
Some Philosophers that Aquinas alone was sufficiently 
attentive to the existential side of being is relevant for answering 
Heidegger's charge of the oblivion of being among Western 
philosophers. Aquinas does not forget what Heidegger calls 
Being in the ontological difference. Aquinas just moves it to a 
latter stage of a posteriori metaphysical reflection. If anyone has 
an oblivion of being, it is Heidegger. Heidegger seems to be 
unaware of the merely existential notion of being by which 
Aquinas initiates metaphysics.54  
 
Knasas’ motivation is to rescue the Thomist (and even Christian) distinction 
between Creator and creature, between ipsum esse subsistens and esse 
accidentale. He argues that ‘Being is always found with beings because it is 
simultaneously derived from them’,55 and, on a deeper level: ‘The analogon of 
esse is not even intelligibly prior to God. Rather, the divine analogate 
instantiates the analogon. God is esse subsistens. All other esse is esse 
accidentale. Aquinas traces esse accidentale to God not only causally but also 
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intelligibly. In sum, for Aquinas, unlike for Heidegger, even intelligibly speaking, 
nothing exists prior to God.’56  
 With all this having been said, however, it seems to me that Knasas is 
missing Caputo’s point, which is precisely that so long as we are talking about 
Beings in terms of cause, we are led away from ‘that which grants Being as 
the subject matter for metaphysics.’ 57  We remain in the realm of mere 
presencing, or Anwesen, which is to say within only one modality of being 
emerging from the Ereignis, the event of the happening of Being, remaining 
unable to step back to consider that which even makes the event possible. 
Again, it is not esse that allows Aquinas and Maritain to avoid ontotheology, 
for esse is again cast in terms of actualitas, which is what we can call the 
ontotheological principle of ‘making present’. While Gilson and Knasas regard 
esse as the highest perfection and that which preserves the ‘real distinction’ 
between essence and existence in all beings that are not God, for Heidegger, 
esse is both a symptom and a cause of ‘annihilation of being’, of the forgetting 
of Being (Seinsvergessenheit). One of Caputo’s main methods, we have seen, 
is to push the notion of esse to its Eckhartian extreme, to the point where, 
along with ratio, it breaks down under its own weight. As it does, we begin to 
see the mystical that is both its inspiration and end. I agree with Thomas 
Sheehan who, in a review, declared that ‘Caputo has undone, once and for all, 
the neo-Thomistic claim that at least one formation of being in the history of 
ontology—what Aquinas identified as esse, an entity’s act-of-being—escapes 
Heidegger's charge of the “oblivion of being”.’58 
  Let it be said that for his part, Maritain is, like Aquinas, caught up in 
causal language, spell-bound as it were to the scholastic machinery of his 
master. Even when it comes to his claim that there is in God an ‘unnamed and 
unnamable’59 capacity of God to suffer, Maritain insists upon the usage of 
Thomistic categories of participation, perfections and imperfections, and calls 
upon his readers to ‘understand these things and do as best we can, advancing 
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little by little’. Not only this, but he makes the rather startling statement that by 
such means he endeavours 
 
to show that we must not leave it to the poets but must work to 
integrate it into theology—the great mystery of what, in an 
infinitely happy God, corresponds to what suffering is in us, not 
with regard to the frightening mark of imperfection it implies, but 
with regard to the incomparable grandeur that it also reveals . . 
. It seems to me that this great mystery opens up a singularly 
vast domain, over which the tyranny of words has too long cast 
its interdict, to theologians, who alone are properly armed to 
treat it by strict methods of reason planted in the faith.60  
 
Maritain is, in fact, immersed in ontotheology, and it is only through careful 
retrieval of his underlying motivations and insights (which he would certainly 
endorse) that we go beyond causality and even the notion of esse to the non-
metaphysical experience of the mystic, to what, in Heideggerian language, is 
‘alethiological’. With regard to the attendant theory of participatory Being, 
Caputo in fact builds upon Max Müller’s thesis that the Thomistic theory of the 
participation of Being sufficiently answers the charge that Aquinas, as a thinker 
of actualitas, also serves to complete the oblivion of being.61 Caputo writes 
that the doctrine of participation ‘must cease to be a causal theory which 
articulates the dynamics of the creative action and become a doctrine of 
presencing’.62 This is the religious alethiology that has been spoken of, and it 
is by means of a deconstruction of Maritain, situating him in his biographical, 
historical and religious context, that I am attempting to show that this religious 
alethiology can be found in his life and philosophy. This deconstructive 
situating of Maritain encompasses identifying the ‘friends of God’ in Maritain’s 
life that are for him ‘revealers of Being’, and by a stripping away of Thomistic 
metaphysics in Maritain’s Infused-Poetic-Contemplative meditations on Léon 
Bloy’s mystical prose, Georges Rouault’s paintings and St. John of the Cross’ 
mystical verses. 
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(iii) Breaking Through: Poetic-Mystical Language  
 
With this in mind, and to unravel the apparent paradox in what Maritain says 
of mystical union, a two-fold strategy of ‘breaking through’ ontotheology must 
therefore be employed. The first step is differentiating between metaphysical 
language and poetic-mystical language in those influencing Maritain’s 
reflections on God and mystical union and in Maritain’s reflections themselves. 
The difference, for the purpose of retrieving a pre-metaphysical tendency in 
Maritain, is not that one language is a true way of expression or refers to what 
is true, whereas the other is not or does not. Rather, the important difference 
for the purposes of this study is the kind of truths they express, or invite one to 
enter into. The difference in mode of expression between metaphysical poetic-
mystical statements is obvious and irrelevant to the charge of onthotheology. 
It is the content that matters.  
 The second (and conclusive) step of the strategy that will be employed 
is determining which of the two kinds of language, metaphysical or poetic-
mystical, for Maritain, expresses or invites one to participation in the highest 
truths about God and mystical union. This cannot be done by merely repeating 
Maritain’s own statements on the ‘degrees’ of knowledge, that metaphysics, 
as I quoted Maritain in the introduction, ‘awakens a desire for supreme union, 
for spiritual possession completed in the order of reality itself [of which 
metaphysics] cannot satisfy’.63 Against any and all types of natural mysticism, 
neo-Platonism, theosophy and idealism, Maritain is adamant that mystical 
wisdom is higher than metaphysical wisdom in its being a connatural 
experience-knowledge of God’s essence and inner life, and that human love 
and poetic experience (not what I called Infused-Poetic Contemplation) are the 
most significant natural analogies of mystical experience. But having had a 
tour of Maritain’s treatments of mystical union, we have seen that half of his 
utterances remain saturated with ontotheology. Determining the primacy of 
mystical language over metaphysical language can only be determined by 
returning to Maritain’s treatment of mystical experience of the Holy Trinity in 
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light of St. John of the Cross and the salient facts in Maritain’s biography. The 
upshot of this is that we can immediately see that despite the rather tortuous 
back-and-forth of the preceding discussion, much progress in this two-step 
strategy has already been made. 
  Maritain’s conceptions of God and mystical union are not 
ontotheological in character so long as he speaks in the language of the poet-
mystic, very much reliant on St. John of the Cross, as we have, for example, 
in the representation of the union of the soul with the Persons of the Trinity in 
God ‘breathing through’ the garden of the soul and the fragrance of the soul 
themselves ‘breathing forth’. Such language is clearly mystical, and not 
metaphysical, only if, and as long as, the language employed draws neither 
explicitly from the principles of ‘efficient’ causality and entitative distinction nor 
from other ontotheological tropes, such as conceiving God as presence in 
visual metaphor—except, of course, where this is unmistakably poetic (this is 
not to say untrue or less true). It is only when he speaks in the same language 
of the poet-mystic (Bloy and St. John of the Cross in this case) that is, through 
Infused-Poetic Contemplation, that a deeply embedded pre-metaphysical, 
mystical tendency is revealed in Maritain’s thinking—and which is, in fact, the 
driving force behind his philosophical utterances. The inspired words of the 
poet-mystic, in which God and the mystical experience of God are not overlaid 
with or even resting on a metaphysics of esse and essentia, but are, in 
Caputo’s terms, coming from a place of an ‘alethiological’ experience of the 
presencing and withdrawal of God, is what we seek here. 
 Admittedly, the boundary between the metaphysical and the poetic is 
anything but water-tight. It is in fact quite porous, and especially so when we 
consider notions such as the ‘beatific vision.’ But it is the distinction between 
the two which allows Maritain to contribute quite radical developments of 
Thomistic philosophy of religion. Central Christian beliefs, such as the 
existence of heaven, are, for Maritain, conveyed as metaphors for the 
transcendence of God (metaphor being essential for poetic language, and 
again, no less true than metaphysical statements, albeit of a different kind of 
truth). And again, Maritain speaks of ‘a mysterious perfection, which is in God 
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the unnamed exemplar of suffering in us’,64 which he goes on to say, ‘implies 
limitation and imperfection in its very notion and so cannot be said of God 
except metaphorically, but which in the reality to which it refers as we 
experience it, does designate a perfection’.65  
 It is also because of this distinction that the vocations of the artist and 
the metaphysician are radically different. And it is because the Christian artist 
does not rely on ratio, does not continually seek to know, as does the 
philosopher, that they, like the Christian mystic, must undergo a kenosis of self 
in their contemplation of the divine, such that the Christian artist and Christian 
mystic understand each other, as Maritain says. ‘I was reduced to nothing and 
I knew no more. Beyond knowing? That is to say, in love. . . . For now my 
exercise is in loving alone.’66 The artist, as we have seen, recognizes in the 
beautiful that which is most real, most lovable, and in the case of Christian 
artists who pursue the divine as their very subject matter, such as Bloy, 
Rouault, Raïssa Maritain and St. John of the Cross, this is precisely where the 
convergence of the artist and mystic converge—their knowledge not arising 
from or expressing metaphysical principles, but mystical truths of love, 
because love is their mode of knowing.67 As St. John of the Cross speaks of 
the ‘spiritual marriage’, and of the breathing between the human soul and the 
Persons of the Trinity, so does Bloy speak of the ‘Friend of God’ who finds 
themselves ‘speaking to God as a lover speaks to his beloved.’68  
 Now, the question needs to be asked: does Maritain himself employ 
mystical-poetic language to express divine truth and experience of mystical 
union? Other than having recourse to St. John of the Cross’ metaphor of the 
‘breathing’ between the human soul and the Persons of the Trinity, we have, 
indeed, already seen that Maritain employs poetic-mystical language to 
express mystical union analogically—which is where the utility of the doctrine 
of analogical being for our purposes lies. We recall that Maritain says that when 
                                                 
64 See Part I, section five of the present study: ‘Petit Frère de Jésus’, in the chapter ‘Truth 
Among Saints’. 
65 UT, p. 261. 
66 DK, pp.. 371–372 (original emphasis). 
67 See Part II, Chapters 2 and 3. 
68 Leiva-Merikakis, ‘Léon Bloy and Jacques Maritain’, p. 77. 
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two people are united in the deepest love, each becomes ‘a part which no 
longer exists except through and in that All which is his or her All. . . . in the 
magic and the spiritual “superexistence” of love . . . [which is] precisely what is 
in itself impossible and makes no sense in the order of mere existence or 
simple being.’ 69  Of artistic experience, Maritain writes that the [P]oet 
‘completes the world of creation; he cooperates in divine balancings, he moves 
mysteries about; he is in natural sympathy with the secret powers that play 
about in the universe. A slide down the inclined plane of heaven, a push from 
grace: the sleeper will change sides, and will wake up with God.’70 
 The latter quote, which suggests that the [P]oet is participating in the 
creative acts of God while remaining in ignorance of the fact until they ‘wake 
up’ from a certain sleep, is particularly pertinent to what I claim is a relationship 
of mutual dependence between apophasis and caritas in the overcoming of 
metaphysics in Maritain. For in ‘Song of Songs’, a translation of and 
commentary on the biblical poem Song of Songs, which, as I previously 
related, was originally published as the final chapter in Maritain’s final book in 
1973—in rather remarkable parallel to Aquinas, whose last work was a 
commentary on the same text71—Maritain gives what he calls a ‘completely 
open reading’72 of the poem and of the sleeping of the Shulamite woman, who 
is one of two main characters in the poem, along with her lover. 
 This commentary, Maritain tells us, he originally wrote for private use, 
reading the Song or ‘Canticle’ ‘in the way that pleases me most,’ rather than 
being for the purpose of contributing to the field of scientific biblical exegesis.73 
Knowing neither Hebrew nor Syriac, he says, the translation of the poem was 
done by way of collating existing French translations and he ‘hoped that, put 
in the form of a French poem sprung from a single continuous burst of 
inspiration, its incomparable beauty would become apparent in such a way as 
would satisfy my need for poetry, something that literal translations generally 
                                                 
69 UT, p. 169. 
70 MAG, pp. 24–25. 
71 See Part I, Chapter 3. 
72 UT, p. 443. 
73 Ibid., p. 475. 
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do not do.’74  
 Maritain identifies three traditional kinds of interpretation of the Song: 
first, that it refers to the history of the Jewish people in their relationship with 
God, second, that, following the Incarnation, it prophetically refers to the 
mysterious union of Christ and the Christian Church, and third, that it refers to 
‘the love between God and the soul that has abandoned itself completely to 
Him in the secret of mystical contemplation.’75 All of these are true, says 
Maritain,76 and this confirms what was said earlier about poetic language, 
particularly metaphor, being just as able to convey truth about God and 
mystical union as metaphysical propositions, for Maritain, as well as the fact 
that truth for him, can be of many different kinds, as with poetic meaning. But 
what unites them, Maritain says, is that the poem is ‘inspired from above, 
singing in a spontaneous impulse of the soul, about absolute love’.77  
 What Maritain calls a ‘reflexive reading’ of the Song according to the 
second interpretation would be concerned with ‘the lived spiritual experience 
lived out by the person of the Church, the Bride of Christ, in her innermost self, 
in her relationship with her Spouse, with the stages of the progress of her 
indefectibly holy love, together with the vicissitudes, the purifying dark nights, 
the renewals of more profound union with the Beloved.’78 The problem with 
providing such an interpretation, however, has been the historical problem that 
patristic commentators could not consider the Church's own history, in virtue 
of the fact that it had yet to unfold. As such, there could be no allegorical 
reading of the poem as an allegory of the relationship between Christ and the 
Church, and a complete reflexive reading according to this interpretation has 
yet to appear. This Maritain sets out to provide, in order to bring out its 
‘prophetic and Christian’ meaning.79 
 The most interesting element of Maritain’s interpretation for our 
purposes, as I indicated, is his deviation from traditional readings of the 
                                                 
74 Ibid., p. 446. 
75 Ibid., p. 444. 
76 Ibid., pp. 443–444, 448. 
77 Ibid., p. 446. 
78 Ibid., p. 447 (original emphasis). 
79 Ibid., p. 445. 
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sleeping of the Shulamite. Maritain is concerned with the ‘mystery’ of the 
‘Person’ of the Christian Church, this Person taken to be ‘an ontological person 
properly so called, a created person made up of a multitude’.80 This Person 
that is the Church, is the Bride of Christ, represented here by the Shulamite. 
And in her capacity as a person, the Church is liable to failure and infirmities 
with respect to her relationship to God, but with the qualification that a 
distinction has to be made between the Person of the Church strictly speaking, 
who remains ‘constituted from above’ and without fault, and the ‘members’ or 
personnel of the Church, who are the imperfect human beings that make up 
its hierarchies.81 The failures of the Church’s personnel, we see, for example, 
Maritain says, in the Inquisition.82 There are, then, periods of darkness that 
the Church has to live through.  
 But, says Maritain, whereas traditional commentators have argued that 
the Shulamite’s sleeping signifies negligence and a forsaking of God on the 
part of the Shulamite—who has traditionally been taken to be Israel or the 
Bride of Christ—the Song actually contains ‘absolutely no reproach’ with 
regard to her.83 Upon reading the Song, ‘what is certain’, Maritain writes, ‘is 
that, however serious it is, the damage caused within the personnel of the 
Church and by that personnel are far less important in the eyes of the 
Bridegroom than progress in charity in the Person of the Church, in its living 
relationship of love with Him.’84 
 Suggesting an alternative approach to interpreting the apparent 
inactivity of the Shulamite, Maritain writes that ‘Between sleep and the night 
there are surely certain affinities’.85 And what we find are four different kinds 
of sleep and night in the Song, interpreted by Maritain to be a kind of 
contemplation in mystical union. The first is the Shulamite falling asleep in the 
arms of her Beloved, which Maritain calls ‘the silent ardor of holy 
                                                 
80 Ibid., p. 456.  
81 Ibid., pp. 461–463. 
82 Ibid., p. 464. 
83 Ibid., p. 452. 
84 Ibid., p. 469. 
85 Ibid., p. 464. 
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contemplation, with eyes closed to everything else.’86 Maritain inserts this line 
in the first part of the poem, in which we find the same metaphor of breathing 
as in the previous discussion:  
 
Alone with each other! The two of us in a single breath of love.87 
 
The second night takes place after ‘the night of the senses’, which Maritain 
takes to be the same spiritual purgation spoken of by St. John of the Cross. 
Thus Maritain’s version of the Song reads: 
 
In my bed, through the long dark nights, 
I sought my soul’s true love. 
I sought him but did not find him.88 
 
Maritain says this dark night is the ‘mystery of nothingness’ of the creature that 
is the correlative of the ‘mystery of God’.89 The Shulamite, the Church, or, 
understood in St. John of the Cross’ terms, as the individual human soul, ‘must 
first pass through the night, before being led into the silence and peace of a 
contemplation that is this time more profound and more abandoned than that 
of the first sleep, so that she may grow in charity’.90 
 The third sleep is referred to only in one line:  
 
I am asleep, but my heart is awake.91 
 
Maritain says that in this sleep, which falls over the Shulamite, nothing remains 
of any gentleness or sweetness, but she is nevertheless ‘at the very depths of 
her being . . . anxiously attentive to the slight indication of her Lover’s 
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87 Ibid., p. 481. 
88 Ibid., p. 483. 
89 Ibid., p. 465. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., p. 487. 
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approach.’92 This is the dark night of the soul, the ‘abyss’ which  
 
precedes and acts as an immediate preface to that great night 
in which the highest and most precious powers of the soul will 
be bound and in which the soul will be besieged by temptations 
to go astray, under the crushing weight, felt in the heart, of 
having been abandoned by God.93 
 
Maritain writes that it is at this point which the Beloved appears and knocks at 
the door, but the Shulamite answers too late, and he disappears. And this is 
proceeded by the deepest suffering of the soul, expressed in the lines: 
 
My soul almost left my body, 
I could do no more than cry after him, 
I looked for him but did not find him. 
I called to him, but he did not answer.94 
 
Upon which she is brutally attacked: 
 
The watchmen came across me 
As they made their rounds about the city. 
They beat me, they wounded me, 
They tore off my cloak, 
These guardians of the city walls.95 
 
Nevertheless, the Shulamite’s desire for her Beloved grows, and there is a final 
sleep, in which ‘the love between the Bridegroom and His Bride reaches its 
consummation.96 The Shulamite entreats the Beloved: ‘Let me dream in your 
arms’, even as she says: ‘A dream? No, this is holy reality’ and that love ‘exults 
forever beyond all sleep’.97 What does this apparent contradiction suggest? 
Dunaway says that ‘the sleeping of the Shulamite Beloved is an allegorical 
picture of the spiritual faculty of vision that can take place only in the serenity 
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97 Ibid., p. 492. 
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of contemplation.’98 This we can see when the Shulamite says: ‘I am asleep, 
but my heart is awake’. In four passages pertaining to sleep, Dunaway points 
out, Maritain’s translation  
 
adds specific phrases to describe the sleep as contemplative 
rest—She [the Shulamite or Bride] ‘abandons herself to rest 
[s’abandonnent au repos] ... Her eyes test in plenitude 
[reposent en plénitude] ... Let me dream in your arms ... Dream? 
But this is holy reality [Laisse-moi rêver dans tes bras ... Rêve? 
Mais c’est la realité sainte]," and, finally, she asks how one 
could awaken love ‘now that in the Beloved, it exults forever 
beyond sleep [maintenant qu’en l’amante / Il exulte à jamais au-
delà du sommeil]?’ Thus, Maritain rejects out of hand any 
interpretation that would suggest that the sleeping episodes 
signify any sort of acedia or truancy on the part of the Beloved, 
who instead is now seen by her Bridegroom as the one 
rendered perfect by her fixed gaze, the soul lost in the wonder 
of contemplation.99 
 
The sleeping of the Shulamite, then, does not represent mere idleness or even 
disinterestedness, but the highest kind of contemplation, only possible after 
having endured dark nights. And this poetic metaphor of contemplative union 
with God is not a one-time event in Maritain’s writings. One might be surprised 
to learn that Maritain briefly alludes to just this idea elsewhere, in the lecture 
Man’s Approach to God, where he speaks of the suppression of concepts in 
mystical contemplation. ‘In such an experience’, Maritain writes, ‘distinct 
concepts keep silent, they sleep as the Apostles slept on the Mount of Olives. 
. . . The light of God-given contemplation is the ardor of love gleaming in the 
dark. That is why this supreme wisdom, this supernatural knowledge of love, 
is described as a giving up of knowing and an unknowing [to quote Pseudo-
Dionysius], a ray of darkness for the intellect.’100 And here it is well worth 
quoting Pseudo-Dionysius, for here in Maritain we see the strongest 
affirmation of the value of apophasis: 
 
                                                 
98 Dunaway, ‘Maritain on the Song of Songs’, p. 317. 
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Do thou, then, in the intent practice of mystic contemplation, 
leave behind the senses and the operations of the intellect, and 
all things that the senses or the intellect can perceive, and all 
things which are not and things which are, and strain upwards 
in unknowing, as far as may be, towards the union with Him 
Who is above all things and knowledge. For by unceasing and 
absolute withdrawal from thyself and all things in purity, 
abandoning all and set free from all, thou shalt be borne up to 
the ray of divine Darkness that surpasseth all being.101 
 
A key to understanding Maritain's approach to the Song, says Dunaway, ‘is to 
remember that it has nothing to do with discursive knowledge.’102 And indeed, 
Maritain says at the outset:  
 
[T]his is not [in fact] an allegorical poem. Like every great poem, 
it is an enigmatic poem, in which there is no question of evoking 
ideas, but rather a question of obeying, in order to give it voice, 
a spontaneous impulse of the soul that is completely intuitive 
and supra-conceptual, and in which the resonances of words 
reverberate endlessly, but which nevertheless goes straight to 
its object: And this object is ‘absolute love.’103 
 
It is of great consequence that Dunaway sees Maritain’s interpretation and 
translation as a perfect example of the connatural mode of knowledge which 
is poetic experience. This, we know, is a resonance between the artist and 
beautiful, lovable, aspects of things.  
 
Maritain, on the other hand, precisely by entering into the poet's 
character through connatural knowledge is able to understand 
that the poet of the Song of Songs, while he certainly was 
extensively and painfully aware of the many infidelities of the 
chosen people, was able to leave that knowledge buried in his 
subconscious during the composition of the inspired poem.104 
 
Thus Maritain’s interpretation and translation of the Song demonstrates to us 
an Infused-Poetic-Contemplative understanding of mystical union in his 
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thought. What is here being represented is not merely human love as an 
analogy of mystical union, but the very dynamics of mystical union itself—and 
we have witnessed a recurrence of the theme of the mutual dependence of 
apophasis and caritas in the contemplative sleep of the Shulamite.  
 Is Maritain truly a poet? Perhaps we see something of the poet in 
Maritain here insofar as there is intentional emotion present in his verses, 
which are themselves quite beautiful even in translation. But what I am most 
concerned with is the content of the poetic-mystical text that Maritain produced 
as it pertains to mystical experience. It is enough to find that Maritain affirms 
the validity of, and attempts to effect, poetic-mystical means of expressing 
mystical union that have absolutely no trace of ontotheology. There is, in 
Maritain’s mystical theology, a necessary element of ‘unknowing’ in the act of 
love that brings the human soul in union with the supreme mystery of the 
Triune God. The mystery of God and mystical union with persons of the Trinity, 
and the act of apophasis necessary for the soul to commune with the Holy 
Trinity, together constitute one of two parts of an alethiological conception of 
the divine and our experience of it. Perhaps the best expression that we have 
found is in the ‘mystery of nothingness’ experienced by the Shulamite as the 
necessary corollary of the ‘mystery of God’ in the dark night of the senses. 
 
(iv) Breaking Through:  
Visual versus Mystical Experience of the Trinity 
 
We come now to the second step in retrieving an alethiological experience of 
God and mystical union in Maritain, and that is determining which kind of 
language for Maritain, metaphysical or mystical, expresses or invites one to 
participate in the highest truths about God and mystical union. If there is in 
Maritain a pre-metaphysical tendency, then it becomes necessary to show that 
mystical language relates to the highest truths of God and mystical union for 
him. I have said that in pursuing this, one cannot merely repeat Maritain’s own 
statements on the primacy of mystical knowledge in the degrees of knowledge. 
One must have recourse to the experience of mystical union with the Persons 
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of the Holy Trinity (which is, for Maritain the summit of mystical experience), 
and of the salient facts of Maritain’s biography. 
 It is precisely concerning experience that Jacques and Raïssa write that 
when the soul has progressed far enough in contemplative union, it ‘no longer 
thinks of anything but loving.’ 105  There is an apophasis that renders the 
mystical union possible, and, as far as the mystic of infused contemplation is 
concerned, even prior to the spiritual marriage, during the spiritual ‘betrothal’, 
the soul, Maritain says, has knowledge of God ‘stripped of all accidents and 
images.’106 In the final pages of The Degrees of Knowledge, some forty years 
before the publication of ‘Song of Songs’, Maritain also distinguishes between 
‘mystical experience of the life of the Trinity’ proper to infused contemplation 
and ‘intellectual vision of the Trinity’, which belongs to the order of 
charismata,107 an order of the ‘manifestation’ of the Holy Spirit which includes 
healing, miracle-working, prophecy, the discernment of spirits , speaking in 
tongues and the interpretation of such language. 108  With respect to the 
spiritual marriage, Maritain writes of this distinction: 
 
Intellectual vision of the Trinity is not essential to the spiritual 
marriage. But mystical experience of the life of the Trinity, 
insofar as it can proceed only from the essential principle of 
infused contemplation . . . such experience is one of the 
essential privileges of this state of transformation. While it 
requires, and because it requires, the highest knowledge on this 
earth of the abyss of unity, this state is explicitly and formally 
related to the life of the Trinity: such is the doctrine of St. John 
of the Cross. Dionysius the Carthusian gives the same 
teaching. . . . This is . . . why we believe that, no matter how 
high a mystical experience springing from a merely implicit 
supernatural faith may rise outside the visible membership in 
the Church of the Incarnate Word, it never rises to this point.109 
 
Here Maritain affirms the primacy of non-visual experiences and conceptions 
of the Holy Trinity. It is only when the soul has endured the dark nights of the 
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senses and of the spirit that it is truly able, by a necessary apophasis of all 
knowledge and an absorption of its will into the will of God, to enter into the 
mysteries of Christianity and the life of God. This is in contradistinction to what 
one might think God is, one’s conception of God being permeated by images 
drawn from the imagination and always, as is the case with visionary 
experiences such as apparitions, embroiled in the complication of what the 
Church calls ‘discernment of spirits’: knowing where each given appearance 
of a supernatural reality comes from, and judging whether it is good or evil in 
disguise. The Infused-Poetic Contemplation of St. John of Cross, manifest in 
the two verses cited at the beginning of this chapter, leads Maritain to a non-
metaphysical understanding of the experience of the Holy Trinity in the spiritual 
marriage and the beatific vision. The language of the mystic, Maritain says, is 
‘necessarily other than the language of philosophy.’110 St. John of the Cross 
is not concerned with metaphysical or theological knowledge of God, nor really 
‘telling us what perfection is, as leading us to it’, being a ‘practitioner of 
wisdom.’ 111  In mystical experience of God, there is a stripping of all 
representational imagery, and as such, of the conception of God as mere 
presence, and the subject-object dichotomy. As Caputo says, ‘There is a 
question, not of looking at God, but of yielding to His embrace’.112 
 Can this be confirmed by those most influential in Maritain’s life and 
thought other than St. John of the Cross? Certainly Bloy, to whom Maritain 
owes his religious faith, uses visual imagery, but in a decidedly poetic fashion, 
according to the qualifications set out above. It need not be pointed out that 
Bloy was certainly not a metaphysician or philosopher. His prose does not 
make its way by means of ratio to logically necessary conclusions. Rather, as 
we have seen, Bloy’s prose is mystical, employing both mystical methods of 
expressing divine truth and mystical union, such as assertion, hyperbole, the 
symbolic, and mystery. Bloy, Maritain says, is a case in whom the vocations of 
the mystic and the poet converge, the writer’s soul enduring ‘the tears of a 
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most harsh mysticism in an atmosphere of violence and passion.’113 We recall 
that it was because Jacques and Raïssa Maritain read Bloy’s La Femme 
Pauvre that they wanted to meet Bloy. ‘Reading La Femme Pauvre’, Raïssa 
writes, ‘we passed through the literary form as the spirits, they say, pass 
through walls, to go directly not to the author but to the man, the man of faith 
illumined by rays of that strange thing, so unknown to us—Catholicism—and 
so to speak identified with it.’114 It was only years later that Martiain, on the 
advice of Raïssa, began to read Aquinas, and we have also seen that in the 
period immediately following his conversion to Catholicism, Maritain in fact 
exhibited an anti-philosophical strain.115 One is compelled to admit that Bloy’s 
influence on Maritain is decidedly non-ontotheological. But what about even 
before Maritain met Bloy? What led him to want to meet him? Before I 
approach this question in the next and final section, the place of Rouault’s 
paintings in Maritain’s thinking on mystical experience ought to be considered. 
 What are we to make of Rouault’s paintings? Is it the case that for 
Maritain, Rouault’s visual Christian art is of less mystical value than Bloy’s or 
St. John of the Cross’ mystical writings? It seems to me that because Maritain 
gives Rouault’s art such a place of prestige in his thought, and, as we have 
seen, it could be said that his paintings of the Cross and Passion of Christ have 
for Maritain a mystical value, this cannot be the case. What needs to be 
remembered, however, is that each painting is a visual sign of what is 
experienced in the depths of its mystery. Precisely insofar as Catholicism is a 
propositional faith, and God is believed to have become incarnate in Christ and 
suffered until undergoing death on the Cross, there is no question of Rouault’s 
paintings of Christ lacking any truth about God. But insofar as there is a 
mystical experience of God—if we assume that Rouault possessed something 
of Infused-Poetic Contemplation, but which we cannot tell from Maritain’s 
writings—that is the source of all mystical art, and that the Trinity itself cannot 
be captured in thought, it is not unreasonable to conclude that even in Rouault 
there would be a prior, non-representational experience of mystical union, 
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even as the Cross is the locus mysticus in his artworks. For this reason, 
Maritain says, St. John of the Cross calls the articles of faith ‘silvered surfaces’, 
containing within themselves ‘that same substance which we now believe, 
clothed and covered with the silver of faith, we shall behold and enjoy in the 
life to come, fully revealed and . . . stripped of this veil of silver, and in color as 
gold.’116  
 On the basis of reflecting on Maritain’s own reflections on the nature of 
mystical experience (seen in what he says about Bloy’s vocation of poet-
mystic, the mystical verses of St. John of the Cross wherein mystical union is 
described as a ‘breathing’, and the sleeping of the Shulamite in the Song of 
Songs as ‘contemplative rest’), as well as reflecting on what those most 
influential on Maritain had to say about mystical experience, we have 
determined two facts. The first is that Maritain privileges pre-metaphysical 
conceptions or suggestions of mystical union, and the second is that the pre-
metaphysical mystical union is one which there is both a presencing and 
concealment of Being, taken to be the Triune God in the highest kinds of 
mystical union in the spiritual marriage and the beatific vision. This, it might, 
be said, is illustrated best precisely by the ‘breathing’ between the human soul 
and the three divine Persons. When the dark night of the soul has come to its 
fulfilment, when the soul is dissolved such that the soul’s desire, cupio dissolvi 
et esse tecum, is felt and palpable, there an ‘the invasion of peace’117 into the 
soul as its responds to the divine initiative and acts through the will of the divine 
itself. Despite this, the dynamic, mystical communion of ‘coinherence’ at play 
in the divine and in mystical union withdraws from the soul’s understanding. 
For this reason, we recall, Maritain says that God ‘is actually known—while 
remaining unknown and inscrutable.’118 We have therefore finally arrived at a 
religious alethiology of mystical experience in Maritain, replete with a 
phenomenological description.  
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2. The Completion of Maritain’s Mystical Theology  
 
(i) From the Meaning of Being to Mysticism 
 
Before concluding, I want to ask: what is it that underlies this privileging of the 
pre-metaphysical in mystical experience in Maritain? What underlies the 
deeply buried beliefs which have required so much spade work to retrieve? 
‘Every great mystic, as every genius’, writes William Johnston, ‘is like a huge 
iceberg with only a fraction of its vast bulk protruding from the waters. Below 
the surface lies the great mass of tradition upon which the whole thing rests.’119 
In the introduction I described the change of direction in this study, from 
existential phenomenology to mystical experience as the most profound 
dimension of human existence, not as a break but a continuum, as following 
the movement one finds in Maritain’s life and work. Having now a full picture 
of Maritain’s mystical theology and knowing his privileging of mystical 
knowledge over metaphysical knowledge, we are now in a far better position 
to understand this immanent movement and determine how it stands in relation 
to the contemporary debate on the nature of mystical experience. 
 I have said that the intuition of Being—what Maritain will call esse—is 
evidently Maritain’s master concept, and as we know, this intuition of Being is 
Maritain’s radical reformulation of Bergson’s own intuition of the élan vital. But 
I have suggested that there is a more primordial, mystical experience that 
determines his life and philosophy, the ‘unthought’ which underlies Maritain’s 
life as a man and a philosopher but which, precisely as unthought, remains 
unarticulated—never, as Pattison says, ‘in the power of the thinker himself.’120 
In Heideggerian terms, ‘What we are really pursuing, then, is not him, not this 
thinker, not his articulated thought, but what he didn’t think, what, in 
withdrawing from him, called upon him to think.’121 
 Just what unthought mystical experience of Maritain is this? To answer 
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this question, I return to the story of the Maritains’ salvation from suicide to 
their conversion to Catholicism and probe the dynamic, or what I called the 
movement, that I believe was at work. Precisely insofar as that which is to be 
retrieved is the ‘unthought’ in a thinker, and can, as with Caputo’s recourse to 
the more famous reported mystical experience of Aquinas, have recourse to 
sources other than what the thinkers themselves write, I would like to return to 
two quotes from Raïssa Maritain from the time of their ‘metaphysical anguish’ 
which led the Maritains to make a suicide pact in 1902. The Maritains vowed 
to end their lives if they could not find meaning—or if meaning would not find 
them—within a year.   
 
Thus we decided for some time longer to have confidence in 
the unknown; we would extend credit to existence, look upon it 
as an experiment to be made, in the hope that to our ardent 
plea, the meaning of life would reveal itself, that new values 
would stand forth so clearly that they would enlist our total 
allegiance, and deliver us from the nightmare of a sinister and 
useless world.122 
 
From instinct we fought against a relativism that led nowhere, 
against a relationship to nothingness, for no absolute was 
admitted. Despite all that might have turned us from it, we 
persisted in seeking the truth—what truth?—in continuing to 
bear within ourselves the hope of the possibility of a full 
adherence to a fullness of being.123 
 
Maritain’s conception of mystical experience differs markedly from Heidegger’s 
Denken in virtue of the fact that the former refers to a communion of love that 
is made possible through an infusion of grace and a bestowal of the gifts of the 
Holy Spirit to the human soul undergoing the dark nights of the stripping of its 
will and its knowledge for the sake of its love for God. Nevertheless, what we 
see in Maritain’s earliest days, judging from the above two quotes, is nothing 
less than a modulation of Heidegger’s Gelassenheit as Jacques and Raïssa 
Maritain wait upon Being to disclose itself.  
 But we can also see that precisely insofar as Jacques and Raïssa 
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Maritain sought out communion with ultimately reality—what they will come to 
call God—that they sought in the structure of ultimate reality ‘values’ which 
would demand ‘total allegiance’ and would ‘deliver’ them from an 
overwhelming feeling of meaninglessness, the Maritains had to go beyond 
both Henri Bergson’s élan vital and Heidegger’s Denken. Bergson’s 
conception of ultimate reality was an impersonal force that, in the end, did not 
satiate their existential yearning for communion with that which is most 
transcendent and most meaning-giving. Heidegger’s Being is not a God and 
Denken is not a seeking of intimate communion with God. 
 This existential yearning for communion with ultimate reality, which is 
the ‘unthought’ in Maritain, led both the Maritains to those who would serve to 
reveal what became for them the character or qualities of ultimate reality, or 
Being. As far as Maritain’s life is concerned, rather than the doctrines 
contained within his writings, the first and most important ‘revealer of Being’—
that is, the concurrent meaning and infinite mystery of Being, which became 
known to them as Christianity—was Léon Bloy. The function of Bloy’s vocation 
of [P]oet-mystic with regard to Maritain was the revelation of Christian truth 
and the call to sainthood through love of God and suffering for God in what is 
nothing less than an apophatic stripping down of knowledge on the part of the 
human soul. Ascetic suffering is one way for the soul to participate in the 
redemptive work of the Cross of Christ.  
 Throughout Maritain’s life, from the sense of meaninglessness and the 
suicide pact that led to his conversion to Catholicism, to the very end of his life, 
we see the same love and suffering in the communion between his own human 
soul and the Christian God, reflected in his mystical theology. ‘Christianity’, 
Maritain writes, ‘is a terrible mystery of suffering’124 of both God and human 
soul. But it is a mystical relationship of suffering not for its own sake, but for 
the re-union between God and a humanity and a world whose existences are 
all too tainted by tragedy. And this suffering, says Maritain, can co-exist with 
peace.125 When the meaning of Being is love and we have journeyed to 
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highest peak of mystical union in this life, ‘The light of God-given contemplation 
is the ardor of love gleaming in the dark.’126 
 
(ii) Maritain and the Core/Contextualist Debate 
 
What does Maritain’s immanent mystical tendency toward communion with 
ultimate reality, with what he came to call God, say about the contemporary 
debate between ‘core’ and ‘contextualist’ theorists on the nature of mystical 
experience? I suggested in the introduction that Maritain’s mysticism is many-
layered and resistant to essentialization. If ‘core’ theorists posit an essentially 
ineffable common core that mystical experiences of mystics from all religious 
faiths share, Maritain’s conception of mystical union both does and does not 
fall into the ‘core’ category. Before his conversion to Catholicism, the divine 
reality that Maritain seeks is unknown and ineffable, to be sure (‘we persisted 
in seeking the truth—what truth?’), but the relationship that characterizes what 
can now be regarded as a mystical seeking on the part of Maritain is one of 
communion, and not, say, of an undifferentiated experience of cosmic 
consciousness.  
 As Maritain converts to Catholicism and the mystical communion with 
ultimate reality comes to be regarded at its highest modulation as the spiritual 
marriage between the human soul and the Persons of the Holy Trinity, the 
picture becomes even more complex. For we have seen that Maritain 
privileges poetic-mystical language over metaphysical language to refer to this 
mystical union in virtue of its absolute ineffability—which suggests that he 
might lean toward the ‘core’ theory, even if as a Catholic he regards the Trinity 
as that indefinable reality at the core of all mystical experience. But he also 
says that the mystical experience of the Trinity is what essentially differentiates 
supernatural mystical experience from all other kinds of mystical experience, 
even if a mystic (for example, of another religion or an allegedly ‘atheist’ person 
of good moral character) has an implicit faith in God, writing that ‘no matter 
how high a mystical experience springing from a merely implicit supernatural 
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faith may rise outside the visible membership in the Church of the Incarnate 
Word, it never rises to this point.’127  
 As I have consistently argued, Maritain, like Aquinas, is a Catholic most 
fundamentally, and I suggest that for Maritain there is no conflict between 
ineffable mystical experiences and affirmative propositions about the nature of 
the Christian God. This is intelligible only if we place Maritain in his 
philosophical and religious context as a Catholic and a Thomist philosopher. 
He stands in a long line of apophatic thinkers and mystics, as is evident from 
his references to St. John of the Cross and Pseudo-Dionysius. When Yves 
Simon says that Maritain is acquainted with Aquinas and St. John of the Cross 
equally well, it is important to remember that both stand firmly in the Dionysian 
tradition. William Johnston, a translator of The Cloud of Unknowing, whose 
anonymous author also draws upon Pseudo-Dionysius, is a helpful guide when 
it comes to situating Maritain’s complex mystical theology within the wider 
Western mystical tradition. 
 Johnston posits that for the Catholic tradition there are three kinds of 
wisdom, corresponding to three types of contemplation. First, there is 
‘metaphysical’ wisdom, which encompasses natural theology and analogical 
knowledge of God, and which corresponds to the metaphysical contemplation 
of Being—to the one ‘One of the philosophers’, as Maritain says. Second, there 
is the ‘wisdom of faith’, which, ‘being built on Divine Revelation, rises above 
natural knowledge’,128 and which penetrates the mysteries of revelation, such 
as the Passion and Resurrection of Christ. The wisdom of faith corresponds to 
contemplation of the mysteries of faith, such as those mentioned. Maritain calls 
this ‘acquired contemplation’ or ‘meditation’. Finally, there is ‘mystical’ wisdom, 
which is ‘experimental knowledge of God as He is in Himself’,129 which, as we 
have seen in Maritain (and with whom Johnston is in complete agreement), is 
the highest kind of wisdom. It corresponds to infused contemplation, whose 
nature I need not rehearse.130  
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 Now, the fact that these types of wisdom and contemplation form a 
hierarchy does not mean they are in isolation from or even opposed to one 
another. ‘The point to be stressed here, however,’ says Johnston, ‘is that in 
the Catholic tradition all three kinds of knowledge or wisdom are valid and their 
object is precisely the same; so far from contradicting, they complement one 
another.’131 One can see it that if it were otherwise, for example, that in order 
for the Catholic mystic to be a ‘genuine’ mystic they would, in William James’ 
terms, have to ‘to ignore the institutional branch entirely’,132 they would have 
to reject the first two kinds of wisdom and their corresponding kinds of 
contemplation—and in so doing, cease to be a Catholic. ‘The traditional 
position’, continues Johnston, ‘was that there is only one truth, known 
imperfectly by reason, more clearly by faith, more clearly still by mystical 
experience, and perfectly in the beatific vision. Faith does not contradict 
reason or revelation but builds on them. Far from being a rejection of dogma, 
it is a supraconceptual penetration of those mysteries that are formulated 
conceptually (and, for that reason, imperfectly) in dogma.’ There is, then, a 
unity of truth even its diversification—whether mystical, poetic, theological, 
dogmatic, or metaphysical. This is, indeed, Maritain’s point when he sets out 
the ‘degrees’ of knowledge, beginning with metaphysical wisdom before 
proceeding to mystical wisdom. It is worth pointing out that in the preface of 
that colossal work of the same name Maritain writes in this connection: ‘“No 
one,” says Tauler, understands true distinction better than they who have 
entered into unity.” So, too, no one truly knows unity who does not also know 
distinction.’133  
 But how are we to reconcile positive belief in a Trinitarian God with the 
radical apophaticism that Maritain claims is necessary for mystical union? 
Johnston explains that ‘Almost all the greatest mystics describe the peak-point 
of their experience as some kind of fruition of that mystery expressed in the 
central Christian dogma: the Blessed Trinity . . . Dionysius himself begins his 
Mystica theologica with a Trinitarian invocation, and this Trinitarian line is 
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followed by Eckhart, Ruysbroeck, and the other apophatic mystics.’ 134  In 
complete congruence with what Maritain and St. John of the Cross teach, it is 
only after a prolonged period of ascetic practice and meditation on the 
mysteries of Christ, says Johnston, that the mystic would be ‘permitted to 
abandon discursive meditation and allow one’s mind and heart to be filled with 
the dark prayer of silence’135—what Maritain, as we saw, calls the ‘prayer of 
the heart’.  
 There is, then, no conflict between the types of contemplation and 
wisdom for Maritain and, moreover, no conflict between the cataphatic and the 
apophatic. And it is by affirming that experience of the life of the Holy Trinity is 
the peak and distinguishing mark of truly supernatural mystical experience that 
Maritain affirms a hierarchy of religious truth and mystical experience, such 
that he does not fall into the category of a ‘core’ theorist. We have also seen 
throughout this study that Maritain makes the distinction between supernatural 
mystical experience per se on the one hand, and natural mysticism and 
multitudinous natural analogies of supernatural union (for example, 
‘metaphysical’ experiences, experiences of moral goodness, and experiences 
of the beautiful), on the other hand, giving us all the more reason to reject any 
claiming of Maritain by the ‘core’ theorist camp. 
 Does Maritain, then, fall into the category of the ‘contextualist’, 
according to whom the apparent diversity in manner and content of mystical 
experiences reveals their context-dependency, perhaps with the implication 
that mystical experiences are necessarily determined and relative to the 
religious, cultural and linguistic context in which they occur? 
 I would like to suggest that here things are equally complicated with 
Maritain. For Maritain’s immanent mystical tendency is clearly religious, 
consisting most basically in an existential yearning for communion with the 
divine which does indeed lend itself to Christian conceptions of mystical 
experience, precisely as union and not, say, cosmic consciousness. But we 
have seen that this very yearning toward communion with ultimate reality did 
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not arise from any Christian or a Catholic context, such as Maritain’s 
upbringing or his education (in fact, we recall that Maritain’s conversion to 
Catholicism had scandalized his anti-religious mother). Moreover, the mystical 
tendency toward communion with ultimate reality did not first manifest itself in 
Christian belief, but a period of discipleship of Henri Bergson. It was only 
later—through Léon Bloy—that Maritain became a Catholic, and so in this 
regard Bloy, as what I call a ‘revealer of Being’ and in the wider context of the 
sacramental life of the Catholic Church, only shapes Maritain’s conception of 
mystical union at a later point—which, as we have seen, is consistent with this 
more primordial existential, mystical yearning.  
 What, then, gave rise to such a mystical yearning of communion with 
ultimate reality in Maritain? Now we are in a position to discount the role of 
what would be the most obvious determining sources and influential people on 
Maritain, must we now grant the possibility of God Himself providing the 
spiritual impetus to Maritain, leading him to an ever-greater deepening of his 
mystical aspirations? Or is the question of the source of Maritain’s mystical 
aspirations the wrong question? For what leads individuals of any religious 
tradition or spiritual path to a particular mystical way may encompass 
everything from a chance encounter with a mystic or mystical text to personal 
temperament, which would require a different, and psychological, kind of 
analysis. And such an analysis may not, in the end, be successful in 
ascertaining the determining factors in mystical vocations. There are many 
different religions and spiritual paths which cannot be reduced to a common 
core and explained away. Analogously, at least, there are many kinds of 
flowers in a meadow, and they neither ask nor answer questions of why they 
are what they are. Perhaps in such a manner there are also many kinds of 
mystics, whose mystical callings deserve, like precious works of art, to be 
loved by simply letting them be. 
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